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Using hand-collected data on CEO appointments during shareholder activism campaigns, this study examines whether shareholder involvement in CEO recruiting affects frictions in CEO hiring decisions. The results indicate that appointments of CEOs who are recruited with shareholder activist influence are followed by more favorable stock market reactions and stronger profitability improvements than CEO appointments that also occur during activism campaigns but without the influence of activists. I find little evidence that shareholder activists increase hiring frictions by facilitating the recruiting of CEOs who will implement myopic corporate policies. Analyses of recruiting process characteristics reveal that activist influence is associated with more resources being dedicated to the CEO search process and with a higher propensity to recruit CEOs from outside the firm. These findings contribute to the CEO labor market literature, which tends to focus on the decision to remove incumbent CEOs but provides limited insights into CEO recruiting.
This paper argues that the key mechanisms protecting retail investors’ financial stake in their portfolio investments are indirect. They do not rely on actions by the investors or by any private actor directly charged with looking after investors’ interests. Rather, they are provided by the ecosystem that investors (are legally forced to) inhabit, as a byproduct of the mostly self-interested, mutually and legally constrained behavior of third parties without a mandate to help the investors (e.g., speculators, activists). This elucidates key rules, resolves the mandatory vs. enabling tension in corporate/securities law, and exposes passive investing’s fragile reliance on others’ trading.
Do required minimum distribution 401(k) rules matter, and for whom? Insights from a lifecylce model
(2021)
Tax-qualified vehicles helped U.S. private-sector workers accumulate $25Tr in retirement assets. An often-overlooked important institutional feature shaping decumulations from these retirement plans is the “Required Minimum Distribution” (RMD) regulation, requiring retirees to withdraw a minimum fraction from their retirement accounts or pay excise taxes on withdrawal shortfalls. Our calibrated lifecycle model measures the impact of RMD rules on financial behavior of heterogeneous households during their worklives and retirement. We show that proposed reforms to delay or eliminate the RMD rules should have little effects on consumption profiles but more impact on withdrawals and tax payments for households with bequest motives.
Expectations about economic variables vary systematically across genders. In the domain of inflation, women have persistently higher expectations than men. We argue that traditional gender roles are a significant factor in generating this gender expectations gap as they expose women and men to different economic signals in their daily lives. Using unique data on the participation of men and women in household grocery chores, their resulting exposure to price signals, and their inflation expectations, we document a tight link between the gender expectations gap and the distribution of grocery shopping duties. Because grocery prices are highly volatile, and consumers focus disproportionally on positive price changes, frequent exposure to grocery prices increases perceptions of current inflation and expectations of future inflation. The gender expectations gap is largest in households whose female heads are solely responsible for grocery shopping, whereas no gap arises in households that split grocery chores equally between men and women. Our results indicate that gender differences in inflation expectations arise due to social conditioning rather than through differences in innate abilities, skills, or preferences.
This paper aims at an improved understanding of the relationship between monetary policy and racial inequality. We investigate the distributional effects of monetary policy in a unified framework, linking monetary policy shocks both to earnings and wealth differentials between black and white households. Specifically, we show that, although a more accommodative monetary policy increases employment of black households more than white households, the overall effects are small. At the same time, an accommodative monetary policy shock exacerbates the wealth difference between black and white households, because black households own less financial assets that appreciate in value. Over multi-year time horizons, the employment effects are substantially smaller than the countervailing portfolio effects. We conclude that there is little reason to think that accommodative monetary policy plays a significant role in reducing racial inequities in the way often discussed. On the contrary, it may well accentuate inequalities for extended periods.
Our starting point is the following simple but potentially underappreciated observation: When assessing willingness to pay (WTP) for hedonic features of a product, the results of such measurement are influenced by the context in which the consumer makes her real or hypothetical choice or in which the questions to which she replies are set (such as in a contingent valuation analysis). This observation is of particular relevance when WTP regards sustainability, the “non-use value” of which does not derive from a direct (physical) sensation and where perceived benefits depend heavily on available information and deliberations. The recognition of such context sensitivity paves the way for a broader conception of consumer welfare (CW), and our proposed standard of “reflective WTP” may materially change the scope for private market initiatives with regards to sustainability, while keeping the analytical framework within the realm of the CW paradigm. In terms of practical implications, we argue, for instance, that actual purchasing decisions may prove insufficient to measure consumer appreciation of sustainability, as they may rather echo learnt but unreflected heuristics and may be subject to the specific shopping context, such as heavy price promotions. Also, while it may reflect current social norm, the latter may change considerably over time as more consumers adopt their behavior.
We present evidence on the way personal and institutional factors could together guide public company directors in decision-making concerning shareholders and stakeholders. In a sample comprising more than nine hundred directors originating from over fifty countries and serving in firms from twenty three countries, we confirm that directors around the world hold a principled, quasi-ideological stance towards shareholders and stakeholders, called shareholderism, on which they vary in line with their personal values. We theorize and find that in addition to personal values, directors’ shareholderism level associates with cultural norms that are conducive to entrepreneurship. Among legal factors, only creditor protection exhibits a negative correlation with shareholderism, while general legal origin and proxies for shareholder and employee protection are unrelated to it.
We show strong overall and heterogeneous economic incidence effects, as well as distortionary effects, of only shifting statutory incidence (i.e., the agent on which taxes are levied), without any tax rate change. For identification, we exploit a tax change and administrative data from the credit market: (i) a policy change in 2018 in Spain shifting an existing mortgage tax from being levied on borrowers to being levied on banks; (ii) some areas, for historical reasons, were exempt from paying this tax (or have different tax rates); and (iii) an exhaustive matched credit register. We find the following robust results: First, after the policy change, the average mortgage rate increases consistently with a strong – but not complete – tax pass-through. Second, there is a large heterogeneity in such pass-through: larger for borrowers with lower income, a smaller number of lending relationships, not working for the lender, or facing less banks in their zip-code, thereby suggesting a bargaining power mechanism at work. Third, despite no variation in the tax rate, and consistent with the non-full tax pass-through, the tax shift increases banks’ risk-taking. More affected banks reduce costly mortgage insurance in case of loan default (especially so if banks have weaker ex-ante balance sheets) and expand into non-affected but (much) ex-ante riskier consumer lending, experiencing even higher ex-post defaults within consumer loans.
This paper shows that judicial enforcement has substantial effects on firms’ decisions with regard to their employment policies. To establish causality, I exploit a reorganization of the court districts in Italy involving judicial district mergers as a shock to court productivity. I find that an improvement in enforcement, as measured by a reduction in average trial length, has a large, positive effect on firm employment. These effects are stronger in firms with high leverage, or that belong to industries more dependent on external finance and characterized by higher complementarity between labor and capital, consistent with a financing channel driving the results. Moreover, in presence of stronger enforcement, firms can raise more debt to dampen the impact of negative shocks and, in this way, reduce employment fluctuations.
We present novel evidence on the value of cross-border political access. We analyze data on meetings of US multinational enterprises (MNEs) with European Commission (EC) policymakers. Meetings with Commissioners are associated with positive abnormal equity returns. We study channels of value creation through political access in the areas of regulation and taxation. US enterprises with EC meetings are more likely to receive favorable outcomes in their European merger decisions and have lower effective tax rates on foreign income than their peers without meetings. Our results suggest that access to foreign policymakers is of substantial value for MNEs.
We investigate the impact of reporting regulation on corporate innovation. Exploiting thresholds in Europe’s regulation and a major enforcement reform in Germany, we find that forcing firms to publicly disclose their financial statements discourages innovative activities. Our evidence suggests that reporting regulation has significant real effects by imposing proprietary costs on innovative firms, which in turn diminish their incentives to innovate. At the industry level, positive information spillovers (e.g., to competitors, suppliers, and customers) appear insufficient to compensate the negative direct effect on the prevalence of innovative activity. The spillovers instead appear to concentrate innovation among a few large firms in a given industry. Thus, financial reporting regulation has important aggregate and distributional effects on corporate innovation.
Extant research shows that CEO characteristics affect earnings management. This paper studies how investors infer a specific characteristic of CEOs, namely moral commitment to honesty, from earnings management and how this perception – in conjunction with their own social and moral preferences – shapes their investment choices. We conduct two laboratory experiments simulating investment choices. Our results show that participants perceive a CEO to be more committed to honesty when they infer that the CEO engaged less in earnings management. For investment decisions, a one standard deviation increase in a CEO's perceived commitment to honesty compared to another CEO reduces the relevance of differences in the CEOs’ claimed future returns by 40%. This effect is most prominent among investors with a proself value orientation. To prosocial investors, their own honesty values and those attributed to the CEO matter directly, while returns play a secondary role. Overall, perceived CEO honesty matters to different investors for distinct reasons.
This paper documents that resource reallocation across firms is an important mechanism through which creditor rights affect real outcomes. I exploit the staggered adoption of an international convention that provides globally consistent strong creditor protection for aircraft finance. After this reform, country-level productivity in the aviation sector increases by 12%, driven mostly by across-firm reallocation. Productive airlines borrow more, expand, and adopt new technology at the expense of unproductive ones. Such reallocation is facilitated by (i) easier and quicker asset redeployment; and (ii) the influx of foreign financiers offering innovative financial products to improve credit allocative efficiency. I further document an increase in competition and an improvement in the breadth and the quality of products available to consumers.
In times of crisis, governments have strong incentives to influence banks’ credit allocation because the survival of the economy depends on it. How do governments make banks “play along”? This paper focuses on the state-guaranteed credit programs (SGCPs) that have been implemented in Europe to help firms survive the COVID 19 crisis. Governments’ capacity to save the economy depends on banks’ capacity to grant credit to struggling firms (which they would not be inclined to do spontaneously in the context of a global pandemic). All governments thus face the same challenge: How do they make sure that state guaranteed loans reach their desired target and on what terms? Based on a comparative analysis of the elaboration and implementation of SGCPs in France and Germany, this paper shows that historically-rooted institutionalized modes of coordination between state and bank actors have largely shaped the terms of the SGCPs in these two countries.
An important question in banking is how strict supervision affects bank lending and in turn local business activity. Supervisors forcing banks to recognize losses could choke off lending and amplify local economic woes. But stricter supervision could also change how banks assess and manage loans. Estimating such effects is challenging. We exploit the extinction of the thrift regulator (OTS) to analyze economic links between strict supervision, bank lending and business activity. We first show that the OTS replacement indeed resulted in stricter supervision of former OTS banks. Next, we analyze the ensuing lending effects. We show that former OTS banks increase small business lending by roughly 10 percent. This increase is concentrated in well-capitalized banks, those more affected by the new regime, and cannot be fully explained by a reallocation from mortgage to small business lending after the crisis. These findings suggest that stricter supervision operates not only through capital but can also correct deficiencies in bank management and lending practices, leading to more lending and a reallocation of loans.
n today’s world, the transfer of laws and regulations between different legal systems is commonplace. The global spread of stewardship codes in recent years presents a promising, but yet untested, terrain to explore the diffusion of such norms. This paper aims to fill this gap. Employing the method of content analysis and using information from 41 stewardship codes enacted between 1991 and 2019, we systematically examine the formal diffusion of these stewardship codes. While we find support for the diffusion story of the UK as a stewardship norm exporter, especially in former British colonies in Asia, we also find evidence of diffusion from transnational initiatives, such as the EFAMA and ICGN codes, as well as regional clusters. We also show that the UK Stewardship Code of 2020 now deviates from these current models; thus, it remains to be seen how far a second round of exportation of the revised UK model into the transnational arena will follow.
When parties present divergent econometric evidence, the court may view such evidence as contradictory and thus ignore it completely, without conducting closer analysis. We develop a simple method for distinguishing between actual and merely apparent contradiction based on the statistical concept of the “severity” of the furnished evidence. Again using “severity”, we also propose a method for reconciling divergent findings in instances of mere seeming contradiction. Our chosen application is that of damage estimation in follow-on cases.
This paper contributes to the debate on the adequate regulatory treatment of non-bank financial intermediation (NBFI). It proposes an avenue for regulators to keep regulatory arbitrage under control and preserve sufficient space for efficient financial innovation at the same time. We argue for a normative approach to supervision that can overcome the proverbial race between hare and hedgehog in financial regulation and demonstrate how such an approach can be implemented in practice. We first show that regulators should primarily analyse the allocation of tail risk inherent in NBFI. Our paper proposes to apply regulatory burdens equivalent to prudential banking regulation if the respective transactional structures become only viable through indirect or direct access to (ad hoc) public backstops. Second, we use insights from the scholarship on regulatory networks as communities of interpretation to demonstrate how regulators can retrieve the information on transactional innovations and their risk-allocating characteristics that they need to make the pivotal determination. We suggest in particular how supervisors should structure their relationships with semi-public gatekeepers such as lawyers, auditors and consultants to keep abreast of the risk-allocating features of evolving transactional structures. Finally, this paper uses the example of credit funds as non-bank entities economically engaged in credit intermediation to illustrate the merits of the proposed normative framework and to highlight that multipolar regulatory dialogues are needed to shed light on the specific risk-allocating characteristics of recent contractual innovations.
Venture capital-backed firms, unavoidable value-destroying trade sales, and fair value protections
(2020)
This paper investigates the implications of the fair value protections contemplated by the standard corporate contract (i.e., the standard contract form for which corporate law provides) for the entrepreneur–venture capitalist relationship, focusing, in particular, on unavoidable value-destroying trade sales. First, it demonstrates that the typical entrepreneur–venture capitalist contract does institutionalize the venture capitalist’s liquidity needs, allowing, under some circumstances, for counterintuitive instances of contractually-compliant value destruction. Unavoidable value-destroying
trade sales are the most tangible example. Next, it argues that fair value protections can prevent the entrepreneur and venture capitalist from allocating the value that these transactions generate as they would want. Then, it shows that the reality of venture capital-backed firms calls for a process of adaptation of the standard corporate contract that has one major step in the deactivation or re-shaping of fair value protections. Finally, it argues that a standard corporate contract aiming to promote social welfare through venture capital should feature flexible fair value protections
The article traces and analyzes the negative globality of pandemic fears. It follows them through literary texts, psychological theories of individual and collective fears as well as legal documents. Rather than treating fears as law’s other, notably pandemic fears are included in the controversial discussion on how law protects (or should protect) peoples’ freedom in a pandemic. In closing, the article presents different forms of fear defense and fear denial such as conspiracy myths.
In diesem Text werden, ausgehend von der Unterscheidung von Autorität und Autoritarismus, zunächst Entwicklungen im Gefahrenabwehrrecht (Polizeirecht) rekonstruiert, die sich autoritär kennzeichnen lassen. Die Entfesselung des (rechtsstaatlich gebändigten) Leviathan wird dann weiterverfolgt im Recht des Infektionsschutzes. Der Fokus liegt hier auf den anti-corona Gesetzen zum Schutz der Bevölkerung der Jahre 2020 und 2021. In einer Art Gegenprobe wird der infektionsschutzrechtliche Autoritarismus daraufhin überprüft, ob er alternativlos war, problemlos auf die rechtsstaatliche Spur zurückgeführt werden oder sich als demokratisches Gemeinschaftsprojekt interpretieren lassen könnte.
In Spätmittelalter und früher Neuzeit spielten Juristen bei der Pestbekämpfung eine wachsende Rolle: Während die Mediziner darüber stritten, ob die Körpersäfte schuld waren an der Ausbreitung der Seuche oder der Kontakt mit Erkrankten, organisierten juristisch gebildete Amtsträger für ihre Obrigkeiten eine beispiellose Politik staatlicher Intervention. Diese Strategie war zwar erfolgreich, zuweilen jedoch auch gnadenlos.
Private equity has grown remarkably in the last 30 years. Given its rise to prominence, exceptional profitability and a more prolific and publicly visible buyout activity, regulation in the private equity space seemed inevitable. The 2007 global financial crisis furnished an opportunity to doubt the industry’s role and magnify the key concerns, providing momentum for calls to regulate the industry more aggressively. Ultimately, the regulatory change came from the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD), which has been described as one of the most rigorously debated and controversial pieces of financial regulation to ever emerge from the European Union (EU).
The AIFMD is unique and unprecedented, yet there has been very little written about it in the context of private equity. Therefore, this thesis makes a contribution to this area of research by examining the implications of AIFMD for private equity and arguing that this EU Directive has a re-shaping effect on the industry that inevitably marks the end of the light-touch regulation in this area. Whilst the desire of policymakers to act and intervene decisively during market
downturns is understandable, there is a risk that the response may not be appropriate and result in a crisis-induced over-reaction.
This thesis demonstrates, amongst other things, that the AIFMD has created a particularly
complex regulatory regime which for the hitherto unregulated or lightly regulated fund managers has had a significant effect in the EU and beyond. Examples of the most impactful
provisions relate to authorisation, marketing, depositaries, acquisition of control, remuneration, and transparency and disclosure. The implication are wide-ranging, and there is a clear conflict between the opportunities (e.g. EU passport, AIFMD as a global brand) and threats (e.g. excessive compliance costs, exodus of fund managers from the EU), which depend on a firm’s size, domicile and the gap needed to be aligned between the pre- and post-AIFMD regime.
Although there will be no stark triumph of one position over another in the assessment of the AIFMD until all of its elements are fully implemented, overall the impact of the Directive has been material, requiring substantial work to comply with (or adapt to) the requirements, which in some cases are not only particularly onerous and costly, but also a bit misguided, discouraging, or fairly irrelevant.
This article is directed towards addressing the employment related issues encountered by female workers in the gig economy in the EU. It revolves around analysing ‘the switch’ from the traditional labour market to the platform economy. It subsequently explains, by drawing comparisons, that the issues of gender inequality in the brick and mortar world are still prevalent in world of the digital platform. In fact, new challenges have emerged which are specifically related to the gig economy. Female workers are now affected by the inherent bias of algorithms. Moreover, due to the unequivocal propagation of ‘flexibility’ which is used as a weapon to glorify the gig economy; women are even more likely to be pushed into precarious work. The other prominent issues of gender inequality like the dynamics of intersectionality, the gender pay gap and hiring policies in traditional and digital platforms are also examined. Furthermore, the existing regulatory frameworks addressing these issues are discussed with the possibility of catering to the gender inequality issues in the gig economy through policy development. The article concludes with a reflection on the need for the EU to take immediate and efficacious policy measures in respect of female workers in the gig economy.
Knowledge for justice : critical perspectives from southern african-nordic research partnerships
(2017)
With the adoption of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement, the purpose of development is being redefined in both social and environmental terms. Despite pushback from conservative forces, change is accelerating in many sectors. To drive this transformation in ways that bring about social, environmental and economic justice at a local, national, regional and global levels, new knowledge and strong cross-regional networks capable of foregrounding different realities, needs and agendas will be essential. In fact, the power of knowledge matters today in ways that humanity has probably never experienced before, placing an emphasis on the roles of research, academics and universities. In this collection, an international diverse collection of scholars from the southern African and Nordic regions critically review the SDGs in relation to their own areas of expertise, while placing the process of knowledge production in the spotlight. In Part I, the contributors provide a sober assessment of the obstacles that neo-liberal hegemony presents to substantive transformation. In Part Two, lessons learned from NorthSouth research collaborations and academic exchanges are assessed in terms of their potential to offer real alternatives. In Part III, a set of case studies supply clear and nuanced analyses of the scale of the challenges faced in ensuring that no one is left behind. This accessible and absorbing collection will be of interest to anyone interested in NorthSouth research networks and in the contemporary debates on the role of knowledge production. The Southern AfricanNordic Centre (SANORD) is a network of higher education institutions that stretches across Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Botswana, Namibia, Malawi, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Universities in the southern African and Nordic regions that are not yet members are encouraged to join.
Das LG Mannheim hat in einer Entscheidung einen sog. Faktencheck auf Facebook für lauterkeitsrechtlich unbedenklich erklärt. Die folgende Urteilsbesprechung zeigt jedoch, dass die Entscheidung weder in der Begründung noch im Ergebnis zu überzeugen vermag. Denn der konkrete Faktencheck ist geeignet, den Wettbewerb zwischen Nachrichtenseiten zu verfälschen.
This article provides a novel explanation for the global intellectual property (IP) paradox, i.e. the consistent growth of the multilateral IP system in spite of mounting evidence that its effects are at best neutral if not disadvantageous for low-income and most middleincome countries and thus the majority of contracting states. It demonstrates that the multilateral IP system is deliberately structured as a virtual network that exhibits network effects similar to a social media platform, for example. The more members an IP treaty has, the more IP protection acceding states can secure for their nationals. Conversely, every accession enlarges the territory in which nationals of previous members can enjoy protection. Due to these increasing returns to adoption, signing up to and remaining part of the global IP network is attractive, irrespective of the immediate effects of a treaty.
The concept of solidarity has been receiving growing attention from scholars in a wide range of disciplines. While this trend coincides with widespread unsuccessful attempts to achieve solidarity in the real world, the failure of solidarity as such remains a relatively unexplored topic. In the case of the so-called European Union (EU) refugee crisis, the fact that EU member states failed to fulfil their commitment to solidarity is now regarded as established wisdom. But as we try to come to terms with failing solidarity in the EU we are faced with a number of important questions: are all instances of failing solidarity equally morally reprehensible? Are some motivations for resorting to unsolidaristic measures more valid than others? What claims have an effective countervailing force against the commitment to act in solidarity?
Populists in the EU often call for restrictions on EU immigrants’ access to welfare rights. These calls are often demagogic and parochial. This paper aims to show what exactly is both distinct and problematic with these populist calls from a normative point of view while not necessarily reducible to demagogy and parochialism. The overall aim of the paper is not to argue that all populists call for such restrictions nor to claim that all calls for such restrictions are populist. The purpose of the paper is rather humble. It only aims to show that populist calls for restrictions on EU immigrants’ access to welfare rights are characterised by two normatively problematic arguments that target two different subsets of the citizenry: what I dub for the purpose of this paper the moralists and the immoralists. It is the way populists address these two subsets of the citizenry, as well as the fact that they could simultaneously appeal to the concerns of both groups, that makes populist approaches to welfare rights both conceptually distinct to other approaches as well as potentially politically appealing to a more diverse population of voters.
This paper critically engages the legal and political framework for responding to democracy and rule of law backsliding in the EU. I develop a new and original critique of Article 7 TEU based on it being democratically illegitimate and normatively incoherent qua itself in conflict with EU fundamental values. Other more incremental and scaleable responses are desirable, and the paper moves on to assess the legitimacy of economic sanctions such as tying access to EU funds to performance on democratic and rule of law indicators or imposing fines on backsliding states. I hold such sanctions to be a priori legitimate, and argue that in some cases economic sanctions are even normatively required, given that EU material support of backsliding member states can amount to material complicity in their backsliding. However, an economic conditionality mechanism would need to be designed to minimize unjust and counterproductive effects. One way to pursue this could be to complement sanctions against the backsliding government with investment for prodemocratic actors in that state.
Recent developments in Hungary and Poland have made democratic backsliding a major issue of concern within the European Union (EU). This article focuses on the secondary agents that facilitate democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland: the European People’s Party (EPP), which has continually protected the Hungarian Fidesz government from EU sanctions, and the Hungarian ruling party Fidesz, which repeatedly promised to block any EU-level sanctions against Poland in the Council. The article analyses these agents’ behaviour as an instance of transnational complicity and passes a tentative judgment as to which of the two cases is normatively more problematic. The analysis has implications for possible countervailing responses to democratic backsliding within EU member states.
This article argues that populism, cosmopolitanism, and calls for global justice should be understood not as theoretical positions but as appeals to different segments of democratic electorates with the aim of assembling winning political coalitions. This view is called democratic realism: it considers political competition in democracies from a perspective that is realist in the sense that it focuses not first on the content of competing political claims but on the relationships among different components of the coalitions they work to mobilise in the pursuit of power. It is argued that Laclau’s populist theory offers a sort of realist critique of other populists, but that his view neglects the crucial dynamics of political coalition-building. When the relation of populism to global justice is rethought from this democratic realist angle, one can better understand the sorts of challenges each faces, and also where and how they come into conflict.
This article sheds light upon the role of the audience in the construction and amendment of populist representative claims that in themselves strengthen representative-represented relationships and simultaneously strengthen ties between the represented who belong to different constituencies. I argue that changes in populist representative claims can be explained by studying the discursive relationship between a populist representative and the audience as a conversation in which both poles give and receive something. From this perspective, populist representative claims, I also argue, can be understood as acts of bonding with the intended effect of constituting ‘the people,’ and inputs from the audience can be seen as conversational exercitives. Populist appeals therefore may change when the audience enacts new permissibility facts and signals to populist representatives that there is another way to strengthen relationships between several individuals belonging to otherwise-different constituencies.
A link between populism and social media is often suspected. This paper spells out a set of possible mechanisms underpinning this link: that social media changes the communication structure of the public sphere, making it harder for citizens to obtain evidence that refutes populist assumptions. By developing a model of the public sphere, four core functions of the public sphere are identified: exposing citizens to diverse information, promoting equality of deliberative opportunity, creating deliberative transparency, and producing common knowledge. A wellworking public sphere allows citizens to learn that there are genuine disagreements among citizens that are held in good faith. Social media makes it harder to gain this insight, opening the door for populist ideology.
Current work on populism stresses its relationship to nationalism. However, populists increasingly make claims to represent ‘the people’ across beyond national borders. This advent of ‘transnational populism’ has implications for work on cosmopolitan democracy and global justice. In this paper, we advance and substantiate three claims. First, we stress populism’s performative and claimmaking nature. Second, we argue that transnational populism is both theoretically possible and empirically evident in the contemporary global political landscape. Finally, we link these points to debates on democracy beyond the state. We argue that, due to the a) performative nature of populism, b) complex interdependencies of peoples, and c) need for populists to gain and maintain support, individuals in one state will potentially have their preferences, interests, and wants altered by transnational populists’ representative claims. We unpack what is normatively problematic in terms of democratic legitimacy about this and discuss institutional and non-institutional remedies.
As academic literatures and political demands, global justice and populism look like competing ways of diagnosing and addressing neoliberal inequality. But both misunderstand neoliberalism and consequently risk reinforcing rather than undermining it. Neoliberalism does not just break down political and social hierarchies, but also relies on and sustains them. Unless populists recognize this, they will find that assertions of sovereignty do more to reinforce neoliberalism and reproduce its hierarchies than to resist them. Recognizing neoliberalism as not simply corrosive of solidarity but also producing its own affective ties suggests that global justice advocates need to develop a critique of individual attitudes that egalitarian liberals have often seen as private and been hesitant to judge. In short, if either populism or global justice hope to take advantage of neoliberalism’s failures to advance an egalitarian politics, they need to reckon more carefully with their own entanglement with neoliberalism’s hopes and hierarchies.
This article examines whether autonomy as an educational aim should be defended at the global scale. It begins by identifying the normative issues at stake in global autonomy education by distinguishing them from the problems of autonomy education in multicultural nation-states. The article then explains why a planet-wide expansion of the ideal of autonomy is conceivable on the condition that the concept of autonomy is widened in a way that renders its precise meaning flexibly adjustable to a variety of distinct social and cultural contexts. A context-transcendent, core meaning of autonomy remains in place, however, according to which a person is only autonomous if she relates to the values and goals that direct her life in a way so that she sees them as her own and is able to identify and critically assess her principal reasons for action. Finally, the article addresses two challenges to the global expansion of autonomy education: the objection that autonomy is presently not the most important educational aim and the objection that global autonomy education is a form of cultural imperialism. It finds both objections wanting.
Introduction
(2020)
As a result of globalization, the number of people living outside of their countries of origin is on the rise. Among them are children of primary and secondary school age of varying socio-economic backgrounds. This article addresses the education-related challenges that children in such circumstances face. I first identify two principles – an educational adequacy principle and a presumption of responsibility on the part of a host country for meeting children’s educational
needs – which are widely employed to guide national policy decisions on educational content and the distribution of educational resources. I then discuss a number of problems that students living abroad face which, I argue, policies devised on the basis of these principles either systematically overlook or, in some cases, exacerbate. Finally, I offer two alternative principles – a cosmopolitan revision of the first and a replacement for the second with a focus on collective responsibility – designed to promote education policies better suited to a globalized world which might help to alleviate the barriers to success commonly encountered by children learning abroad.
This paper examines and rejects two normative justifications for low-fee private schools (LFPS), whose expansion throughout the Global South in recent years has been significant. The first justification – what I shall call the ideal thesis – contends that LFPS are the best mechanism to expand access to quality education, particularly at the primary level, and that the premise of their success is that they reject educational equality and state intervention in educational affairs, traditionally associated with public schools, embracing instead educational adequacy and unregulated markets for education. Against this thesis, the paper argues that an ideal educational arrangement must not do away with educational equality and some degree of state interference. The other justification for LFPS – the secondbest thesis – contends that although LFPS do not represent the ideal state of affairs, they nonetheless bring us a step closer to the ideal of universal primary education; they are a ‘realistic’ approximation to that goal. Against the second-best thesis, the paper argues that this justification commits the approximation fallacy: by deviating from the ideal educational arrangement LFPS may obstruct rather than facilitate its achievement.
This contribution develops a defence of a universalist conception of Global Citizenship Education (GCE) against three prominent critiques, which are, among others, put forward by postcolonial scholars. The first critique argues that GCE is essentially a project of globally minded elites and therefore expressive both of global educational injustices and of the values and lifestyles of a particular class or milieu. The second critique assumes that GCE is based on genuinely ‘Western values’ (e.g., in the form of a conception of human rights or conceptions of rationality or the self), which are neither universally accepted nor universally valid and therefore unjustly forced on members of non-Western cultures and societies. GCE, according to this critique, is assumed to be another version of the educational justification of a hegemonic and unjust global Western regime. The third critique focuses on the epistemological preconditions of GCE. It assumes that GCE relies on a particular, culturally embedded ‘Western epistemology,’ which perpetuates historically grown global educational and epistemic injustices by dominating and subjugating alternative epistemological approaches. With respect to the first critique I argue that it is to a certain extent sociologically plausible, but wrong when it is applied to the educational and political legitimacy of GCE. The second critique overestimates the consensus within the ‘Western tradition’ and underestimates the transnational dissemination of universalist ideals and values as well as its own reliance on universalist validity claims. I argue that in order to provide a plausible criticism of historically grown global educational and political injustices, it is imperative for GCE to integrate central insights provided by the postcolonial critique, without giving up on universalist ideals and values. The third critique is, according to my argumentation, based on flawed epistemological assumptions, which do not withstand critical scrutiny. Instead of identifying epistemic and scientific claims as the expressions of a particular ‘culture’ or geographical location (the ‘West’), I defend the position that philosophical and scientific research should ideally be conceived as a democratic and universalist project, whose emancipatory potential can only be realized on the basis of a universalist epistemology.
This paper explores how University as social entity has great potential to confront epistemic injustices by expanding epistemic capabilities. To do this, we primarily follow the contributions of scholars such as Miranda Fricker and José Medina. The epistemic capabilities and epistemic injustice nexus will be explored via two empirical cases: the first one is an experience developed in Lagos (Nigeria) using participatory video; the second is a service learning pedagogical strategy for final year undergraduate students conducted at Universidad de Ibagué (in Colombia). The Lagos experience shows how participatory action-research methodologies could promote epistemic capabilities and functioning, making it possible for the participants to generate interpretive materials to speak of their own realities. However, this experience is too limited to address testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. The Colombian experience is a remarkable experience that is building epistemic capabilities among students and other local participants. However, there is a hermeneutical and structural injustice that tends to give more value to disciplinary and codified knowledge at the expense of experiential and tacit knowledge.
This paper addresses the phenomenon of climate-induced displacement. I argue that there is scope for an account of asylum as compensation owed to those displaced by the impacts of climate change which needs only to appeal to minimal normative commitments about the requirements of global justice. I demonstrate the possibility of such an approach through an examination of the work of David Miller. Miller is taken as an exemplar of a broadly ‘international libertarian’ approach to global justice, and his work is a useful vehicle for this project because he has an established view about both responsibility for climate change and about the state’s right to exclude would-be immigrants. In the course of the argument, I set out the relevant aspects of Miller’s views, reconstruct an account of responsibility for the harms faced by climate migrants which is consistent with Miller’s views, and demonstrate why such an account yields an obligation to provide asylum as a form of compensation to ‘climate migrants.’
This paper discusses two possible difficulties with Catherine Lu’s powerful analysis of the moral response to our shared history of colonial evil; both of these difficulties stem from the rightful place of shame in that moral response. The first difficulty focuses on efficacy: existing states may be better motivated by shame at the past than by a shared duty to bring about a just future. The second focuses on equity: it is, at the very least, possible that shame over past misdeeds ought to be brought into the conversation about present duties, in a manner more robust than Lu’s analysis allows.
In Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics Catherine Lu endorses the idea that those who contribute to the reproduction of structural injustice have responsibilities to address that injustice (Lu, 2017). However, in the book, Lu does not explore the grounds and justification for recognising such a responsibility. In order to address this deficit, this paper proposes that those likely to contribute to the reproduction of structural injustice, in the future, have precautionary duties, in the present, that require them to take action aimed at preventing their future contribution. It is proposed that these ‘collectivization duties’ (Collins, 2013) require them to act responsively with a view to forming a collective that can end the structural injustice in question. This account recommends a collective-action solution alongside recognising that each socially connected agent is obliged to act. However, it does not entail that amorphous groups bear responsibilities and is appropriate in its attribution of blame, thus avoiding both Nussbaum’s (2011) critique of perpetually forward-looking accounts and the ‘agency objection’ (Wringe, 2010).
This article analyzes and criticizes the temporal orientation of Catherine Lu’s theory of colonial redress in Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics. Lu argues that colonial historic injustice can, with few exceptions, justify special reparative measures only if these past injustices still contribute to structural injustice in contemporary social relations. Focusing on Indigenous peoples, I argue that the structural injustice approach can and should incorporate further backward looking elements. First, I examine how Lu’s account has backward-looking elements not present in other structural injustice accounts. Second, I suggest how the structural injustice approach could include additional backward-looking features. I presuppose here, with Lu, that all agents connected to an unjust social structure have a forwardlooking political responsibility to reform this structure, regardless of their relation (or lack thereof) to victims or perpetrators of historic injustice. However, I suggest that agents with connections to historic injustice can occupy a social position that makes them differently situated than other agents within that same structure, leading to differences in how these agents should discharge their forward-looking responsibility and differentiated liability for failure to do so. Third, I argue that Lu obscures the importance of rectifying material dispossession. Reparations, pace Lu, can be justified beyond a minimum threshold of disadvantage. Theorists of settler colonialism and Indigenous scholars show how the dispossession of Indigenous land can be seen as a structure that has not yet ended. I conclude by arguing that rectification can be a precondition for genuine reconciliation.
Structural alienation: Lu's structural approach to reconciliation from within a relational framework
(2019)
In Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics Catherine Lu argues that structural reconciliation, rather than interactional reconciliation, ought to be the primary normative goal for political reconciliation efforts. I suggest that we might have good reason to want to retain relational approaches – such as that of Linda Radzik – as the primary focus of reconciliatory efforts, but that Lu’s approach is invaluable for identifying the parties who ought to bear responsibility for those efforts in cases of structural injustice. First, I outline Lu’s analysis of reconciliation, where she argues for the normative priority of structural approaches within the global political sphere, and propose that it will be useful to identify whether or not a relational account could instead identify underlying structural injustices. Second, I examine one particular relational account of reconciliation (based on Radzik’s account of atonement) and argue that this type of account brings to light underlying structural injustices of the kind Lu is concerned with. Finally, I identify an issue for relational accounts in identifying relevant responsible parties for reconciliation before returning to Lu’s structural account to address this gap.
Traditionally, in deciding whether some strategy or action in war is proportionate and necessary and thus permissible both international law and just war theory focus exclusively on civilian deaths and the destruction of civilian infrastructure. I argue in this paper that any argument that can explain why we should care about collateral killing and damage to infrastructure can also explain why collateral displacement matters. I argue that displacement is a foreseeable near-proximate cause of lethal harm to civilians and is relevant for proportionality and necessity calculi. Accepting my argument has significant consequences for what we are permitted to do in war and for what obligations we have towards refugees that result from our actions in war.
Moral refugee markets
(2018)
States are increasingly paying other states to host refugees. For example, in 2010 the EU paid Libya €50 million to continue hosting the refugees within its borders, and five years later Australia offered Cambodia $31.16 million to accept asylum seekers living in Naru. These exchanges, which I call ‘refugees markets,’ have faced criticism by philosophers. Some philosophers claim the markets fail to ensure true protection, and are demeaning, expressing just how much refugees are unwanted. In response, some have defended refugee markets, claiming they can ensure refugees have protection and are not demeaned. I argue that many markets do demean refugees, and therefore have moral costs, but can still be all-things-considered preferable to alternative schemes if they protect refugees more than these alternative schemes.
This essay develops, within the terms of the recent New York Declaration, an account of the shared responsibility of states to refugees and of how the character of that responsibility effects the ways in which it can be fairly shared. However, it also moves beyond the question of the general obligations that states owe to refugees to consider ways in which refugee choices and refugee voice can be given appropriate standing with the global governance of refuge. It offers an argument for the normative significance of refugee’s reasons for choosing states of asylum and linked this to consideration of a refugee matching system and to refugee quota trading conceived as responsibility-trading, before turning to the issue of the inclusion of refugee voice in relation to the justification of the norms of refugee governance and in relation to the institutions and practices of refugee governance through which those norms are given practical expression.
The issue of statelessness poses problems for the statist (or nationalist) approach to the philosophy of immigration. Despite the fact that the statist approach claims to constrain the state’s right to exclude with human rights considerations, the arguments statists offer for the right of states to determine their own immigration policies would also justify citizenship rules that would render some children stateless. Insofar as rendering a child stateless is best characterized as a violation of human rights and insofar as some states have direct responsibility for causing such harm, the problem of non-refugee stateless children points to greater constraints than most statists accept on states’ right to determine their own rules for membership. While statists can ultimately account for the right not to be rendered stateless, recognizing these additional human rights constraints ultimately weakens the core of the statist position.
While global justice theorists heatedly discuss the responsibilities of the affluent and powerful, those states which can legitimately be seen as victims of global injustice have seldom, if ever, been considered as duty bearers to whom responsibilities can be attached. However, recognising agents whose options are constrained not only as victims, but also as duty bearers is necessary as a proof of respect for their agency and indispensable to mobilise the type of action required to alter global injustices. In this article, I explore what responsibilities state officials of dominated states have. I argue that they have the responsibility to resist domination in the name of the dominated states members. While under particular circumstances this responsibility gives rise to a duty to engage in acts of state civil disobedience, under other circumstances state officials of dominated states ought to resist domination in an internal, attitudinal way by recognising themselves as outcome responsible agents.
Fair Trade is under fire. Some critics argue, for instance, that there is no obligation to purchase Fair Trade certified products and that doing so may even be counter-productive. Others worry that well-justified conceptions of what makes trade fair can conflict. Yet others suggest that the common arguments for Fair Trade cannot justify purchasing Fair Trade certified goods, in particular. This paper starts by sketching one common argument for Fair Trade and defends it against this last line of criticism. In particular, it argues that we should purchase Fair Trade certified goods because doing so benefits the poor even though there are other ways to alleviate poverty. It then considers how other common arguments for Fair Trade fare in light of similar criticism and concludes that they may well succeed.
Political realists claim that international relations are in a state of anarchy, and therefore every state is allowed to disregard its moral duties towards other states and their inhabitants. Realists argue that complying with moral duties is simply too risky for a state’s national security. Political moralists convincingly show that realists exaggerate both the extent of international anarchy and the risks it poses to states who act morally. Yet moralists do not go far enough, since they do not question realism’s normative core: the claim that when national security is really at risk, states are allowed to disregard their moral duties. I contend that there is at least one moral duty that states should not disregard even if their inhabitants are at risk of death by military aggression: the duty to reduce extreme global poverty. The reason is that even granting that national security is about securing individuals’ right to life, global poverty relief is about that as well.
There are longstanding calls for international organizations (IOs) to be more inclusive of the voices and interests of people whose lives they affect. There is nevertheless widespread disagreement among practitioners and political theorists over who ought to be included in IO decision-making and by what means. This paper focuses on the inclusion of IOs’ ‘intended beneficiaries,’ both in principle and practice. It argues that IOs’ intended beneficiaries have particularly strong normative claims for inclusion because IOs can affect their vital interests and their political agency. It then examines how these claims to inclusion might be feasibly addressed. The paper proposes a model of inclusion via representation and communication, or ‘mediated inclusion.’ An examination of existing practices in global governance reveals significant opportunities for the mediated inclusion of IOs’ intended beneficiaries, as well as pervasive obstacles. The paper concludes that the inclusion of intended beneficiaries by IOs is both appropriate and feasible.
This article outlines a new approach to answering the foundational question in democratic theory of how the boundaries of democratic political units should be delineated. Whereas democratic theorists have mostly focused on identifying the appropriate population-group – or demos – for democratic decisionmaking, it is argued here that we should also take account of considerations relating to the appropriate scope of a democratic unit’s institutionalized governance capabilities – or public power. These matter because democratically legitimate governance is produced not only through the decision-making agency of a demos, but also through the institutionally distinct sources of political agency that shape the governance capabilities of public power. To develop this argument, the article traces a new theoretical account of the normative and institutional sources of collective agency, political legitimacy, and democratic boundaries, and illustrates it through a democratic reconstruction of the classical body politic metaphor. It further shows how this theoretical account lends strong prescriptive support to pluralist institutional boundaries within democratic global governance.
The democratic boundary problem raises the question of who has democratic participation rights in a given polity and why. One possible solution to this problem is the all-affected principle (AAP), according to which a polity ought to enfranchise all persons whose interests are affected by the polity’s decisions in a morally significant way. While AAP offers a plausible principle of democratic enfranchisement, its supporters have so far not paid sufficient attention to economic participation rights. I argue that if one commits oneself to AAP, one must also commit oneself to the view that political participation rights are not necessarily the only, and not necessarily the best, way to protect morally weighty interests. I also argue that economic participation rights raise important worries about democratic accountability, which is why their exercise must be constrained by a number of moral duties.
Der Beitrag erläutert die Fragestellung, die Kernthesen und den juristischen Erkenntniswert einer „Ontologie des Immaterialgüterrechts“. Ihr Untersuchungsgegenstand ist die Frage, auf welchem Verständnis der Wirklichkeit, genauer: seines Schutzgegenstands, das IP-Recht beruht. Nicht die Seinsweise des Rechts wird analysiert, sondern die hiervon zu unterscheidende Seinsweise einer bestimmten Klasse von Rechtsobjekten, nämlich Immaterialgütern und insbesondere urheberrechtlichen Werken. Die diesbezügliche ontologische und historische Betrachtung ergibt, dass es sich beim abstrakt-unkörperlichen Werk um eine sprachbasierte Konstruktion handelt, die als sozial-institutionelle Tatsache wirkmächtig ist, weil und soweit Menschen seit ca. 200 Jahren so sprechen und denken, als gäbe es unkörperliche Werke – obwohl diese metaphysische Annahme nicht plausibel ist. Der Beitrag erläutert weiter, dass sich das Urheber- und IP-Recht auf der Basis dieser Einsichten und einer alternativen, handlungs- und artefaktbasierten IP-Theorie besser erklären lässt als auf dem Boden des herrschenden Paradigmas vom abstrakten Immaterialgut bzw. Werk. Dies gilt sowohl im Hinblick auf die Dogmatik und Anwendungspraxis des geltenden Rechts als auch im Hinblick auf die ökonomische Analyse und den Rechtsvergleich. Die normativen Implikationen dieser deskriptiven Erkenntnisse sind hingegen begrenzt und richten sich vor allem an die Urheberrechtswissenschaft. Diese sollte tunlichst nicht mehr so reden und argumentieren, als existierten abstrakte Werke, die dem Berechtigten wie Sachen exklusiv zugeordnet sind.
The paper examines the importance of international labour standards for ESG reporting. International labour standards exist today for almost all working conditions. There are many reasons why ESG criteria should be based on these standards. This is already happening to some extent. However, the references to international labor standards should be expanded and the existing references deepened.
According to the standard account, IPRs allocate objects to owners, just like ownership allocates real property. In this paper, I explain that this simplistic paradigm operates on the basis of three fictions: The first – truly Polanyian – fiction concerns IP subject matter that was originally not produced for sale but created for other purposes, e.g. private pleasure. The second fiction is that IP is treated as a marketable good whereas much IP, in particular works and signs, are embedded in communication. Finally, IP is a fictitious concept in that we speak of works, inventions, and other IP objects as of tangible commodities, where in fact IP objects only exist insofar and because we speak and regulate as if they exist as abstract “goods” of value.
In a tribute to Hon. Justice Iorhemen Hwande CFR, Chief Judge of Benue State this book includes contributions from a variety of scholars from Nigeria. 14 essays cover a wide range of topics such as: Insider Dealing by Company Directors and the Nigerian Capital Market; United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea as a Tool for the Resolution of Climate Change Disputes; Is a Practicing Christian Lawyer/Judge in Nigeria an Anachronism?; The Justiciability and Enforcement of Social Rights; and International Economic Law and Development.
Critical Issues in Nigerian Property Law, a collection of writings in honour of Professor Jelili Adebisi Omotola, SAN, a former Vice Chancellor of the University of Lagos, who died on the 29th of March 2006, has ten chapters that closely examine not only the current state of Property Law in Nigeria, but also recent developments and other challenges that have surfaced since the infamous Land Use Act of 1999. The book is clearly a useful contribution to a growing body of knowledge on property law and practice in Nigeria.
African land rights systems
(2014)
This book, from ethical, interdisciplinary, and African perspectives, unveils the root causes of the increasing land disputes. Its significance lies upon the effort of presenting a broad overview founded upon a critical analysis of the existing land-related disputes. It is a perspective that attempts to evaluate the renewed interest in evolving theories of land rights by raising questions that can help us to understand better differences underlying land ownership systems, conflict between customary and statutory land rights systems, and the politics of land reform. Other dimensions explored in the book include the market influence on land-grabbing and challenges accompanying trends of migration, resettlement, and integration. The methodology applied in the study provides a perspective that raises questions intended to identify areas of contention, dispute, and conflict. The study, which could also be categorized as a critical assessment of the African land rights systems, is intended to be a resource for scholars, activists, and organizations working to resolve land-related disputes.
The "Suma de tratos y contratos" (1569-1571) by Tomás de Mercado is the first legal treatise on trade that explicitly takes into account the specificities of Spanish trade with the Indias. Tomás de Mercado was faced with very profound changes in trade: long distances, large convoy sizes, the need for large amounts of funding, high risk, variations in prices and the value of money...
From a theological-legal point of view, these upheavals posed new and complex questions.
Mercado, advisor to the merchants of Seville and an excellent knowledge of New Spain, analyses the sudden transformation of economic and juridical practice with finesse and realism. The 'Suma' is thus an extraordinary real-time testimony to the profound transformations taking place in 16th century commerce.
Moreover, faced with fundamental questions of moral order and juridical legitimacy, Mercado proposes legal solutions of high equilibrium in which theological imperatives are masterfully reconciled with the needs of transatlantic commercial practice.
Few African countries provide for an explicit right to a nationality. Laws and practices governing citizenship effectively leave hundreds of thousands of people in Africa without a country. These stateless Africans can neither vote nor stand for office; they cannot enrol their children in school, travel freely, or own property; they cannot work for the government; they are exposed to human rights abuses. Statelessness exacerbates and underlies tensions in many regions of the continent. Citizenship Law in Africa, a comparative study by two programs of the Open Society Foundations, describes the often arbitrary, discriminatory, and contradictory citizenship laws that exist from state to state and recommends ways that African countries can bring their citizenship laws in line with international rights norms. The report covers topics such as citizenship by descent, citizenship by naturalisation, gender discrimination in citizenship law, dual citizenship, and the right to identity documents and passports. It is essential reading for policymakers, attorneys, and activists. This third edition is a comprehensive revision of the original text, which is also updated to reflect developments at national and continental levels. The original tables presenting comparative analysis of all the continent's nationality laws have been improved, and new tables added on additional aspects of the law. Since the second edition was published in 2010, South Sudan has become independent and adopted its own nationality law, while there have been revisions to the laws in Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Tunisia and Zimbabwe. The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child have developed important new normative guidance.
Since 1963, when the African integration project was born, regional Economic Communities (RECs) have been an indispensable part of the continent's deeper socioeconomic and political integration. More than half a century later, such regional institutions continue to evolve, keeping pace with an Africa that is transforming itself amid challenges and opportunities. RECs represent a huge potential to be the engines that drive the continent's economic growth and development as well as being vehicles through which a sense of a continental community is fostered. It is critical therefore that citizens understand the multi-faceted and bureaucratic operations of regional institutions in order to use them to advance their collective interests.
Few African countries provide for an explicit right to a nationality. Laws and practices governing citizenship effectively leave hundreds of thousands of people in Africa without a country. These stateless Africans can neither vote nor stand for office; they cannot enrol their children in school, travel freely, or own property; they cannot work for the government; they are exposed to human rights abuses. Statelessness exacerbates and underlies tensions in many regions of the continent. Citizenship Law in Africa, a comparative study by two programs of the Open Society Foundations, describes the often arbitrary, discriminatory, and contradictory citizenship laws that exist from state to state and recommends ways that African countries can bring their citizenship laws in line with international rights norms. The report covers topics such as citizenship by descent, citizenship by naturalisation, gender discrimination in citizenship law, dual citizenship, and the right to identity documents and passports. It is essential reading for policymakers, attorneys, and activists. This second edition includes updates on developments in Kenya, Libya, Namibia, South Africa, Sudan and Zimbabwe, as well as minor corrections to the tables and other additions throughout.
Labour law in Zimbabwe
(2015)
Um die Voraussetzungen für Heckers Wirken in Baden und das liberale Klima jener Zeit besser zu veranschaulichen, ist eine Betrachtung des Staats-Lexikons angebracht. Die Unterschiede zwischen den beiden ersten Auflagen, die im Deutschen Bund nicht veröffentlicht werden durften und der dritten Auflage sind geradezu umwälzend, sie veranschaulichen, warum das politische Klima des Vormärz nach der 1848er Revolution zum Erliegen kam. Das von Rotteck für die erste Auflage verfasste Vorwort (1834) sieht dessen Aufgabe darin, eine breite Menge der Bürger, Gelehrten und Gebildeten zu belehren und den gemeinen Menschenverstand zu schärfen.
Die Versammlungsfreiheit war ein gesuchtes Gut, das erst einmal zu begründen und im Blick auf mögliche Beschränkungen zu untersuchen war. Die Performativität einer Versammlung – das Beieinandersein freier Individuen zu einem Zweck, der sich nicht oder nicht immer einer reglementierenden Norm verdankte – erscheint heute als Teil jener Ethik der Kohabitation, die aus der Kantischen Notwendigkeit der Koordination der Freiheitsräume als Aneinanderstoßen von Willkürgrenzen kommt und im Blick auf Gefährdungsszenarien aktualisiert ist. Doch Aktualisierungen bedürfen der Grundlage, wollen sie nicht geschichtsvergessen sein (niedergelegt in der Geschichte finden wir die Praktiken, die für die damaligen Akteure Sinn verbürgten).
The «spirit of the laws» is, as a concept, an answer to a problem of the laws. Regarding modern law, this problem is about unity: How can the manyness of the laws be coherent in one legal order? In my paper, I reconstruct three different models which establish unity as relational (Montesquieu), absolute (Kelsen), and interruptive (Schmitt). The interruptive model connects an aspect of the first with an aspect of the second model insofar it conceives unity as heterogeneous (related to something different) and nonetheless immanent (a unity in itself). As such, unity has to be thought of as a process or an activity. Schmitt’s account of this activity, however, leads to problematic consequences because it separates the activity from the norms and denies the political and democratic dimension of the laws; as a result, the difference between law and violence vanishes. Against this background, I argue for a different understanding of the immanent heterogeneity of the unity (and accordingly of what is called «spirit of the laws»). In this perspective, the spirit of the laws does no longer appear as the solution for the problem of the laws, but becomes the starting point of their critical investigation.
Wenn die Bedrohung, wie im Fall des Virus, als natürliche Gegebenheit auftritt, kommen leicht auch die Maßnahmen, um ihn zu beseitigen, als natürliche, d.h. fraglos vorgegebene Maßnahmen in Betracht. Eine Gefahr liegt hier darin, von einer Natürlichkeit des Zwecks auf die Natürlichkeit der Mittel zu schließen. Dass die Maßnahmen aber nicht natürlich gegeben, sondern politisch entschieden sind, muss demgegenüber im Blick bleiben.
In der gegenwärtigen Corona-Krise erscheinen die Entstehung der Krise – die Verbreitung der Krankheit Covid-19 zur Pandemie – und die Bewältigung der Krise – die rechtlichen Einschränkungen und Maßnahmen – scharf getrennt. Die Entstehung der Krise geht auf ein Stück Natur zurück, auf ein für Menschen bedrohliches Virus. Die Bewältigung der Krise geht mit staatlichem und gesellschaftlichem Handeln einher, das in zahlreichen Ländern im Rahmen rechtlicher Ausnahmezustände erfolgte. Den markanten Trennungspunkt zwischen Entstehung und Bewältigung der Krise bildet die Ausrufung der Ausnahmemaßnahmen, durch die in das Pandemiegeschehen interveniert wurde. Diese Einteilung kann den Eindruck erwecken, die mit Natur verbundene Entstehung der Krise sei eine Zeit, die gänzlich vor dem Handeln liegt: eben die Zeit des natürlichen Prozesses, die von der mit Handeln verbundenen Bewältigung der Krise abgekoppelt sei. Dieser Aufsatz zielt demgegenüber darauf, die Phasen der Entstehung und der Bewältigung der Corona- Krise in ihrer jeweiligen Ambivalenz hervortreten zu lassen. Das Ziel ist dabei ein doppeltes: Einerseits soll hervortreten, inwiefern die Phase der Entstehung der Krise nicht nur prä-aktiv und die Krise damit keine bloß natürlich gegebene, sondern auch eine gesellschaftlich gemachte ist. Andererseits soll deutlich werden, in welcher Weise die Phase der Bewältigung der Pandemie nicht allein krisenreaktiv, sondern auch krisenproduktiv ist.
Einleitend werde ich die genannte Zeitlichkeit – Entstehung und Bewältigung – erläutern, die einem gängigen Krisenverständnis zugrunde liegt, das auch in der gegenwärtigen Pandemie wirksam ist. Darauf werde ich darlegen, inwiefern das Denken des Ausnahmezustands ein Denken ebendieser Zeitlichkeit und damit zweier Phasen der Krise ist (I.1), und zeigen, warum sich die gegenwärtige Krise gerade aufgrund ihrer Verbindung mit Natur in dieses Denken einfügt (I.2). Auf dieser Grundlage gehe ich dazu über, ein komplizierteres Verständnis der gegenwärtigen Krise zu gewinnen, indem ich darlege, wie in ihrer Entstehung natürliche Prozessualität und gesellschaftliches Handeln untrennbar zusammenwirken (II.1) und an welchen Punkten ihrer Bewältigung die Krisenreaktion so in Krisenproduktion umschlägt, dass das gesellschaftliche bzw. staatliche Handeln wiederum auf Natur zurückwirkt (II.2). Durch diese Schritte soll deutlich werden, inwiefern sich in der gegenwärtigen Krise weder natürliche Prozesse und soziale Praxis noch Krisenreaktion und Krisenproduktion äußerlich gegenüberstehen, sondern intern verbunden sind. Das eingangs erläuterte Krisenverständnis erfährt dadurch eine Modifikation.
Menschenrechte und Ausnahmezustand sind zwei Weisen, durch die der moderne Staat seine rechtliche Ordnung nicht nur begründet und erhält, sondern auch immer wieder durchbricht. Zwischen ihnen besteht ein Gegensatz: Wo der Ausnahmezustand erklärt wird, werden Menschenrechte eingeschränkt.
Während die beiden Phänomene in ihrem Zweck entgegengesetzt sind, sind sie allerdings in ihren Mitteln verbunden. Darauf beruht ihr dialektisches Verhältnis, das in diesem Buch als Zusammenhang von Berechtigung und Entrechtung ausgewiesen wird. Dazu diskutiert der Autor im ersten Teil die Theorien von Souveränität und Ausnahmezustand bei Carl Schmitt und Giorgio Agamben. Im zweiten, philosophisch und historisch argumentierenden Teil zeigt er auf, dass das für die Menschenrechtsidee konstitutive Konzept der Rechtsperson staatliches (Ausnahme-)Handeln nicht nur begrenzt, sondern es auch ermöglicht.
Die Analyse zielt darauf, das positive Potential der Menschenrechte gegen ihre negativen Effekte in Stellung zu bringen und so gegenüber einer Logik der Maßnahme zu verteidigen.
Für die diesem Buch zugrunde liegende gleichnamige Dissertation wurde Jonas Heller 2018 mit dem Werner Pünder-Preis ausgezeichnet.
Lexikalische Merkmale der türkischen Rechtssprache : am Beispiel des neuen Strafgesetzbuches (YTCK)
(2019)
Ziel dieser Studie ist es, die Besonderheiten von Rechtstexten in türkischer Sprache am Beispiel des neuen türkischen Strafgesetzbuches (YTCK) zu analysieren. In der Arbeit soll untersucht werden, inwieweit das YTCK vom alten türkischen Strafgesetzbuch von 1926 (ETCK) abweicht. Im Fokus des Forschungsinteresses steht die lexikalische Struktur des YTCK. Diese Studie erfordert einen interdisziplinär ausgerichteten Ansatz, der Rechts- und Sprachwissenschaften integriert. Der Schwerpunkt liegt auf der lexikalischen Analyse der Fachsprache des Rechts.
Ursprünglich sollte das vorliegende Buch nur eine Studie über die von der Kanzlei des Führers bzw. ihrem Umfeld nach Kriegsbeginn initiierten Entwürfe zu einem NS-„Euthanasie“-Gesetz werden. Dabei sollte vor allem der wichtige, allerdings mit zahlreichen Fehlern behaftete Beitrag von Roth/Aly(1984) revidiert werden. Da diese Fehler auch den Beginn der Debatte über die „Euthanasie“ im NS-Staat und den Beginn der Planung und Durchführung der „NS-Euthanasie“ (1939/1940) betrafen, musste weiter ausgeholt werden. Die Gesetzentwürfe aus der Zeit nach Kriegsbeginn machen unzweifelhaft deutlich, dass die am Krankenmord Beteiligten wussten, dass der auf den 1.9.1939 datierte „Euthanasie“-Erlass Hitlers in legaler Hinsicht nicht „ausreichte“.
UNESCO-Weltdokumentenerbe: Prof. Sybille Steinbacher zur Bedeutung der Akten des Auschwitz-Prozesses
(2017)
[Nachruf] Ilse Staff
(2018)
Kaum jemand hat sich in den 1950er und 1960er Jahre ähnlich intensiv für die strafrechtliche, aber auch die zivilgesellschaftliche Aufarbeitung der nationalsozialistischen Gewaltverbrechen eingesetzt wie Fritz Bauer. Dessen 50. Todestag am 1. Juli 2018 nahm das Fritz Bauer Institut zum Anlass, seinem Namensgeber zwei große Veranstaltungen zu widmen.