Open Access

This article builds upon the literature on inclusion/inclusivity in IP law by applying these concepts to the example of the scraping and mining of copyright-protected content for the purpose of training an artificial intelligence (AI) system or model. Which mode of operation dominates in this technological area: exclusion, inclusion or even inclusivity? The features of AI training appear to call for universal and sustainable “inclusivity” instead of a mere voluntary “inclusion” of AI provider bots by copyright holders. As the overview on the copyright status of AI training activities in different jurisdictions and emerging laws on AI safety (such as the EU AI Act) demonstrates, the global regulatory landscape is, however, much too fragmented and dynamic to immediately jump to an inclusive global AI regime. For the time being, legally secure global AI training requires the voluntary cooperation between AI providers and copyright holders, and innovative techno-legal reasoning is needed on how to effectuate this inclusion.

The Åland Islands archipelago enjoys a special international status sui generis, which essentially encompasses demilitarisation, neutralisation, and autonomy. This status is guaranteed under international law by the agreements of 1921, 1940, and 1947, which are still in force. Furthermore, there are convincing reasons to assume that the Åland Islands regime has grown into European customary law. By virtue of her international (treaty) obligations, Finland cannot unilaterally change this status under the present conditions, irrespective of domestic (constitutional) decisions. While integration into NATO’s collective defence system and the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy structures is compatible with the special status of the Åland Islands, care must be taken by Finland and her partners to ensure that the obligations arising from these developments are fulfilled in accordance with the demilitarised and neutralised status of the archipelago. This includes that the use by Finnish troops for preventive defence, beyond the exceptions laid down in the 1921 Åland Agreement, is only permitted in the case (of threat) of an immediate and clearly identifiable attack. The autonomous character of the Åland Islands was established under a League of Nations dispute settlement and implemented, inter alia, in Finnish legislation. Its essence even grew into customary law. The arrangements of 1921, however, do not constitute a bilateral treaty between Finland and Sweden. The UN assumes that the international mechanism to protect Åland’s autonomy did not become obsolete with the demise of the League of Nations, but was only “suspended until such time as an express decision has been taken by the United Nations to put it back into force”. A corresponding proposal could be submitted, in any case, both by Finland and/or Sweden or possibly even by any other UN member state, for discussion in the Sixth Committee. However, the final decision to re-activate this special mechanism would have to be adopted by the UN General Assembly. EU Law applies to the Åland Islands in principle; however, Finland’s Accession Treaty to the EU to which Protocol No. 2 on the Åland Islands was annexed, established a number of specific rules which are still in force today. This, most notably, results in the limited application of value added tax and excise duties in the Åland Islands. Therefore, the rules on customs procedures apply with respect to the movement of goods to and from the Åland Islands. In addition, other provisions of Union law, in particular those relating to fundamental freedoms and European state aid law, may be relevant in view of the special fiscal status of the Åland Islands. However, assessing individual cases would require further information and in-depth studies. Irrespective of the requirements set out in the said Protocol, the EU is obliged to respect the national identity of Member States pursuant to Article 4 para. 2 TEU; this obligation includes respect for the special status of the Åland Islands under both international and Finnish constitutional law.

This article provides an overview of the current state of the regulation of disinformation in the EU. It shows that the concept of disinformation, the purpose of anti-disinformation measures and their content and enforcement can only be understood if a holistic view is taken of private, hybrid-co-regulatory and public-law norms. The delicate field of disinformation is to a large extent dealt with outside of statutory law. The questions raised thereby are largely unresolved.

In den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten sind Anmeldungen von Rechten des geistigen Eigentums (intellectual property, IP) bzw. Verletzungsklagen wiederholt an der unzureichenden Bestimmtheit des exklusiv beanspruchten Gegenstands gescheitert. Ihren Ausgang nahm diese Entwicklung im Markenrecht mit Entscheidungen des EuGH (Stichworte: Sieckmann, Heidelberger Bauchemie, Dyson, IP Translator, Oy Hartwall) und später auch des BGH (Stichwort: UHU). Die markenrechtlichen Grundsätze strahlten auf das Designrecht (Stichworte: Sporthelm, Mast-Jägermeister) und zuletzt auch auf das Urheberrecht (Stichwort: Levola) aus. Im Folgenden werden die maßgeblichen Urteile zur Schutzfähigkeit von Zeichen, Designs und Werken zusammengetragen und systematisiert. Dabei treten zwei Aspekte eines Bestimmtheitsgebots zu Tage, die, wie abschließend zu zeigen sein wird, auch im Patentrecht gelten

Der Beitrag nimmt kritisch zum gegenwärtig anhängigen EU-Gesetz über digitale Dienste (Digital Services Act, DSA) Stellung. Die Kernthese lautet: Big Tech muss reguliert werden, aber nicht wie im DSA vorgesehen. Zur Untermauerung dieser Position werden fünf grundlegend problematische Aspekte des DSA benannt. Es wird gezeigt, dass die derzeit verhandelten Fassungen des DSA (1) die Vertragsfreiheit nicht kommunikationsmächtiger Vermittlungsdienste missachten, (2) automatisiertes Overblocking begünstigen, (3) auch legale, aber in unspezifischer Weise „schädliche“ Äußerungen ins Visier nehmen, (4) einen vagen und für die Kommunikationsregulierung generell unpassenden Risikopräventionsansatz verfolgen und (5) eine Kommunikationsüberwachungsbürokratie errichten, die ihrerseits keinen zureichenden öffentlich-demokratischen Kontrollen unterliegt. Als Reaktion auf diese Befunde wird vorgeschlagen, (1) nur sehr großen Online-Plattformen inhaltliche Vorgaben im Hinblick auf ihre AGB zu machen, (2) die Verpflichtung/Berechtigung zum Einsatz automatischer Moderationssysteme auf offensichtlich rechtswidrige Inhalte zu beschränken, (3) im DSA auch keine indirekten Pflichten zur Unterdrückung legaler, aber „schädlicher“ Inhalte vorzusehen, (4) das systemische Risiko des Art. 26 Abs. 1 Buchst. c DSA ersatzlos zu streichen und (5) die DSA-Bürokratie staatsfern auszugestalten und einer parlamentarischen Kontrolle zu unterwerfen.