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In Deutschland wird intensiv über die Gefahr einer Deindustrialisierung diskutiert. Steigende Energie- und Arbeitskosten auf international höchstem Niveau, hohe Steuerbelastungen, eine überbordende Regulierung sowie Defizite bei analoger und digitaler Infrastruktur lassen befürchten, dass der Wirtschaftsstandort Deutschland ins Hintertreffen gerät. Viele Unternehmen, insbesondere der energieintensiven Industrie, warnen vor einem Verlust an internationaler Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und erwägen oder vollziehen bereits Produktionsverlagerungen an günstigere Standorte im Ausland.
Vor diesem Hintergrund untersucht der Kronberger Kreis, wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Stiftung Marktwirtschaft, was zu tun und was zu unterlassen ist, um die wirtschaftlichen Standortbedingungen in Deutschland wieder zu verbessern. Dabei werden aktuell in der Diskussion stehende wirtschaftspolitische Konzepte wie die „Transformative Angebotspolitik“, der „Industriestrompreis“, das „Wachstumschancengesetz“ oder die Subventionierungen von Chip- und Halbleiterfabriken analysiert. Darüber hinaus unterbreitet der Kronberger Kreis eigene Reformempfehlungen für eine angebotsorientierte Wirtschaftspolitik, mit denen die Bundesregierung bestehende und neue Herausforderungen besser bewältigen könnte.
We contribute to the debate about the future of capital markets and corporate finance, which has ensued against the background of a significant boom in private markets and a corresponding decline in the number of firms and the amount of capital raised in public markets in the US and Europe.
Our research sheds light on the fluctuating significance of public and private markets for corporate finance over time, and challenges the conventional view of a linear progression from one market to the other. We argue instead that a more complex pattern of interaction between public and private markets emerges, after taking a long-term perspective and examining historical developments more closely.
We claim that there is a dynamic divide between these markets, and identify certain factors that determine the degree to which investors, capital, and companies gravitate more towards one market than the other. However, in response to the status quo, other factors will gain momentum and favor the respective other market, leading to a new (unstable) equilibrium. Hence, we observe the oscillating domains of public and private markets over time. While these oscillations imply ‘competition’ between these markets, we unravel the complementarities between them, which also militate against a secular trend towards one market. Finally, we examine the role of regulation in this dynamic divide as well as some policy implications arising from our findings.
Industry concentration and markups in the US have been rising over the last 3-4 decades. However, the causes remain largely unknown. This paper uses machine learning on regulatory documents to construct a novel dataset on compliance costs to examine the effect of regulations on market power. The dataset is comprehensive and consists of all significant regulations at the 6-digit NAICS level from 1970-2018. We find that regulatory costs have increased by $1 trillion during this period. We document that an increase in regulatory costs results in lower (higher) sales, employment, markups, and profitability for small (large) firms. Regulation driven increase in concentration is associated with lower elasticity of entry with respect to Tobin's Q, lower productivity and investment after the late 1990s. We estimate that increased regulations can explain 31-37% of the rise in market power. Finally, we uncover the political economy of rulemaking. While large firms are opposed to regulations in general, they push for the passage of regulations that have an adverse impact on small firms.