Advertising arbitrage
- Arbitrageurs with a short investment horizon gain from accelerating price discovery by advertising their private information. However, advertising many assets may overload investors' attention, reducing the number of informed traders per asset and slowing price discovery. So arbitrageurs optimally concentrate advertising on just a few assets, which they overweight in their portfolios. Unlike classic insiders, advertisers prefer assets with the least noise trading. If several arbitrageurs share information about the same assets, inefficient equilibria can arise, where investors' attention is overloaded and substantial mispricing persists. When they do not share, the overloading of investors' attention is maximal.
Author: | Sergey Kovbasyuk, Marco Pagano |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-534594 |
URL: | https://ssrn.com/abstract=3660945 |
Parent Title (English): | Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 641 |
Series (Serial Number): | CFS working paper series (641) |
Publisher: | Center for Financial Studies |
Place of publication: | Frankfurt, M. |
Document Type: | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Year of Completion: | 2020 |
Year of first Publication: | 2020 |
Publishing Institution: | Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg |
Release Date: | 2020/07/27 |
Tag: | advertising; limited attention; limits to arbitrage; price discovery |
Issue: | July 15, 2020 |
Page Number: | 34 |
HeBIS-PPN: | 467547130 |
Institutes: | Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Center for Financial Studies (CFS) | |
Dewey Decimal Classification: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
Sammlungen: | Universitätspublikationen |
Licence (German): | Deutsches Urheberrecht |