Venture capital exit rights
- Theorists argue that exit rights can mitigate hold-up problems in venture capital. Using a hand-collected data-set of venture capital contracts from Germany we show that exit rights are included more frequently in venture capital contracts when a hold-up problem associated with the venture capitalist's exit decision is likely. Examples include drag-along and tag-along rights. Additionally, we find that almost all exit rights are allocated to the venture capitalist rather than to the entrepreneur. In addition, we show that besides the basic hold-up mechanism there are other mechanisms such as ex-ante bargaining power and the degree of pledgeable income that drive the allocation of exit rights. JEL Classification: G24, G34, D80
| Verfasserangaben: | Carsten Bienz, Uwe WalzORCiDGND |
|---|---|
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-63764 |
| Titel des übergeordneten Werkes (Deutsch): | Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 2009,05 |
| Schriftenreihe (Bandnummer): | CFS working paper series (2009, 05) |
| Dokumentart: | Arbeitspapier |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Jahr der Fertigstellung: | 2009 |
| Jahr der Erstveröffentlichung: | 2009 |
| Veröffentlichende Institution: | Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg |
| Datum der Freischaltung: | 16.04.2009 |
| Freies Schlagwort / Tag: | Corporate Governance; Empirical Contract Theory; Exit Rights; Hold-up; Trade-sale Rights; Venture Capital |
| GND-Schlagwort: | Deutschland; Risikokapital; Vertrag |
| HeBIS-PPN: | 211775274 |
| Institute: | Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Center for Financial Studies (CFS) |
| DDC-Klassifikation: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
| Lizenz (Deutsch): |  Deutsches Urheberrecht |
