Context-sensitivity and the Preface Paradox for credence

  • It’s intuitively plausible to suppose that there are many things that we can be rationally certain of, at least in many contexts. The present paper argues that, given this principle of Abundancy, there is a Preface Paradox for (rational) credence. Section 1 gives a statement of the paradox, discusses its relation to its familiar counterpart for (rational) belief, and points out the congeniality between Abundancy and broadly contextualist trends in epistemology. This leads to the question whether considerations of context-sensitivity might lend themselves to solving the Preface for credence. Sections 2 and 3 scrutinize two approaches in this spirit—one mimicking Hawthorne’s (2002) Semantic Contextualist approach to an epistemic version of the Preface, the other one analogous to Clarke’s (2015) Sensitivist approach to the doxastic version—arguing that neither approach succeeds as it stands.

Download full text files

Export metadata

Author:Dominik KaussORCiD
Parent Title (English):Synthese
Publisher:Springer Science + Business Media B.V.
Place of publication:Dordrecht [u.a.]
Document Type:Article
Date of Publication (online):2021/03/24
Date of first Publication:2021/03/24
Publishing Institution:Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Release Date:2023/03/21
Tag:Certainty; Closure; Consistency; Context-sensitivity; Probabilistic Coherence; Total Evidence
Page Number:18
First Page:7303
Last Page:7320
Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.
Institutes:Philosophie und Geschichtswissenschaften
Dewey Decimal Classification:1 Philosophie und Psychologie / 10 Philosophie / 100 Philosophie und Psychologie
Licence (German):License LogoCreative Commons - CC BY - Namensnennung 4.0 International