Refine
Year of publication
- 2019 (34) (remove)
Document Type
- Working Paper (34) (remove)
Has Fulltext
- yes (34) (remove)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (34)
Keywords
- Banking Union (3)
- Bankenunion (2)
- Commerzbank (2)
- Deutsche Bank (2)
- Fusion (2)
- German banks (2)
- German financial system (2)
- Merger (2)
- Open Banking Platform Germany (2)
- corporate governance (2)
Institute
- House of Finance (HoF) (34) (remove)
In this exploratory article, we consider the future of Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank and develop a new approach to the topic: instead of a merger of DB and CB we propose to consider a partial merger of the IT and related back office functions in order to create the basis for an Open Banking platform in Germany. Such a platform would act as a cross-institutional infrastructure company in which the participating banks develop a common data and IT platform (while respecting the data protection regulations). Significant parts of the transaction processes would be pooled by the institutions and executed by the Open Banking platform. Moreover, the institutions remain legally independent and compete with each other at the level of products and services that are developed and produced using just this common data and IT platform – “national champions” would not be created.
But such an “Open Banking Platform” could become even the nucleus of a European Banking platform that could be competitive with existing global data platforms from the USA and China which are already offering financial services and are likely to expand their offerings in the foreseeable future. The proposed model of an open data platform for banks prevents the emergence of national champions and supports the main goal of the banking union: creation of a financial system, in which single banks can be resolved without provoking a systemic crisis and forcing taxpayers to finance bailouts.
We investigate the transmission of central bank liquidity to bank deposits and loan spreads in Europe over the January 2006 to June 2010 period. We find evidence consistent with an impaired transmission channel due to bank risk. Central bank liquidity does not translate into lower loan spreads for high-risk banks, even as it lowers deposit rates for both high-risk and low-risk banks. This adversely affects the balance sheets of high-risk bank borrowers, leading to lower payouts, lower capital expenditures, and lower employment. Overall, our results suggest that banks’ capital constraints at the time of an easing of monetary policy pose a challenge to the effectiveness of the bank lending channel and the effectiveness of the central bank as a lender of last resort.
Depressed demand and supply
(2019)
We investigate the implications of experienced-based learning on consumption-saving and labor supply, two fundamental decisions in business cycle models. Using the Dutch Household Survey, we find that individuals who have experienced higher national unemployment rates over their lifetime save more, borrow less, and work less, after controlling for aggregate shocks, income, wealth, and demographics. Possibly explaining these behavioral responses, these individuals find it more important to save for retirement and to cover unexpected expenses, are more worried about losing their job, and dislike their job more. These results have implications for business cycle models and stabilization policies.
This paper aspires to provide an overview of the issue of diversity of banking and financial systems and its development over time from a positive and a normative perspective. In other word: how different are banks within a given country and how much do banking systems and entire financial systems differ between countries and regions, and do in-country diversity and between-country diversity change over time, as one would be inclined to expect as a consequence of globalization and increasingly global standards of regulation?
As the first part of this paper shows, the general answer to these questions is that there is still today a surprisingly high level of diversity in finance. This raises the two questions addressed in the second part of the paper: How can the persistence of diversity be explained, and how can it be assessed? In contrast to prevailing views, the author argues that persistent diversity should be regarded as valuable in a context in which there is no clear answer to the question of which structures of banking and financial systems are optimal from an economic perspective
We uncover a new channel for spillovers of funding dry-ups. The 2016 US money market fund (MMF) reform exogenously reduced unsecured MMF funding for some banks. We use novel data to trace those banks to a platform for corporate deposit funding. We show that intensified competition for corporate deposits spilled the funding squeeze over to other banks with no MMF exposure. These banks paid more for deposits, and their pool of funding providers deteriorated. Moreover, their lending volumes and margins declined, and their stocks underperformed. Our results suggest that banks' competitiveness in funding markets affect their competitiveness in lending markets.
This paper analyzes the effect of financial constraints on firms' corporate social responsibility. Exploiting heterogeneity in firms' exposure to a monetary policy shock in the U.S., which reduced financial constraints for some firms, I find that firms increase their environmental responsibility. I use facility-level data to account for unobservable time-varying influences on pollution and find that toxic emissions decrease when parent companies are more exposed to the monetary policy shock. I further find that these facilities are also more likely to implement pollution abatement activities. Examining within-parent company heterogeneity I find that pollution abatement investments center on facilities at greater risk of facing additional costs due to environmental regulation. The findings are consistent with the idea that a reduction in financial constraints reduces pollution as it allows firms to implement pollution abatement measures.
Facebook’s proposal to create a global digital currency, Libra, has generated a wide discussion about its potential benefits and drawbacks. This note contributes to this discussion and, first, characterizes similarities and dissimilarities of Libra’s building blocks with existing institutions. Second, the note discusses open questions about Libra which arise from this characterization and, third, potential future developments and their policy implications. A central issue is that Libra raises considerable questions about its role in and impact on the international monetary and financial system that should be addressed before policymakers and regulators give Libra the green light.
Recently, Fuest and Sinn (2018) have demanded a change of rules for the Eurozone’s Target 2 payment system, claiming it would violate the Statutes of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. The authors present a stylized model based on a set of macro-economic assumptions, and show that Target 2 may lead to loss sharing among national central banks (NCBs), thus violating the no risk-sharing requirement laid out by the Eurosystem Statutes.
In this note, I present an augmented model that incorporates essential features of the micro- and macroprudential regulatory and supervisory regime that today is hard-wired into Europe’s banking system. The model shows that the original no-risk-sharing principle is not necessarily violated during a financial crisis of a member state. Moreover, it shows that under a banking union regime, financial crisis asset value losses at or below the 99.9th percentile are borne by private investors, not by taxpayers, and particularly not by central banks.
Therefore, policy conclusions from the micro-founded model differ significantly from those suggested by Fuest and Sinn (2018).
Die Europäische Zentral Bank hat am 6. Juni 2019 beschlossen, die Nullzinspolitik bis Mitte 2020 beizubehalten, obwohl mit dieser das Inflationsziel von 2% seit Jahren, in Japan seit Jahrzehnten, verfehlt wird. Nach dem Neo-Fisher-Effekt sollte, gegeben dieses Ziel, der Zins nicht gesenkt, sondern gehoben werden, weil die Inflationsrate der Differenz von Nominal- und langfristig stabilem Realzins entspricht. Zwar senken rasche Zinserhöhungen Nachfrage und Preise, aber daraus folgt nicht notwendig, dass niedrige Zinsen die Nachfrage anregen. Gemäß neueren Untersuchungen werden langsam durchgeführte Zinserhöhungen bei rationalen Erwartungen dagegen das Preisniveau heben. Der Aufsatz untersucht die begleitenden Verteilungswirkungen und stützt die These mit Überlegungen aus dem 19. Jahrhundert, wonach die gestiegenen Preise durch die Erhöhung der Zinskosten erklärt werden können.
In early July 2019, Christian Sewing, the CEO of Deutsche Bank, proclaimed a fundamental shift of the bank’s strategy after finally obtaining the approval of the Supervisory Board, which the management seems to have requested for quite some time. The essential point of the reorientation is a deep cut into the bank’s investment banking activities. At the same time, those parts of the bank’s activity portfolio that had been the mainstay of Deutsche Bank’s business 20 to 25 years ago, in particular lending to large and mid-sized German and European corporate clients, shall be strengthened in spite of a simultaneous reduction of the bank’s staff by 18,000 FTEs over the next three years.
The bank’s CEO, who has only been in office since about one year, was reported to have called this shift of strategy a “return to the roots of Deutsche Bank” at the press conference at which it was announced, without, however, making it clear to which roots he was referring: those of some 40 years ago, when Deutsche Bank was essentially a Germany-focused commercial bank, or even those from the late 19th century, when the bank had been founded with the mission to become an international bank with a strong capital market-orientation. In any event, the press was impressed and keeps repeating these words, that deserve to be taken seriously and irrespective of their vagueness may be justified. If it were successfully implemented, this change of strategy would indeed be fundamental and imply undoing what Deutsche Bank’s former management teams had aspired to do in the last 20 or 25 years.
The newly announced strategy shift raises two questions. Can it be successful, and what does it mean for the bank itself and its shareholders, for its staff and for its clients? And what does it imply for the German financial system? This note focuses on the latter question. What makes it interesting is the fact that the last fundamental change of Deutsche Bank’s strategy of two decades ago, which aimed at transforming Deutsche Bank from a Germany-centered commercial bank into a leading international investment bank, had a profound – and in my view clearly negative - effect on the entire German financial system.