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• Parents with and without migration background differ in educational knowledge.
• Parents with migration background have less educational knowledge on average.
• Variations in educational knowledge by immigrant groups.
• Social and cultural resources are central to explaining knowledge differences.
• Acculturation strategies prove to be of little relevance.
Abstract
Although extant research persistently highlights the importance of information for educational decision-making, better understanding the existence of, and the underlying reasons for, informational differences between immigrant and non-immigrant parents is important. This study examines the differences in the level of information between immigrant and non-immigrant parents of third graders just before they make probably their most important educational decision in the German education system. We draw on approaches highlighting the importance of resources and parents’ acculturation to explain the informational differences between immigrant and non-immigrant parents. Employing linear regression and probability models on data from the National Educational Panel Study in Germany (N = 3961), we demonstrate that all immigrant groups, particularly those from Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East, and northern Africa, are significantly less informed than parents without own immigration experience. This result is evident both in our overall test and in various domains of the test, which analyze different aspects of information relevant to parents’ educational decision-making. Furthermore, different endowments with social and cultural capital largely explain the informational differences between parents with and without an immigrant background. In contrast, different acculturation strategies are almost negligible in explaining the differences in the level of information. Our findings provide important insights for research on migration-related inequalities in educational decision-making and for developing interventions to improve migrant parents’ ability to make well-informed and thus intended educational decisions.
The aim of this paper is to take a fresh look at a discussion about the distinct existences argument that took place between David Armstrong and Frank Jackson more than 50 years ago. I will try to show that Armstrong’s argument can be successfully defended against Jackson’s objections (albeit at the price of certain concessions concerning Armstrong’s view on the meaning of psychological terms as well as his conception of universals). Focusing on two counterexamples that Jackson put forward against Hume’s principle (which is central to Armstrong’s argument), I will argue that they are either compatible with Hume’s principle, or imply a false claim. I will also look at several other considerations that go against Hume’s principle, such as, for example, Kripke’s origin essentialism and counterexamples from aposteriori necessity.
I will argue for a novel variant of the knowledge norm for practical reasoning. In Sect. 2, I will look at current variations of a knowledge norm for practical reasoning and I will provide reasons to doubt these proposals. In Sects. 3 and 4, I develop my own proposal according to which knowledge is the norm of apt practical reasoning. Section 5 considers objections. Finally, Sect. 6 concerns the normativity of my proposed knowledge norm and its significance.
A decorated pair of trousers excavated from a well-preserved tomb in the Tarim Basin proved to have a highly informative life history, teased out by the authors – with archaeological, historical and art historical dexterity. Probably created under Greek influence in a Bactrian palace, the textile started life in the third/second century BC as an ornamental wall hanging, showing a centaur blowing a war-trumpet and a nearly life-size warrior of the steppe with his spear. The palace was raided by nomads, one of whom worked a piece of the tapestry into a pair of trousers. They brought no great luck to the wearer who ended his days in a massacre by the Xiongnu, probably in the first century BC. The biography of this garment gives a vivid glimpse of the dynamic life of Central Asia at the end of the first millennium.
This essay presents contributions by Jürgen Habermas and Paulo Freire for the constitution of critical-reflexive subjects and the implications in the teaching-research-extension processes in the field of Organizational Studies. We show that intersubjectivity and dialogicity are conditions for the understanding between subjects and it is precisely through these conditions that the subjects are constituted, in a process that is dialogical, pedagogical and political. Freire and Habermas offer elements to deconstruct dominant instrumental logic and provide the basis for the reconstruction of unprecedented-viable possibilities of ways of organizing and managing. Therefore, this article highlights the importance of Organizational Studies to broaden the focus of teaching-research-extension possibilities and directs them to a communicative and dialogic engagement, beyond the borders of universities. This reconstruction indicates that researchers participate in different public arenas, debate and build public problems, processes of resistance, visibility, and dramatization of problematic issues. Observing the contributions of Freire and Habermas, Organizational Studies as a field cannot be limited to developing a critique, from a distant point of view: it is necessary to co-participate, co-act, co-operate and co-construct with its public.
This reading of Pride and Prejudice and Mansfield Park suggests that the semantic framework of the novels is provided by the contrast between two meanings of the word consequence, the archaic meaning of social or emotional importance and the common and garden meaning of effect of a cause. It also suggests that the narrative structure of the novels is that of a game of consequences, a game that was played at the time of Jane Austen.
Day-to-day art criticism and art theory are qualitatively distinct. Whereas the best art criticism entails a closeness to its objects which is attuned to particularity, art theory inherently makes generalized claims, whether these claims are extrapolated from the process of art criticism or not. However, this article argues that these dynamics are effectively reversed if we consider the disparity between the criticism of so-called political art and attempts over the last century to elaborate theory which accounts for the political in art qua art. Art theory has located the political force of art precisely in the way that its particularity opposes or resists the status quo. Art criticism, on the other hand, tends to treat artwork as a text to be interpreted whose particularity may as well dissolve when translated into discourse. Drawing from the work of Theodor W. Adorno, this article argues that political art theory calls for art criticism more attuned to experience if it is to elucidate art’s critical valence.
I first encountered the work of Miriam Hansen as a graduate student in the mid-1990s when her book Babel and Babylon was the talk of the (at that time still fairly modest) film studies town – even though it was sitting somewhat uneasily on the fence. In fact, it was this position beyond the canonical that made the book so attractive in the first place. It did not fit into the raging debate of that time between psychosemiotics and neo-formalism, nor did it offer the (often too schematic and naive) way out within the cultural studies paradigm of empowering the individual or sub-culturally constituted groups.
The Methodological seminar was conducted by the scientific journal “Philosophy of Education” (Institute of Higher Education, National Academy of Educational Sciences of Ukraine). The participants of the seminar were Prof. Panos Eliopoulos (University of Peloponnese, Greece), Lyudmyla Gorbunova, Mykhailo Boychenko, Olga Gomilko, Mariia Kultaieva, Volodymyr Kovtunets, Sergiy Kurbatov, Anna Laktionova, Tetiana Matusevych, Natalia Radionova, Iryna Stepanenko, Maya Trynyak and Viktor Zinchenko. On March 30, 2016, a methodological seminar was conducted at the Institute of Higher Education NAES of Ukraine. This seminar was devoted to the discussion of educational problems in the area of mass culture, and relative opportunities for the development of individuality. The report «Mass culture, education and the perspective of individuality» was made by Panos Eliopulos, professor of Peloponnese University, a member of journal’s «Філософія освіти. Philosophy of Education” editorial board. The scientists from the Institute of Higher Education, Institute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Skovoroda National Pedagogical University of Kharkiv participated in this event. Designated issues were observed primarily from the point of view of the Frankfurt School representatives, as well as representatives of modern critical philosophy of education and critical pedagogy. It was emphasized that T.Adorno’s ideas and ideas of other Frankfurt School members, which were developed in the middle of the last century, continue to be relevant in current socio-cultural contexts. The technical rationalism which became the rationalism of dominance in the context of technological civilization, could not provide the way toward the liberation of man and the development of his or her individuality. Market society with its instrumental rationality leads to homogenization and standardization of mass culture and as a result, we have a semi-education, leading to destruction of personality and social pathologies. The panelists agreed that semi-education reflects the crisis of ideals of education and training as far as a suspension of human emancipation process. Due to suspension of the creative process of a person formation, replacing it by the processes of stereotyping based on mimetic rationality, culture itself loses creative potential. The process of degradation of education and culture in the semi-education eventually leads to its destruction at theoretical level and the elaboration of the practice of anti-education. Only through returning of the individual and maintaining his or her social importance due to the tools of holistic education it is possible to overcome such stereotyping. For Frankfurt School members, and those who share their ideals, true education in its meta-theoretical sense becomes the important factor, contributing to the emancipation of society and individual. This idea is particularly important in the context of contemporary challenges and threats from instrumentalization of approaches to the process of transformation of the Ukrainian culture and education.
This article claims that the institution of the market is structurally exploitative. It allows for exploitation, it encouragesactors to engage in it and it even pressurizes them to do so. Within Marxism, this claim is well known, but can it bedefended without strongly relying on Marxist concepts and arguments? I will answer in the affirmative and identify theforces of market competition to be a fundamental source of exploitative pressures...
The main sources for the discussion of the category “relation” were Aristotle’s Categories and Metaphysics. Before their translation into Arabic in the 8th and 9th centuries, Christian theologians and in their footsteps Syriac scholars considered Aristotle’s works to be a useful tool in Christological discussions. This article analyzes the category of relation and its development in Arabic-Islamic philosophy in authors such as Kindī and his student Aḥmad Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib as-Saraḫsī, Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Ghazālī, Ibn Rušd, the Sufi Ibn ʿArabī and others.
Sublimity, negativity, and architecture. An essay on negative architecture through Kant to Adorno
(2015)
Architecture defines and consumes people. It exposes them to a multitude of varieties of different aesthetic engagements. Architecture becomes a lived experience. However, this lived experience is always caught in the inner workings of the social and more specifically within cultural ideology. In modern capitalism, culture pervades every aspect of our lives. It shows its presence everywhere from our own homes to the public streets. Culture is everywhere, and architecture is a tool used for both the benefit and detriment of the “culture industry”. Kant speaks of the sublime as a profound moment of reason realizing its ability to overcome its own limits. In this experience is it possible to be completely ravaged and descend into hades and melancholy? Is there a beauty in this descent? More specifically, can architecture become banal or pedestrian, uplifting or depressing? According to Theodor Adorno, our subjectivity is defined by the constant dialectical struggle between freedom and unfreedom (among other things). It is realizing our freedom in the face of our unfreedom that makes us truly able to attain some form of resistance. The sublime experience can be transformed into a spirit of revelation and beautifully allow us to in a way resist the one-dimensional tendencies of modern capitalism. Architecture, which is immersed in our societal being and contributes to many of our own subjective unfreedoms, comes to define our lives as inhabited space. When does architecture produce a sublime experience? Can architecture’s authentic “aura” stand out amongst the reproduced city and produce a sublime feeling that can be a form of resistance against the culture industry? Does Grand Central Terminal provide the key to an architecturally sublime experience? Using dialectical experience and examining the sublime feeling (in a critique of the Kantian sublime) as the key to breaking through the culture industry’s banal architectural hold on our subjectivity, this essay will examine the experience of the sublime as a key to unfolding resistance in the face of the banality of modern architecture in the city and opening our minds to the Great Refusal through the exploration of Grand Central Terminal.
This essay reflects on the convergence between Jürgen Habermas’ work and the theoretical framework put forward by the Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt, arguing in favor of the characteristics of the Frankfurt school in Habermas and pointing out research possibilities in the field of Organizational Studies (OS). We discuss the essential theoretical aspects of the work by Horkheimer (1975) “Traditional and Critical Theory,” and produce a critique on the use of generational chronology as the main criterion for understanding the intellectual movement of the Frankfurt School. The methodology is based on the critique of the interpretation using the philosophical hermeneutics (RICOEUR, 1990) and observes the propositional nature of an interpretation offered in theoretical essays (MENEGUETTI, 2011). To support the provocative proposition of this work, we establish a dialogue with authors such as Bottomore (2001), Freitag (2004), Nobre (2004), and Melo (2013)) discussing a non-generational characterization of the Frankfurt School’s members and the proximity of Habermas in relation to the pioneer works on the Critical Theory. We believe that (i) the re-reading of the emancipatory purpose (HABERMAS, 2002); (ii) the deconstruction of the impartiality of the scientific knowledge (HABERMAS, 1987); (iii) and the incorporation of the philosophy of language into the Frankfurtian social criticism (HABERMAS, 2012) are important contributions of Habermas to the Frankfurt’s critical theory. As for a proposal for the field of organizational studies, this esseay concludes that recognizing Habermas as a Critical Theory scholar of the Frankfurt School may constitute a new research agenda for the field. The contribution of this essay lies in helping researchers in the field of Organizational Studies to understand Habermas’ work differently and not as a non-critical or utopian production. In this perspective, it is clear that Habermas’ intellectual production is politically engaged in contemporary social problems, which is a dimension neglected by the researchers of the field of Organizational Studies in Brazil.
The purpose of the text is to present an interpretation of Theodor Adorno’s critical reading of authors considered revisionists of Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic theory, particularly Karen Horney. We discuss critically Adorno’s favorable positioning to the Freudian conception of the individual psychic nucleus in contrast to the hasty sociologization of psychoanalysis practiced by the revisionism of Karen Horney. In the final part we try to show how the Adornian perspective ends up by making, in his own way, the same mistake of a hasty sociologization of psychoanalysis he imputed to the revisionists and advocates an theoretical emphasis on the sociological realm that seems also problematic.
This essay argues for the philosophical standing of Walter Benjamin’s early work and posits a deeper continuity between this early work as a philosopher and the subsequent development of his work as a writer. When these fragments are read in proper relation to each other, they reveal for the first time many of the key innovations of Benjamin as a philosopher, as well as his points of influence on Horkheimer and Adorno. His early ‘Program’ critiques the Enlightenment conception of experience as a means for gaining empirical knowledge, and announces the need for a new concept of experience. Benjamin follows through on this program with a method of philosophical enquiry that is by turns fragmentary and constellational, developing a series of provisional notions of experience, which form a constellation with one another: perception, mimesis, language as a medium of experience, observation and memory.
This article is an inquiry into the concept of metaphysical experience through a joint discussion of two authors and philosophers with different approaches that nevertheless converge in the reclamation of the concept and rely both on the experience of death as an example. In both cases, the authors are guided by the central problem of how not to relinquish metaphysical experience to unscrutinized immediacy or a powerful conversion which enjoins subjection, putting it in contact with aesthetics and ethics at once. Theodor Adorno situates metaphysical experience as a problem of philosophy of history and devotes attention to the contemporary possibility of experiences that evoke transcendence. The transformations he identifies in the concept also lead him to propose art as a domain where metaphysical experience is alive. The implicit personal investment Adorno makes is much more clear in Lacoue-Labarthe who, in a dialogue with Maurice Blanchot, shows the experience as deeply bound up with literature and its links to subjectivity. The article argues that the main difference between the two approaches is modal and temporal from the side of the object, aside from the different modes of interrogation recognized with the labels deconstruction and critical theory.
This essay focuses on the relationship between solipsism and aesthetic subjectivity, as outlined in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory. As he mentions, according to dialectical materialism, solipsism gained actuality within (radical) modernism as general “standpoint”, realized in atomistic society through “reified division of labor”. This also applies to artistic production. At the same time, solipsism constitutes a long standing philosophical hypothesis, which concerns the truth value of perception, thus imitating the “subjective point of reference in art”. Therefore, Adorno’s brief statements on the relationship between epistemological solipsism and immanent artistic subjectivity designate different phenomena under the same heading; these concern sociological, cognitive and existential aspects of artistic creation and aesthetic experience, sedimented in the artwork’s content. However, he often undertakes abrupt conceptual transitions within them. In this essay, I mainly focus on the cognitive aspect, especially on the relationship between solipsism and art’s “subjective point of reference”. For this purpose, I reconstruct Adorno’s relevant ideas on the role of subjectivity within art and relate them to his elaborated analysis of the process of aesthetic experience. Finally, I scrutinize the value of this non-apodictic truth and its relationship to particular aspects of “truth-content” and to Adorno’s redemption of the artwork’s fragile ontological status, its semblance character.
The necessity of over-interpretation: Adorno, the essay, and the gesture of aesthetic experience
(2013)
This article is a discussion of Theodor W. Adorno’s comment, in the beginning of ‘The Essay as Form’, that interpretations of essays are over-interpretations. I argue that this statement is programmatic, and should be understood in the light of Adorno’s essayistic ideal of configuration, his notion of truth, and his idea of the enigmatic character of art. In order to reveal how this over-interpreting appears in practice, I turn to Adorno’s essay on Kafka. According to Adorno, the reader of Kafka is caught in an aporia: Kafka’s work cannot be interpreted, yet every single sentence calls for interpretation. This paradox is related to the gestures and images in Kafka’s work: like Walter Benjamin, Adorno means that they contain sedimented, forgotten experiences. Instead of interpreting these images, Adorno visualizes the experiences indirectly by presenting images of his own. His own essay becomes gestural.
‘Being with oneself in the other’ is a well-known formula that Hegel uses to characterize the basic relation of subjective freedom. This phrase points to the fact that subjects can only come to themselves if they remain capable of going beyond themselves. This motif also plays a significant role in Hegel’s philosophy of art. The article further develops this motif by exploring the extent to which this polarity of selfhood and otherhood is also characteristic of states of aesthetic freedom. It does not offer an exegesis of Hegel’s writings, but attempts to remain as close as possible to the spirit of Hegel’s philosophy – with some help from Kant and Adorno. The argument begins with some key terms on the general state of subjective freedom in order to distinguish it from the particular role of aesthetic freedom and then, finally, drawing again on Hegel, works out the sense in which aesthetic freedom represents an important variant of freedom.