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Automatisierte Methoden der Erfassung von Rufen und Gesängen in der avifaunistischen Feldforschung
(2012)
Der gegenwärtige Kenntnisstand über automatisierte Methoden
zur akustischen Erfassung von Rufen und Gesängen von
Vögeln wird dargelegt. Die Grundlage für eine automatisierte
Erfassung bilden Langzeitaufzeichnungen. Es wird der
Frage nachgegangen, inwiefern Tonaufzeichnungen für eine
qualitative und auch quantitative Analyse von Vogelbeständen
geeignet sind. Spezielles Augenmerk wird autonomen Aufzeichnungsmethoden
und der Auswertung von Langzeitaufzeichnungen
unter Nutzung von Algorithmen der akustischen
Mustererkennung gewidmet. Sinnvolle Einsatzszenarien für
automatisierte Methoden im Rahmen avifaunistischer Feldforschung
sind die Erfassung des nächtlichen Vogelzuges, die
Erfassung nachtaktiver Brutvogelarten und die Datenerhebung
in Kernzonen von Schutzgebieten.
This work derives the value of the neutron capture cross section of 60Fe at the energy of kT = 25 meV. Iron plays an important role in stellar nucleosynthesis, because it is a seed material for the s-process, a neutron capture process in which the elements between iron and bismuth are synthesized.
To determine the thermal neutron cross section of 60Fe, an iron sample produced in the framework of the ERAWAST1 program at the Paul Scherrer Institute in Switzerland was irradiated at the research reactor TRIGA2 at Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz, Germany. Before the irradiation, the number of 60Fe particles in the sample was calculated using the decay scheme of 60Fe. There were (8.207 ± 0:066 stat 0:298 syst) * 10 14 60Fe particles in the sample.
The irradiation of the sample took place in May 2012. The counting of the reaction product, 61Fe, was undertaken using a HPGe detector located in a laboratory at Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz. Knowing the number of 60Fe particles in the sample, the number of produced 61Fe particles and the neutron flux from the reactor, the thermal neutron capture cross section of ρth60Fe = (0.203 ± 0:021 stat 0:024 syst) b could be determined.
The determination of the thermal neutron capture cross section at the energy of kT = 25 meV constitutes to the first at this energy. There was already a measurement of the neutron capture cross section of 60Fe at the energy of kT = 25 keV in Karlsruhe in Germany. The result of the measurement was 25 keV = (9.9 ± 2:8 syst 1:4 stat) mb and was published in the year 2009 [14].
Adding datapoints for the cross section at different energies improves extarpolation and helps verification of theoretical models for elemental synthesis. For this reason, a measurement of the 60Fe neutron capture cross section at the energy of kT = 90 keV is planned at Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany.
Having the neutron capture cross section of 60Fe at the energy of kT = 25 keV measured in the year 2009 in Karlsruhe [14], at the energy of kT = 25 meV measured in May 2012 at Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz and at the planned energy of kT = 90 keV at Goethe University Frankfurt, there will be three points for the extrapolation of the values for the neutron capture cross section of 60Fe. This will lead to a significant reduction in uncertainty with respect to existing theoretical discrepancies.
Manche besonders artenreiche Lokalitäten mit seltenen Arten wurden von Bryologen über die Jahrhunderte immer wieder aufgesucht. Die dort gefundenen Arten haben auch Eingang in lokale Florenwerke gefunden. Am Nordrand des Sauerlandes in Nordrhein-Westfalen liegen eine ganze Reihe von solchen hot spots wie der Ramsbecker Wasserfall, die Meilerlegge bei Ostwig, die Velmedahöhle oder die Bruchhauser Steine. Will man sich aber über das Arteninventar eines solcher Gebiete orientieren, vermisst man zumindestens zusammenfassende Artenlisten wenn nicht gar Gebietsmonographien. Da hilft es nur, die Floren durchzusehen und die Arten herauszuziehen, in diesem Fall die Mooflora von Westfalen (Koppe 1935-49. Die Nachträge sind nicht mehr so interessant, da darin nur Kleinarten und unwesentliche Nefunde hinzukommen, die Funde sensationeller Arten aber bereits schon im 19. Jahrhundert gemacht wurden). Dabei reicht es, wenn das einmal gemacht wird und nicht jeder, der solch ein Gebiet besuchen möchte, diese Arbeit von neuem leisten muss. Es gibt sicherlich fähigere Bryologen als den Autor, welche die Gebiete besser kennen, was aber nichts nutzt, wenn dieses Wissen in den Köpfen schlummert und nicht verfügbar ist. Daher sind an dieser Stelle solche Artenlisten für einige solcher Gebiete am Nordrand des Sauerlandes zusammengestellt, die der Autor sich für eine Exkursion im Herbst 2011 erstellt hat. Hier haben wir besondere Voraussetzungen für ein Artenreichtum: das Gebiet bist geologisch sehr divers. Das Grundgebirge besteht aus devonischen Schiefern, das ganze Gebiet wird aber von einem schmalen Kalkriff durchzogen, und zusätzlich gibt es plutonitische Intrusionen von Diabas und Quarzporphyr. Mit Höhen von um 450 m haben wir zudem schon entsprechende Niederschläge und Feuchtigkeit. Daher wurde das Gebiet schon frühzeitig von Bryologen besucht, angefangen von H. Müller Lippstadt über Winter, Grebe, Brockhausen, Mönkemeyer bis zu den Gebrüdern Koppe. In letzter Zeit war die Moosflora der Massenkalkfelsen des nördlichen Sauerlandes Thema der Dissertation von Carsten Schmidt (2004), von dem der erste Teil in Buchform veröffentlicht ist. Das Buch ist aber nach Arten gegliedert, lässt somit auch die hier gewünschten Gebietsbeschreibungen vermissen, die man gerne hätte, wenn man solch eine Lokalität aufsucht.
Amino acids can induce yeast cell adhesion but how amino acids are sensed and signal the modulation of the FLO adhesion genes is not clear. We discovered that the budding yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae CEN.PK evolved invasive growth ability under prolonged nitrogen limitation. Such invasive mutants were used to identify amino acid transporters as regulators of FLO11 and invasive growth. One invasive mutant had elevated levels of FLO11 mRNA and a Q320STOP mutation in the SFL1 gene that encodes a protein kinase A pathway regulated repressor of FLO11. Glutamine-transporter genes DIP5 and GNP1 were essential for FLO11 expression, invasive growth and biofilm formation in this mutant. Invasive growth relied on known regulators of FLO11 and the Ssy1-Ptr3-Ssy5 complex that controls DIP5 and GNP1, suggesting that Dip5 and Gnp1 operates downstream of the Ssy1-Ptr3-Ssy5 complex for regulation of FLO11 expression in a protein kinase A dependent manner. The role of Dip5 and Gnp1 appears to be conserved in the S. cerevisiae strain ∑1278b since the dip5 gnp1 ∑1278b mutant showed no invasive phenotype.
Secondly, the amino acid transporter gene GAP1 was found to influence invasive growth through FLO11 as well as other FLO genes. Cells carrying a dominant loss-of-function PTR3647::CWNKNPLSSIN allele had increased transcription of the adhesion genes FLO1, 5, 9, 10, 11 and the amino acid transporter gene GAP1. Deletion of GAP1 caused loss of FLO11 expression and invasive growth. However, deletions of FLO11 and genes encoding components of the mitogen-activated protein kinase pathway or the protein kinase A pathway were not sufficient to abolish invasive growth, suggesting involvement of other FLO genes and alternative pathways. Increased intracellular amino acid pools in the PTR3647::CWNKNPLSSIN-containing strain opens the possibility that Gap1 regulates the FLO genes through alteration of the amino acid pool sizes.
Im Jahr 2012 feiert die Matej-Bel-Universität in Banská Bystrica ihr zwanzigjähriges Bestehen. Zugleich sind an dieser Universität 15 Jahre lebendiger translationswissenschaftlicher Bemühungen in Lehre und Forschung zu verzeichnen. Ein Jahr zuvor, 2011, konnte auch der SUNG – der Verband der Deutschlehrer und Germanisten der Slowakei – auf zwanzig Jahre ergiebiger Tätigkeit zurückblicken. In diesem Jahr schließe auch ich mit 20 Jahren Tätigkeit in der slowakischen Germanistik als Pädagogin an der Matej-Bel-Universität und gleichzeitig als SUNG-Mitglied an diese Jubiläen an. Seit 1992 bin ich im Umfeld der Neusohler (Bystricaer) Germanistik tätig: zunächst an der Geisteswissenschaftlichen Fakultät, dann an der "Übersetzerfakultät" – ein Wechsel nach zehn Jahren, der meine professionelle Orientierung entscheidend geprägt hat – und schließlich seit 2007 an der neu formierten Geisteswissenschaftlichen Fakultät.
Da offensichtlich die Zeit gekommen ist, Zwischenbilanzen zu ziehen, regte Prof. Peter Ďurčo von der Hl. Kyrill und Method-Universität Trnava entsprechende Aktivitäten der slowakischen Germanisten an und verankerte sie in einem VEGA-Projekt (Anm.1). In der vorliegenden Studie habe ich mir daher vorgenommen, einen Blick auf die Ergebnisse, Erfolge und Pläne der germanistischen Translationswissenschaft an der Matej-Bel-Universität in Banská Bystrica zu werfen und das Resultat dieser Rückschau als ein sinnvolles Ganzes publik zu machen.
This book, with contributions in both English and French, is a product of collaborative research between the Institut de recherche pour le développement (IRD, France), the University of Ghana, Legon and CODESRIA. It examines various economic, social and environmental challenges of urbanization that critically affect the capital of Ghana, which has experienced high demographic growth and territorial expansion. The study analyses the Greater Accra city dwellers residential practices, and focuses on two main factors influencing land and rental markets. On the one hand, it interrogates the constraints and dynamics of urban families, their needs and gender characteristics in terms of accommodation. On the other hand, it explores the opportunities and interests in investment on the part of land owners and real estate developers. At these two levels of describing the social and spatial discriminations, the book attempts to explain the difficult choices that this fragmented city faces. It emphasizes the role of mobility in structuring the metropolitan area, and the negative impact of lack of mobility which results in some households and communities suffering more than others. Light is thrown on diagnostics and prospects in the matter of urban planning.
BACKGROUND: The endocannabinoid 2-arachidonoyl glycerol (2-AG) acts as a retrograde messenger and modulates synaptic signaling e. g. in the hippocampus. 2-AG also exerts neuroprotective effects under pathological situations. To better understand the mechanism beyond physiological signaling we used Organotypic Entorhino-Hippocampal Slice Cultures (OHSC) and investigated the temporal regulation of 2-AG in different cell subsets during excitotoxic lesion and dendritic lesion of long range projections in the enthorhinal cortex (EC), dentate gyrus (DG) and the cornu ammonis region 1 (CA1).
RESULTS: 2-AG levels were elevated 24 h after excitotoxic lesion in CA1 and DG (but not EC) and 24 h after perforant pathway transection (PPT) in the DG only. After PPT diacylglycerol lipase alpha (DAGL) protein, the synthesizing enzyme of 2-AG was decreased when Dagl mRNA expression and 2-AG levels were enhanced. In contrast to DAGL, the 2-AG hydrolyzing enzyme monoacylglycerol lipase (MAGL) showed no alterations in total protein and mRNA expression after PPT in OHSC. MAGL immunoreaction underwent a redistribution after PPT and excitotoxic lesion since MAGL IR disappeared in astrocytes of lesioned OHSC. DAGL and MAGL immunoreactions were not detectable in microglia at all investigated time points. Thus, induction of the neuroprotective endocannabinoid 2-AG might be generally accomplished by down-regulation of MAGL in astrocytes after neuronal lesions.
CONCLUSION: Increase in 2-AG levels during secondary neuronal damage reflects a general neuroprotective mechanism since it occurred independently in both different lesion models. This intrinsic up-regulation of 2-AG is synergistically controlled by DAGL and MAGL in neurons and astrocytes and thus represents a protective system for neurons that is involved in dendritic reorganisation.
... Es stellen sich auch für das Konzept eines Schuldentilgungsfonds – jedenfalls in Deutschland – verfassungsrechtliche Fragen. Zwar sollen Schuldentilgungsfonds sowie die dadurch bedingte gemeinschaftliche Haftung zeitlich und dem Umfang nach begrenzt sein und seine Errichtung parlamentarischer Zustimmung unterliegen. Das klingt zunächst einmal beruhigend. ...
Occasionally, in pursuing their adjudicative duties over the course of a legal hearing, judges are called upon to acquire new concepts – that is, concepts which they did not possess at the commencement of the hearing. In performing their judicial role they are required to learn new things and, as a result, conceptualise the world in a way which differs from the way they conceived of things before the hearing commenced. Some theorists have argued that either as a general matter or as a matter specific to judicial practice and the legal context, judges are, with some degree of necessity, incapacitated from acquiring certain kinds of concepts. Such concepts include those possessed by the members of culturally different minority groups. Drawing on contemporary trends in analytic and naturalistic philosophy of mind, this paper explores the extent to which a judge might be incapacitated from acquiring new concepts over the course of a legal hearing and identifies those factors which condition the success or failure of that process.
Financing asset growth
(2012)
We document the existence of a debt anomaly that is in addition to the asset growth anomaly: for a given asset growth rate, firms that issue more debt, as well as firms that retire more debt, have lower stock returns in the 12 months starting 6 months after the calendar year of asset growth. Exploring the reasons for debt issuance, we find that managers of firms for which analyst expectations are more over-optimistic, which suffer from declining investment profitability, and whose earnings-price ratios are relatively high are inclined to rely more heavily on debt financing. On the other hand, firms that retire more debt for a given asset growth rate tend to have improving profitability but to be over-priced. We also find that the financing decision is influenced by the prior debt ratio, the asset growth rate, profitability, and CEO pay sensitivity. We interpret our results in terms of managerial incentives, signaling, and market timing.
Background: Adaptation to low oxygen by changing gene expression is vitally important for cell survival and tissue development. The sprouting of new blood vessels, initiated from endothelial cells, restores the oxygen supply of ischemic tissues. In contrast to the transcriptional response induced by hypoxia, which is mainly mediated by members of the HIF family, there are only few studies investigating alternative splicing events. Therefore, we performed an exon array for the genome-wide analysis of hypoxia-related changes of alternative splicing in endothelial cells.
Methodology/Principal findings: Human umbilical vein endothelial cells (HUVECs) were incubated under hypoxic conditions (1% O(2)) for 48 h. Genome-wide transcript and exon expression levels were assessed using the Affymetrix GeneChip Human Exon 1.0 ST Array. We found altered expression of 294 genes after hypoxia treatment. Upregulated genes are highly enriched in glucose metabolism and angiogenesis related processes, whereas downregulated genes are mainly connected to cell cycle and DNA repair. Thus, gene expression patterns recapitulate known adaptations to low oxygen supply. Alternative splicing events, until now not related to hypoxia, are shown for nine genes: six which are implicated in angiogenesis-mediated cytoskeleton remodeling (cask, itsn1, larp6, sptan1, tpm1 and robo1); one, which is involved in the synthesis of membrane-anchors (pign) and two universal regulators of gene expression (cugbp1 and max).
Conclusions/Significance: For the first time, this study investigates changes in splicing in the physiological response to hypoxia on a genome-wide scale. Nine alternative splicing events, until now not related to hypoxia, are reported, considerably expanding the information on splicing changes due to low oxygen supply. Therefore, this study provides further knowledge on hypoxia induced gene expression changes and presents new starting points to study the hypoxia adaptation of endothelial cells.
Der Begriff 'Verstreute Gedichte' klingt im Deutschen nicht gut, der Terminus 'Einzelgedichte' lenkt den Blick hin auf das Singuläre jedes Texts und weg von Gemeinsamkeiten und Gedichtgruppen. Der Titel "Uncollected Poems", den William Waters für das Treffen der Internationalen Rilke-Gesellschaft in Boston (2011) in Vorschlag gebracht hat, vermag die Balance gut zu halten, allerdings nur in der englischen Sprache. Eine erste, noch provisorische Übersetzung ins Deutsche mit 'Ungesammelte Gedichte' war wenig überzeugend, denn eine solche Fügung findet sich nicht im Repertoire der deutschen Sprache. Zusammen mit der englischen Prägung wird aber sofort klar, was gemeint ist, auch wenn ein passender editorischer Fachbegriff in der deutschen Sprache nur schwer zu finden ist. Ein Blick auf die Editionsgeschichte von Rilkes Werken erklärt, worin die Besonderheit des Falles besteht.
Es hatte sich eingestellt, was für einige Jahrzehnte, nicht nur für Herder und nicht nur für Männer den Weg eines Topos zu einer Gattung und einer Gattung zum Buch bahnen sollte. Und vice versa. Es begann die Karriere ,zerstreuter Blätter', deren Mode - soweit es sich bei der gegenwärtigen Forschungslage beurteilen lässt - um 1800 ihren Anfang nahm und die sich bis um 1900 behauptete. In dieser Erfolgsgeschichte geht es genau um die genannte Titelgebung, deren Herkunft sich aus dem Wortfeld ,zerstreuter Sachen' sozusagen bequem herauskristallisiert. Denn es steht fest, dass die Sprache auch Schriften und Papieren immer schon erlaubte, zerstreut zu werden oder eben einfach chaotisch herumzuliegen. Seit dem frühen 18. Jahrhundert verzeichnen die Kataloge zerstreute Gedanken, Gedichte, Anmerkungen, Nachrichten und Aufsätze. Auch finden sich genug vermischte, gesammelte, ,verlohrene' und natürlich fliegende Blätter, und man begegnet auch jener professionellen Tätigkeit, die später die Herausgeber zerstreuter Blätter kennzeichnen wird.
Eine Reihe von Sprachgesten des jungen Herder haben nachhaltige Wirkung gehabt und wurden zum literaturhistorischen Paradigma des Lebensgefühls einer Generation, zu Merkmalen des Sturm und Drang. Allem voran pflegt man jene Rhetorik zu diesen Gesten zu zählen, mit der sich Herder von den „vielen Beyträge[nl des Jahrhunderts“, d. h. von der zeitgenössischen Gelehrsamkeit distanziert. Tatsächlich werden in seiner Schrift Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit (1774) die „Erfahrung“, die „That“, die „Anwendung des Lebens, in dem bestimmtesten Kreise“ dem „abgezogne[nl Geist“, der selbstgefälligen Sprachgewalt der Aufklärung gegenübergestellt und auch die Institutionen der „Letternkultur“ kritisiert. […] Herders Charakterisierung seiner Epoche als des „Jahrhundert[sl des Bücherlesens“ wird darüber hinaus in der Attesten Urkunde des Menschengeschlechts (1774) verbunden mit einem apokalyptischen Denken, das eine Schelte der Aufklärung einschließt. Für Ralf Simon schafft die Buchkultur eine „medientheoretisch“ signifikante Situation: Das große Archiv, das durch den Buchdruck ermöglicht und bis einschließlich des 18. Jahrhunderts errichtet wurde, erhebt sich über die Zeit und wird zum Medium einer Art papierenen Posthistoires.
From the dawn of civilization, a multitude of religious has developed each very complex. These great differences among religions make it difficult to find a least common denominator or to talk at length of religion in general. On the other hand, focusing on just one specific religion often causes us to ignore or underestimate some of the very broad traits that religions seem to share. The fact remains that we will make no headway into the question of what makes a specific religion a religion if we do not seek some characteristics common to all religions.
Religion is usually associated with the supernatural or the divine.505 However, the notion of a supernatural realm does not occur in the non-theistic schools of Buddhism and functions in very different ways, say, in Taoism, Hinduism, and Islam. These shortcomings suggest that religion is notoriously difficult to define. To me, religion is any action taken through every aspect of our being to release us from our weakness or imperfection, and bring us closer to the divine reality. In other words, it is a human inner desire or activity to unite with an absolute being.
The examination of the intellectual dimension of religion that is, its key beliefs is most beneficial when it is guided and informed. Since epistemology is the theory of knowledge, one would therefore expect epistemological discussions of religion to concentrate on the question whether one could have knowledge of religious beliefs. Religious epistemology is simple to say that it is the epistemology of distinctively religious beliefs, but that will not be helpful in the absence of a definition of religious beliefs.
Philosophers of religion might consider the epistemology of religious belief, pondering questions about the sources and justifications of religious knowledge. Fundamental questions regarding the nature of knowledge are likely to arise in any culture. After all, everyone has some stake in distinguishing truth from error, wisdom from ignorance, and the path to knowledge from the path to ignorance. Epistemologists have discussed, in addition to the defining conditions and the sources of knowledge, the extent of human knowledge. They have asked how far human knowledge can extend. Many philosophers find it obvious that we know at least some things, if only things about personal experiences or household physical objects. Others have claimed, however, that we really have no knowledge. Such philosophers admit that people typically feel confident that they have some knowledge, but these philosophers insist that our apparent cases of knowledge are mere illusions. Many epistemologists aim not to set knowledge beyond our reach or to escape the quest for knowledge but rather to make many of our ordinary claims to knowledge more secure by explaining knowledge. They seek to explain what knowledge consists in and how we get it.506
Therefore, a good deal of the task of general epistemology is to understand the nature of the various truth-relevant merits which beliefs can possess, the necessary and sufficient conditions for beliefs to possess those merits, and the virtues of mind and practice requisite and apt for their presence merits such as being reliably formed, being warranted, being entitled, being scientific, being rational, being justified and indeed being true.
Epistemology in Western philosophical tradition has until recently offered a prominent definition of knowledge that analyzes knowledge into three essential components: justification, truth, and belief. According to this analysis, propositional knowledge is, by definition, justified true belief. Epistemologists typically focus on propositional knowledge. Knowledge that something is the case, as opposed to knowledge of how to do something. The content of propositional knowledge can be expressed in a proposition, that is, what is meant by a declarative sentence. Knowledge how to do something is by contrast, a skill or competence in performing a certain task. Within the last few decades, philosophers have discovers that these three conditions are not really sufficient for knowledge; something else is required. Genuine knowledge requires not only truth and belief, but also the satisfaction of the belief condition be appropriately related to the satisfaction of the truth condition. That is, on the traditional approach, genuine knowledge requires that a knower have an “adequate indication” that a believed proposition is true. The required “adequate indication”507 of truth, according to Plato, Kant, and many other philosophers, is evidence indicating that a proposition is true. These philosophers thus hold that knowledge must be based on evidence, or justifying reason.
The kind of justification crucial to knowledge is called epistemic justification. Even if knowledge requires justification, a justified belief can be false. In allowing for justified false beliefs, contemporary epistemologists endorse fallibilism about justification. Reformed epistemologists contend that belief in the existence of God can, in some circumstances, have an epistemic status high enough to render it worthy of acceptance even if it has no support from the arguments of natural theology or from any other beliefs. The views of Alston and Mavrodes are sometimes said to display an affinity with Reformed epistemology, and Nicholas Wolterstorff has made significant contributions to its development. But Plantinga has clearly been the leading contemporary advocate of this school of thought in religious epistemology. During the earlier phase of their development, Plantinga concentrated on defending the view that theistic belief can be in certain conditions, is justified or rationally held even in the absence of any propositional evidence or supporting argument.508
For the conviction that theistic belief is properly basic, foundationalists carry out a reconstructive project that would put our revised doxastic structures on foundations so firm that they could withstand rather than ignore skeptical challenges. That is, for the classical foundationlist theistic belief requires support from propositional evidence or argument if it is to be rationally or justifiably held. However, it is fairly clear that belief in God’s existence does not satisfy this criterion; it is neither self-evident nor incorrigible nor evident to the sense for humans at any time in this life.
The question of justification attracts philosophers especially in contemporary epistemology. And controversy of this question focuses on the meaning of ‘justification’ as well as on the substantive conditions of a belief’s being justified in a way appropriate to knowledge. William Alston, for instance, has introduced a non-deontological normative concept of justification that relies mainly on the notion of what is epistemically good from the view-point of maximizing truth and minimizing falsity. Alston link epistemic goodness to a belief’s being based on adequate grounds in the absence of overriding reason to the contrary. But for some epistemologists “Epistemic justification” means simply “evidential support” of certain sort.509 To say that s is epistemically justifiable to some extent for you is, on this view, just to say that s is supportable to some extent by your overall evidential reason. According to epistemologist, knowledge entails beliefs, so that I cannot know that such and such is the case unless I believe that such and such is the case.
Robert Audi mentioned that knowledge arises in experience. It is constituted by conclusively justified true belief, meaning that: the believer may be justified by psychological certain of the true proposition in question and this proposition is so well-grounded as to be itself propositionally certain. And knowledge constitute by such belief may be called epistemic certainty. When we come to religious knowledge, Audi says that religious propositions are simply beyond the scope of human knowledge. But the point is why would it be thought that no religious propositions are known? The most common ground for holding this view is namely, that religious propositions, such as that God exists, cannot be known either a priori or on the basis of experience. The concept of justification or evidence would occur with the concept of belief in a more complex analysis of the concept of knowledge.510
In recent decades, questions of knowledge seem to have been marginalized by question of justification. As a matter of fact, however, epistemological discussion of religious belief, at least since the Enlightenment has tended to focus, not on the question whether religious belief has warrant, but whether it is justified. More precisely, it has tended to focus on the question whether those properties are enjoyed by theistic belief - the belief that there exists a person like the God of traditional Christianity, Judaism, and Islam: an almighty, all knowing, wholly benevolent and loving spiritual person who has created the world. The main epistemological question about religious belief, therefore, has been the question whether or not religious belief in general and theistic belief in particular is rational or rationally acceptable, or whether it is justified?
In its primary sense, rationality is a normative concept that philosophers have generally tried to characterize in such a way that, for any action, belief, or desire, if it is rational we ought to choose it. Rationality is the use of reason to reach a certain level of reasonableness or unreasonableness. Many positive characterizations of rational beliefs have been proposed by beliefs that are either self-evident or derived from self-evident beliefs by a reliable procedure and beliefs that are consistent with the overwhelming majority of one’s beliefs.511 Analytic epistemology in the twentieth century was conducted as if there were a part from truth itself - just one truth-relevant merit in beliefs, that one typically called either “justification or rationality;”512 and since there was a great deal of disagreement on the answer to that question, there was a great flowering of theories of justification, or theories of rationality.
According to Nicholas Wolterstorff, there are a large number of distinct truth-relevant merits in beliefs, and that neither “Justification” nor “rationality”513 picks out single such merit, both are highly ambiguous terms, each picking out a number of distinct merits. Religious beliefs are formed or evoked by experience of some sort, or by believing what is said in some discourse, or by reflection on the implications of some complex of beliefs that one has previously acquired. Here, we notice that there are no rational activities to understand or justify the experience.
Richard Swinburne considered the nature of actual belief. He saw how in a sense all beliefs given rise to action and must be based on evidence. But he knows that not all beliefs are rational beliefs. For him a beliefs will fail to be rational if it is based on evidence in the wrong way or if it is based on the wrong sort of evidence. According to Swinburne beliefs are rational in so far as they are based on investigation which was, in the believer’s view, adequate, and if the believer believes it to be rational. Swinburne understand by religious beliefs as about transcendent reality, including his belief about whether or not there is a God, and his beliefs about what properties God has (what God is like) and what actions he has performed.514
According to John Hick, the issue is not whether it can be established as an item of indubitable public knowledge that God (or the divine or the Transcendent) exists, or most probably exists, but whether it is rational for those who experience some of life’s moments theistically to believe that God exists, and to proceed to conduct their lives on that basis. Hick looks at a rational belief in general way. For him “belief” can mean a proposition believed or it can be defined as an act or state of believing. The idea of evidence normally presupposes a gap between an observed fact, or body of facts, and an inferred conclusion. Therefore, our ordinary moment - to moment perceptual beliefs contradict the principle that all rational believing must be based upon adequate evidence. It is not that they are based upon inadequate evidence, but rather that the model of evidence-inference-belief does not apply here. Ordinary perceptual beliefs arise directly out of our experience, and it is entirely appropriate, proper, and rational to form these beliefs in this way. The relationship between experience and belief has been much debated in recent work in the philosophy of religion. This discussion has focused upon specifically theistic belief and Hick discusses also in these terms and his argument is that it is rational to believe in the reality of God.
Alvin Plantinga argues on these manifestation-experiences that they are properly basic.515 That is to say, it is as rational for religious persons to hold these basic religious beliefs as it is for all of us to hold our basic perceptual beliefs. But, more basically, it is the biblical assumption translated into philosophical terms. According to Plantinga this experience is what justifies me in holding (the belief) that is the ground of my justification, and by extension, the ground of the belief itself. He then applies this principle to religious beliefs.
In philosophy, experience is generally what we perceive by the senses what we learn from others, or whatever comes from external sources or from inner reflection. In the sense, experience is associated with observation and experiment. Empiricism stresses that our knowledge must be based on experience, but rationalism claims that experience is a potential source of error and prefers rational certainty to mere empirical generalization. In ordinary usage, for every experience there must be something experienced that is independent of the subject of experience. But in philosophy, the relation between experience as a state of consciousness and independent objects of experience becomes a focus of debate. There are many different kinds of experiences, but it is religious experiences that interest me here.
From the point of view of epistemology the modifications of consciousness consisting our apparently perceptual experience are of importantly different kinds. In addition to true perceptions there are misperceptions, illusions, and hallucinations. Therefore, if anyone misled by any of these forms of perceptual error, he or she is then deluded. In each case the delusion consists in a mistaken implicit belief about the cause of the experience: Applying this concept of delusion to the realm of religious experience, we have to ask whether those who assume that their experience of living in God’s presence is caused by their being in God’s presence are believing truly or are, on the contrary, under a delusion.
In modern philosophy of mind a major theme which bears on many theoretical issues, concerns the alleged privacy of an experience as an event knowable only to its possessor and the possibility of public access to that experience. There is much philosophical debate concerning precisely how perception is to be analyzed. In particular, questions are raised concerning the status of the phenomenon. But there is general agreement that in perception, objects present themselves to us in ways that enable us to know them. Similarly, in religious experience God presents himself in ways that enable us to know him and his actions. For Alston there are, it seems, important differences between ordinary perceptual or sense experience and religious experience. Sense perception is a common experience, whereas religious experience is less common, perhaps, even rare, sense perception yields a great deal of information about the world, whereas religious experience yields apparently little information about God, all humans have the capacity for sense perception, but many seem not to have the capacity for religious experience. These differences, however, do not show that religious experience has a structure unlike perception. For one thing, neither the frequency of an experience nor the amount of information it yields tells us anything about its structure.
On the other hand, the limitation of the rationalist way is that the only truths capable of being strictly proved are analytic and ultimately tautological. But we cannot by logic alone demonstrate any matter of fact and existence; these must be known through experience. For sure if nothing were given through experience in its various modes, we should never have anything to reason about. This is as true in religion as in other fields. If God exists, God is not an idea but a reality outside us, in order to be known to men and women, God must therefore become manifest in some way within their experience. This conclusion is in line with the contemporary revolt against the rationalist assumptions which have dominated much of western philosophy since the time of Descartes.516 Descartes held that we can properly be said to know only truths that are self-evident or that can be reached by logical inferences from self-evident premises.
Therefore, those who stress faith and attack reason often place a great deal of emphasis on religious experience. However, religious experience is by no means a purely emotional “happening”; rather, it involves concepts and beliefs about the being that is experienced. If we tried to separate religious experiences from such concepts and beliefs - from the religious belief-system, as we shall call it - then there would be no way saying who or what is that is experienced, or of explaining what sort of difference the experience ought to make to the person who has it. However, such a religious belief system needs to be understood; at least to some degree - it is hard to see how understanding it is not going to involve the use of reason.
For Rationalisms, in order for a religious belief-system to be properly and rationally accepted, it must be possible to prove that the belief-system is true. Rationalism in this sense implies a reliance on reason, or intelligence, in deciding our beliefs and actions. The central idea of strong rationalism was stated forcefully by W. K. Clifford. According to his opinion, no religious belief-system is capable of meeting the high standard of proof that should govern all of our believing, and so a reasonable (and moral) person must do without religious beliefs. Among the objections to Christian belief, as well as to Judaic and Muslim, Characteristic of the modern intelligentsia is the objection that it is no longer rational, if ever it was, to believe that God exists. Therefore, the rational person will have to make his way in the world without supposing that there exists any God in whom he could trust.517
However, according to Nicholas Wolterstorff, to believe in God is our fundamental human obligation. Central to Christianity, Judaism, and Islam alike is the conviction that we as human beings are called to believe in God to trust in him, to rely on him, to place our confidence in him. Central also is the conviction that only by believing in God can the deepest stirrings of the human heart be satisfied. Duty and fulfillment here coalesce. The rationality of trusting someone presupposes the rationality of believing that person exists.
John Locke was among the first to formulate articulately the evidentialist challenge to theistic belief. Reason is reasoning for Locke, and clearly he thinks of it as one among others of our belief-forming processes. Faith is another belief-forming process. It, by contrast, consists in accepting something “as coming from God.”518 However, for Locke it still belongs to reason to judge of the truth of its being a revelation, and of the signification of the words wherein it is delivered.
For evidentialist, one’s belief that God exists is rational only if it is formed or sustained by good inference by inferring it from others of one’s beliefs, which in fact provide adequate evidence for it. But, Wolterstorff, see no reason what so ever to suppose that by the criterion offered the evidentialist challenge is tenable. He see no reason to suppose that people who hold as one of their immediate beliefs that God exists always have adequate reason to surrender that belief or ought to believe that they do. However, for him those abstract and highly general theses of evidentialism no longer look very interesting, once we regard them in the light of the criterion offered. Therefore, for him the fact that it is not rational for some person to believe that God exists does not follow that he ought to give up that belief.
But can we accept the Principle of Credulity? One problem is that whereas there is a fundamental uniformity about the way we report both ordinary perceptual experiences and the beliefs about objects of those experiences, there is quite a diversity of reports about religious experiences and the claim based on them. Person give incompatible descriptions of the Reality experienced. Therefore, where perceptions yield conflicting testimony, we must turn to other experiences and rational arguments to determine the truth of the various claims. That is, where there are different accounts, additional considerations must be introduced to help decide which, if any, of the religious experiences are veridical. Although the reports provide a prima facie ground for their acceptance, not all beliefs based on such experiences are true. Just as we at times doubt perceptual claims for good reason, we might do the same for claims based on religious experience.
According to Hick, religion constitutes our varied human response to transcendent reality. Religious experience then is structured by religious beliefs which are implicit within religious experience. But the question is if this complex of experience and beliefs that takes place in different shapes within the different traditions, is to be regarded simply as a human creation or as our response to a transcendent reality, even if a response whose particular forms always involve the creative activity of the human imagination. Of course the problem of terminology is obvious as we see in many parts of philosophy, and without explanatory gloss none of the available descriptive labels for these two possibilities is entirely adequate.
Much of the philosophical discussion of religious diversity continues to centre on the work of John Hick.519 He is not interested in the question of what can justifiably be affirmed in the face of such diversity, rather, he is primarily concerned with the question of which justified response is most reasonable. Moreover, on this question, he leaves no doubt as to his opinion:
519 See John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human response to the Transcendent, (New Haven: Yale University and London: Macmillan press, 1989), 172.
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religious pluralism is by far the most plausible explanation for the pervasive religious diversity we encounter.
Many Westerners will best understand the emergence of inclusivism and pluralism in terms of the history of Christianity. For most of its history, Christianity has been resolutely exclusivist. In late antiquity, it was a new religion, struggling to establish itself in the face of criticism and persecution. It is not surprising to find it making exclusive claims on behalf of its charismatic founder, Jesus of Nazareth. Of course, Christianity is not the only religion to have fostered exclusivist attitudes. In their more militant movements, Muslims have done the same. Some Jews cherish an ethnically exclusive identity as God’s chosen people, and some Hindus revere the Vedas as a source of absolute truth, Buddhists often see in the teachings of Gautama the only dharma that can liberate humans from illusion and suffering.
Hick has set forth a philosophically sophisticated pluralistic hypothesis that may avoid problems of this sort.520 As he sees it, each of the major religious traditions offers a path to salvation or liberation that involves a transformation of human existence from self-centeredness to reality- centeredness.
Religious plurality is simply a fact. There are religious traditions that differ deeply in terms of their doctrines, practices, institutions, scriptures, experiences, and hope. According to pluralism, a single ultimate religious reality is being differently experienced and understood in all the major religious traditions; they all, as far as the philosophers can tell, offer equally effective paths to salvation or liberation.
According to Harold Coward, Judaism is an appropriate tradition in which to begin the stay of religious pluralism and the world religions. The experience of being a minority group in other cultures, which becoming more common place for all the world religions as religious pluralism spreads, has been the norm for Judaism for countless generations. From the biblical period to the present, Judaism has had to formulate its beliefs and practices in the face of challenges from other cultures and religions. The viewpoint of the modern Jew opens the way for relations with Christianity, Islam, and perhaps Hinduism; however, Buddhism - especially Mahayana Buddhism may prove to be in a separate category. The Buddhist consciousness in which no transcendent God is recognized and the Mahayana awareness of the Divine in the
520 Ibid.
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secular may be judged by the Jewish philosopher as a modern idolatry. Therefore, perhaps the most serious challenge for Judaism comes in its response to Buddhism. As long as a religion is founded on the experience of a transcendent God, Judaism seems to be able to enter into spiritual partnership with it. But if that experience does not hold true for the Buddhist - if it is not a transcendent God that is being experienced - can the Jew still embrace the Buddhist as a spiritual partner? This question has yet to be faced by Judaism.521
The relationship between Christianity and the other religions is one of the key issues in Christian self-understanding. Perhaps pluralism is so pressing a challenge because of the exclusivist missionary approaches adopted by Christianity over the past several hundred years.
In the rapidly expanding body of literature resulting from the encounter with other religions, many Christian theologians are concluding that Christian theology cannot continue to be formulated in isolation from the other religions, and that in fact future developments in Christian theology will be the direct result of serious dialogue with the other religions. Although the Churches are altering their ecclesiology so as to open the way for serious dialogue with other religions, the fundamental Christology that underlies traditional ecclesiology has not yet changed.
Through out the centuries the basic Islamic approach to other religions was to search for some fundamental structures that were harmonious with Islam but which lay hidden beneath the other religion’s deviations from true Islam: A major obstacle for understanding other religions was the lack of accurate information. However, Islam has essentially reached the truth toward which all other religions are evolving. Christianity, it seems, has also virtually reached this goal. It is possible that various nations or cultures will reach the truth in their own way. The Qur’an itself teaches that every community in every age has had its prophet. However, modern education will offer Muslims an opportunity to understand each religion in terms of its own culture, history, world view, and claims to truth. This will have an effect on Islamic self-perception.
Therefore, the religious pluralism of the modern world will force Islam, finding itself in much the same position as the other traditions, to come to grips with them rather provincial
521 See Harold Coward, Pluralism: Challenge to World Religions, Harold Coward, 1-12.
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character of some of its past views of other religions.
According to Hinduism, there is one divine reality that manifests itself in many forms. The various religions are simply different revelations of the one divine reality. Hinduism sees itself as being a very open and tolerant religion. But because it asserts that the Vedas are the most perfect revelation of divine truth, Hinduism also sees itself as providing the criteria against which the revelations of all other religions must be tested. Nevertheless, the Hindu view that there is one Divine, which may be reached by many paths, has proven through out the centuries to be a powerful influence upon Hinduism’s interaction with the other religions.522 Therefore, the Hindu contribution to the modern challenge of religious pluralism is to encourage the inquiring spirit and devotion to truth that is larger than any individual tradition.
The Buddhist attitude to other religions has been described as “critical tolerance”523 combined with a missionary goal. Buddhism has demonstrated a remarkable degree of tolerance and flexibility throughout the course of its expansion. Unlike some other religious expansions, the spread of Buddhism has been accomplished more through the dissemination of ideas than by migration of peoples.
Buddhism rejects the worship of God or gods and the performance of religious rituals as a means to release. It also rejects speculations about ultimate beginnings, especially about whether the self and the world were eternal, and a number of speculations about the ultimate state of the self in the future. The tolerant but critical attitude of the Buddha toward the plurality of religious views is shaped into a rigorous philosophic approach by the Madhyamika Buddhists. If, as the Buddha discovered, the goal of religion is compassion, then, say the Madhyamika, the biggest obstacle to realizing that goal is attachment to our own religious beliefs in such a way as to make them absolute. Based on this understanding, the Madhyamika Buddhist’s attitude towards other religions is one of openness and indeed a “missionary desire”524 to enter into dialogue.
The inherent desire to conceptualize and share religious experience is too deeply ingrained in
522 Ibid., 63-80.
523 See K. N. Jayatilleke, The Buddhist Attitude to Other Religions (Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society, 1975). And see also Harold Coward Pluralism: Challenge to World Religions, 81.
524 See Harold Coward, Pluralism: Challenge to World Religions, 88.
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human nature to render silence an acceptable answer. In fact the Madhyamika himself has been far from silent. His prescription of silence was only intended to apply to claims of absolute knowledge. As long as the limitation is honored, then discussion, including theological discussion, could take place.
The dialogical approach opens the way for the meeting of Christians with Jews, Muslims, and Hindus. However, the theocentric premise could become an obstacle to meaningful encounters with Buddhists and Advaita Vedantists. Therefore, an unresolved problem for all of these approaches is the Buddhist and even those with considerable exposure to Buddhism and Hinduism seem almost willfully to turn a blind eye to this problem. One possible exception might be found in Tillich’s formulation of the “god above gods” as the “ground of being.”525
Dialogue starts from the assumption that each religion has its absolute claims which cannot be relativized. No amount of reformulation will do away with the difference. But, by letting our theologizing be influenced by others we will be forced to greater honesty and deeper spirituality. The prerequisite for dialogue is not the harmonizing of all beliefs but the recognition that each spiritual person has a committed and absolute conviction, and that these convictions are different.
Therefore, the expected outcome is not the homogenization of particular religions but the mutual deepening of spiritual experience within each particular religion, which may lead to glimpses of a common transcendent reality. This shift in perspective had the effect of drawing attention to the universal nature of religious experience in its many different traditions. In addition to turning attention away from metaphysics, rationalism, or revelation, the focus on the humanity of religion has had the effect of highlighting some of the limitations in human nature that must be taken seriously in all future religion.
Am letzten Freitag ist die zweite Jahreskonferenz des Forschungsprojekts „Sicherheitskultur im Wandel“ erfolgreich zu Ende gegangen. Diesmal standen die Folgen des Wandels von Sicherheitskultur im Mittelpunkt, also die Frage, welche Auswirkungen die gestiegenen und immer weiter diversifizierten Ansprüche der Staatsbürger nach „mehr Sicherheit“ auf den Staat, also die Regierung und die Administration, in Zeiten der Globalisierung haben. Ist der Staat mit der Aufgabe, alle vor jedem erdenklichen Risiko zu schützen, überfordert? Ist das überhaupt seine Aufgabe bzw. geht sie wirklich so weit? Wie könnte eine effektive, aber immer noch legitime und transparente Neugestaltung der Sicherheitspolitik aussehen?