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The paper analyzes the mutual influence of the capital structure and the investment decision of a bank, as well as the incentive effects of the bank executives compensation schemes on these decisions. In case the government implicitly or explicitly insures deposits and/or the banks debt, banks are incentivized to invest in risky assets and to have a high leverage. Capital regulation could potentially solve this excessive risk taking problem. However, this is only possible if the regulator can observe and properly measure the investment risks of the bank, which was called into question during the 2008-09 financial crisis. Hence, we propose a regulatory approach that is also able to implement the first best risk taking levels by the bank, but does not require the regulator to know the investment risk of the bank. The regulatory approach involves the implementation of capital requirements, which are made contingent on the management compensation.
We build on previous work on operational performance evaluation of private equity portfolio companies as we are able to at least partially decrypt the black box consisting of restructuring tools these investors use and the corresponding impact on their portfolio companies. Beyond answering whether private equity improves operating efficiency we figure out which of the typical restructuring tools drive operating efficiency. Using a set of over 300 international leveraged buyout transactions in the last thirty years we find that while there is vast improvement in operational efficiency these gains vary considerably. Our top performing transactions are subject to strong equity incentives, frequent asset restructuring and tight control by the investor. Furthermore, investors experience has a positive and financial leverage a negative influence on operational performance.
In this thesis the behavior of banks in financial markets which banks frequently use to obtain short-term as well as long-term financing is studied. In the first chapter we incorporate an interbank market for collateralized lending among banks into a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium (DSGE) framework to analyze the impact of variations in the expected value of the collateral on the interbank lending volume. We find that a central bank which decides to lower the haircut on eligible collateral in repurchase agreements is able to stimulate interbank markets. In the second chapter a microeconomic model of bank behavior on the interbank market is set up to analyze the impact of risk-taking behavior of interbank borrowing banks and uncertainty about their balance sheet quality on the lending behavior of interbank lending banks. It is found that the disruptions on the interbank market are the result of optimal behavior on the part of interbank lending banks in response to the uncertainty about the balance sheet quality of an interbank borrowing bank. In the third chapter we use monthly data on German bank bond spreads and regress it on bank-specific risk factors to assess the degree of market discipline in the German bank bond market. The regression results for the whole German bank bond market indicate that the bond spread does not show signs of market discipline. However, a structural break analysis uncovers that since the beginning of the financial crisis the German bank bond market exhibits at least a weak form of market discipline for bonds issued by medium-size and large banks.
Die Rechnung kommt immer zum Schluss – und sie zu bezahlen, macht in der Regel keine Freude. Wenn wir aber schon eher ungern bezahlen, soll die Zahlungsmethode selbst wenigstens einfach, überall verfügbar und sehr sicher sein. Insbesondere die Sicherheit ist beim Bezahlen im 21. Jahrhundert ein wichtiges Thema, zu dem es interdisziplinäre Forschungsansätze aus Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Informatik und Recht in einem von dynamischer Entwicklung geprägten Umfeld gibt.
We investigate the decisions of listed firms to go private once again. We start by revealing that while a significant number of firms which go public is VC-backed, an overproportional share of these VC-backed firms go private later on (they stay on the exchange for an average of 8.5 years). We interpret this very robust pattern such that IPOs of VC-backed firms are to a large extent a temporary rather than a permanent feature of the corporate governance of these firms. We investigate various potential hypotheses why VCs actually seem to be able to bring marginal firms to the exchange by relating the going-private decisions to various characteristics of the IPO market as well as to VC characteristics. We find strong support for the certification ability of VCs: more experienced and reputable VCs are more able to bring marginal firms to public exchanges via an IPOs. These marginal firms backed-by more reputable and experienced VCs are more likely to go private later on. Hence, our analysis suggests that IPOs backed by experienced VCs are most likely to be a temporary rather than the final stage in the life of the portfolio firm. We find no support that reputable VCs underprice their IPO-exits more implying that they have no need to leave more money on the table to take the marginal firms public.
In this paper, we develop a state-dependent sensitivity value-at-risk (SDSVaR) approach that enables us to quantify the direction, size, and duration of risk spillovers among financial institutions as a function of the state of financial markets (tranquil, normal, and volatile). Within a system of quantile regressions for four sets of major financial institutions (commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds, and insurance companies) we show that while small during normal times, equivalent shocks lead to considerable spillover effects in volatile market periods. Commercial banks and, especially, hedge funds appear to play a major role in the transmission of shocks to other financial institutions. Using daily data, we can trace out the spillover effects over time in a set of impulse response functions and find that they reach their peak after 10 to 15 days.
Debt-induced crises, including the subprime, are usually attributed exclusively to supply-side factors. We examine the role of social influences on debt culture, emanating from perceived average income of peers. Utilizing unique information from a household survey representative of the Dutch population, that circumvents the issue of defining the social circle, we consider collateralized, consumer, and informal loans. We find robust social effects on borrowing, especially among those who consider themselves poorer than their peers; and on indebtedness, suggesting a link to financial distress. We employ a number of approaches to rule out spurious associations and to handle correlated effects.
Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der zeitstetigen Portfoliooptimierung sowie mit Themen aus dem Bereich des Kreditrisikos. Das Ziel der Portfoliooptimierung ist es, zu einem gegebenen Anfangskapital die bestmöglichen Konsum- und Investmentstrategien zu finden. In dieser Arbeit wird dabei vor allem der Einfluss von Einkommen auf diese Entscheidungen untersucht. Da einerseits jedoch der zukünftige Einkommensstrom vom Zufall bestimmt ist und es andererseits keine Finanzprodukte gibt, die diesen replizieren können, stellt die Einbindung von Einkommen in die Portfoliooptimierung ein großes Problem dar. Es führt dazu, dass die Annahmen eines vollständigen Marktes nicht weiter gelten, so dass die Standardmethoden zur Lösung nicht angewendet werden können. Diese Arbeit analysiert mehrere Ausprägungen dieses Problems und geht auf verschiedene Verfahren zur Lösung ein. Weiterhin untersucht diese Studie den Einfluss des Kreditrisikos einer Firma auf die jeweilige Firmenrendite. Dabei wird vor allem auf eine Anomalie, die bereits umfassend in der Literatur diskutiert wurde, Bezug genommen. Diese Anomalie besagt, dass Firmen mit hohen Ausfallwahrscheinlichkeiten geringere Renditen erwirtschaften als Firmen mit kleineren Ausfallwahrscheinlichkeiten. Eine weitere Frage, die in den Bereich des Kreditrisikos fällt, ist die Frage, inwieweit Modelle dazu in der Lage sind, strukturierte Produkte zu bewerten und abzusichern. Diese Arbeit versucht Antworten darauf zu geben.
This contribution draws on two recent publications in which the macroeconomic model data base (www.macromodelbase.com) is employed for model comparisons. The comparative approach is used to base policy analysis on a systematic evaluation of the different implications that a certain economic policy can have when submitted to different modeling approaches. In this manner, policy recommendations are more robust to modeling uncertainty. By extending the comparative approach to forecasting, the authors investigate the accuracy of different forecasting models and obtain more reliable mean forecasts.
In 2011 wurde der Preis für Wirtschaftswissenschaften der schwedischen Reichsbank im Gedenken an Alfred Nobel an die US-Ökonomen Thomas J. Sargent von der New York University und Chistopher A. Sims von Princeton University verliehen. Gerade deutsche Zeitungskommentare kritisierten die Forscher vielfach für die Verwendung „unrealistischer“ Annahmen wie Nutzenmaximierung und rationale Erwartungen. Diese Kritik verkennt den maßgeblichen Beitrag von Sargent und Sims zur Entwicklung der modernen Makroökonomik. Ihre empirischen Methoden sind heute Standardwerkzeuge der akademischen Forschung und werden auch von Ökonomen in Zentralbanken, Finanzministerien und internationalen Organisationen eingesetzt. Sie haben grundlegende neue Erkenntnisse ermöglicht, zum Beispiel über die Wirkungsweise der Geld- und Fiskalpolitik.