• Treffer 9 von 18
Zurück zur Trefferliste

Performance-sensitive debt - the intertwined effects of performance measurement and pricing grid asymmetry : [This version: September 8, 2014]

  • This paper studies the use of performance pricing (PP) provisions in debt contracts and compares accounting-based with rating-based pricing designs. We find that rating-based provisions are used by volatile-growth borrowers and allow for stronger spread increases over the credit period. Accounting-based provisions are employed by opaque-growth borrowers and stipulate stronger spread reductions. Further, a higher spread-increase potential in rating-based contracts lowers the spread at the loan’s inception and improves the borrower’s performance later on. In contrast, a higher spread-decrease potential in accounting-based contracts lowers the initial spread and raises the borrower’s leverage afterwards. The evidence indicates that rating-based contracts are indeed employed for different reasons than accounting-based contracts: the former to signal a borrower’s quality, the latter to mitigate investment inefficiencies.

Volltext Dateien herunterladen

Metadaten exportieren

Weitere Dienste

Teilen auf Twitter Suche bei Google Scholar
Metadaten
Verfasserangaben:Christina E. BannierORCiDGND, Markus Wiemann
URN:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-351088
URL:http://ssrn.com/abstract=2507707
DOI:https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2507707
Titel des übergeordneten Werkes (Englisch):Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 476
Schriftenreihe (Bandnummer):CFS working paper series (476)
Verlag:Center for Financial Studies
Verlagsort:Frankfurt, M.
Dokumentart:Arbeitspapier
Sprache:Englisch
Jahr der Fertigstellung:2014
Jahr der Erstveröffentlichung:2014
Veröffentlichende Institution:Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Datum der Freischaltung:20.10.2014
Freies Schlagwort / Tag:accounting data; collateral; credit ratings; performance pricing; performance-sensitive debt; underinvestment
Ausgabe / Heft:September 8, 2014
Seitenzahl:44
HeBIS-PPN:351156828
Institute:Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
DDC-Klassifikation:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
Sammlungen:Universitätspublikationen
Lizenz (Deutsch):License LogoDeutsches Urheberrecht