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We document significant and robust empirical relationships in cross-country panel data between government size or social expenditure on the one hand, and trade and financial development indicators on the other. Across countries, deeper economic integration is associated with more intense government redistribution, but more developed financial markets weaken that relationship. Over time, controlling for country-specific effects, public social expenditure appears to be eroded by globalization trends where financial market development can more easily substitute for it.
Previous evidence suggests that less liquid stocks entail higher average returns. Using NYSE data, we present evidence that both the sensitivity of returns to liquidity and liquidity premia have significantly declined over the past four decades to levels that we cannot statistically distinguish from zero. Furthermore, the profitability of trading strategies based on buying illiquid stocks and selling illiquid stocks has declined over the past four decades, rendering such strategies virtually unprofitable. Our results are robust to several conventional liquidity measures related to volume. When using liquidity measure that is not related to volume, we find just weak evidence of a liquidity premium even in the early periods of our sample. The gradual introduction and proliferation of index funds and exchange traded funds is a possible explanation for these results.
This paper discusses the effect of capital regulation on the risk taking behavior of commercial banks. We first theoretically show that capital regulation works differently in different market structures of banking sectors. In lowly concentrated markets, capital regulation is effective in mitigating risk taking behavior because banks' franchise values are low and banks have incentives to pursue risky strategies in order to increase their franchise values. If franchise values are high, on the other hand, the effect of capital regulation on bank risk taking is ambiguous as banks lack those incentives. We then test the model predictions on a cross-country sample including 421 commercial banks from 61 countries. We find that capital regulation is effective in mitigating risk taking only in markets with a low degree of concentration. The results remain robust after accounting for financial sector development, legal system effciency, and for other country and bank-specific characteristics. Keywords: Banks, market structure, risk shifting, franchise value, capital regulation
Research with Keynesian-style models has emphasized the importance of the output gap for policies aimed at controlling inflation while declaring monetary aggregates largely irrelevant. Critics, however, have argued that these models need to be modified to account for observed money growth and inflation trends, and that monetary trends may serve as a useful cross-check for monetary policy. We identify an important source of monetary trends in form of persistent central bank misperceptions regarding potential output. Simulations with historical output gap estimates indicate that such misperceptions may induce persistent errors in monetary policy and sustained trends in money growth and inflation. If interest rate prescriptions derived from Keynesian-style models are augmented with a cross-check against money-based estimates of trend inflation, inflation control is improved substantially.
On 27 and 28 September 2007, a commission formed on the initiative of the authors held its first meeting in Aarhus, Denmark to deliberate on its goal of drafting a "European Model Company Law Act" (EMCLA). This project, outlined in the following pages, aims neither to force a mandatory harmonization of national company law nor to create a further, European corporate form. The goal is rather to draft model rules for a corporation that national legislatures would be free to adopt in whole or in part. Thus, the project is thought as an alternative and supplement to the existing EU instruments for the convergence of company law. The present EU instruments, their prerequisites and limits will be discussed in more detail in Part II, below. Part III will examine the US experience with such "model acts" in the area of company law. Part IV will then conclude by discussing several topics concerning the content of an EMCLA, introducing the members of the EMCLA Working Group, and explaining the Group's preliminary working plan.
Im Normalfall, in dem Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat den Jahresabschluß feststellen (vgl. § 172 AktG), können sie einen Teil des Jahresüberschusses, höchstens jedoch die Hälfte, in „andere Gewinnrücklagen“1 einstellen (§ 58 Abs. 2 S. 1 AktG). Die Satzung kann Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat zur Einstellung eines größeren oder kleineren Teils des Jahresüberschusses ermächtigen; allerdings darf die Verwaltung aufgrund einer solchen Satzungsbestimmung keine Beträge in andere Gewinnrücklagen einstellen, wenn die anderen Gewinnrücklagen die Hälfte des Grundkapitals übersteigen oder soweit sie nach der Einstellung die Hälfte übersteigen würden (§ 58 Abs. 2 S. 2, 3 AktG). Nach § 58 Abs. 3 AktG kann die Hauptversammlung sodann in ihrem Beschluß über die Verwendung des Bilanzgewinns (vgl. § 174 AktG) weitere Beträge in Gewinnrücklagen einstellen oder als Gewinn vortragen. Im Folgenden werden nach einer Sichtung wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Erwägungen zu Thesaurierung und Ausschüttung (unten II.) die Pflichten und die Kontrolle der Entscheidungen über die Gewinnverwendung von Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat einerseits (unten III.) und der Hauptversammlung andererseits (unten IV.) erörtert. V. faßt die Ergebnisse zusammen. Die besonderen Rechtsfragen, die sich bei Rücklagenbildung in abhängigen Gesellschaften ergeben, werden nicht behandelt.
In meinem Vortrag habe ich mich mit den eher technischen Bestimmungen des Referentenentwurfs des Schuldverschreibungsgesetzes zu den Anforderungen an die Beschlüsse der Gläubigerversammlung und vor allem mit ihrer gerichtlichen Kontrolle zu befassen. Diese technischen Fragen lassen sich freilich nicht ganz von den Fragen trennen, die Gegenstand der Referate zu den Befugnissen der Gläubigerversammlung und zu den Anleihebedingungen sind. Ich werde mir also gewisse Grenzüberschreitungen insbesondere auf die Gebiete der zu diesen Themen speziell vorgesehenen Referate zuschulden kommen lassen und bitte hierfür schon jetzt um Nachsicht. Mit Anmerkungen versehene Fassung eines Vortrags auf dem Seminar des Deutschen Aktieninstituts „Die Novellierung des Schuldverschreibungsrechts“ am 16. 9. 2008. Die Vortragsform ist beibehalten.
Am 27. und 28. September des vergangenen Jahres hat auf Initiative von Prof. Paul Krüger Andersen, Dänemark,1 und des Verfassers in Aarhus/Dänemark das erste Treffen der Arbeitsgruppe stattgefunden, die sich zum Ziel gesetzt hat, einen „European Model Company Law Act“ (EMCLA) zu entwickeln. Dieses Projekt soll im Folgenden vorgestellt werden. Es zielt weder auf eine zwingende Harmonisierung der nationalen Gesellschaftsrechte noch auf die Schaffung einer weiteren europäischen Gesellschaftsform ab. Ziel ist vielmehr, Modellregeln für eine Kapitalgesellschaft, zunächst die Aktiengesellschaft, zu entwerfen, die von den nationalen Gesetzgebern ganz oder zum Teil übernommen werden können. Damit tritt das Vorhaben als Alternative und Ergänzung neben die vorhandenen Instrumente der Gesellschaftsrechtsangleichung in der Europäischen Union. Darauf ist im Folgenden zunächst einzugehen (II.). Ein weiterer Abschnitt weist auf die US-amerikanischen Erfahrungen mit solchen einheitlichen „Modellgesetzen“ im Bereich des Gesellschaftsrechts hin (III.). Der letzte Teil spricht dann ausgewählte Einzelprobleme an, die sich bei der Entwicklung eines EMCLA ergeben, stellt die Arbeitsgruppe vor und erläutert ihren vorläufigen Arbeitsplan (IV.).
Sur initiative du Professeur Paul Krüger Andersen, Danemark, et de l’auteur du présent article1, les 27 et 28 septembre 2007 a eu lieu au Danemark la première réunion d’une commission qui s’est fixé comme objectif la conception d’un European Model Company Law Act (EMCLA). Le projet sera décrit dans ce qui suit. Il ne vise ni l’harmonisation impérative des droits des sociétés nationaux ni la création d’une forme supplémentaire de société européenne. Le but est d’élaborer des normes modèles pour les sociétés de capitaux, dans un premier temps pour la société anonyme, qui pourraient être reprises tout ou en partie par les législateurs nationaux. Le projet doit donc être conçu comme une alternative ou un complément aux instruments existants d’harmonisation légale au niveau communautaire (II.). Il convient par la suite de décrire l’expérience américaine avec de telles « lois modèles » en matière de droit des sociétés (III.). Enfin une ébauche des problèmes spécifiques auxquels se heurtera le EMCLA sera faite tandis que seront exposés la composition et le plan de travail de la commission (IV.).
Recently, the Bank of Japan outlined a “two perspectives” approach to the conduct of monetary policy that focuses on risks to price stability over different time horizons. Interpreting this as pertaining to different frequency bands, we use band spectrum regression to study the determination of inflation in Japan. We find that inflation is related to money growth and real output growth at low frequencies and the output gap at higher frequencies. Moreover, this relationship reflects Granger causality from money growth and the output gap to inflation in the relevant frequency bands. Keywords: spectral regression, frequency domain, Phillips curve, quantity theory. JEL Numbers: C22, E3, E5
Ensuring financial stability : financial structure and the impact of monetary policy on asset prices
(2008)
This paper studies the responses of residential property and equity prices, inflation and economic activity to monetary policy shocks in 17 countries, using data spanning 1986-2006. We estimate VARs for individual economies and panel VARs in which we distinguish between groups of countries on the basis of the characteristics of their financial systems. The results suggest that using monetary policy to offset asset price movements in order to guard against financial instability may have large effects on economic activity. Furthermore, while financial structure influences the impact of policy on asset prices, its importance appears limited. Keywords: asset prices, monetary policy, panel VAR. JEL Number: C23, E52
We study the responses of residential property and equity prices, inflation and economic activity to monetary policy shocks in 17 countries, using data spanning 1986-2006, using single-country VARs and panel VARs in which we distinguish between groups of countries depending on their financial systems. The effect of monetary policy on property prices is about three times as large as its impact on GDP. Using monetary policy to guard against financial instability by offsetting asset-price movements thus has sizable effects on economic activity. While the financial structure influences the impact of policy on asset prices, its importance appears limited.
After the pioneering German “Aktiengesetz” of 1965 and the Brazilian “Lei das Sociedades Anónimas” of 1976, Portugal has become the third country in the world to enact a specific regulation on groups of companies. The Code of Commercial Companies (“Código das Sociedades Comerciais”, abbreviately hereinafter CSC), enacted in 1986, contains a unitary set of rules regulating the relationships between companies, in general, and the groups of companies, in particular (arts. 481° to 508°-E CSC). With this set of rules, the Portuguese legislator has dealt with one of the major topics of modern Company Law. While this branch of law is traditionally conceived as the law of the individual company, modern economic reality is characterized by the massive emergence of large-scale enterprise networks, where parts of a whole business are allocated and insulated in several legally independent companies submitted to an unified economic direction. As Tom HADDEN put it: “Company lawyers still write and talk as if the single independent company, with its shareholders, directors and employees, was the norm. In reality, the individual company ceased to be the most significant form of organization in the 1920s and 1930s. The commercial world is now dominated both nationally and internationally by complex groups of companies”. This trend, which is now observable in any of the largest economies in the world, holds also true for small markets such as Portugal. Although Portuguese economy is still dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises, the organizational structure of the group has always been extremely common. During the 70s, it was estimated that the seven largest groups of companies owned about 50% of the equity capital of all domestic enterprises and were alone responsible for 3/4 of the internal national product. Such a trend has continued and even highlighted in the next decades, surviving to different political and economic scenarios: during the 80s, due to the process of state nationalization of these groups, an enormous public group with more than one thousand controlled companies has been created (“IPE - Instituto de Participações do Estado”); and during the 90s until today, thanks to the reprivatisation movement and the opening of our national market, we assisted to the re-emergence of some large private groups, composed of several hundred subsidiaries each, some of which are listed in foreign stock exchange markets (e.g., in the banking sector, “BCP – Banco Comercial Português”, in the industrial area, “SONAE”, and in the media and communication area, “Portugal-Telecom”).
The reaction of consumer spending and debt to tax rebates – evidence from consumer credit data
(2008)
We use a new panel dataset of credit card accounts to analyze how consumer responded to the 2001 Federal income tax rebates. We estimate the monthly response of credit card payments, spending, and debt, exploiting the unique, randomized timing of the rebate disbursement. We find that, on average, consumers initially saved some of the rebate, by increasing their credit card payments and thereby paying down debt. But soon afterwards their spending increased, counter to the canonical Permanent-Income model. Spending rose most for consumers who were initially most likely to be liquidity constrained, whereas debt declined most (so saving rose most) for unconstrained consumers. More generally, the results suggest that there can be important dynamics in consumers’ response to “lumpy” increases in income like tax rebates, working in part through balance sheet (liquidity) mechanisms.