Screening and advising by a venture capitalist with a time constraint

  • This paper proposes an intertemporal model of venture capital investment with screening and advising where the venture capitalist´s time endowment is the scarce input factor. Screening improves the selection of firms receiving finance, advising allows firms to develop a marketable product, both have a variable intensity. In our setup, optimal linear contracts solves the moral hazard problem. Screening however asks for an entrepreneur wage and does not allow for upfront payments which would cause severe adverse selection. Project characteristics have implications for screening and advising intensity and the distribution of profits. Finally, we develop a formal version of the "venture capital cycle" by extending the basic setup to a simple model of venture capital supply and demand.

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Author:Martin D. Dietz
Parent Title (German):Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 2003,48
Series (Serial Number):CFS working paper series (2003, 48)
Document Type:Working Paper
Year of Completion:2003
Year of first Publication:2003
Publishing Institution:Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Release Date:2005/06/13
Tag:Venture capital; market structure; product development
GND Keyword:Risikokapital
Institutes:Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
Dewey Decimal Classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
Licence (German):License LogoDeutsches Urheberrecht