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Stellungnahme zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie 2014/59/EU (BRRD-Umsetzungsgesetz) der Bundesregierung vom 22.09.2014
Der Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung zur Umsetzung der EU-Richtlinie 2014/59/EU zur Festlegung eines Rahmens für die Sanierung und Abwicklung von Kreditinstituten und Wertpapierfirmen (“BRRD-Umsetzungsgesetz“) berührt auch die Frage der institutionellen Struktur für die Zuständigkeit für Bankenaufsicht und Geldpolitik. Es gibt gewichtige Gründe dafür, auf lange Sicht die Geldpolitik von der Bankenaufsicht und möglichen Bankenabwicklungs- und -restrukturierungsfragen institutionell zu trennen. Bei einer Trennung ist zu beachten, dass alle Institutionen für ihre jeweiligen Mandate gleichberechtigt auf erstklassige Daten über die Kapitalmärkte und die Transaktionen und Bilanzen der Banken zugreifen müssen. Ein Y-Modell, in dem zwei voneinander unabhängige Institutionen auf eine gemeinsame Datenbasis aufsetzen, kann im deutschen Kontext erreicht werden, indem die Bundesbank und die Bafin in einer Institution zusammengeführt werden, wobei sowohl die Aufsicht wie auch die Geldpolitik als Anstalt in der Anstalt (AIDA) geführt werden. Im Rahmen dieser „doppelten AIDA“-Lösung können beide Anstalten gleichberechtigt auf eine Datenbasis zugreifen. Die Daten werden im Rahmen der Mandate von Geldpolitik und Aufsicht wie bisher bundesweit erhoben. Die Entwicklung und spätere Einführung des Y-Modells („doppelte AIDA“) würde auch einen Modellcharakter für die noch zu führende Debatte um eine sinnvolle Institutionenstruktur für Europa haben.
Das Financial Stability Board (FSB) schlägt zur Lösung des "too big to fail"-Problems einen neuen Risikokapital-Puffer für global tätige systemrelevante Banken vor. Die Kennzahl „Total Loss Absorbing Capacity“ (TLAC), setzt sich zusammen aus hartem Kernkapital und verlustabsorbierendem Fremdkapital. Das verlustabsorbierende, also bail-in-fähige Fremdkapital soll vor anderen Positionen der Passivseite einer Bank in einer Krisensituation vorrangig haften oder aber in Eigenkapital umgewandelt werden. Jan Krahnen argumentiert, dass es für eine glaubhafte Verringerung des "too big to fail"-Problems auf die Anforderungen an das verlustabsorbierende Fremdkapital ankommt. Dass die Aufsicht die Halter von Bail-in Anleihen im Verlustfall tatsächlich einem Bail-in unterzieht ist vor allem nur dann glaubwürdig, wennn andere Banken nicht die Halter solcher Anleihen sind.
A recent proposal by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) suggests a new risk capital buffer for globally operating systemically important financial institutions. The suggested metric, “Total Loss Absorbing Capacity“ (TLAC), is composed of Tier-1 capital and loss absorbing debt. In a crisis situation, “bail-in-able” debt is to be written down or converted into equity. Jan Krahnen argues that the credibility of bail-in, in the case of systemically important financial institutions, hinges crucially on the design of TLAC and the requirements that will be placed on loss absorbing “bail-in-able” debt.The fear of direct systemic consequences through bail-in could be overcome, if a holding ban were placed on the “bail-in-bonds” of financial institutions. The holding ban would stipulate that these bonds cannot be held by other institutions within the banking sector.
According to the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), introduced as a lesson from the recent financial crisis, the losses a failing bank incurred should generally be borne by its investors. Before a minimum bail-in has occurred, government money can only be injected in emergency cas-es to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy and to preserve financial stability. This policy letter argues that in case of the Italian Bank Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), which the Italian gov-ernment currently plans to bail out, a resolution would most likely not cause such a systemic event. A bailout contrary to the existing rules will lead to a mispricing of bank capital and retard the re-structuring of the European banking sector, the authors write. They appeal to the European Central Bank, the Systemic Risk Board and the EU Commission to follow the rules as the test-case MPS will have a direct impact on the credibility of the new BRRD regime and the responsible institutions.
The Wirecard scandal is a wake-up call alerting German politics to the importance of securities market integrity. The role of market supervision is to ensure the smooth functioning of capital markets and their integrity, creating trust among and acceptance by investors locally and globally. The existing patchwork of national supervisory practice in Europe is under discussion today, in the wake of Brexit that will end the role of London as a de-facto lead supervisor in stock and bond markets. A fundamental overhaul of a fragmented securities markets supervisory regime in Europe would offer the potential to lead to the establishment of an independent European Single Market Supervisor (ESMS). Endowed with strong enforcement powers, and supported by the existing national agencies, the ESMS would be entrusted with ensuring a uniform market standard as to transparency and other issues of market integrity across Europe. This would not rule out maintaining a variety of market organization structures at the national level. The ESMS would need executive powers in the world of markets (i.e. securities and trading), much like the SSM in the world of banking. To fill this new role, ESMS would have to be established as a new, independent institution, including an enormously scaled up staff if compared, e.g., to ESMA.
In light of the failed negotiations with Greece, Jan Krahnen argues that an effective reform agenda for Greece can only be designed by the elected government. Fundamental reforms will take time to take full effect and euro area member states will, in the meantime, have to offer Greece a basic level of economic security.
Krahnen demands that policy makers and the professional public involved view the Greek crisis as an opportunity to take the next necessary steps to formulate a reform agenda for the European Monetary Union. A community of supranational and non-party researchers and intellectuals could take the initiative and in a structured process develop a trustworthy and realistic concept that drafts the next big step towards a political union of Europe, including elements of a fiscal union.
Recently, Fuest and Sinn (2018) have demanded a change of rules for the Eurozone’s Target 2 payment system, claiming it would violate the Statutes of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. The authors present a stylized model based on a set of macro-economic assumptions, and show that Target 2 may lead to loss sharing among national central banks (NCBs), thus violating the no risk-sharing requirement laid out by the Eurosystem Statutes.
In this note, I present an augmented model that incorporates essential features of the micro- and macroprudential regulatory and supervisory regime that today is hard-wired into Europe’s banking system. The model shows that the original no-risk-sharing principle is not necessarily violated during a financial crisis of a member state. Moreover, it shows that under a banking union regime, financial crisis asset value losses at or below the 99.9th percentile are borne by private investors, not by taxpayers, and particularly not by central banks.
Therefore, policy conclusions from the micro-founded model differ significantly from those suggested by Fuest and Sinn (2018).
The great financial crisis and the euro area crisis led to a substantial reform of financial safety nets across Europe and – critically – to the introduction of supranational elements. Specifically, a supranational supervisor was established for the euro area, with discrete arrangements for supervisory competences and tasks depending on the systemic relevance of supervised credit institutions. A resolution mechanism was created to allow the frictionless resolution of large financial institutions. This resolution mechanism has been now complemented with a funding instrument.
While much more progress has been achieved than most observers could imagine 12 years ago, the banking union remains unfinished with important gaps and deficiencies. The experience over the past years, especially in the area of crisis management and resolution, has provided impetus for reform discussions, as reflected most lately in the Eurogroup statement of 16 June 2022.
This Policy Insight looks primarily at the current and the desired state of the banking union project. The key underlying question, and the focus here, is the level of ambition and how it is matched with effective legal and regulatory tools. Specifically, two questions will structure the discussions:
What would be a reasonable definition and rationale for a ‘complete’ banking union? And what legal reforms would be required to achieve it?
Banking union is a case of a new remit of EU-level policy that so far has been established on the basis of long pre-existing treaty stipulations, namely, Article 127(6) TFEU (for banking supervision) and Article 114 TFEU (for crisis management and deposit insurance). Could its completion be similarly carried out through secondary law? Or would a more comprehensive overhaul of the legal architecture be required to ensure legal certainty and legitimacy?
This paper discusses policy implications of a potential surge in NPLs due to COVID-19. The study provides an empirical assessment of potential scenarios and draws lessons from previous crises for effective NPL treatment. The paper highlights the importance of early and realistic assessment of loan losses to avoid adverse incentives for banks. Secondary loan markets would help in this process and further facilitate bank resolution as laid down in the BRRD, which should be uphold even in extreme scenarios.
This policy note summarizes our assessment of financial sanctions against Russia. We see an increase in sanctions severity starting from (1) the widely discussed SWIFT exclusions, followed by (2) blocking of correspondent banking relationships with Russian banks, including the Central Bank, alongside secondary sanctions, and (3) a full blacklisting of the ‘real’ export-import flows underlying the financial transactions. We assess option (1) as being less impactful than often believed yet sending a strong signal of EU unity; option (2) as an effective way to isolate the Russian banking system, particularly if secondary sanctions are in place, to avoid workarounds. Option (3) represents possibly the most effective way to apply economic and financial pressure, interrupting trade relationships.
In the recent theoretical literature on lending risk, the coordination problem in multi-creditor relationships have been analyzed extensively. We address this topic empirically, relying on a unique panel data set that includes detailed credit-file information on distressed lending relationships in Germany. In particular, it includes information on creditor pools, a legal institution aiming at coordinating lender interests in borrower distress. We report three major findings. First, the existence of creditor pools increases the probability of workout success. Second, the results are consistent with coordination costs being positively related to pool size. Third, major determinants of pool formation are found to be the number of banks, the distribution of lending shares, and the severity of the distress shock.
The SVB case is a wake-up call for Europe’s regulators as it demonstrates the destructive power of a bank-run: it undermines the role of loss absorbing capital, elbowing governments to bailout affected banks. Many types of bank management weaknesses, like excessive duration risk, may raise concerns of bank losses – but to serve as a run-trigger, there needs to be a large enough group of bank depositors that fails to be fully covered by a deposit insurance scheme. Latent run-risk is the root cause of inefficient liquidations, and we argue that a run on SVB assets could have been avoided altogether by a more thoughtful deposit insurance scheme, sharply distinguishing between loss absorbing capital (equity plus bail-in debt) and other liabilities which are deemed not to be bail-inable, namely demand deposits. These evidence-based insights have direct implications for Europe’s banking regulation, suggesting a minimum and a maximum for a banks’ loss absorption capacity.
Um eine grüne Transformation der Volkswirtschaft zu erreichen, werden Finanzmärkte und die mit ihnen verbundenen Banken eine wichtige Rolle einnehmen müssen. Aber allein vermögen Banken und Kapitalmärkte wenig, wenn sie nicht im Kontext einer klugen, politischen Rahmensetzung und einer transparenten Erfassung der verursachten Schäden auf Unternehmensebene gesehen werden. Diese drei Pfeiler stellen bildlich den tragenden Unterbau für eine Brücke hin zu einer klimaneutralen Wirt-schaftsverfassung dar. Ihr Zusammenwirken ist eine Voraussetzung dafür, dass die Finanzwirtschaft die benötigten Finanzmittel für die grüne Transformation bereitstellen kann.
Climate risk has become a major concern for financial institutions and financial markets. Yet, climate policy is still in its infancy and contributes to increased uncertainty. For example, the lack of a sufficiently high carbon price and the variety of definitions for green activities lower the value of existing and new capital, and complicate risk management. This column argues that it would be welfare-enhancing if policy changes were to follow a predictable longer-term path. Accordingly, the authors suggest a role for financial regulation in the transition.
Eurobonds zur Bewältigung der europäischen Krise? : Wegweisung zu einer modernen Entwicklungsunion
(2011)
Die aktuelle Debatte um den Umgang mit der Verschuldung Griechenlands und anderer EWU Staaten berührt die Grundlagen europäischer Wirtschaftspolitik. Die nächsten Schritte sind wohl abzuwägen, um über eine unmittelbare Kriseneindämmung hinaus eine langfristige Stabilisierung der wirtschaftlichen und politischen Strukturen in der Eurozone zu erreichen.
Eine funktionsfähige Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion hat ihren Preis. Sie ist aber auch von großem Nutzen, gerade für Deutschland und die wettbewerbsstarken Regionen, die insbesondere vom einheitlichen Binnenmarkt und der monetären Stabilität profitieren. Das rechtfertigt zugleich
eine Unterstützung ökonomisch schwächerer Mitglieder der Union durch die stärkeren. Historisch waren Währungsunionen ohne einen derartigen minimalen fiskalischen Ausgleich nicht dauerhaft. Deshalb sind, wenn man die Währungsunion aufrechterhalten will, zwei Extrempositionen - keine Transfers, um keinen Preis ebenso wie deren Gegenteil: jedwedes Defizit wird bedingungslos finanziert - nicht zielführend. Ein kompletter Haftungsausschluss (no bail-out) ist nicht glaubwürdig, solange unabweisbare Schuldenschnitte von insolventen Staaten oder Regionen (wegen Überschuldung) nicht möglich sind, weil sie innerhalb eines stark integrierten Bankenmarktes potentiell unkontrollierbare Rückwirkungen auslösen. Andererseits liefe die unkonditionierte, dauerhafte Finanzierung regionaler Ungleichgewichte auf Transfervolumina hinaus, die eine Überforderung der Transfergeber darstellten. Sie führte vor allem zu einer Perpetuierung der Probleme, weil Anreize zur letztlich unabdingbaren Anpassung fehlten. Damit bleiben zur Schaffung der Voraussetzungen einer funktionsfähigen Währungsunion nur Optionen, die zwischen den Polen liegen.
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, significant regulatory actions have been taken aimed at limiting risks emanating from banks’ trading activities. The goal of this paper is to look at the alternative reforms in the US, the UK and the EU, specifically with respect to the role of proprietary trading. Our conclusions can be summarized as follows: First, the focus on a prohibition of proprietary trading, as reflected in the Volcker Rule in the US and in the current proposal of the European Commission (Barnier proposal), is inadequate. It does not necessarily reduce risk-taking and it is likely to crowd out desired trading activities, thereby possibly affecting financial stability negatively. Second, trading separation into legally distinct or ring-fenced entities within the existing banking organizations, as suggested under the Vickers Report for the UK and the Liikanen proposal for the EU, is a more effective solution. Separation limits cross-subsidies between banking and proprietary trading and diminishes contagion risk, while still allowing for synergies and risk management across banking, non-proprietary trading and proprietary trading.
Über Scheinriesen: Was TARGET-Salden tatsächlich bedeuten : eine finanzökonomische Überprüfung
(2018)
Der TARGET-Saldo der Bundesbank beläuft sich gegenwärtig auf knapp 1 Billion Euro. Kritikern zufolge birgt dieser Umstand hohe Lasten und Risiken für den deutschen Steuerzahler und zeigt, dass Deutschland zu einem „Selbstbedienungsladen“ im Eurosystem geworden sei. Vor diesem Hintergrund erörtert das Papier im Detail, wie TARGET-Salden überhaupt entstehen und was sie finanzökonomisch bedeuten. Die wirtschaftspolitische Analyse kommt zu dem Schluss, dass - anders als von den Kritikern behauptet- unter den Bedingungen einer Währungsunion im Normalbetrieb - TARGET-Salden lediglich Verrechnungssalden ohne weitere Implikationen sind, die aber nützliche Informationen über ökonomisch tieferliegende, regionale Verschiebungen geben können. Unter dem Extremszenario eines Zerfalls der Währungsunion können TARGET-Salden zwar als offene Positionen interpretiert werden, deren spätere Erfüllung würde aber ähnlich dem Brexit von komplizierten politischen Verhandlungen abhängen, sodass über die Werthaltigkeit allenfalls spekuliert werden kann. Sollte man das Extremszenario für bedeutend halten, und politisches Handeln fordern, erscheinen zwei Lösungen sinnvoll. Beide Vorschläge führen zu einer institutionellen Stärkung der Eurozone: i) die Einführung einer Tilgungspraxis, wie sie im US-amerikanischen Fedwire-System angewandt wird. Dabei handelt es sich um eine rein fiktive Tilgung in Form einer Umbuchung auf einem gemeinsamen (Offenmarkt-)Konto bei der EZB; ii) die Bündelung aller monetären Aktivitäten bei der EZB, sodass eine regionale Abgrenzung von Zahlungsvorgängen entfällt (und damit die TARGET-Salden verschwinden), weil alle Banken in direkter Beziehung zu ein und derselben Zentralbank stehen und der Zahlungsverkehr direkt zwischen den beteiligten Banken stattfindet.
We raise some critical points against a naïve interpretation of “green finance” products and strategies. These critical insights are the background against which we take a closer look at instruments and policies that might allow green finance to become more impactful. In particular, we focus on the role of a taxonomy and investor activism. We also describe the interaction of government policies with green finance practice – an aspect, which has been mostly neglected in policy debates but needs to be taken into account. Finally, the special case of green government bonds is discussed.
We raise some critical points against a naïve interpretation of “green finance” products and strategies. These critical insights are the background against which we take a closer look at instruments and policies that might allow green finance to become more impactful. In particular, we focus on the role of a taxonomy and investor activism. We also describe the interaction of government policies with green finance practice – an aspect, which has been mostly neglected in policy debates but needs to be taken into account. Finally, the special case of green government bonds is discussed.
This Policy Letter presents a proposal for designing a program of government assistance for firms hurt by the Coronavirus crisis in the European Union (EU). In our recent Policy Letter 81, we introduced a new, equity-type instrument, a cash-against-tax surcharge scheme, bundled across firms and countries in a European Pandemic Equity Fund (EPEF). The present Policy Letter 84 focuses on the principles and conditions relevant for the operationalization of a EPEF. Our proposal has several desirable features. It: a) offers better risk sharing opportunities, augmenting the resilience of businesses and EU economies; b) is need-based, thereby contributing to an effective use of resources; c) builds on conditions and credible controls, addressing adverse selection and moral hazard; d) is accessible to smaller and medium-sized firms, the backbone of Europe’s economy; e) applies Europe-wide uniform eligibility criteria, strengthening support among member states; f) is a scheme of limited duration, reducing (perceived) government interference in businesses; g) creates a template for a growth-oriented public policy, aligning public and private sector interests; and h) builds on the existing institutional infrastructure and requires minimal legislative adjustments.
This policy letter adds to the current discussion on how to design a program of government assistance for firms hurt by the Coronavirus crisis. While not pretending to provide a cure-all proposal, the advocated scheme could help to bring funding to firms, even small firms, quickly, without increasing their leverage and default risk. The plan combines outright cash transfers to firms with a temporary, elevated corporate profit tax at the firm level as a form of conditional payback. The implied equity-like payment structure has positive risk-sharing features for firms, without impinging on ownership structures. The proposal has to be implemented at the pan-European level to strengthen Euro area resilience.
The spreading of the Covid-19 virus causes a reduction in economic activity worldwide and may lead to new risks to financial stability. The authors draw attention to the urgency of the targeted mitigation strategies on the European level and suggest taking coordinated action on the fiscal side to provide liquidity to affected firms in the corporate sector. Otherwise, virus-related cashflow interruptions could lead to a new full-blown banking crisis. Monetary policy measures are unlikely to mitigate cash liquidity shortages at the level of individual firms. Coordinated action at European level is decisive to prevent markets from losing confidence in the resilience of banks, particularly in countries with limited fiscal capacity. In contrast to the euro crisis of 2011, the cause of the current crisis does not lie in the financial markets; therefore, the risk of moral hazard for banks or states is low.
With the second wave of the Covid-19 pandemic in full swing, banks face a challenging environment. They will need to address disappointing results and adverse balance sheet restatements, the intensity of which depends on the evolution of the euro area economies. At the same time, vulnerable banks reinforce real economy deficiencies. The contribution of this paper is to provide a comparative assessment of the various policy responses to address a looming banking crisis. Such a crisis will fully materialize when non-performing assets drag down banks simultaneously, raising the specter of a full-blown systemic crisis. The policy responses available range from forbearance, recapitalization (with public or private resources), asset separation (bad banks, at national or EU level), to debt conversion schemes. We evaluate these responses according to a set of five criteria that define the efficacy of each. These responses are not mutually exclusive, in practice, as they have never been. They may also go hand in hand with other restructuring initiatives, including potential consolidation in the banking sector. Although we do not make a specific recommendation, we provide a framework for policymakers to guide them in their decision making.
In this paper we put forward a legal argument in favour of granting more independence to BaFin, the German securities market supervisor. Following the Wirecard scandal, our reform proposal aims at strengthening the impartiality and credibility of the German supervisor and, as a consequence, at restoring capital market integrity. In order to achieve the necessary degree of democratic legitimacy for giving BaFin more independence and disassociating it from the Ministry of Finance, the paper sets out the necessary steps for a legal reform that creates accountability of BaFin vis-à-vis the Parliament, subjecting it to strict disclosure and reporting obligations.
The European Commission has published a Green Paper outlining possible measures to create a single market for capital in Europe. Our comments on the Commission’s capital markets union project use the functional finance approach as a starting point. Policy decisions, according to the functional finance perspective, should be essentially neutral (agnostic) in terms of institutions (level playing field). Our main angle, from which we assess proposals for the capital markets union agenda, are information asymmetries and the agency problems (screening, monitoring) which arise as a result. Within this perspective, we make a number of more specific proposals.
In diesem explorativen Beitrag machen wir uns Gedanken über die Zukunft von Deutscher Bank und Commerzbank und entwickeln einen neuen Zugang zu dem Thema: Statt einer Fusion von DB und CB schlagen wir eine Teilfusion nur der Datenzentren vor – es entsteht auf diese Weise die Grundlage für eine Open Banking Plattform als „utility“, also als Betrieb im Eigentum der Nutzer, an der perspektivisch weitere Finanzinstitute teilnehmen können. Die über die Daten kooperierenden Institute bleiben mit Blick auf Produkte und Dienstleistungen unverändert Konkurrenten – „national champions“ entstehen auf diese Weise nicht. Aber es wird damit in Europa die Basis für einen erfolgversprechenden Wettbewerb mit den großen Datenplattformen aus USA und China (Facebook, Amazon, Alipay) gelegt, die früher oder später in den Finanzmarkt eindringen werden. Das von uns vorgeschlagene Modell einer offenen Datenplattform für Banken verhindert das Entstehen von „national champions“ und schützt damit auch das Kernanliegen der Bankenunion: Die Schaffung eines Finanzsystems, dessen Banken jede für sich ausscheiden können ohne eine systemische Krise auszulösen, und ohne den Steuerzahler zu einer Rettungsaktion zu zwingen
This paper analyzes loan pricing when there is multiple banking and borrower distress. Using a unique data set on SME lending collected from major German banks, we can instrument for effective coordination between lenders, carrying out a panel estimation. The analysis allows to distinguish between rents that accrue due to single bank lending, rents that accrue due to relationship lending, and rents that accrue due to the elimination of competition among multiple lenders. We find the relationship lending to have no discernible impact on loan spreads, while both single lending and coordinated multiple lending significantly increase the spread. Thus, contrary to predictions in the literature, multiple lending does not insure the borrower against hold-up. JEL Classification: D74, G21, G33, G34
This paper discusses the role of internal corporate ratings as a means by which commercial banks condense their informational advantage and preserve it vis-à-vis a competitive lending market. In drawing on a unique data set collected from leading universal banks in Germany, we are able to evaluate the extent to which non-public information determines corporate ratings. As a point of departure, the paper describes a sample of rating systems currently in use, and points at methodological differences between them. Relying on a probit analysis, we are able to show that the set of qualitative, or soft, factors is not simply redundant with respect to publicly available accounting data. Rather, qualitative information tends to be decisive in at least one third of cases. It tends to improve the firms' overall corporate rating. In the case of conflicting rating changes, i.e. when qualitative and quantitative rating changes have opposing signs, quantitative criteria dominate the overall rating change. Furthermore, the more restrictive the weighting scheme as part of the rating methodology is, the stronger is the impact of qualitative information on the firms' overall rating. The implications of our results underline the need to define stringent rating standards, from both a risk management and a regulatory point of view. Revised edition published in: ZEW Wirtschaftsanalysen 2001, Bd 54, Baden-Baden, Nomos
Multiple lenders and corporate distress: evidence on debt restructuring : [Version Juli 2002]
(2002)
In the recent theoretical literature on lending risk, the common pool problem in multi-bank relationships has been analyzed extensively. In this paper we address this topic empirically, relying on a unique panel data set that includes detailed credit-fie information on distressed lending relationships in Germany. In particular, it includes information on bank pools, a legal institution aimed at coordinating lender interests in borrower distress. We find that the existence of small bank pools increases the probability of workout success and that coordination costs are positively related to pool size. We identify major determinants of pool formation, in particular the distribution of lending shares among banks, the number of banks, and the severity of the distress shock to the borrower.
We analyse the coordination problem in multi-creditor relationships empirically, relying on a unique panel data set that contains detailed credit-file information on distressed lending relationships in Germany, including information on creditor pools, a legal institution aiming at coordinating lender interests in borrower distress. We report three major findings. First, the existence of creditor pools increases the probability of workout success. Second, the results are consistent with coordination costs being positively related to pool size. Third, major determinants of pool formation are found to be the number of banks, the distribution of lending shares, and the severity of the distress shock.
Die große Herausforderung, um das systemische Risiko im Finanzsektor zu vermindern, besteht darin, kluge Finanzarchitektur zu etablieren, die gewährtleistet, dass ein verbindlicher Anteil von Bankanleihen außerhalb des Finanzsektors gehalten wird. Die Anleihegläubiger von außerhalb des Bankensektors müssen sich dadurch auszeichnen, dass sie kein Refinanzierungsrisiko haben, wenn sie eine plötzliche Verlussituation erleben.
The bail-in puzzle
(2011)
Under the current conditions of a global financial crisis, notably in Europe’s banking industry, the governance role of bond markets is defunct. In fact, investors have understood that bank debt will almost always be rescued with taxpayers’ money. The widespread practice of government-led bank bailouts has thus severely corrupted the bond market, leading to the underestimation of risk and, as a consequence, the destruction of market discipline. Any feasible solution to the bank-debt-is-too-cheap problem will have to re-install true default risk for bank bond holders.
This paper analyses the role of collateral in loan contracting when companies are financed by multiple bank lenders and relationship lending can be present. We conjecture and empirically validate that relationship lenders, who enjoy an informational advantage over arm’s-length banks, are more senior to strengthen their bargaining power in future renegotiation if borrower’s face financial distress. This deters costly conflicts between lenders and fosters workout decisions by the best informed party. Consistent with our conjecture, we find that relationship lender in general have a higher probability to be collateralized, and a higher degree of collateralization (i.e. seniority). Furthermore, we show that seniority and the status of relationship lending increases the likelihood that a bank invests in a risky workout of distressed borrowers. Both findings support the view that collateral is a strategic instrument intended to influence the bargaining position of banks. Our result further suggest that seniority and relationship lending are complementary to each other. JEL Classification: G21