Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Working Paper (47)
- Part of Periodical (16)
- Article (1)
- Report (1)
Has Fulltext
- yes (65)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (65)
Keywords
- banking union (8)
- MREL (7)
- TLAC (7)
- bail-in (7)
- prudential supervision (7)
- BRRD (6)
- Bail-in (6)
- Financial Institutions (6)
- Banking Resolution (4)
- Banking Supervision (4)
Institute
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften (58)
- Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE) (56)
- Center for Financial Studies (CFS) (39)
- House of Finance (HoF) (35)
- Rechtswissenschaft (16)
- Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS) (9)
- Foundation of Law and Finance (4)
- Institut für sozial-ökologische Forschung (ISOE) (1)
- Institut für Ökologie, Evolution und Diversität (1)
The great financial crisis and the euro area crisis led to a substantial reform of financial safety nets across Europe and – critically – to the introduction of supranational elements. Specifically, a supranational supervisor was established for the euro area, with discrete arrangements for supervisory competences and tasks depending on the systemic relevance of supervised credit institutions. A resolution mechanism was created to allow the frictionless resolution of large financial institutions. This resolution mechanism has been now complemented with a funding instrument.
While much more progress has been achieved than most observers could imagine 12 years ago, the banking union remains unfinished with important gaps and deficiencies. The experience over the past years, especially in the area of crisis management and resolution, has provided impetus for reform discussions, as reflected most lately in the Eurogroup statement of 16 June 2022.
This Policy Insight looks primarily at the current and the desired state of the banking union project. The key underlying question, and the focus here, is the level of ambition and how it is matched with effective legal and regulatory tools. Specifically, two questions will structure the discussions:
What would be a reasonable definition and rationale for a ‘complete’ banking union? And what legal reforms would be required to achieve it?
Banking union is a case of a new remit of EU-level policy that so far has been established on the basis of long pre-existing treaty stipulations, namely, Article 127(6) TFEU (for banking supervision) and Article 114 TFEU (for crisis management and deposit insurance). Could its completion be similarly carried out through secondary law? Or would a more comprehensive overhaul of the legal architecture be required to ensure legal certainty and legitimacy?
European banks have substantial investments in assets that are
measured without directly observable market prices (mark-to-
model). Financial disclosures of these value estimates lack
standardization and are hard to compare across banks. These
comparability concerns are concentrated in large European
banks that extensively rely on level 3 estimates with the most
unobservable inputs. Although the relevant balance sheet
positions only represent a small fraction of these large banks’
total assets (2.9%), their value equals a significant fraction of core
equity tier 1 (48.9%). Incorrect valuations thus have a potential to
impact financial stability. 85% of these bank assets are under
direct ECB supervision. Prudential regulation requires value
adjustments that are apt to shield capital against valuation risk.
Yet, stringent enforcement is critical for achieving this objective.
This document was provided by the Economic Governance
Support Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.
The European Commission has published a Green Paper outlining possible measures to create a single market for capital in Europe. Our comments on the Commission’s capital markets union project use the functional finance approach as a starting point. Policy decisions, according to the functional finance perspective, should be essentially neutral (agnostic) in terms of institutions (level playing field). Our main angle, from which we assess proposals for the capital markets union agenda, are information asymmetries and the agency problems (screening, monitoring) which arise as a result. Within this perspective, we make a number of more specific proposals.
To ensure the credibility of market discipline induced by bail-in, neither retail investors nor peer banks should appear prominently among the investor base of banks’ loss absorbing capital. Empirical evidence on bank-level data provided by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority raises a few red flags. Our list of policy recommendations encompasses disclosure policy, data sharing among supervisors, information transparency on holdings of bail-inable debt for all stakeholders, threshold values, and a well-defined upper limit for any bail-in activity. This document was provided by the Economic Governance Support Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.
The publication of the Liikanen Group's final report in October 2012 was surrounded by high expectations regarding the implementation of the reform plans through the proposed measures that reacted to the financial and sovereign debt crises. The recommendations mainly focused on introducing a mild version of banking separation and the creation of the preconditions for bail-in measures. In this article, we present an overview of the regulatory reforms, to which the financial sector has been subject over the past years in accordance with the concepts laid out in the Liikanen Report. It becomes clear from our assessment that more specific steps have yet to be taken before the agenda is accomplished. In particular, bail-in rules must be implemented more consistently. Beyond the question of the required minimum, the authors develop the notion of a maximum amount of liabilities subject to bail-in. The combination of both components leads to a three-layer structure of bank capital: a bail-in tranche, a deposit-insured bailout tranche, and an intermediate run-endangered mezzanine tranche. The size and treatment of the latter must be put to a political debate that weighs the costs and benefits of a further increase in financial stability beyond that achieved through loss-bearing of the bail-in tranche.
According to the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), introduced as a lesson from the recent financial crisis, the losses a failing bank incurred should generally be borne by its investors. Before a minimum bail-in has occurred, government money can only be injected in emergency cas-es to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy and to preserve financial stability. This policy letter argues that in case of the Italian Bank Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), which the Italian gov-ernment currently plans to bail out, a resolution would most likely not cause such a systemic event. A bailout contrary to the existing rules will lead to a mispricing of bank capital and retard the re-structuring of the European banking sector, the authors write. They appeal to the European Central Bank, the Systemic Risk Board and the EU Commission to follow the rules as the test-case MPS will have a direct impact on the credibility of the new BRRD regime and the responsible institutions.
An important prerequisite for the efficiency of bail-in as a regulatory tool is that debt holders are able to bear the cost of a bail-in. Examining European banks’ subordinated debt we caution that households may be investors in bail-in able bonds. Since households do not fulfil the aforementioned prerequisite, we argue that European bank supervisors need to ensure that banks’ bail-in bonds are held by sophisticated investors. Existing EU market regulation insufficiently addresses mis-selling of bail-in instruments.
Bank regulators have the discretion to discipline banks by executing enforcement actions to ensure that banks correct deficiencies regarding safe and sound banking principles. We
highlight the trade-offs regarding the execution of enforcement actions for financial stability. Following this we provide an overview of the differences in the legal framework governing supervisors’ execution of enforcement actions in the Banking Union and the United States. After discussing work on the effect of enforcement action on bank behaviour and the real economy, we present data on the evolution of enforcement actions
and monetary penalties by U.S. regulators. We conclude by noting the importance of supervisors to levy efficient monetary penalties and stressing that a division of competences among different regulators should not lead to a loss of efficiency regarding
the execution of enforcement actions.