Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Article (9)
- Conference Proceeding (9)
- Working Paper (3)
- Report (1)
Language
- English (15)
- Portuguese (3)
- Italian (2)
- German (1)
- Spanish (1)
Has Fulltext
- yes (22)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (22) (remove)
Keywords
- Democracy (22) (remove)
Natural resources in sub-Saharan Africa suffer from a bad reputation. Oil and diamonds, particularly, have been blamed for a number of Africa’s illnesses such as poverty, corruption, dictatorship and war. This paper outlines the different areas and transmission channels of how this so-called “resource curse” is said to materialize. By assessing empirical evidence on sub-Saharan Africa it concludes that the resource curse theory fails to sufficiently explain why and how several countries have not or only partly been affected by the “curse”. Theoretically, the paper argues that whether or not natural resources are detrimental to a country’s socio-economic and political development depends on a number of contextual variables, divided into country-specific conditions and resource-specific conditions (type, degree/level of abundance and dependence, resource revenue management, involved companies etc.). Methodologically, a future research agenda needs to examine the complex interplay of these contextual variables by adding sophisticated comparative research designs, especially “small and medium N” comparisons, to the tool box which has been widely confined to the juxtaposition of “large N” and country case studies.
This paper considers ways in which rulers can respond to, generate, or exploit fear of COVID-19 infection for various ends, and in particular distinguishes between ‘fear-invoking’ and ‘fear-minimising’ strategies. It examines historical precedent for executive overreach in crises and then moves on to look in more detail at some specific areas where fear is being mobilised or generated: in ways that lead to the suspension of civil liberties; that foster discrimination against minorities; and that boost the personality cult of leaders and limit criticism or competition. Finally, in the Appendix, we present empirical work, based on the results of an original survey in Brazil, that provides support for the conjectures in the previous sections. While it is too early to tell what the longer-term outcomes of the changes we note will be, our purpose here is simply to identify some warning signs that threaten the key institutions and values of democracy.
This work intends to analysis the philosophy of history and to discuss the consequences of this death to the Critical Theory. The concept of reason and the devices of democracy and human rights are discussed in a revision of the historical debate about the end of history operates the life in the interior of the modern society, especially about the intellectual condition at the information society.
Within democratic orders, it is the declared aim of a state of exception to secure or restore the endangered foundation of democracy. The provided measures are, however, undemocratic insofar they directly affect individual rights as the principle on which democracy is based: By suspending rights, the state of exception treats individuals not as members of a democratic community (demos), but as parts of a population which has to be secured. Whereas individual rights enable individuals to be part of the demos, the state of exception – by restraining rights – enforces a politics of population. In my article, I show in what way individual rights, too, are used as a strategy of governing the population. Referring to the history of individual rights in the early modern period, I describe a specific form of alienation of individual rights. I argue that this alienation consists in the separation of a private from the political component of individual rights. This alienation is the reason for a dialectical shift from demos to population which occurs in an extreme form in the state of exception. Against this background, the question of the state of exception and the question of individual rights appear in an unfamiliar but crucial relation. In order to oppose the dialectical shift and the misuse of exceptional measures, I claim it necessary to insist on the inextricable link between the private and the political component of individual rights – that is to extend the domain of democracy.
Este artigo busca aliar as leituras de Adorno e Dewey acerca do papel da educação frente o fenômeno da alienação social, focando principalmente a experiência dentro do processo de emancipação. Ao final, busca-se identificar os ideais de coletividade e compromisso como premissas falsas dos processos educacionais.
Disagreement among philosophers over the proper justification for political institutions is far from a new phenomenon. Thus, it should not come as a surprise that there is substantial room for dissent on this matter within democratic theory. As is well known, instrumentalism and proceduralism represent the two primary viewpoints that democrats can adopt to vindicate democratic legitimacy. While the former notoriously derives the value of democracy from its outcomes, the latter claims that a democratic decision-making process is inherently valuable. This article has two aims. First, it introduces three variables with which we can thoroughly categorise the aforementioned approaches. Second, it argues that the more promising version of proceduralism is extrinsic, rather than intrinsic, and that extrinsically procedural accounts can appeal to other values in the justification of democracy without translating into instrumentalism. This article is organised as follows. I present what I consider to be the ‘implicit view’ in the justification of democracy. Then, I analyse each of the three variables in a different section. Finally, I raise an objection against procedural views grounded in relational equality, which cannot account for the idea that democracy is a necessary condition for political legitimacy.
Questo saggio descrive il progetto ambizioso del costituzionalismo moderno e lo distingue dalla mera giuridicizzazione del potere pubblico. Esso mostra le sfide del costituzionalismo derivanti dalla perdita di identità del potere statale e del potere pubblico. Il saggio afferma la persistenza della necessità di regolare il potere pubblico, indipendentemente dal fatto che sia esercitato dalle autorità statali o da organizzazioni internazionali. Tuttavia, esso solleva dubbi sul fatto che il potere pubblico frammentato a livello internazionale possa essere regolato in modo tale da soddisfare le richieste del costituzionalismo. È in corso una giuridicizzazione che manca delle caratteristiche fondamentali del costituzionalismo. Come realizzare una compensazione in questo senso resta una domanda aperta.
La educación y el espacio público democrático. Un capítulo descuidado en la filosofía política
(2013)
En este trabajo se examina la relación interna entre educación y democracia, así como la razón por la cual, pese a su papel crucial en la formación de culturas democráticas, esta relación se ha hecho problemática. Con el fin de mostrar, en primer lugar, qué consecuencias negativas tiene para la vida política contemporánea esta ruptura entre pedagogía y filosofía política y, en segundo lugar, cómo superarlas, este artículo explora algunos malentendidos básicos en torno a las condiciones culturales para la democracia y el papel neutral del Estado, finalizando con la propuesta de un programa renovado de educación democrática.
As is well known, the 2nd Spanish Republic (1931-1936) was toppled by a military uprising which, after a cruel Civil War, set up an autocratic regime led by General Franco which lasted until his natural death in 1975. According to the contemporary theory of the legal system, a legal order exists on the sole condition that it is efficient in general terms and this was the case for both the Republic and the Dictatorship. In turn, the validity of the legal norms of all legal orders is based on its respective rules of recognition. Thus, neither the existence of the legal order nor the validity of its respective legal norms depends on moral considerations. In this paper, we call this affirmation into question on the base of the fact that the compensatory methods adopted from the Transition to Democracy show an evident concern to repair the damage of taking away a person’s basic rights (life, health, freedom, expression, association etc) although the Spanish Constitution, with its catalogue of fundamental rights was not in force at that time. But these measures would not have much sense if, as Raz says, there was no shared content which is common to all legal systems. Like Nino, we claim that one must discriminate between a democratic legal order and an autocratic one to establish the level of validity of its respective legal norms. Thus it can be assigned a presumption of justice to democratic norms. Finally, we state that the criteria to weigh up the justice or injustice of legal norms, as that of legal orders, takes root in the level of respect they show towards human rights.
In the last few years, Myanmar has undergone a severe and unexpected change. The military-led country has been starting to open up its borders and economy, enhance citizens’ rights and, allegedly, democratize. While the EU and US were quick to celebrate the changes and lift sanctions in return, a number of questions remain: Will the changes be sustainable? Does the opening-up indicate a movement towards democracy? What were the reasons for the military to relinquish some of its power – and has it actually done so in the first place?