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This note proposes a new set-up for the fund backing the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). The proposed fund is a Multi-Tier Resolution Fund (MTRF), restricting the joint and several supranational liability to a limited range of losses, bounded by national liability at the upper and the lower end. The layers are, in ascending order: a national fund (first losses), a European fund (second losses), the national budget (third losses), the ESM (fourth losses, as a backup for sovereigns). The system works like a reinsurance scheme, providing clear limits to European-level joint liability, and therefore confining moral hazard. At the same time, it allows for some degree of risk sharing, which is important for financial stability if shocks to the financial system are exogenous (e.g., of a supranational macroeconomic nature). The text has four parts. Section A describes the operation of the Multi-Tier Resolution Fund, assuming the fund capital to be fully paid-in (“Steady State“). Section B deals with the build-up phase of the fund capital (“Build up“). Section C discusses how the proposal deals with the apparent incentive conflicts. The final Section D summarizes open questions which need further thought (“Open Questions“).
Ausgehend von einer Erläuterung der Kriseninterpretation (crisis narrative), wie sie in dem Bericht der Liikanen-Kommission zugrunde liegt, werden die nach Ansicht des Verfassers zentralen Vorschläge des Kommissionsberichts ausgewählt, vorgestellt und in den größeren Rahmen einer erneuerten Ordnungspolitik für die Finanzmärkte Europas eingeordnet. Die mit den Vorschlägen eng zusammenhängenden Reformelemente der Bankenunion werden in diesem Text bewusst ausgeklammert. Die beiden zentralen Strukturvorschläge des Liikanen-Berichts betreffen die Abspaltung der Handelsgeschäfte von dem Universalbankengeschäft für große, internationale Banken (der Trennbankenvorschlag), sowie die verpflichtende Emission nachrangigen, glaubwürdig haftenden Fremdkapitals (der strenge Bail-in Vorschlag). Glaubwürdigkeit der Haftungszusage wird durch strenge Halterestriktionen erreicht. Vorhersehbare Folgerungen einer Einführung dieser Strukturregeln für die Finanzindustrie und -märkte werden in einem abschließenden Teil angesprochen.
Content A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, INCLUDING MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS B. COMPLETE REPORT 1. INTRODUCTION 2. RISK MAP 2.1 Why a Risk Map is needed, and for what purpose 2.1.1 Creating a unified data base 2.1.2 Assessing systemic risk 2.1.3 Allowing for coordinated policy action 2.2 Recommendations 3. GLOBAL REGISTER FOR LOANS (CREDIT REGISTER) AND BONDS (SECURITIES REGISTER) 3.1 Objectives of a credit register 3.2 Credit registers in Europe (and beyond) 3.3 Suggestions for a supra-national Credit Register 3.4 Integrating a supra-national Securities Register 3.5 Recommendations 4. HEDGE FUNDS: REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 4.1 What are hedge funds (activities, location, size, regulation)? 4.2 What are the risks posed by hedge funds (systematic risks, interaction with prime brokers)? 4.3 Routes to better regulation (direct, indirect) 4.4 Recommendations 5. RATING AGENCIES: REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 5.1 The role of ratings in bond and structured finance markets, past and present 5.2 Elements of rating integrity (independence, compensation and incentives, transparency) 5.3 Recommendations (registration, transparency, annual report on rating performance) 6. PROCYCLICALITY: PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 6.1 What is meant by “procyclicality” and why is it a problem? 6.2 The roots of procyclicality and the lessons it suggests for policymakers 6.2.1 Underpinnings of the phenomenon 6.2.2 Lessons to be learned 6.3 Characteristics of a macrofinancial stability framework 6.4 Recommendations 7. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND FORA, IN PARTICULAR THE IMF, BIS AND FSF 7.1 Legitimacy 7.2 Re-focusing the work 7.3 Recommendations
Content New Financial Architecture (Short Version) 1. Purpose of the paper – causes of the crisis 2. Recommendations 2.1. Incentives 2.2. Transparency 2.3. Regulation and Supervision 2.4. International Institutions 3. Concluding remarks Appendix (Full text) A 1. Causes of the crisis A 2. Improving the Framework A 2.1. Incentives A 2.2. Transparency A 2.3. Regulation and Supervision A 2.4. International Institutions A 3. Concluding remarks
Instabile Finanzmärkte
(2009)
Die Vorstellung selbst-stabilisierender, zum Gleichgewicht tendierender Finanzmärkte, lange Zeit als Selbstverständlichkeit angesehen, ist durch die aktuelle Banken- und Kreditkrise in Frage gestellt. Trotz ausgefeilten Risikomanagements der Banken und einer an Basel II orientierten Aufsicht ist es in den Jahren 2007-2009 zu einem Zusammenbruch des Interbankenmarktes und weiter Teile der Anleihemärkte gekommen. Die hierdurch erzwungenen massiven Staatsinterventionen zur Bankenrettung sind ohne Beispiel in der modernen Wirtschaftsgeschichte. In diesem Essay suchen wir nach Ansatzpunkten einer Erklärung für die Instabilität der Finanzmärkte. Als zentrale Krisenursache sehen wir Schwächen der Informationsarchitektur, deren Aufgabe darin besteht, glaubwürdige Information für Investoren bereitzustellen. Drei Determinanten der Instabilität werden herausgestellt, erstens die Nutzung von Schuldtiteln verbunden mit hohen Verschuldungsgraden, zweitens die Handelbarkeit von Titeln verbunden mit erhöhter Risikoübernahme, sowie drittens die zunehmende Komplexität von Finanzprodukten und Finanznetzwerken verbunden mit einer Homogenisierung der Aktiva- und Risikostrukturen von Finanzinstituten. Alle drei Faktoren verstärken die Anfälligkeit des Finanzsystems und zugleich die Bedeutung der Informationsarchitektur. Hieraus lassen sich Anforderungen an eine sinnvolle Reform der Regulierung ableiten. Neben den Anreizproblemen, die Gegenstand einer weiteren Arbeit sind (Franke/Krahnen 2009), diskutieren wir hier vier Kernthemen: glaubwürdige Informationen, makroprudentielle Aufsicht, robuste Eigenkapitalstandards und eine notwendige Risikobegrenzung auf Derivatemärkten
The Capital Markets Union-project of the European Commission aims for an increase of marketbased debt financing of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), complementing bank lending. In this essay we argue that rather than focussing on pure non-bank lending, a reasonable mix of bankand market-based financing should be considered. Banks are said to have a comparative advantage in critical lending functions such as credit screening, debtor monitoring and debt renegotiation. All forms of lending require a persistent skin-in-the-game of critical players in order to be effective. The regulator should insist on full disclosure of skin-in-the-game, thereby improving capital allocation and reducing systemic risks.
This essay reviews a cornerstone of the European Banking Union project, the resolution of systemically important banks. The focus is on the inherent conflict between a possible intervention by resolution authorities, conditional on a crisis situation, and effective prevention prior to a crisis. Moreover, the paper discusses the rules for bail-in debt and conversion rules for different layers of debt. Finally, some organizational requirements to achieve effective resolution results will be analyzed.
Wir halten das bisher in Deutschland und anderen Ländern praktizierte Krisenmanagement für ordnungspolitisch inakzeptabel. Die aktuelle Notlage 2007 und 2008, verbunden mit einem enormen Überraschungsmoment, ließ möglicherweise keine andere Wahl, als die betroffenen Banken unbürokratisch zu retten - aber nun ist es Zeit, grundlegende Lehren aus den Rettungsaktionen zu ziehen.
On November 8, 2013, several members of the British House of Lords’ Subcommittee A conducted a hearing at the ECB in Frankfurt, Germany, on “Genuine Economic and Monetary Union and its Implications for the UK”. Professors Otmar Issing and Jan Pieter Krahnen were called as expert witnesses.
The testimony began with a general discussion on the elements considered necessary for a functioning internal market. Do economic union and monetary union require a fiscal union or even a political union, beyond the elements of the banking union currently being prepared? In this context, also the critique of the German current account surplus and the international expectations that Germany stimulate internal demand to support growth in crisis countries, were discussed.
With regard to the monetary union, the members of the subcommittee asked for an assessment of how European nations and the banking industry would have fared in the banking crisis that followed the Lehman collapse, had there not been a common currency. Given the important role that the ECB has played in the course of the crisis management, the members further asked for an evaluation of the OMT-program of the ECB and also if the monetary union is in need of common debt instruments, in order to provide the ECB with the possibility of buying EU liabilities, comparable to the Fed buying US Treasury bonds. Finally, the dual role of the ECB for monetary policy and banking supervision was an issue touched on by several questions.
The future of securitization
(2008)
Securitization is a financial innovation that experiences a boom-bust cycle, as many other innovations before. This paper analyzes possible reasons for the breakdown of primary and secondary securitization markets, and argues that misaligned incentives along the value chain are the primary cause of the problems. The illiquidity of asset and interbank markets, in this view, is a market failure derived from ill-designed mechanisms of coordinating financial intermediaries and investors. Thus, illiquidity is closely related to the design of the financial chains. Our policy conclusions emphasize crisis prevention rather than crisis management, and the objective is to restore a “comprehensive incentive alignment”. The toe-hold for strengthening regulation is surprisingly small. First, we emphasize the importance of equity piece retention for the long-term quality of the underlying asset pool. As a consequence, equity piece allocation needs to be publicly known, alleviating market pricing. Second, on a micro level, accountability of managers can be improved by compensation packages aiming at long term incentives, and penalizing policies with destabilizing effects on financial markets. Third, on a macro level, increased transparency relating to effective risk transfer, risk-related management compensation, and credible measurement of rating performance stabilizes the valuation of financial assets and, hence, improves the solvency of financial intermediaries. Fourth, financial intermediaries, whose risk is opaque, may be subjected to higher capital requirements.
Default risk sharing between banks and markets : the contribution of collateralized debt obligations
(2005)
This paper contributes to the economics of financial institutions risk management by exploring how loan securitization a.ects their default risk, their systematic risk, and their stock prices. In a typical CDO transaction a bank retains through a first loss piece a very high proportion of the expected default losses, and transfers only the extreme losses to other market participants. The size of the first loss piece is largely driven by the average default probability of the securitized assets. If the bank sells loans in a true sale transaction, it may use the proceeds to to expand its loan business, thereby incurring more systematic risk. We find an increase of the banks' betas, but no significant stock price e.ect around the announcement of a CDO issue. Our results suggest a role for supervisory requirements in stabilizing the financial system, related to transparency of tranche allocation, and to regulatory treatment of senior tranches. JEL Klassifikation: D82, G21, D74 .
This present comment suggests an amendment to the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council, establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms. The current proposal focuses on bail-in, but does not sufficiently take into account the pressure exerted on central bankers, supervisors and politicians by the fear of interbank contagion. The only way out of this hold-up type of situation can be found in bail-in bonds. Bail-in bonds are dedicated loss taking debt instruments, whose status of being first in line if it comes to default is clearly communicated from day one.
This paper provides a systematic analysis of individual attitudes towards ambiguity, based on laboratory experiments. The design of the analysis allows to capture individual behavior across various levels of ambiguity, ranging from low to high. Attitudes towards risk and attitudes towards ambiguity are disentangled, providing pure measures of ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity aversion is captured in several ways, i.e. as a discount factor net of a risk premium, and as an estimated parameter in a generalized utility function. We find that ambiguity aversion varies across individuals, and with the level of ambiguity, being most prominent for intermediate levels. Around one third of subjects show no aversion, one third show maximum aversion, and one third show intermediate levels of ambiguity aversion, while there is almost no ambiguity seeking. While most theoretical work on ambiguity builds on maxmin expected utility, our results provide evidence that MEU does not adequately capture individual attitudes towards ambiguity for the majority of individuals. Instead, our results support models that allow for intermediate levels of ambiguity aversion. Moreover, we find risk aversion to be statistically unrelated to ambiguity aversion on average. Taken together, the results support the view that ambiguity is an important and distinct argument in decision making under uncertainty.
This paper applies the theory of structured finance to the regulation of asset backed securities. We find the current regulation in Europe (Article 405 of the CRR) and the US (Section D of Dodd-Frank Act) to be severely flawed with respect to its key intention: the imposition of a strict loss retention requirement. While nominal retention is always 5%, the true level of loss retention varies across available retention options between zero loss retention and full loss retention at the extreme ends. Based on a standard model of structured finance transactions, we propose a new risk retention metric RM measuring the level of an issuer’s skin-in-the-game. The new metric could help to achieve a better implementation of CRR/CRD-IV and DFA, by making disclosure of the RM-number compulsory for all ABS transactions. There are also implications for the operation of rating agencies. On a general level, the RM metric will be instrumental in achieving simplicity and transparency in securitizations (STS).
Geiz war gestern
(2020)
In dieser Notiz wird ein neues Konzept für eine europäische Einlagensicherung vorgeschlagen, welches den starken politischen Vorbehalten Rechnung trägt, die gegen eine Vergemeinschaftung der Haftung für Bankeinlagen bestehen. Das skizzierte drei-stufige Einlagensicherungsmodell führt existierende nationale Einlagensicherungseinrichtungen weiter, bietet einen europäischen Verlustausgleich und verhindert eine exzessive Risikoübernahme zu Lasten der internationalen Gemeinschaft.
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, significant regulatory actions have been taken aimed at limiting risks emanating from trading in bank business models. Prominent reform proposals are the Volcker Rule in the U.S., the Vickers Report in the UK, and, based on the Liikanen proposal, the Barnier proposal in the EU. A major element of these reforms is to separate “classical” commercial banking activities from securities trading activities, notably from proprietary trading. While the reforms are at different stages of implementation, there is a strong ongoing discussion on what possible economic consequences are to be expected. The goal of this paper is to look at the alternative approaches of these reform proposals and to assess their likely consequences for bank business models, risk-taking and financial stability. Our conclusions can be summarized as follows: First, the focus on a prohibition of only proprietary trading, as envisaged in the current EU proposal, is inadequate. It does not necessarily reduce risk-taking and it likely crowds out desired trading activities, thereby negatively affecting financial stability. Second, there is potentially a better solution to limit excessive trading risk at banks in terms of potential welfare consequences: Trading separation into legally distinct or ring-fenced entities within the existing banking organizations. This kind of separation limits cross-subsidies between banking and proprietary trading and diminishes contagion risk, while still allowing for synergies across banking, non-proprietary trading and proprietary trading.
On January 29, 2014, EU Commissioner Barnier published a draft law proposing a ban for proprietary trading by big banks in Europe. In this opinion piece, published in a German newspaper on 30 January, 2014, Jan Pieter Krahnen, who was a member of the Liikanen Commission, argues that the proposal could prove to be effective in preventing systemic risk.
In this exploratory article, we consider the future of Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank and develop a new approach to the topic: instead of a merger of DB and CB we propose to consider a partial merger of the IT and related back office functions in order to create the basis for an Open Banking platform in Germany. Such a platform would act as a cross-institutional infrastructure company in which the participating banks develop a common data and IT platform (while respecting the data protection regulations). Significant parts of the transaction processes would be pooled by the institutions and executed by the Open Banking platform. Moreover, the institutions remain legally independent and compete with each other at the level of products and services that are developed and produced using just this common data and IT platform – “national champions” would not be created.
But such an “Open Banking Platform” could become even the nucleus of a European Banking platform that could be competitive with existing global data platforms from the USA and China which are already offering financial services and are likely to expand their offerings in the foreseeable future. The proposed model of an open data platform for banks prevents the emergence of national champions and supports the main goal of the banking union: creation of a financial system, in which single banks can be resolved without provoking a systemic crisis and forcing taxpayers to finance bailouts.
Stinginess was yesterday
(2020)
In der dritten Veranstaltung der „Gesprächsreihe zu Strukturreformen im europäischen Bankensektor“ diskutierten Professor Dr. Jan Krahnen und Dr. Theodor Weimer die Auswirkungen von Regulierung auf Bankverhalten und Wettbewerb, insbesondere im Hinblick auf die Vorschläge der Liikanen-Kommission. Weimer verwies auf die volkswirtschaftlichen Kosten einer zu strengen Bankenregulierung, u.a. negative Auswirkungen auf die Kreditvergabe. Weimer warnte auch davor, dass man in Europa, und gerade in Deutschland, strenger reguliere als in anderen Ländern. Krahnen erklärte, man habe durch die Liikanen-Vorschläge vor allem das Problem des systemischen Risikos im Bankensektor adressieren wollen. Außerdem sei es ein Ziel der Kommission gewesen, Banken so zu regulieren, dass der Steuerzahler im Krisenfall nicht länger für die Risiken der Banken haften müsse. Es sei notwendig, den Bankensektor zu reformieren, damit Banken abgewickelt werden könnten, auch wenn diese untereinander vernetzt sind.
Gesprächsreihe zu Strukturreformen im europäischen
Bankensektor : Zukunft der Universalbanken
(2013)
In der zweiten Veranstaltung der „Gesprächsreihe zu Strukturreformen im europäischen Bankensektor“ diskutierten Professor Dr. Jan Pieter Krahnen und Dr. Michael Kemmer die Zukunft der Universalbanken. Anlass war der Vorschlag der Liikanen-Kommission, dass Finanzinstitute einen Teil ihres Investmentbankings, den Eigenhandel und das Market-Making, ab einer bestimmten Größenordnung ausgliedern sollen.
Gesprächsreihe zu Strukturreformen im Europäischen Bankensektor: Managementvergütung im Bankensektor
(2013)
In der ersten Veranstaltung der „Gesprächsreihe zu Strukturreformen im europäischen Bankensektor“ diskutierten Professor Dr. Jan Krahnen und Dr. Thomas Mayer den im Liikanen-Bericht enthaltenen Vorschlag zur Managervergütung im Bankensektor. Der Vorschlag baut auf einem der Kernvorschläge der Liikanen-Kommission auf, nach dem Finanzinstitute gehalten sein sollen, einen Teil ihres Fremdkapitals so zu strukturieren, dass, bei Schieflage des Finanzinstituts, eine Inhaftungnahme der Gläubiger dieses Fremdkapitals möglich wird. Um dies zu erreichen, empfiehlt die Liikanen-Kommission für alle Banken, dass diese einen festgelegten Prozentsatz ihres Kapitals als „Bail-in Anleihen“ begeben müssen. Der Vorschlag zur Managervergütung sieht vor Bail-in Anleihen für die leistungsorientierte und anreizorientierte Entlohnung von Managern einzusetzen, um Anreize zu geben, die Risikopolitik des Unternehmens so zu verankern, dass auch längerfristig keine exorbitanten Risiken auftreten.
Am 6. Februar 2013 hat die Bundesregierung den "Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Abschirmung von Risiken und zur Planung der Sanierung und Abwicklung von Kreditinstituten und Finanzgruppen” veröffentlicht. Artikel 2 des Gesetzesentwurfs sieht vor bei systemrelevanten Finanzinstitutionen das Einlagen- und Kreditgeschäft vom Handelsgeschäft abzutrennen. Die Zielsetzung des Gesetzentwurfs, Kapitalkosten wieder in direkte Abhängigkeit des Risikos von Geschäftsfeldern zu setzen und eine Abwicklung zu erleichtern, die ohne den Einsatz von Steuermitteln gelingen kann, ist begrüßenswert. In seiner derzeitigen Ausgestaltung läuft der Gesetzesentwurf jedoch Gefahr, zwar symbolträchtig zu sein, aber in der Zielerreichung hinsichtlich Stabilität des Finanzmarktes und Schutz von Einlegern und Steuerzahlern hinter den Erwartungen zurückzubleiben.
Fünf Jahre nach Beginn der Banken- und Staatsschuldenkrise („Finanzkrise“) kämpfen wir weiterhin mit den elementaren Problemen: Bei Märkten und Marktteilnehmern fehlt es an Stabilität und Vertrauen. Viele Banken stehen immer noch nicht auf eigenen Füßen und nehmen die ihnen in Europa traditionell zukommende zentrale Rolle für Wachstum und Entwicklung nicht wahr. Den guten Absichten, auf die sich die großen politischen Mächte während der ersten G-20 Treffen 2008 und 2009 verständigt hatten, ist eine Reihe von sinnvollen Ideen und Konzepten gefolgt. Die Voraussetzungen für einen grundlegenden reformerischen Erfolg sind somit gegeben – doch nun muss die Umsetzung folgen. Dazu bedarf es mutiger Entscheidungen. Im Jahr 2014 muss die europäische Politik gleich mehrere Weichen stellen. Der Bundesregierung kommt dabei die Schlüsselrolle zu. Sie muss den Mut haben zu radikaler Ordnungspolitik!
In this note, a new concept for a European deposit guarantee scheme is proposed, which takes account of the strong political reservations against a mutualization of the liability for bank deposits. The three-stage model for deposit insurance outlined in the text builds on existing national deposit guarantee schemes, offering loss compensation on a European level and at the same time preventing excessive risk and moral hazard taking by individual banks.
This policy letter provides an overview of the strengths, weaknesses, risks and opportunities of the upcoming comprehensive risk assessment, a euro area-wide evaluation of bank balance sheets and business models. If carried out properly, the 2014 comprehensive assessment will lead the euro area into a new era of banking supervision. Policy makers in euro area countries are now under severe pressure to define a credible backstop framework for banks. This framework, as the author argues, needs to be a broad, quasi-European system of mutually reinforcing backstops.
The eurozone remains in a deep, largely macro-economic crisis. A robust global economy and falling oil prices have supported Europe’s economy for some time, but by now it is clear that the eurozone will only be able to pull itself out of this crisis by means of more decisive action. One response, the recent easing of monetary policy by the European Central Bank (ECB), has, for the most part, been sharply and one-sidedly criticised in Germany. Monetary policy inaction seems to be the preferred option of many in Germany.
The authors discuss the following question: What would happen if the ECB failed to respond to the excessively low inflation and the weak economy? And what economic policy would be suitable under the current circumstances, if not monetary policy?
Von Februar bis Juni 2015 hat die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) die Notfall-Liquiditätshilfen (emergency liquidity assistance, ELA) für griechische Banken von 50 auf etwa 90 Milliarden Euro ausgeweitet. Dies hat zu einer Diskussion unter Wissenschaftlern, Politikern und Praktikern geführt, ob diese Liquiditätshilfen rechtmäßig sind. Es wurde der Vorwurf erhoben, die EZB trage bewusst zu einer Konkursverschleppung der bereits insolventen griechischen Banken bei.
Wir nehmen diesen Vorwurf zum Anlass, die Grundsätze des ELA-Programms genauer zu betrachten und die Frage zu diskutieren, ob das Programm in der aktuellen Situation rechtmäßig war. Zunächst beschreiben wir hierfür aus finanzwirtschaftlicher Perspektive die komplexe Beziehung zwischen der Europäischen Union, der EZB und den griechischen Banken. Dabei gehen wir insbesondere auf die wirtschaftspolitischen Grundsätze einer Währungsunion mit einer unvollständigen Fiskalunion (oder Haushaltskonsolidierung) ein. Vor diesem Hintergrund analysieren wir dann die Entscheidung der EZB, weiterhin Liquiditätshilfen an griechische Banken bereitzustellen. Wir kommen zu dem Ergebnis, dass das Vorgehen der EZB nicht als Konkursverschleppung zu bezeichnen ist.
The European Central Bank (ECB) increased the emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) for Greek banks from €50 billion in February 2015 to approximately €90 billion in June 2015. Its actions were accompanied by a discussion among academics, politicians and practitioners regarding the legitimacy of the ELA. Some have even accused the ECB of deliberately delaying the bankruptcy filing of already insolvent Greek banks.
We take the claim regarding insolvency delay as an opportunity to highlight the underlying economics of the ELA program and discuss its legitimacy in the current situation. We start by characterizing the complex interrelationship of the European Union, the ECB and the Greek banks through the lens of financial economics, with a particular focus on the political economy of a monetary union with incomplete fiscal union (or fiscal consolidation). Combining these two issues, we examine the decision of the ECB to continue the provision of ELA to Greek banks. Our conclusions, drawn from the analysis, do not support the claim that the ECB’s actions are consistent with a delayed filing for insolvency.
In this paper we propose a way forward towards increased financial resilience in times of growing disagreement concerning open borders, free trade and global regulatory standards. In light of these concerns, financial resilience remains a highly valued policy objective. We wish to contribute by suggesting an agenda of concrete, do-able steps supporting an enhanced level of resilience, combined with a deeper understanding of its relevance in the public domain.
First, remove inconsistencies across regulatory rules and territorial regimes, and ensure their credibility concerning implementation. Second, discourage the use of financial regulatory standards as means of international competition. Third, give more weight to pedagogically explaining the established regulatory standards in public, to strengthen their societal backing.
The European Commission is trying to reboot the CMU project: The High-Level Forum on Capital Markets Union – a group of 28 selected experts from industry, academia and civil society – is expected to submit policy recommendations by the end of May 2020 which will feed into the Commission’s new CMU agenda. This contribution is largely based on a letter to the High-Level Forum that gives feedback on the Interim Report published in February. There, we introduce a comprehensive approach to distinguish, from a functional finance perspective, between the ‘game changers’ and what is nice to have. We highlight the importance of common and consistent supervisory practices across Member States and recommend building up a European Securities and Exchange Commission (E-SEC) according to the American model.
Mit Blick auf die gescheiterten Verhandlungen mit Griechenland, argumentiert Jan Krahnen im vorliegenden Policy Beitrag, dass eine zielführende Reformagenda nur von der gewählten Regierung Griechenlands formuliert werden kann. Die Euro-Staaten müssten Griechenland für die Zeitdauer einer Restrukturierungszeit eine Grundsicherung zusagen. Die EU-Staaten fordert Krahnen dazu auf, aus der Griechenlandkrise die notwendigen Konsequenzen zu ziehen. Auch die Eurozone brauche eine effektive Reformagenda. Die Verschuldungsdynamik innerhalb der Währungsunion, deren Auswüchse am Beispiel Griechenlands besonders deutlich werden, könne bei fehlendem guten Willen nur durch eine politische Union und eine in sie eingebettete Fiskalunion aufgelöst werden. Krahnen argumentiert, dass ein Weiterverhandeln über Restrukturierungsauflagen aus der derzeitigen verfahrenen Situation nicht herausführen wird. Entscheidend sei, ein mehr oder weniger umfassendes Paket zu schnüren, das Elemente eines teilweisen internationalen Haftungsverbunds mit Elementen eines partiellen nationalen Souveränitätsverzichts verbindet.