Rechtswissenschaft
Refine
Year of publication
- 2022 (27) (remove)
Document Type
- Working Paper (20)
- Contribution to a Periodical (5)
- Book (1)
- Doctoral Thesis (1)
Language
- English (15)
- German (11)
- Multiple languages (1)
Has Fulltext
- yes (27)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (27)
Keywords
- Digital Services Act (5)
- Big Data (2)
- Desinformation (2)
- Digitalisierung (2)
- Financial Regulation (2)
- Hassrede (2)
- NetzDG (2)
- Plattform (2)
- AI borrower classification (1)
- AI enabled credit scoring (1)
Institute
- Rechtswissenschaft (27)
- Foundation of Law and Finance (15)
- House of Finance (HoF) (15)
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften (15)
- Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE) (14)
- Center for Financial Studies (CFS) (13)
- Präsidium (5)
- Exzellenzcluster Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen (4)
- Gesellschaftswissenschaften (1)
Die digitale Revolution stellt viele traditionelle Industrien vor große Herausforderungen. Auf dem Finanzmarkt werden innovative Geschäftsmodelle geschaffen, die die Rahmenbedingungen, unter denen Finanzprodukte und -dienste angeboten werden, drastisch verändern. Infolgedessen entstehen rechtliche Unsicherheiten sowohl für die Marktakteure als auch für die Aufsicht. Diese Unsicherheiten weisen auf die Notwendigkeit hin, den Rechtsrahmen an die technologische und ökonomische Entwicklung anzupassen. Im Rahmen dieser Dissertation werden die Herausforderungen für das Aufsichts- und Wettbewerbsrecht untersucht, die die digitale Transformation des Finanzmarktes verursacht. Der Finanzmarkt wird vor allem durch die Entstehung von FinTechs, durch das Eintreten von BigTechs in den Finanzbereich und durch die Veränderung der Produkte und Dienstleistungen traditioneller Anbieter auf der Grundlage moderner Technologien transformiert. Die Arbeit gibt einen Überblick über die zentralen innovativen Geschäftsmodelle, der mit den zahlreichen praxisrelevanten Beispielen begleitet wird. Anschließend folgt eine Beurteilung des Umfanges und der Effizienz der vorhandenen und vorgeschlagenen aufsichtsrechtlichen Vorschriften. Diese Erkenntnisse dienen als Grundlage für die wettbewerbsrechtliche Analyse des Finanzmarktes mit dem Fokus auf die plattform- und algorithmenbasierten Geschäftsmodelle im zweiten Teil der Dissertation. Da werden wettbewerbsrechtliche Konstellationen betrachtet, die zwischen konkurrierenden innovativen Geschäftsmodellen entstehen. Die Verfasserin befasst sich mit der Problematik der Definition des relevanten Marktes bei den algorithmen- und plattformbasierten Geschäftsmodellen, der Beurteilung ihrer Marktmacht, den möglichen Auswirkungen der Netzwerkeffekte auf die mehrseitigen Plattformen. Ferner werden solche Aspekte wie Datenzugriff als wettbewerbsrechtlicher Faktor und die Rolle der Algorithmen für die Durchführung wettbewerbswidrigen Praktiken analysiert. Infolgedessen wird ein Überblick über mögliche kartellrechtliche Probleme gegeben, die im Rahmen der Digitalisierung im Finanzmarkt auftreten können, sowie die Vorstellungen darüber, wie sich Wettbewerbsfaktoren verändern sollten, wenn die Anwendung der traditionellen Konzepte des Wettbewerbsrechts nicht immer möglich oder sinnvoll ist. Es werden die Bereiche identifiziert, in denen das europäische und deutsche Wettbewerbsrecht derzeit nicht in der Lage ist, die von den innovativen Geschäftsmodellen stammenden Herausforderungen effektiv zu bewältigen. Im dritten Teil der Dissertation wird erörtert, wie sich das Aufsichts- und das Wettbewerbsrecht ergänzen und zusammen ein System der Ex-ante- und Ex-post-Regulierung bilden. Es wird dargestellt, wie die aufsichtsrechtlichen Anforderungen an die Finanzinstitute, FinTechs und BigTechs mit den ausgewählten Wettbewerbsergebnissen im Finanzsektor zusammenhängen. Darüber hinaus erklärt die Verfasserin, inwiefern einige aufsichtsrechtliche Vorschriften wettbewerbsnachteilig oder wettbewerbsfreundlich auswirken können und warum die Koordination zwischen den aufsichts- und wettbewerbsrechtlichen Instrumenten und Ansätzen essenziell ist. Schließlich werden die Vor- und Nachteile unterschiedlicher Optionen zur Regulierung innovativer Geschäftsmodelle auf dem Finanzmarkt auf einer abstrakteren Ebene erwogen.
Lack of privacy due to surveillance of personal data, which is becoming ubiquitous around the world, induces persistent conformity to the norms prevalent under the surveillance regime. We document this channel in a unique laboratory---the widespread surveillance of private citizens in East Germany. Exploiting localized variation in the intensity of surveillance before the fall of the Berlin Wall, we show that, at the present day, individuals who lived in high-surveillance counties are more likely to recall they were spied upon, display more conformist beliefs about society and individual interactions, and are hesitant about institutional and social change. Social conformity is accompanied by conformist economic choices: individuals in high-surveillance counties save more and are less likely to take out credit, consistent with norms of frugality. The lack of differences in risk aversion and binding financial constraints by exposure to surveillance helps to support a beliefs channel.
Supranational supervision
(2022)
We exploit the establishment of a supranational supervisor in Europe (the Single Supervisory Mechanism) to learn how the organizational design of supervisory institutions impacts the enforcement of financial regulation. Banks under supranational supervision are required to increase regulatory capital for exposures to the same firm compared to banks under the local supervisor. Local supervisors provide preferential treatment to larger institutes. The central supervisor removes such biases, which results in an overall standardized behavior. While the central supervisor treats banks more equally, we document a loss in information in banks’ risk models associated with central supervision. The tighter supervision of larger banks results in a shift of particularly risky lending activities to smaller banks. We document lower sales and employment for firms receiving most of their funding from banks that receive a tighter supervisory treatment. Overall, the central supervisor treats banks more equally but has less information about them than the local supervisor.
Resolving financial distress where property rights are not clearly defined: the case of China
(2022)
We use data on financially distressed Chinese companies in order to study a debt market where property rights are crudely defined and poorly enforced. To help with identification we use an event where a business-friendly province published new guidelines regarding the administration and enforcement of assets pledged as collateral. Although by no means a comprehensive reform of bankruptcy law or property rights, by instructing courts to enforce existing, albeit rudimentary, contractual rights the new guidelines virtually eliminated creditors runs and produced a sharp increase in the survival rate of financially-distressed companies. These changes illustrate how piecemeal reforms of property rights and their enforcement may have a significant impact on economic outcomes. Our analysis and results challenge the view that a fully fledged system of private property is a precondition for economic development.
The loan impairment rules recently introduced by IFRS 9 require banks to estimate their future credit losses by using forward-looking information. We use supervisory loan-level data from Germany to investigate how banks apply their reporting discretion and adjust their lending upon the announcement of the new rules. Our identification strategy exploits a cut-off for the level of provisions at the investment grade threshold based on banks’ internal rating of a borrower. We find that banks required to adopt the new rules assign better internal ratings to exactly the same borrowers compared to banks that do not apply IFRS 9 around this cut-off. This pattern is consistent with a strategic use of the increased reporting discretion that is inherent to rules requiring forward-looking loss estimation. At the same time, banks also reduce their lending exposure to exactly those borrowers at the highest risk of experiencing a rating downgrade below the cutoff. These loans would be associated with additional provisions in future periods, both in the intensive and extensive margin. The lending change thus mitigates some of the negative effects of increased reporting opportunism on banks’ crisis resilience. However, when these firms with internal ratings around the investment grade cut-off obtain less external funding through banks, the introduction of IFRS 9 will likely also be associated with real economic effects
Using the negotiation process of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), this paper studies the way regulators form their positions on regulatory issues in the process of international standard-setting and the consequences on the resultant harmonized framework. Leveraging on leaked voting records and corroborating them using machine learning techniques on publicly available speeches, we construct a unique dataset containing the positions of banks and national regulators on the regulatory initiatives of Basel II and III. We document that the probability of a regulator opposing a specific initiative increases by 30% if their domestic national champion opposes the new rule, particularly when the proposed rule disproportionately affects them. We find the effect is driven by regulators who had prior experience of working in large banks – lending support to the private-interest theories of regulation. Meanwhile smaller banks, even when they collectively have a higher share in the domestic market, do not have any impact on regulators’ stand – providing little support to public-interest theories of regulation. Finally, we show this decision-making process manifests into significant watering down of proposed rules, thereby limiting the potential gains from harmonization of international financial regulation.
We employ a proprietary transaction-level dataset in Germany to examine how capital requirements affect the liquidity of corporate bonds. Using the 2011 European Banking Authority capital exercise that mandated certain banks to increase regulatory capital, we find that affected banks reduce their inventory holdings, pre-arrange more trades, and have smaller average trade size. While non-bank affiliated dealers increase their market-making activity, they are unable to bridge this gap - aggregate liquidity declines. Our results are stronger for banks with a higher capital shortfall, for non-investment grade bonds, and for bonds where the affected banks were the dominant market-maker.
Das Forschungsprojekt KviAPol (Körperverletzung im Amt durch Polizeibeamte und -beamtinnen) untersucht polizeiliche Gewaltanwendungen, die aus Sicht der Betroffenen rechtswidrig waren, mittels quantitativer Online-Befragung sowie die polizeiliche, justizielle und zivilgesellschaftliche Perspektive auf rechtswidrige Polizeigewalt und deren Aufarbeitung in Deutschland mittels qualitativer Interviews. Zum Team gehören die Wissenschaftlichen Mitarbeiterinnen Laila Abdul-Rahman, Hannah Espín Grau und Luise Klaus sowie Prof. Dr. Tobias Singelnstein, der die Projektleitung innehat.
Search costs for lenders when evaluating potential borrowers are driven by the quality of the underwriting model and by access to data. Both have undergone radical change over the last years, due to the advent of big data and machine learning. For some, this holds the promise of inclusion and better access to finance. Invisible prime applicants perform better under AI than under traditional metrics. Broader data and more refined models help to detect them without triggering prohibitive costs. However, not all applicants profit to the same extent. Historic training data shape algorithms, biases distort results, and data as well as model quality are not always assured. Against this background, an intense debate over algorithmic discrimination has developed. This paper takes a first step towards developing principles of fair lending in the age of AI. It submits that there are fundamental difficulties in fitting algorithmic discrimination into the traditional regime of anti-discrimination laws. Received doctrine with its focus on causation is in many cases ill-equipped to deal with algorithmic decision-making under both, disparate treatment, and disparate impact doctrine. The paper concludes with a suggestion to reorient the discussion and with the attempt to outline contours of fair lending law in the age of AI.
We investigate the impact of uneven transparency regulation across countries and industries on the location of economic activity. Using two distinct sources of regulatory variation—the varying extent of financial-reporting requirements and the staggered introduction of electronic business registers in Europe—, we consistently document that direct exposure to transparency regulation is negatively associated with the focal industry’s economic activity in terms of inputs (e.g., employment) and outputs (e.g., production). By contrast, we find that indirect exposure to supplier and customer industries’ transparency regulation is positively associated with the focal industry’s economic activity. Our evidence suggests uneven transparency regulation can reallocate economic activity from regulated toward unregulated countries and industries, distorting the location of economic activity.