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It’s intuitively plausible to suppose that there are many things that we can be rationally certain of, at least in many contexts. The present paper argues that, given this principle of Abundancy, there is a Preface Paradox for (rational) credence. Section 1 gives a statement of the paradox, discusses its relation to its familiar counterpart for (rational) belief, and points out the congeniality between Abundancy and broadly contextualist trends in epistemology. This leads to the question whether considerations of context-sensitivity might lend themselves to solving the Preface for credence. Sections 2 and 3 scrutinize two approaches in this spirit—one mimicking Hawthorne’s (2002) Semantic Contextualist approach to an epistemic version of the Preface, the other one analogous to Clarke’s (2015) Sensitivist approach to the doxastic version—arguing that neither approach succeeds as it stands.
Drawing on insights found in both philosophy and psychology, this paper offers an analysis of hate and distinguishes between its main types. I argue that hate is a sentiment, i.e., a form to regard the other as evil which on certain occasions can be acutely felt. On the basis of this definition, I develop a typology which, unlike the main typologies in philosophy and psychology, does not explain hate in terms of patterns of other affective states. By examining the developmental history and intentional structure of hate, I obtain two variables: the replaceability/irreplaceability of the target and the determinacy/indeterminacy of the focus of concern. The combination of these variables generates the four-types model of hate, according to which hate comes in the following kinds: normative, ideological, retributive, and malicious.
Leibniz-Preisträger Hartmut Leppin setzt sich seinem neuen Buch mit einem Konzept auseinander, das die antike Wertschätzung der freien Rede in der Politik und im sozialen Leben zeigt, aber auch den religiösen Bereich prägte. Hartmut Leppin lehrt seit 2001 Alte Geschichte an der Goethe-Universität und ist Principal Investigator im Forschungsverbund »Dynamiken des Religiösen«.
