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Insurance guarantee schemes aim to protect policyholders from the costs of insurer insolvencies. However, guarantee schemes can also reduce insurers’ incentives to conduct appropriate risk management. We investigate stock insurers’ risk-shifting behavior for insurance guarantee schemes under the two different financing alternatives: a flat-rate premium assessment versus a risk-based premium assessment. We identify which guarantee scheme maximizes policyholders’ welfare, measured by their expected utility. We find that the risk-based insurance guarantee scheme can only mitigate the insurer’s risk-shifting behavior if a substantial premium loading is present. Furthermore, the risk-based guarantee scheme is superior for improving policyholders’ welfare compared to the flat-rate scheme when the mitigating effect occurs.
[Tagungsbericht] Making finance sustainable: Ten years equator principles – success or letdown?
(2013)
In 2003, a number of banks adopted the Equator Principles (EPs), a voluntary Code of Conduct based on the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) performance standards, to ensure the ecological and social sustainability of project finance. These so called Equator Principles Financial Institutions (EPFI) commit to requiring their borrowers to adopt sustainable management plans of environmental and social risks associated with their projects. The Principles apply to the project finance business segment of the banks and cover projects with a total cost of US $10 million or more. While for long developing countries relied on World Bank and other public assistance to finance infrastructure projects there has occurred a shift in recent years to private funding. The NGOs have been frustrated by this shift of project finance as they had spent their resources to exercise pressure on the public financial institutions to incorporate environmental and social standards in their project finance activities. However, after a shift of NGO pressure to private financial institutions the latter adopted the EPs for fear of reputational risks. NGOs had laid down their own more ambitious ideas about sustainable finance in the Collevecchio Declaration on Financial Institutions and Sustainability. Legally speaking, the EPs are a self-regulatory soft law instrument. However, it has a hard law dimension as the Equator Banks require their borrowers to comply with the EPs through covenants in the loan contracts that may trigger a default in a case of violation. ...
Die Kompetenzmessung im Hochschulbereich stellt bislang ein weitgehend vernachlässigtes Forschungsgebiet des Bildungssektors dar (vgl. Blömeke et al. 2013). Eine umfassende Analyse des internationalen Forschungsstandes im Bereich der Modellierung und Erfassung von Kompetenzen zeigt insbesondere für Europa ein Forschungsdefizit im Hochschulsektor auf (vgl. Kuhn/Zlatkin-Troitschanskaia 2011). Daher wurde 2010 vom BMBF das Forschungsprogramm "Kompetenzmodellierung und Kompetenzerfassung im Hochschulsektor" (KoKoHs) initiiert, welches die Ziele verfolgt, die Leistungsfähigkeit des tertiären Bildungssystems in Deutschland zu erhalten und Grundlagen für eine Evaluation der Kompetenzentwicklung sowie des Kompetenzerwerbs an Hochschulen zu schaffen (vgl. Blömeke et al. 2013, 3). Im Rahmen des Forschungsprogramms werden u.a. Verbundprojekte aus den Bereichen der Berufs- und Wirtschaftspädagogik (Projekt WiWiKom, siehe Zlatkin-Troitschanskaia/Breuer 2013) sowie der Lehrerbildung gefördert (für eine Übersicht der einzelnen Projekte siehe Blömeke/Zlatkin-Troitschanskaia 2013). Das Verbundprojekt "Modellierung und Erfassung fachwissenschaftlicher und fachdidaktischer Kompetenzen im wirtschaftspädagogischen Studium" (kurz KoMeWP: Kompetenzmessung im wirtschaftspädagogischen Studium; siehe Seifried/Wuttke/Schmitz 2011) verknüpft diese beiden Bereiche. 1 Dabei wird die Zielsetzung verfolgt, die professionelle Kompetenz von angehenden Lehrkräften im kaufmännisch-verwaltenden Bereich zu modellieren und testtheoretisch abprüfbar zu machen. ...
Die berufliche Bildung in Deutschland, vor allem das Duale System der Berufsausbildung, erfährt – nicht zuletzt vor dem Hintergrund der sehr hohen Jugendarbeitslosigkeit – in einigen Ländern der EU große Aufmerksamkeit. In empirischen Analysen zur engen Verzahnung von Lernen und Arbeiten sowie in theoretischen Fundierungen des Bildungspotenzials stellt die berufs- und wirtschaftspädagogische Forschung allen Akteuren im Berufsbildungssystem Erkenntnisse, Argumente und Impulse zur Weiterentwicklung zur Verfügung.
Marketers increasingly use word of mouth to promote products or acquire new customers. But is such companystimulated WOM effective? Are customers who are referred by other customers really worth the effort? A recent study clearly says “yes”. In a study of almost 10,000 accounts at a German bank, the referred customers turned out to be 25 % more profi table than customers acquired by other means. Over a 33-month period, they generated higher profi t margins, were more loyal and showed a higher customer lifetime value. The difference in lifetime value between referred and non-referred customers was most pronounced among younger people and among retail (as opposed to private banking) customers. The reward of € 25 per acquired customer clearly paid off. Given the average difference in customer lifetime value of € 40, this amount implied a return on investment (ROI) of roughly 60 % over a six-year period. The encouraging results of this study, however, do not imply that “viral-for-hire” works in each and every case. Referral programs would be most beneficial for products and services that customers might not appreciate immediately. Products and services that imply some kind of risk would also benefit to a more than average degree from referrals because prospects are likely to feel more confi dent when a trusted person has positive experiences. Companies should consider carefully which prospects to target with referral programs and how large a referral fee to provide.
The IMFS Interdisciplinary Study 2/2013 contains speeches of Michael Burda (Humboldt University ), Benoît Coeuré (European Central Bank), Stefan Gerlach (Bank of Ireland and former IMFS Professor), Patrick Honohan (Bank of Ireland), Sabine Lautenschläger (Deutsche Bundesbank), Athanasios Orphanides (MIT) and Helmut Siekmann as well as Volker Wieland.
This study contains articles based on speeches and presentations at the 14th CFS-IMFS Conference "The ECB and its Watchers" on June 15, 2012 by Mario Draghi, John Vickers, Peter Praet, Lucrezia Reichlin, Vitor Gaspar, Lucio Pench and Stefan Gerlach and a post-conference outlook by Helmut Siekmann and Volker Wieland.
In this paper, we investigate the implications of providing loan officers with a compensation structure that rewards loan volume and penalizes poor performance. We study detailed transactional information of more than 45,000 loans issued by 240 loan officers of a large commercial bank in Europe. We find that when the performance of their portfolio deteriorates, loan officers shift their efforts towards monitoring poorly-performing borrowers and issue fewer loans. However, these new loans are of above-average quality, which suggests that loan officers have a pecking order and process loans only for the very best clients when they are under time constraints.
Is wider access to stockholding opportunities related to reduced wealth inequality, given that it creates challenges for small and less sophisticated investors? Counterfactual analysis is used to study the influence of changes in the US stockholder pool and economic environment, on the distribution of stock and net household wealth during a period of dramatic increase in stock market participation. We uncover substantial shifts in stockholder pool composition, favoring smaller holdings during the 1990s upswing but larger holdings around the burst of the Internet bubble. We find no evidence that widening access to stocks was associated with reduced net wealth inequality.
Using fiscal reaction functions for 3a panel of actual euro-area countries the paper investigates whether euro membership has reduced the responsiveness of countries to increases in the level of inherited debt compared to the period prior to succession to the euro. While we find some evidence for such a loss in prudence, the results are not robust to changes in the specification, as for example an exclusion of Greece from the panel. This suggests that the current debt problems may result to a large extent from pre-existing debt levels prior to entry or from a larger need for fiscal prudence in a common currency, while an adverse change in the fiscal reaction functions for most countries does not apply.
Dem Druck standhalten
(2013)
Außerhalb Griechenlands herrscht die Ansicht vor, dass eine höhere Wettbewerbsfähigkeit gleichbedeutend ist mit Preissenkungen für Güter und Dienstleistungen. Angesichts der begrenzten Bereitschaft in Griechenland, Reformen umzusetzen, fordern die Gläubiger drastische Lohnkürzungen, um die Produktivität zu erhöhen und die öffentlichen Ausgaben zu senken. Doch mit einer Kürzungsrunde nach der anderen lässt sich Wettbewerbsfähigkeit nicht erreichen. Umfangreiche flächendeckende Lohnkürzungen reduzieren vielmehr die erwartete Produktivität, da sie die besten Arbeitnehmer vertreiben, dem Rest Anreize zur Produktivität nehmen und neue gute Leute fernhalten.
This note proposes a new set-up for the fund backing the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). The proposed fund is a Multi-Tier Resolution Fund (MTRF), restricting the joint and several supranational liability to a limited range of losses, bounded by national liability at the upper and the lower end. The layers are, in ascending order: a national fund (first losses), a European fund (second losses), the national budget (third losses), the ESM (fourth losses, as a backup for sovereigns). The system works like a reinsurance scheme, providing clear limits to European-level joint liability, and therefore confining moral hazard. At the same time, it allows for some degree of risk sharing, which is important for financial stability if shocks to the financial system are exogenous (e.g., of a supranational macroeconomic nature). The text has four parts. Section A describes the operation of the Multi-Tier Resolution Fund, assuming the fund capital to be fully paid-in (“Steady State“). Section B deals with the build-up phase of the fund capital (“Build up“). Section C discusses how the proposal deals with the apparent incentive conflicts. The final Section D summarizes open questions which need further thought (“Open Questions“).
This policy letter provides an overview of the strengths, weaknesses, risks and opportunities of the upcoming comprehensive risk assessment, a euro area-wide evaluation of bank balance sheets and business models. If carried out properly, the 2014 comprehensive assessment will lead the euro area into a new era of banking supervision. Policy makers in euro area countries are now under severe pressure to define a credible backstop framework for banks. This framework, as the author argues, needs to be a broad, quasi-European system of mutually reinforcing backstops.
This paper analyzes the inherent dangers of paternalist economic policies associated with the newly established economic sub-disciplines of behavioral economics, economic happiness research and economic psychology. While the authors in general welcome these sub-disciplines for enriching and critically evaluating mainstream economics – especially their criticism of the Homo oeconomicus-heuristic is of great value contributing to a more realistic idea of man –, the political-economic implications as well as inherent risks of paternalist economic policies should be received with concern and thus be subject to a critical review. The paper is structured as follows: In the first step, we recapitulate Kahneman’s, Thaler/Sunstein’s, and Layard’s versions of paternalism pointing at similarities and differences alike. We contrast libertarian or soft paternalism of behavioral economics (Thaler/Sunstein) and economic psychology (Kahneman) with (Layard’s) happiness economics and its hard paternalism. In the second step, we analyze the political and economic implications and consequences of paternalism. We give an overview of the main points of criticism of paternalism from a constitutional economics perspective. The Ordnungs- vs. Prozesspolitik argument is discussed as well as epistemological, political-economic or idea of man arguments. The paper ends with some concluding remarks.
Following Foucault's analysis of German Neoliberalism (Ordoliberalism) and his thesis of ambiguity, this paper introduces a two-level distinction between individual and regulatory ethics. In particular, its aim is to reassess the importance of individual ethics in the conceptual framework of Ordoliberalism. The individual ethics of Ordoliberalism is based on the heritage of Judeo-Christian values and the Kantian individual liberty and responsibility. The regulatory or formal-institutional ethics of Ordoliberalism which has so far received most attention on the contrary refers to the institutional and legal framework of a socio-economic order. By distinguishing these two dimensions of ethics incorporated in German Neoliberalism, it is feasible to distinguish different varieties of neoliberalism and to link Ordoliberalism to modern economic ethics.
June 4th, 2013 marks the formal launch of the third generation of the Equator Principles (EP III) and the tenth anniversary of the EPs – enough reasons for evaluating the EPs initiative from an economic ethics and business ethics perspectives. In particular, this essay deals with the following questions: What are the EPs and where are they going? What has been achieved so far by the EPs? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the EPs? Which necessary reform steps need to be adopted in order to further strengthen the EPs framework? Can the EPs be regarded as a role-model in the field of sustainable finance and CSR? The paper is structured as follows: The first chapter defines the term EPs and introduces the keywords related to the EPs framework. The second chapter gives a brief overview of the history of the EPs. The third chapter discusses the Equator Principles Association, the governing, administering, and managing institution behind the EPs. The fourth chapter summarizes the main features and characteristics of the newly released third generation of the EPs. The fifth chapter critically evaluates the EP III from an economic ethics and business ethics perspectives. The paper concludes with a summary of the main findings.
4 June 2013 marked the formal launch of the third generation of the Equator Principles (EP III) and the tenth anniversary of the EPs – enough reasons for evaluating the EPs initiative from an economic ethics and business ethics perspective. This chapter deals with the following questions: What has been achieved so far by the EPs? Which reform steps need to be adopted to further strengthen the EPs framework? Can the EPs be regarded as a role model in the field of sustainable finance and CSR? The first part explains the term EPs and introduces the keywords related to the EPs framework. The second part summarises the main characteristics of the newly-released third generation of the EPs. The third part critically evaluates EP III from an economic ethical and business ethics perspective. The chapter concludes with a summary of the main findings.
Variations and disparities between von Hayek and Ordoliberalism can be detected on diverse levels: 1. philosophy of science; 2. setting dissimilar priorities; 3. social philosophy; 4. genesis of norms; and, 5. notion of freedom. Therefore, it is possible to make an important distinction within neoliberalism itself, which contains at least two factions: von Hayek’s evolutionary liberalism, and German Ordoliberalism. The following essay not only takes the neoliberal separation of different varieties as granted; it proceeds further. It focuses on the topic of justice and elaborates the (slightly) differing conceptions of justice within neoliberalism. Thus, the specific contribution of the paper is that it adds a sixth dimension of differences (which is highly interconnected with the differing conceptions of genesis of norms). In this paper, I emphasize the (often neglected) subtle differences between von Hayek, Eucken, Röpke, and Rüstow, with special emphasis on their theories of justice. In this regard, I focus not only on Eucken and von Hayek; in addition, I include the concepts of justice developed by Rüstow and Röpke, as well, and, in consequence, broaden the perspective incorporating Eucken as a member of the Freiburg School of Law and Economics, and Rüstow and Röpke as representatives of Ordoliberalism in the wider sense. The paper tackles these topics in three steps. After briefly examining and discussing the existing literature and providing a literature overview on the decade-long debate on von Hayek and Ordoliberalism, I then describe von Hayek’s conception of commutative justice; particularly, justice of rules and procedures (rather than end-state justice). Then, I examine Eucken’s, Rüstow’s, and Röpke’s theories of justice, which consist of a mixture of commutative and distributive justice. Then, I draw a comparison between the ideas of justice developed by Eucken, Röpke, Rüstow, and von Hayek. The essay ends with a summary of my main findings.
SAFE Newsletter : 2013, Q4
(2013)
This paper tests whether an increase in insured deposits causes banks to become more risky. We use variation introduced by the U.S. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in October 2008, which increased the deposit insurance coverage from $100,000 to $250,000 per depositor and bank. For some banks, the amount of insured deposits increased significantly; for others, it was a minor change. Our analysis shows that the more affected banks increase their investments in risky commercial real estate loans and become more risky relative to unaffected banks following the change. This effect is most distinct for affected banks that are low capitalized.
We introduce a new measure of systemic risk, the change in the conditional joint probability of default, which assesses the effects of the interdependence in the financial system on the general default risk of sovereign debtors. We apply our measure to examine the fragility of the European financial system during the ongoing sovereign debt crisis. Our analysis documents an increase in systemic risk contributions in the euro area during the post-Lehman global recession and especially after the beginning of the euro area sovereign debt crisis. We also find a considerable potential for cascade effects from small to large euro area sovereigns. When we investigate the effect of sovereign default on the European Union banking system, we find that bigger banks, banks with riskier activities, with poor asset quality, and funding and liquidity constraints tend to be more vulnerable to a sovereign default. Surprisingly, an increase in leverage does not seem to influence systemic vulnerability.
We show that market discipline, defined as the extent to which firm specific risk characteristics are reflected in market prices, eroded during the recent financial crisis in 2008. We design a novel test of changes in market discipline based on the relation between firm specific risk characteristics and debt-to-equity hedge ratios. We find that market discipline already weakened after the rescue of Bear Stearns before disappearing almost entirely after the failure of Lehman Brothers. The effect is stronger for investment banks and large financial institutions, while there is no comparable effect for non-financial firms.
We analyze the equilibrium in a two-tree (sector) economy with two regimes. The output of each tree is driven by a jump-diffusion process, and a downward jump in one sector of the economy can (but need not) trigger a shift to a regime where the likelihood of future jumps is generally higher. Furthermore, the true regime is unobservable, so that the representative Epstein-Zin investor has to extract the probability of being in a certain regime from the data. These two channels help us to match the stylized facts of countercyclical and excessive return volatilities and correlations between sectors. Moreover, the model reproduces the predictability of stock returns in the data without generating consumption growth predictability. The uncertainty about the state also reduces the slope of the term structure of equity. We document that heterogeneity between the two sectors with respect to shock propagation risk can lead to highly persistent aggregate price-dividend ratios. Finally, the possibility of jumps in one sector triggering higher overall jump probabilities boosts jump risk premia while uncertainty about the regime is the reason for sizeable diffusive risk premia.
Advances in technology and several regulatory initiatives have led to the emergence of a competitive but fragmented equity trading landscape in the US and Europe. While these changes have brought about several benefits like reduced transaction costs, regulators and market participants have also raised concerns about the potential adverse effects associated with increased execution complexity and the impact on market quality of new types of venues like dark pools. In this article we review the theoretical and empirical literature examining the economic arguments and motivations underlying market fragmentation, as well as the resulting implications for investors' welfare. We start with the literature that views exchanges as natural monopolies due to presence of network externalities, and then examine studies which challenge this view by focusing on trader heterogeneity and other aspects of the microstructure of equity markets.
We present a thought-provoking study of two monetary models: the cash-in-advance and the Lagos and Wright (2005) models. We report that the different approach to modeling money — reduced-form vs. explicit role — neither induces theoretical nor quantitative differences in results. Given conformity of preferences, technologies and shocks, both models reduce to one difference equation. The equations do not coincide only if price distortions are differentially imposed across models. To illustrate, when cash prices are equally distorted in both models equally large welfare costs of inflation are obtained in each model. Our insight is that if results differ, then this is due to differential assumptions about the pricing mechanism that governs cash transactions, not the explicit microfoundation of money.
This paper summarizes the key proposals of the report by the Liikanen Commission. It starts with an explanation of a crisis narrative underlying the Report and its proposals. The proposals aim for a revitalization of market discipline in financial markets. The two main structural proposals of the Liikanen Report are: first, for large banks, the separation of the trading business from other parts of the banking business (the "Separation Proposal"), and the mandatory issuing of subordinated bank debt thought to be liable (the strict "Bail-in Proposal"). The credibility of this commitment to private liability is achieved by strict holding restrictions. The anticipated consequences of the introduction of these structural regulations for the financial industry and markets are addressed in a concluding part.
Ausgehend von einer Erläuterung der Kriseninterpretation (crisis narrative), wie sie in dem Bericht der Liikanen-Kommission zugrunde liegt, werden die nach Ansicht des Verfassers zentralen Vorschläge des Kommissionsberichts ausgewählt, vorgestellt und in den größeren Rahmen einer erneuerten Ordnungspolitik für die Finanzmärkte Europas eingeordnet. Die mit den Vorschlägen eng zusammenhängenden Reformelemente der Bankenunion werden in diesem Text bewusst ausgeklammert. Die beiden zentralen Strukturvorschläge des Liikanen-Berichts betreffen die Abspaltung der Handelsgeschäfte von dem Universalbankengeschäft für große, internationale Banken (der Trennbankenvorschlag), sowie die verpflichtende Emission nachrangigen, glaubwürdig haftenden Fremdkapitals (der strenge Bail-in Vorschlag). Glaubwürdigkeit der Haftungszusage wird durch strenge Halterestriktionen erreicht. Vorhersehbare Folgerungen einer Einführung dieser Strukturregeln für die Finanzindustrie und -märkte werden in einem abschließenden Teil angesprochen.
The financial crisis which started in 2007 has caused a tremendous challenge for monetary policy. The simple concept of inflation targeting has lost its position as state of the art. There is a debate on whether the mandate of a central bank should not be widened. And, indeed, monetary policy has been very accommodative in the last couple of years and central banks have modified their communication strategies by introducing forward guidance as a new policy tool. This paper addresses the consequences of these developments for the credibility, the reputation and the independence of central banks. It also comments on the recent debate among economists concerning the question whether the ECB's OMT program is compatible with its mandate.
Um den Teufelskreis sich wechselseitig verstärkender Banken- und Staatsschuldenkrisen zu durchbrechen, haben sich die europäischen Institutionen grundsätzlich dazu bekannt, eine Bankenunion zu schaffen. Der Dreh- und Angelpunkt der verfolgten Strategie liegt dabei darin, durch die Schaffung zentraler, d.h. supranationaler Auffangmechanismen die Ausfallrisiken von Banken und Staaten nachhaltig zu entkoppeln. Dabei ist zu beachten, dass gerade auch die einzelnen Elemente des institutionellen Reformpakets in ihrer Binnenstruktur so beschaffen sein müssen, dass vorhersehbare Ineffizienzen nicht dazu führen, dass Vorteile der Supranationalisierung aufgehoben oder gar in ihr Gegenteil verkehrt werden. Der vorliegende Beitrag diskutiert den Verordnungsentwurf der EU Kommission für einen Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) vor dem Hintergrund dieser Forderung.
In der vierten Veranstaltung der „Gesprächsreihe zu Strukturreformen im europäischen Bankensek-tor“ diskutierte Dr. Elke König, Präsidentin der Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin), die Wiederherstellung privater Haftung und die zukünftige Rolle der Aufsicht, insbesondere im Hinblick auf die Vorschläge der Liikanen-Kommission.
König warnte, dass man systemische Risiken, die vor allem während der Finanzkrise zu Problemen geführt hätten, noch nicht im Griff habe. Sowohl die Bankenaufsicht als auch die Wissenschaft suche immer noch nach einer geeigneten Lösung dieses Problems. Systemische Risiken führen dazu, dass komplexe und stark vernetzte Institute von Staaten gestützt werden, wenn diese ins Straucheln gera-ten. In der Finanzkrise hatte dies zur Folge, dass Banken letztlich vom Steuerzahler gerettet wurden. Diesen Quasi-Insolvenzschutz systemrelevanter Institute müsse man aufheben, um Fehlanreize im Markt zu korrigieren, so König. Verantwortung und Haftung für unternehmerisches Handeln müssten wieder in einer Hand liegen, und zwar in der der Institute, seiner Eigner und Gläubiger.
König ist deshalb der Meinung, dass ein einheitlicher Abwicklungsmechanismus für Banken notwen-dig sei, der auch grenzüberschreitend wirke. Als einen wichtigen Bestandteil dieses Mechanismus nannte sie die Umsetzung eines breiten Bail-ins. Durch Bail-in werden Eigentümer und Gläubiger von Bankinstituten an einer Restrukturierung beteiligt. Eine Umwandlung von Fremdkapital in Eigenkapi-tal kann darüber hinaus dazu dienen, ein Brückeninstitut mit Kapital auszustatten.
Zur konkreten Ausgestaltung von Bail-in-Instrumenten gibt es unterschiedliche Ansätze: Die Liikanen-Kommission plädierte in ihrem Vorschlag für eine Schaffung konkreter Bail-in-Anleihen, vergleichbar mit den Contingent Convertible Bonds (CoCo-Bonds), die in der Schweiz bereits eingeführt wurden. Die BaFin setze dagegen, ähnlich wie die Europäische Kommission, auf einen möglichst breiten An-satz und habe sich gegen die Emission einer neuen Gattung vertraglicher Bail-in-Instrumente ausge-sprochen, sagte König. Die Höhe der bail-in-fähigen Instrumente sowie die Reihenfolge der Haftung müssten aber trotzdem für jedes Institut klar definiert sein.
König betonte, dass es wichtig sei, nun die institutsspezifischen Sanierungs- und Abwicklungspläne zu entwickeln. Die BaFin habe mit der Erstellung der Abwicklungspläne auch schon begonnen. Bail-in sei dabei nur ein Baustein in dem wesentlich umfangreicheren Instrumentenkasten der Sanierungs- und Abwicklungspläne.
In der anschließenden Diskussion sagte König, dass es eine Abwicklungsbehörde für Institute, die in Zukunft einer europäischen Aufsicht unterliegen, derzeit nur auf nationaler Ebene geben könne. An-dernfalls sei eine Änderung der europäischen Verträge notwendig, da die Mittel, die für eine Abwick-lung aufgewendet werden müssten, aus nationalen Haushalten kämen. Bei einer Abwicklungsbehör-de auf europäischer Ebene würden die Haushaltsbelastung und die Entscheidung über die Verwen-dung der Mittel auseinanderfallen.
Essays in behavioral economics - evidence on self-selection into jobs, social networks and leniency
(2013)
Die Dissertation mit dem Titel „Essays in Behavioral Economics – Evidence on Self-Selection into Jobs, Social Networks and Leniency“ besteht aus einer Sammlung von vier wissenschaftlichen Abhandlungen. Alle Arbeiten verbindet die Analyse von theoretischen Konzepten und Erkenntnissen der Verhaltensökonomie unter Verwendung der experimentellen Methode. Die erste wissenschaftliche Abhandlung trägt den Titel „Sorting of Motivated Agents - Empirical Evidence on Self-Selection into the German Police“ und untersucht Selbstselektion bestimmter Individuen in den Polizeiberuf. Die experimentelle Studie untersucht die Frage, ob Polizeibewerber sich hinsichtlich ihrer Präferenzen in Bezug auf ihr Normdurchsetzungsverhalten in den Polizeiberuf selektieren. Die zweite Abhandlung greift diese Erkenntnisse auf und untersucht Polizeianwärter in ihrer Berufsausbildung ebenfalls hinsichtlich ihrer Normdurchsetzungsbereitschaft. Die Arbeit trägt den Titel „Selection and formation of motivated agents -- empirical evidence from the German Police”. In der dritten wissenschaftlichen Abhandlung werden geschlechterspezifische Unterschiede bei der Wahl von Partnern und dem Aufbau des sozialen Netzwerkes untersucht. Diese trägt den Titel „Selectivity and opportunism: two dimensions of gender differences in trust games and network formation“ und wurde zusammen mit Guido Friebel, Marie Lalanne, Paul Seabright und Peter Schwardmann verfasst. Die vierte Abhandlung geht einer aktuellen Fragestellung der Industrieökonomie nach und trägt den Titel „Antitrust, auditing and leniency programs: evidence from the laboratory“, verfasst mit Mehdi Feizi and Ali Mazyaki. In ihrer Gesamtheit liefert meine Dissertation Antworten auf personalpolitische, soziale und industrieökonomische Fragestellungen.
SAFE Newsletter : 2013, Q3
(2013)
Research: Joachim Weber, Benjamin Loos, Steffen Meyer, Andreas Hackethal "Individual Investors' Trading Motives and Security Selling Behavior"
Ignazio Angeloni, Ester Faia "Monetary Policy and Prudential Regulations with Bank Runs"
Helmut Siekmann "Legal Limits to Quantitative Easing"
Policy Margit Vanberg "SAFE Summer Academy 2013 on 'International Financial Stability'"
Guest Commentary Peter Praet "Cooperation between the ECB and Academia"
Monetary theorists have advanced an intriguing notion: we exchange money to make up for a lack of enforcement, when it is difficult to monitor and sanction opportunistic behaviors. We demonstrate that, in fact, monetary equilibrium cannot generally be sustained when monitoring and punishment limitations preclude enforcement — external or not. Simply put, monetary systems cannot operate independently of institutions — formal or informal — designed to monitor behaviors and sanction undesirable ones. This fundamental result is derived by integrating monetary theory with the theory of repeated games, studying monetary equilibrium as the outcome of a matching game with private monitoring.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the ECB has experienced an unprecedented deterioration in the level of trust. This raises the question as to what factors determine trust in central banking. We use a unique cross-country dataset which includes a rich set of socio-economic characteristics and supplement it with variables meant to reflect a country’s macroeconomic condition. We find that besides individual socio-economic characteristics, macroeconomic conditions play a crucial role in the trust-building process. Our results suggest that agents are boundedly rational in the trust-building process and that current ECB market operations may even be beneficial for trust in the ECB in the long-run.
We examine whether the robustifying nature of Taylor rule cross-checking under model uncertainty carries over to the case of parameter uncertainty. Adjusting monetary policy based on this kind of cross-checking can improve the outcome for the monetary authority. This, however, crucially depends on the relative welfare weight that is attached to the output gap and also the degree of monetary policy commitment. We find that Taylor rule cross-checking is on average able to improve losses when the monetary authority only moderately cares about output stabilization and when policy is set in a discretionary way.
How does the need to preserve government debt sustainability affect the optimal monetary and fiscal policy response to a liquidity trap? To provide an answer, we employ a small stochastic New Keynesian model with a zero bound on nominal interest rates and characterize optimal time-consistent stabilization policies. We focus on two policy tools, the short-term nominal interest rate and debt-financed government spending. The optimal policy response to a liquidity trap critically depends on the prevailing debt burden. While the optimal amount of government spending is decreasing in the level of outstanding government debt, future monetary policy is becoming more accommodative, triggering a change in private sector expectations that helps to dampen the fall in output and inflation at the outset of the liquidity trap.
This paper analyzes the evolving architecture for the prudential supervision of banks in the euro area. It is primarily concerned with the likely effectiveness of the SSM as a regime that intends to bolster financial stability in the steady state. By using insights from the political economy of bureaucracy it finds that the SSM is overly focused on sharp tools to discipline captured national supervisors and thus underincentives their top-level personnel to voluntarily contribute to rigid supervision. The success of the SSM in this regard will hinge on establishing a common supervisory culture that provides positive incentives for national supervisors. In this regard, the internal decision making structure of the ECB in supervisory matters provides some integrative elements. Yet, the complex procedures also impede swift decision making and do not solve the problem adequately. Ultimately, a careful design and animation of the ECB-defined supervisory framework and the development of inter-agency career opportunities will be critical.
The ECB will become a de facto standard setter that competes with the EBA. A likely standoff in the EBA’s Board of Supervisors will lead to a growing gap in regulatory integration between SSM-participants and other EU Member States.
Joining the SSM as a non-euro area Member State is unattractive because the current legal framework grants no voting rights in the ECB’s ultimate decision making body. It also does not supply a credible commitment opportunity for Member States who seek to bond to high quality supervision.
On July 4, 2013 the ECB Governing Council provided more specific forward guidance than in the past by stating that it expects ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time. As explained by ECB President Mario Draghi this expectation is based on the Council’s medium-term outlook for inflation conditional on economic activity and money and credit. Draghi also stressed that there is no precise deadline for this extended period of time, but that a reasonable period can be estimated by extracting a reaction function. In this note, we use such a reaction function, namely the interest rate rule from Orphanides and Wieland (2013) that matches past ECB interest rate decisions quite well, to project the rate path consistent with inflation and growth forecasts from the survey of professional forecasters published by the ECB on August 8, 2013. This evaluation suggests an increase in ECB interest rates by May 2014 at the latest. We also use the Eurosystem staff projection from June 6, 2013 for comparison. While it would imply a longer period of low rates, it does not match past ECB decisions as well as the reaction function with SPF forecasts.
This note reviews the legal issues and concerns that are likely to play an important role in the ongoing deliberations of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany concerning the legality of ECB government bond purchases such as those conducted in the context of its earlier Securities Market Programme or potential future Outright Monetary Transactions.
Der vorliegende Beitrag zeigt auf, dass die zunehmende Komplexität der Aufgaben von Zentralbanken zu einer strukturellen Überforderung führen kann. Aufgrund der funktionellen Komplexität einer makroprudenziellen Prozesspolitik auf der Ziel- und Instrumentenebene sollte eher nach einer Reduktion als nach einer Ausweitung des makroprudenziellen Werkzeugkastens Ausschau gehalten werden. Weiterhin steht die sich derzeit teilweise noch vergrößernde institutionelle Komplexität der makroprudenziellen Politik ihrer funktionellen Komplexität um nichts nach. Bei entsprechenden Vorkehrungen können die bereits eingetretenen und die potenziellen Überforderungen jedoch zumindest teilweise in verkraftbare Herausforderungen überführt werden. Der Aufsatz schließt mit Empfehlungen für entsprechende Maßnahmen.