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Institute
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften (126) (remove)
The great financial crisis and the euro area crisis led to a substantial reform of financial safety nets across Europe and – critically – to the introduction of supranational elements. Specifically, a supranational supervisor was established for the euro area, with discrete arrangements for supervisory competences and tasks depending on the systemic relevance of supervised credit institutions. A resolution mechanism was created to allow the frictionless resolution of large financial institutions. This resolution mechanism has been now complemented with a funding instrument.
While much more progress has been achieved than most observers could imagine 12 years ago, the banking union remains unfinished with important gaps and deficiencies. The experience over the past years, especially in the area of crisis management and resolution, has provided impetus for reform discussions, as reflected most lately in the Eurogroup statement of 16 June 2022.
This Policy Insight looks primarily at the current and the desired state of the banking union project. The key underlying question, and the focus here, is the level of ambition and how it is matched with effective legal and regulatory tools. Specifically, two questions will structure the discussions:
What would be a reasonable definition and rationale for a ‘complete’ banking union? And what legal reforms would be required to achieve it?
Banking union is a case of a new remit of EU-level policy that so far has been established on the basis of long pre-existing treaty stipulations, namely, Article 127(6) TFEU (for banking supervision) and Article 114 TFEU (for crisis management and deposit insurance). Could its completion be similarly carried out through secondary law? Or would a more comprehensive overhaul of the legal architecture be required to ensure legal certainty and legitimacy?
With the second wave of the Covid-19 pandemic in full swing, banks face a challenging environment. They will need to address disappointing results and adverse balance sheet restatements, the intensity of which depends on the evolution of the euro area economies. At the same time, vulnerable banks reinforce real economy deficiencies. The contribution of this paper is to provide a comparative assessment of the various policy responses to address a looming banking crisis. Such a crisis will fully materialize when non-performing assets drag down banks simultaneously, raising the specter of a full-blown systemic crisis. The policy responses available range from forbearance, recapitalization (with public or private resources), asset separation (bad banks, at national or EU level), to debt conversion schemes. We evaluate these responses according to a set of five criteria that define the efficacy of each. These responses are not mutually exclusive, in practice, as they have never been. They may also go hand in hand with other restructuring initiatives, including potential consolidation in the banking sector. Although we do not make a specific recommendation, we provide a framework for policymakers to guide them in their decision making.
This policy letter adds to the current discussion on how to design a program of government assistance for firms hurt by the Coronavirus crisis. While not pretending to provide a cure-all proposal, the advocated scheme could help to bring funding to firms, even small firms, quickly, without increasing their leverage and default risk. The plan combines outright cash transfers to firms with a temporary, elevated corporate profit tax at the firm level as a form of conditional payback. The implied equity-like payment structure has positive risk-sharing features for firms, without impinging on ownership structures. The proposal has to be implemented at the pan-European level to strengthen Euro area resilience.
This Policy Letter presents a proposal for designing a program of government assistance for firms hurt by the Coronavirus crisis in the European Union (EU). In our recent Policy Letter 81, we introduced a new, equity-type instrument, a cash-against-tax surcharge scheme, bundled across firms and countries in a European Pandemic Equity Fund (EPEF). The present Policy Letter 84 focuses on the principles and conditions relevant for the operationalization of a EPEF. Our proposal has several desirable features. It: a) offers better risk sharing opportunities, augmenting the resilience of businesses and EU economies; b) is need-based, thereby contributing to an effective use of resources; c) builds on conditions and credible controls, addressing adverse selection and moral hazard; d) is accessible to smaller and medium-sized firms, the backbone of Europe’s economy; e) applies Europe-wide uniform eligibility criteria, strengthening support among member states; f) is a scheme of limited duration, reducing (perceived) government interference in businesses; g) creates a template for a growth-oriented public policy, aligning public and private sector interests; and h) builds on the existing institutional infrastructure and requires minimal legislative adjustments.
We analyse the coordination problem in multi-creditor relationships empirically, relying on a unique panel data set that contains detailed credit-file information on distressed lending relationships in Germany, including information on creditor pools, a legal institution aiming at coordinating lender interests in borrower distress. We report three major findings. First, the existence of creditor pools increases the probability of workout success. Second, the results are consistent with coordination costs being positively related to pool size. Third, major determinants of pool formation are found to be the number of banks, the distribution of lending shares, and the severity of the distress shock.
In this note, a new concept for a European deposit guarantee scheme is proposed, which takes account of the strong political reservations against a mutualization of the liability for bank deposits. The three-stage model for deposit insurance outlined in the text builds on existing national deposit guarantee schemes, offering loss compensation on a European level and at the same time preventing excessive risk and moral hazard taking by individual banks.
This paper makes an attempt to present the economics of credit securitisation in a non-technical way, starting from the description and the analysis of a typical securitisation transaction. The paper sketches a theoretical explanation for why tranching, or nonproportional risk sharing, which is at the heart of securitisation transactions, may allow commercial banks to maximize their shareholder value. However, the analysis makes also clear that the conditions under which credit securitisation enhances welfare, are fairly restrictive, and require not only an active role of the banking supervisory authorities, but also a price tag on the implicit insurance currently provided by the lender of last resort.
This policy note summarizes our assessment of financial sanctions against Russia. We see an increase in sanctions severity starting from (1) the widely discussed SWIFT exclusions, followed by (2) blocking of correspondent banking relationships with Russian banks, including the Central Bank, alongside secondary sanctions, and (3) a full blacklisting of the ‘real’ export-import flows underlying the financial transactions. We assess option (1) as being less impactful than often believed yet sending a strong signal of EU unity; option (2) as an effective way to isolate the Russian banking system, particularly if secondary sanctions are in place, to avoid workarounds. Option (3) represents possibly the most effective way to apply economic and financial pressure, interrupting trade relationships.
This note proposes a new set-up for the fund backing the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). The proposed fund is a Multi-Tier Resolution Fund (MTRF), restricting the joint and several supranational liability to a limited range of losses, bounded by national liability at the upper and the lower end. The layers are, in ascending order: a national fund (first losses), a European fund (second losses), the national budget (third losses), the ESM (fourth losses, as a backup for sovereigns). The system works like a reinsurance scheme, providing clear limits to European-level joint liability, and therefore confining moral hazard. At the same time, it allows for some degree of risk sharing, which is important for financial stability if shocks to the financial system are exogenous (e.g., of a supranational macroeconomic nature). The text has four parts. Section A describes the operation of the Multi-Tier Resolution Fund, assuming the fund capital to be fully paid-in (“Steady State“). Section B deals with the build-up phase of the fund capital (“Build up“). Section C discusses how the proposal deals with the apparent incentive conflicts. The final Section D summarizes open questions which need further thought (“Open Questions“).
The European Central Bank (ECB) increased the emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) for Greek banks from €50 billion in February 2015 to approximately €90 billion in June 2015. Its actions were accompanied by a discussion among academics, politicians and practitioners regarding the legitimacy of the ELA. Some have even accused the ECB of deliberately delaying the bankruptcy filing of already insolvent Greek banks.
We take the claim regarding insolvency delay as an opportunity to highlight the underlying economics of the ELA program and discuss its legitimacy in the current situation. We start by characterizing the complex interrelationship of the European Union, the ECB and the Greek banks through the lens of financial economics, with a particular focus on the political economy of a monetary union with incomplete fiscal union (or fiscal consolidation). Combining these two issues, we examine the decision of the ECB to continue the provision of ELA to Greek banks. Our conclusions, drawn from the analysis, do not support the claim that the ECB’s actions are consistent with a delayed filing for insolvency.
Mit Blick auf die gescheiterten Verhandlungen mit Griechenland, argumentiert Jan Krahnen im vorliegenden Policy Beitrag, dass eine zielführende Reformagenda nur von der gewählten Regierung Griechenlands formuliert werden kann. Die Euro-Staaten müssten Griechenland für die Zeitdauer einer Restrukturierungszeit eine Grundsicherung zusagen. Die EU-Staaten fordert Krahnen dazu auf, aus der Griechenlandkrise die notwendigen Konsequenzen zu ziehen. Auch die Eurozone brauche eine effektive Reformagenda. Die Verschuldungsdynamik innerhalb der Währungsunion, deren Auswüchse am Beispiel Griechenlands besonders deutlich werden, könne bei fehlendem guten Willen nur durch eine politische Union und eine in sie eingebettete Fiskalunion aufgelöst werden. Krahnen argumentiert, dass ein Weiterverhandeln über Restrukturierungsauflagen aus der derzeitigen verfahrenen Situation nicht herausführen wird. Entscheidend sei, ein mehr oder weniger umfassendes Paket zu schnüren, das Elemente eines teilweisen internationalen Haftungsverbunds mit Elementen eines partiellen nationalen Souveränitätsverzichts verbindet.
This essay reviews a cornerstone of the European Banking Union project, the resolution of systemically important banks. The focus is on the inherent conflict between a possible intervention by resolution authorities, conditional on a crisis situation, and effective prevention prior to a crisis. Moreover, the paper discusses the rules for bail-in debt and conversion rules for different layers of debt. Finally, some organizational requirements to achieve effective resolution results will be analyzed.
Wir halten das bisher in Deutschland und anderen Ländern praktizierte Krisenmanagement für ordnungspolitisch inakzeptabel. Die aktuelle Notlage 2007 und 2008, verbunden mit einem enormen Überraschungsmoment, ließ möglicherweise keine andere Wahl, als die betroffenen Banken unbürokratisch zu retten - aber nun ist es Zeit, grundlegende Lehren aus den Rettungsaktionen zu ziehen.