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The inclusive charged particle transverse momentum distribution is measured in proton–proton collisions at s=900 GeV at the LHC using the ALICE detector. The measurement is performed in the central pseudorapidity region (|η|<0.8) over the transverse momentum range 0.15<pT<10 GeV/c. The correlation between transverse momentum and particle multiplicity is also studied. Results are presented for inelastic (INEL) and non-single-diffractive (NSD) events. The average transverse momentum for |η|<0.8 is 〈pT〉INEL=0.483±0.001 (stat.)±0.007 (syst.) GeV/c and 〈pT〉NSD=0.489±0.001 (stat.)±0.007 (syst.) GeV/c, respectively. The data exhibit a slightly larger 〈pT〉 than measurements in wider pseudorapidity intervals. The results are compared to simulations with the Monte Carlo event generators PYTHIA and PHOJET.
The Transition Radiation Detector (TRD) was designed and built to enhance the capabilities of the ALICE detector at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC). While aimed at providing electron identification and triggering, the TRD also contributes significantly to the track reconstruction and calibration in the central barrel of ALICE. In this paper the design, construction, operation, and performance of this detector are discussed. A pion rejection factor of up to 410 is achieved at a momentum of 1 GeV/c in p-Pb collisions and the resolution at high transverse momentum improves by about 40% when including the TRD information in track reconstruction. The triggering capability is demonstrated both for jet, light nuclei, and electron selection.
The Transition Radiation Detector (TRD) was designed and built to enhance the capabilities of the ALICE detector at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC). While aimed at providing electron identification and triggering, the TRD also contributes significantly to the track reconstruction and calibration in the central barrel of ALICE. In this paper the design, construction, operation, and performance of this detector are discussed. A pion rejection factor of up to 410 is achieved at a momentum of 1 GeV/c in p-Pb collisions and the resolution at high transverse momentum improves by about 40% when including the TRD information in track reconstruction. The triggering capability is demonstrated both for jet, light nuclei, and electron selection.
The Transition Radiation Detector (TRD) was designed and built to enhance the capabilities of the ALICE detector at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC). While aimed at providing electron identification and triggering, the TRD also contributes significantly to the track reconstruction and calibration in the central barrel of ALICE. In this paper the design, construction, operation, and performance of this detector are discussed. A pion rejection factor of up to 410 is achieved at a momentum of 1 GeV/c in p–Pb collisions and the resolution at high transverse momentum improves by about 40% when including the TRD information in track reconstruction. The triggering capability is demonstrated both for jet, light nuclei, and electron selection.
The first measurement of two-pion Bose–Einstein correlations in central Pb–Pb collisions at √sNN=2.76 TeV at the Large Hadron Collider is presented. We observe a growing trend with energy now not only for the longitudinal and the outward but also for the sideward pion source radius. The pion homogeneity volume and the decoupling time are significantly larger than those measured at RHIC.
Inclusive transverse momentum spectra of primary charged particles in Pb–Pb collisions at √sNN=2.76 TeV have been measured by the ALICE Collaboration at the LHC. The data are presented for central and peripheral collisions, corresponding to 0–5% and 70–80% of the hadronic Pb–Pb cross section. The measured charged particle spectra in |η|<0.8 and 0.3<pT<20 GeV/c are compared to the expectation in pp collisions at the same sNN, scaled by the number of underlying nucleon–nucleon collisions. The comparison is expressed in terms of the nuclear modification factor RAA. The result indicates only weak medium effects (RAA≈0.7) in peripheral collisions. In central collisions, RAA reaches a minimum of about 0.14 at pT=6–7 GeV/c and increases significantly at larger pT. The measured suppression of high-pT particles is stronger than that observed at lower collision energies, indicating that a very dense medium is formed in central Pb–Pb collisions at the LHC.
Rapidity and transverse momentum dependence of inclusive J/ψ production in pp collisions at √s=7 TeV
(2011)
The ALICE experiment at the LHC has studied inclusive J/ψ production at central and forward rapidities in pp collisions at √s=7 TeV. In this Letter, we report on the first results obtained detecting the J/ψ through the dilepton decay into e+e− and μ+μ− pairs in the rapidity ranges |y|<0.9 and 2.5<y<4, respectively, and with acceptance down to zero pT. In the dielectron channel the analysis was carried out on a data sample corresponding to an integrated luminosity Lint=5.6 nb−1 and the number of signal events is NJ/ψ=352±32(stat.)±28(syst.); the corresponding figures in the dimuon channel are Lint=15.6 nb−1 and NJ/ψ=1924±77(stat.)±144(syst.). The measured production cross sections are σJ/ψ(|y|<0.9)=10.7±1.0(stat.)±1.6(syst.)−2.3+1.6(syst.pol.)μb and σJ/ψ(2.5<y<4)=6.31±0.25(stat.)±0.76(syst.)−1.96+0.95(syst.pol.)μb. The differential cross sections, in transverse momentum and rapidity, of the J/ψ were also measured.
„Bedeutende Finanzplätze“ oder Finanzzentren sind eng abgegrenzte Orte mit einer beträchtlichen Konzentration wichtiger professioneller Aktivitäten aus dem Finanzdienstleistungsbereich und der entsprechenden Institutionen. Allerdings: „Finance is a footloose industry“: Die Finanzbranche kann abwandern, ein Finanzzentrum kann sich verlagern, möglicherweise auch einfach auflösen. Die Möglichkeit der Auflösung und der Abwanderung stellt eine Bedrohung dar, die in der Zeit der Globalisierung und der rasanten Fortschritte der Transport- und der Informations- und Kommunikationstechnik ausgeprägter sein dürfte, als sie je war. Frankfurt ist zweifellos ein „bedeutender Finanzplatz“, und manchen gilt er auch als bedroht. Allein deshalb ist unser Thema wichtig; und auch wenn die Einschätzungen von Bedeutung und Bedrohtheit keineswegs neu sind, ist es doch aktuell. Der Aspekt der Bedrohtheit prägt, wie wir die Frage im Titel verstehen und diskutieren möchten. Was ist ein „bedeutender Finanzplatz“? Selbst wenn man das Attribut „bedeutend“ erst einmal beiseite lässt, ist die Frage keineswegs trivial. Sie zielt ja nicht nur auf eine Begriffsklärung, eine Sprachregelung ab. Hinter dem Begriff steht oft auch eine Vorstellung vom „Wesen“ dessen, was ein Begriff bezeichnet. Also: Was macht einen Finanzplatz aus? Und weiter: Warum gibt es überhaupt Finanzplätze als beträchtliche Konzentrationen von bestimmten wichtigen Aktivitäten und Institutionen? Welche Kräfte führen - oder zumindest führten - zu der räumlichen Konzentration der Aktivitäten und Institutionen, wie wirken diese Kräfte, und wie ändern sie sich gegebenenfalls? Diesen Fragen ist dieser Beitrag im Wesentlichen gewidmet, und sie prägen seinen Aufbau. Im Abschnitt II wird diskutiert, was ein „bedeutender Finanzplatz“ ist oder woran man ihn erkennt und „was er braucht“. Im Abschnitt III gehen wir zuerst auf die Frage nach der in letzter Zeit unter dem Stichwort „the end of geography“ heftig diskutierten Vorstellung einer Auflösung oder Virtualisierung der Finanzplätze ein – nicht weil dies die wichtigere Bedrohung wäre, sondern weil es die grundlegendere Frage darstellt. Dann diskutieren wir den Wettbewerb von Finanzplätzen in Europa. Den Abschluss bilden Überlegungen zu den Perspektiven des Finanzplatzes Frankfurt und der möglichen Förderung seiner Entwicklung.
This paper discusses the effect of capital regulation on the risk taking behavior of commercial banks. We first theoretically show that capital regulation works differently in different market structures of banking sectors. In lowly concentrated markets, capital regulation is effective in mitigating risk taking behavior because banks' franchise values are low and banks have incentives to pursue risky strategies in order to increase their franchise values. If franchise values are high, on the other hand, the effect of capital regulation on bank risk taking is ambiguous as banks lack those incentives. We then test the model predictions on a cross-country sample including 421 commercial banks from 61 countries. We find that capital regulation is effective in mitigating risk taking only in markets with a low degree of concentration. The results remain robust after accounting for financial sector development, legal system effciency, and for other country and bank-specific characteristics. Keywords: Banks, market structure, risk shifting, franchise value, capital regulation
This paper discusses the so-called commercial approach to microfinance under economic and ethical aspects. It first shows how microfinance has developed from a purely welfare-oriented activity to a commercially relevant line of banking business. The background of this stunning success is the – almost universal – adoption of the so-called commercial approach to microfinance in the course of the last decade. As the author argues, this commercial approach is the only sound approach to adopt if one wanted microfinance to have any social and developmental impact, and therefore the wide-spread “moralistic” criticism of the commercial approach, which has again and again been expressed in the 1990s, is ill-placed from an economic and an ethical perspective. However, some recent events in microfinance raise doubts as to whether the commercial approach has not, in a number of cases, gone too far. The evident example for such a development is the Mexican microfinance institution Compartamos, which recently undertook a financially extremely successful IPO. As it seems, some microfinance institutions have by now become so radically commercial that all of those social and development considerations, which have traditionally motivated work in the field of microfinance, seem to have lost their importance. Thus there is a conflict between commercial and developmental aspirations. However, this conflict is not inevitable. The paper concludes by showing that, and how, a microfinance institution can try to combine using the strengths of the capital market and at the same time maintaining its developmental focus and importance.
At present, the question of how national pension or retirement payment systems should be organised is being hotly debated in various countries, and opinions vary widely as to what should be regarded as the optimal design for such systems. It appears to the authors of the present paper that in this entire discussion one aspect is largely overlooked: What relationships exist between the pension system and the financial system in a given country? As such relationships might prove to be important, the present paper investigates the following questions: (1) Are there differences between the national pension systems of three major European countries – Germany, France and the U.K. – and between the financial systems of these countries? (2) And if the existence of such differences can be demonstrated, is there a correspondence between the differences with respect to the various national pension systems and the differences as regards the countries’ financial systems? (3) And if such a correspondence exists, is there any kind of interrelationship between the national financial and pension systems of the individual countries which goes beyond a mere correspondence? Looking mainly at two aspects – namely, risk allocation and the incentives to create human capital – the authors of this paper argue (1) that there are indeed considerable differences between the financial and pension systems of the three countries; (2) that in both Germany and the U.K. there are also systematic correspondences between the respective pension systems and financial systems and their economic characteristics, but that such a correspondence cannot be identified in the case of France; and (3) that these parallels are, in the final analysis, based on complementarities and are therefore likely to contribute to the efficiency of the German and the British systems. The paper concludes with a brief look at policy implications which the existence of, or the lack of, consistency between national pension systems and national financial systems might have.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, it has been widely expected that the implementation of the European Single Market would lead to a rapid convergence of Europe’s financial systems. In the present paper we will show that at least in the period prior to the introduction of the common currency this expected convergence did not materialise. Our empirical studies on the significance of various institutions within the financial sectors, on the financing patterns of firms in various countries and on the predominant mechanisms of corporate governance, which are summarised and placed in a broader context in this paper, point to few, if any, signs of a convergence at a fundamental or structural level between the German, British and French financial systems. The German financial system continues to appear to be bank-dominated, while the British system still appears to be capital market-dominated. During the period covered by the research, i.e. 1980 – 1998, the French system underwent the most far-reaching changes, and today it is difficult to classify. In our opinion, these findings can be attributed to the effects of strong path dependencies, which are in turn an outgrowth of relationships of complementarity between the individual system components. Projecting what we have observed into the future, the results of our research indicate that one of two alternative paths of development is most likely to materialise: either the differences between the national financial systems will persist, or – possibly as a result of systemic crises – one financial system type will become the dominant model internationally. And if this second path emerges, the Anglo-American, capital market-dominated system could turn out to be the “winner”, because it is better able to withstand and weather crises, but not necessarily because it is more efficient.
Wenn man untersuchen möchte, ob sich die Finanzsysteme verschiedener Länder im Verlauf der letzten Jahre aneinander angeglichen haben oder demnächst angleichen werden, braucht man ein Konzept zur Beschreibung von Finanzsystemen, durch das wesentliche Strukturen, deren Unterschiede und Veränderungen erkennbar werden, ohne dabei in "Systemgeschwafel" (D. Schneider) abzugleiten. Wir haben dafür das Konzept der Komplementarität als nützlich identifiziert. Der Beitrag stellt dieses Konzept vor und soll und seine Eignung belegen. Letztlich geht es dabei auch um die Frage, ob reale Finanzsysteme konsistente Systeme mit komplementären Elementen darstellen. Nach der Vorstellung der formalen Konzepte der Komplementarität und der Konsistenz wird "das Finanzsystem" auf seine Komple mentarität untersucht. Dazu wird ein Finanzsystem aus der Sicht von Unternehmen des nichtfinanziellen Sektors als ein System gekennzeichnet, das aus drei Teilsystemen besteht. Das erste Teilsystem ist das Finanzierungssystem einschließlich Finanzsektor und Mustern der Unternehmensfinanzierung, das zweite das Corporate Governance-System und das dritte das Unternehmens-Strategie-System. Für alle drei Teilsysteme wird – allgemein und mit Bezug auf die Finanzsysteme Deutschlands, Japans und der USA - gezeigt, inwieweit die Elemente der betreffenden Teilsysteme untereinander komplementär sind, und geprüft, ob sie in ihren Ausprägungen auch konsistent sind, d.h. wirklich "zueinander passen". Untersucht wird auch die Komplementarität und Konsistenz zwischen den Teilsystemen selbst. Der Beitrag endet mit Überlegungen über die Anwendung des Komplementaritätskonzepts. Dass ein Finanzsystem die Eigenschaft der Komplementarität aufweist, hat nicht nur weitreichende Implikationen für die Methodik der Analyse von Finanzsystemen, sondern auch für die Vorhersehbarkeit der Entwicklung von Finanzsystemen und damit für die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Konvergenz von Finanzsystemen, für deren Effizienzeigenschaften und für die Möglichkeiten, Finanzsysteme durch gestaltende Eingriffe zu verbessern.
Although the world of banking and finance is becoming more integrated every day, in most aspects the world of financial regulation continues to be narrowly defined by national boundaries. The main players here are still national governments and governmental agencies. And until recently, they tended to follow a policy of shielding their activities from scrutiny by their peers and members of the academic community rather than inviting critical assessments and an exchange of ideas. The turbulence in international financial markets in the 1980s, and its impact on U.S. banks, gave rise to the notion that academics working in the field of banking and financial regulation might be in a position to make a contribution to the improvement of regulation in the United States, and thus ultimately to the stability of the entire financial sector. This provided the impetus for the creation of the “U.S. Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee”. In the meantime, similar shadow committees have been founded in Europe and Japan. The specific problems associated with financial regulation in Europe, as well as the specific features which distinguish the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee from its counterparts in the U.S. and Japan, derive from the fact that while Europe has already made substantial progress towards economic and political integration, it is still primarily a collection of distinct nation-states with differing institutional set-ups and political and economic traditions. Therefore, any attempt to work towards a European approach to financial regulation must include an effort to promote the development of a European culture of co-operation in this area, and this is precisely what the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC) seeks to do. In this paper, Harald Benink, chairman of the ESFRC, and Reinhard H. Schmidt, one of the two German members, discuss the origin, the objectives and the functioning of the committee and the thrust of its recommendations.
Entwicklungsfinanzierung
(2000)
What constitutes a financial system in general and the German financial system in particular?
(2003)
This paper is one of the two introductory chapters of the book "The German Financial System". It first discusses two issues that have a general bearing on the entire book, and then provides a broad overview of the German financial system. The first general issue is that of clarifying what we mean by the key term "financial system" and, based on this definition, of showing why the financial system of a country is important and what it might be important for. Obviously, a definition of its subject matter and an explanation of its importance are required at the outset of any book. As we will explain in Section II, we use the term "financial system" in a broad sense which sets it clearly apart from the narrower concept of the "financial sector". The second general issue is that of how financial systems are described and analysed. Obviously, the definition of the object of analysis and the method by which the object is to be analysed are closely related to one another. The remainder of the paper provides a general overview of the German financial system. In addition, it is intended to provide a first indication of how the elements of the German financial system are related to each other, and thus to support our claim from Section II that there is indeed some merit in emphasising the systemic features of financial systems in general and of the German financial system in particular. The chapter concludes by briefly comparing the general characteristics of the German financial system with those of the financial systems of other advanced industrial countries, and taking a brief look at recent developments which might undermine the "systemic" character of the German financial system.
The paper is a follow-up to an article published in Technique Financière et Developpement in 2000 (see the appendix to the hardcopy version), which portrayed the first results of a new strategy in the field of development finance implemented in South-East Europe. This strategy consists in creating microfinance banks as greenfield investments, that is, of building up new banks which specialise in providing credit and other financial services to micro and small enterprises, instead of transforming existing credit-granting NGOs into formal banks, which had been the dominant approach in the 1990s. The present paper shows that this strategy has, in the course of the last five years, led to the emergence of a network of microfinance banks operating in several parts of the world. After discussing why financial sector development is a crucial determinant of general social and economic development and contrasting the new strategy to former approaches in the area of development finance, the paper provides information about the shareholder composition and the investment portfolio of what is at present the world's largest and most successful network of microfinance banks. This network is a good example of a well-functioning "private public partnership". The paper then provides performance figures and discusses why the creation of such a network seems to be a particularly promising approach to the creation of financially self-sustaining financial institutions with a clear developmental objective.
A widely recognized paper by Colin Mayer (1988) has led to a profound revision of academic thinking about financing patterns of corporations in different countries. Using flow-of-funds data instead of balance sheet data, Mayer and others who followed his lead found that internal financing is the dominant mode of financing in all countries, that therefore financial patterns do not differ very much between countries and that those differences which still seem to exist are not at all consistent with the common conviction that financial systems can be classified as being either bank-based or capital market-based. This leads to a puzzle insofar as it calls into question the empirical foundation of the widely held belief that there is a correspondence between the financing patterns of corporations on the one side, and the structure of the financial sector and the prevailing corporate governance system in a given country on the other side. The present paper addresses this puzzle on a methodological and an empirical basis. It starts by demonstrating that the surprising empirical results found by Mayer et al. are due to a hidden assumption underlying their methodology. It then derives an alternative method of measuring financing patterns, which also uses flow-of-funds data, but avoids the questionable assumption. This measurement concept is then applied to patterns of corporate financing in Germany, Japan and the United States. The empirical results are very much in line with the commonly held belief prior to Mayer’s influential contribution and indicate that the financial systems of the three countries do indeed differ from one another in a substantial way.
Financial development and financial institution building are important prerequisites for economic growth. However, both the potential and the problems of institution building are still vastly underestimated by those who design and fund institution building projects. The paper first underlines the importance of financial development for economic growth, then describes the main elements of “serious” institution building: the lending technology, the methodological approaches, and the question of internal structure and corporate governance. Finally, it discusses three problems which institution building efforts have to cope with: inappropriate expectations on the part of donor and partner institutions regarding the problems and effects of institution building efforts, the lack of awareness of the importance of governance and ownership issues, and financial regulation that is too restrictive for microfinance operations. All three problems together explain why there are so few successful micro and small business institutions operating worldwide.
Nationale rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen beeinflussen die Möglichkeiten für wirtschaftliche Aktivitäten multinationaler Unternehmen (MNU) in einem Gastland und der Koordination zwischen den Unternehmensteilen in verschiedenen Ländern. Sie sind damit wichtige Bestimmungsfaktoren für Standortentscheidungen von MNU. Die Bedeutung von Recht und Standortwahl unterscheidet sich aber je nach verfolgter MNUStrategie. Seit etwa 10 Jahren verändern MNU ihre strategische Ausrichtung. Gleichzeitig gab es wesentliche Fortschritte bei der Forschung über Geschäftsfeld- und Gesamt-unternehmensstrategien von MNU. Aufbauend auf diesen beiden Entwicklungen wird in diesem Aufsatz die These vertreten, daß heute - im Zeitalter integrierter MNU-Strategien - Einfachheit, Flexibilität und Verläßlichkeit des relevanten nationalen Rechts in einem Land und seine Ähnlichkeiten mit dem Recht anderer Länder eine zentrale Bedeutung erlangt haben. Dies stellt einen wesentlichen Unterschied zu einer – allerdings noch nicht gänzlich überwundenen – Situation dar, in der MNU mehr an einer rechtlichen Situation interessiert sind, die ihnen eine maximale Anpassung an die jeweiligen lokalen Umstände der einzelnen Gastländer erlaubt, worin der Kern von ”multi-domestic” MNU-Strategien besteht. Die Veränderung von MNU-Strategien bietet auch eine Erklärung für die in jüngster Zeit zu beobachtende Veränderung der Lobbyingaktivitäten von MNU bezüglich der rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen in ihren jeweiligen Gastländern.
The paper presents an empirical analysis of the alledged transformation of the financial systems in the three major European economies, France, Germany and the UK. Based on a unified data set developed on the basis of national accounts statistics, and employing a new and consistent method of measurement, the following questions are addressed: Is there a common pattern of structural change; do banks lose importance in the process of change; and are the three financial systems becoming more similar? We find that there is neither a general trend towards disintermediation, nor towards a transformation from bank-based to capital market-based financial systems, nor for a loss of importance of banks. Only in the case of France strong signs of transformation as well as signs of a general decline in the role of banks could be found. Thus the three financial systems also do not seem to become more similar. However, there is also a common pattern of change: the intermediation chains are lengthening in all three countries. Nonbank financial intermediaries are taking over a more important role as mobilizers of capital from the non-financial sectors. In combination with the trend towards securitization of bank liabilites, this change increases the funding costs of banks and may put banks under pressure. In the case of France, this change is so pronounced that it might even threaten the stability of the financial system.
The paper is a follow-up to an article published in Technique Financière et Developpement in 2000 (see the appendix to the hardcopy version), which portrayed the first results of a new strategy in the field of development finance implemented in South-East Europe. This strategy consists in creating microfinance banks as greenfield investments, that is, of building up new banks which specialise in providing credit and other financial services to micro and small enterprises, instead of transforming existing credit-granting NGOs into formal banks, which had been the dominant approach in the 1990s. The present paper shows that this strategy has, in the course of the last five years, led to the emergence of a network of microfinance banks operating in several parts of the world. After discussing why financial sector development is a crucial determinant of general social and economic development and contrasting the new strategy to former approaches in the area of development finance, the paper provides information about the shareholder composition and the investment portfolio of what is at present the world's largest and most successful network of microfinance banks. This network is a good example of a well-functioning "private public partnership". The paper then provides performance figures and discusses why the creation of such a network seems to be a particularly promising approach to the creation of financially self-sustaining financial institutions with a clear developmental objective.
We investigate the connection between corporate governance system configurations and the role of intermediaries in the respective systems from a informational perspective. Building on the economics of information we show that it is meaningful to distinguish between internalisation and externalisation as two fundamentally different ways of dealing with information in corporate governance systems. This lays the groundwork for a description of two types of corporate governance systems, i.e. insider control system and outsider control system, in which we focus on the distinctive role of intermediaries in the production and use of information. It will be argued that internalisation is the prevailing mode of information processing in insider control system while externalisation dominates in outsider control system. We also discuss shortly the interrelations between the prevailing corporate governance system and types of activities or industry structures supported.
A financial system can only perform its function of channelling funds from savers to investors if it offers sufficient assurance to the providers of the funds that they will reap the rewards which have been promised to them. To the extent that this assurance is not provided by contracts alone, potential financiers will want to monitor and influence managerial decisions. This is why corporate governance is an essential part of any financial system. It is almost obvious that providers of equity have a genuine interest in the functioning of corporate governance. However, corporate governance encompasses more than investor protection. Similar considerations also apply to other stakeholders who invest their resources in a firm and whose expectations of later receiving an appropriate return on their investment also depend on decisions at the level of the individual firm which would be extremely difficult to anticipate and prescribe in a set of complete contingent contracts. Lenders, especially long-term lenders, are one such group of stakeholders who may also want to play a role in corporate governance; employees, especially those with high skill levels and firm-specific knowledge, are another. The German corporate governance system is different from that of the Anglo-Saxon countries because it foresees the possibility, and even the necessity, to integrate lenders and employees in the governance of large corporations. The German corporate governance system is generally regarded as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. Moreover, only a few years ago it was a consistent system in the sense of being composed of complementary elements which fit together well. The first objective of this paper is to show why and in which respect these characterisations were once appropriate. However, the past decade has seen a wave of developments in the German corporate governance system, which make it worthwhile and indeed necessary to investigate whether German corporate governance has recently changed in a fundamental way. More specifically one can ask which elements and features of German corporate governance have in fact changed, why they have changed and whether those changes which did occur constitute a structural change which would have converted the old insider-controlled system into an outsider-controlled and shareholder-oriented system and/or would have deprived it of its former consistency. It is the second purpose of this paper to answer these questions. Revised version forthcoming in "The German Financial System", edited by Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, Oxford University Press.
In the early 1990s, a consensus emerged among the leading experts in the field of small and micro business finance. It is based on three elements: The focus of projects should be on improving the entire financial sector of a given developing country; a commercial approach should be adopted, which implies covering costs and keeping costs as low as possible; and institutions should be created which are both able and willing to provide good financial services to the target group on a lasting basis. The starting point for this paper, which wholeheartedly endorses these three elements, is the proposition that putting these general principles into practice is much more difficult than some of their proponents seem to believe - and also more difficult than some of them have led donors to believe. The paper discusses the central issues of small and micro business financing in three areas: credit in general and the cost-effectiveness of lending methodologies in particular (Section II); savings in general and the role of deposit-taking in the growth of a target group-oriented financial institution in particular (Section III); and the process of creating viable target group-oriented financial institutions in developing countries (Section IV). We argue that donor institutions must be willing, and prepared, to play a role here which differs in important respects from their conventional role if they really wish to support sustainable financial sector development.
"Ich möchte in diesem Vortrag Beziehungen zwischen Gutenbergs Theorie der Unternehmung, die in seiner Habilitationsschrift angelegt und in den "Grundlagen der Betriebswirtschaftslehre" entfaltet ist, und aktuellen Entwicklungen in der Theorie der Unternehmung herstellen. Obwohl der Anlaß für diesen Vortrag das Thema hinreichend rechtfertigt, stellt sich die Frage, ob mein Vorhaben ein wissenschaftlich sinnvolles Unterfangen darstellt: Kann Gutenbergs Theorie der Unternehmung noch aktuell sein?"
This paper starts out by pointing out the challenges and weaknesses which the German banking systems faces according to the prevailing views among national and international observers. These challenges include a generalproblem of profitability and, possibly as its main reason, the strong role of public banks. These concerns raise the questions whether the facts support this assessment of a general profitability problem and whether there are reasons to expect a fundamental or structural transformation of the German banking system. The paper contains four sections. The first one presents the evidence concerning the profitability problem in a comparative, international perspective. The second section presents information about the so-called three-pillar system of German banking. What might be surprising in this context is that the group of pub lic banks is not only the largest segment of the German banking system, but that the primary savings banks also are its financially most successful part. The German banking system is highly fragmented. This fact suggests to discuss past, present and possible future consolidations in the banking system in the third section. The authors provide evidence to the effect that within- group consolidation has been going on at a rapid pace in the public and the cooperative banking groups in recent years and that this development has not yet come to an end, while within-group consolidation among the large private banks, consolidation across group boundaries at a national level and cross-border or international consolidation has so far only happened at a limited scale, and do not appear to gain momentum in the near future. In the last section, the authors develop their explanation for the fact that large-scale and cross border consolidation has so far not materialized to any great extent. Drawing on the concept of complementarity, they argue that it would be difficult to expect these kinds of mergers and acquisitions happening within a financial system which is itself surprisingly stable, or, as one cal also call it, resistant to change.
A financial system can only perform its function of channelling funds from savers to investors if it offers sufficient assurance to the providers of the funds that they will reap the rewards which have been promised to them. To the extent that this assurance is not provided by contracts alone, potential financiers will want to monitor and influence managerial decisions. This is why corporate governance is an essential part of any financial system. It is almost obvious that providers of equity have a genuine interest in the functioning of corporate governance. However, corporate governance encompasses more than investor protection. Similar considerations also apply to other stakeholders who invest their resources in a firm and whose expectations of later receiving an appropriate return on their investment also depend on decisions at the level of the individual firm which would be extremely difficult to anticipate and prescribe in a set of complete contingent contracts. Lenders, especially long-term lenders, are one such group of stakeholders who may also want to play a role in corporate governance; employees, especially those with high skill levels and firm-specific knowledge, are another. The German corporate governance system is different from that of the Anglo-Saxon countries because it foresees the possibility, and even the necessity, to integrate lenders and employees in the governance of large corporations. The German corporate governance system is generally regarded as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. Moreover, only a few years ago it was a consistent system in the sense of being composed of complementary elements which fit together well. The first objective of this paper is to show why and in which respect these characterisations were once appropriate. However, the past decade has seen a wave of developments in the German corporate governance system, which make it worthwhile and indeed necessary to investigate whether German corporate governance has recently changed in a fundamental way. More specifically one can ask which elements and features of German corporate governance have in fact changed, why they have changed and whether those changes which did occur constitute a structural change which would have converted the old insider-controlled system into an outsider-controlled and shareholder-oriented system and/or would have deprived it of its former consistency. It is the second purpose of this paper to answer these questions.
A widely recognized paper by Colin Mayer (1988) has led to a profound revision of academic thinking about financing patterns of corporations in different countries. Using flow-of-funds data instead of balance sheet data, Mayer and others who followed his lead found that internal financing is the dominant mode of financing in all countries, that financing patterns do not differ very much between countries and that those differences which still seem to exist are not at all consistent with the common conviction that financial systems can be classified as being either bank-based or capital market-based. This leads to a puzzle insofar as it calls into question the empirical foundation of the widely held belief that there is a correspondence between the financing patterns of corporations on the one side, and the structure of the financial sector and the prevailing corporate governance system in a given country on the other side. The present paper addresses this puzzle on a methodological and an empirical basis. It starts by comparing and analyzing various ways of measuring financial structure and financing patterns and by demonstrating that the surprising empirical results found by studies that relied on net flows are due to a hidden assumption. It then derives an alternative method of measuring financing patterns, which also uses flow-of-funds data, but avoids the questionable assumption. This measurement concept is then applied to patterns of corporate financing in Germany, Japan and the United States. The empirical results, which use an estimation technique for determining gross flows of funds in those cases in which empirical data are not available, are very much in line with the commonly held belief prior to Mayer’s influential contribution and indicate that the financial systems of the three countries do indeed differ from one another in a substantial way, and moreover in a way which is largely in line with the general view of the differences between the financial systems of the countries covered in the present paper.
The German corporate governance system has long been cited as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. We argue that despite important reforms and substantial changes of individual elements of the German corporate governance system the main characteristics of the traditional German system as a whole are still in place. However, in our opinion the changing role of the big universal banks in the governance undermines the stability of the corporate governance system in Germany. Therefore a breakdown of the traditional system leading to a control vacuum or a fundamental change to a capital market-based system could be in the offing.
Der folgende Beitrag geht der Frage nach, wie die Verteilung von Entscheidungs- und Handlungsrechten in Unternehmen im Rahmen der Corporate Governance ausgestaltet werden kann. Im Zentrum der Überlegungen steht die Frage, welcher der am Unternehmen beteiligten Interessengruppen diese Rechte sinnvollerweise zukommen sollten. Insbesondere die beiden polaren Systeme - das auf dem Shareholder-Value-Primat aufbauende System einer ausschließlich im Interesse der Aktionäre geführten Unternehmung auf der eine Seite - und einem Corporate Governance-System, das die Interessen aller am Unternehmen beteiligten Stakeholder berücksichtigt, auf der anderen Seite - werden geschildert und mit den Mitteln der ökonomischen Theorie bewertet. Spezifische Investitionen möglicher Stakeholder und die Institutionen und Mechanismen, die eine Absicherung der daraus entstehenden ökonomischen Renten für die jeweiligen Stakeholder erlauben, sind damit wichtige Bestimmungsparameter für die Unternehmensverfassung. Insbesondere die Existenz und Güte von Märkten innerhalb des Finanzsystems, in dem ein Unternehmen tätig ist, lassen das ein oder das andere Corporate Governance-System vorteilhafter erscheinen. Überlegungen zu anderen möglichen Mechanismen, die auf der internen Organisation von Unternehmungen basieren und dadurch eine Feinsteuerung von Entscheidungs- und Handlungsrechten - und der damit verbundenen Machtverteilung zwischen den Interessengruppen im Unternehmen - erlaubt, schließen die Arbeit ab.
Die durch jahrzehntelange Planwirtschaft geprägten Strukturen sind in Russland noch fest verwurzelt. Dementsprechend ist das Bankensystem auch zwölf Jahre nach dem Ende des kommunistischen Regimes unterentwickelt. Die markantesten Merkmale der Finanzwirtschaft sind die ungewöhnliche Größenstruktur der Banken; deren Schwierigkeiten, die rapide zunehmende Zahl kleinster, kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen mit Finanzdienstleistungen zu versorgen sowie die geringe Rolle ausländischer Banken. Überdies sind die weiterhin bestehenden Systemrisiken nicht zu unterschätzen.
At least in the past, banking in continental Europe has been characterised by a number of features that are quite specific to the region. They include the following: (1) banks play a strong role in their respective financial systems; (2) universal banking is prevalent; (3) not strictly profit-oriented banks play a significant role; and (4) there are considerable differences between national banking systems. It can be safely assumed that the future of banking in Europe will be shaped by three major external developments: deregulation and liberalisation; advances in information technology; and economic, financial and monetary integration. The overall consequences of these developments would be much too vast a topic to be addressed in one short paper. Therefore the present paper concentrates on the following question: Are the traditional peculiarities of the banking and financial systems of continental Europe likely to disappear as a consequence of the aforementioned external developments or are they more likely to remain in spite of these developments? The external developments affect the features specific to banking in continental Europe only indirectly and only via the strategies selected and pursued by the various players in the financial systems, notably the banks themselves, and in ways which strongly depend on the structure of the banking industry and the level of competition between banks and other providers of financial services. The paper develops an informal model of the relationships between (1) external developments, (2) bank strategies and the structure of the banking industry, and (3) the peculiarities of banking in Europe, and derives a hypothesis predicting which of the traditional peculiarities are likely to disappear and which are likely to remain. It argues that, overall, the peculiarities are not likely to disappear in the short or the medium term. First version June 2000. This version March 2001.
Paper Presented at the Conference on Workable Corporate Governance: Cross-Border Perspectives held in Paris, March 17-19, 1997 To appear in: A. Pezard/J.-M. Thiveaud: Workable Corporate Governance: Cross-Border Perspectives, Montchrestien, Paris 1997. The paper discusses the role of various constituencies in the corporate governance of a corporation from the perspective of incomplete contracts. A strict shareholder value orientation in the sense of a rule that at any time firm decisions should be made strictly in the interest of the present shareholders would make it difficult for the firm to establish long-term relationships as the potential partners would have to fear that, at a later stage of the co-operation, the shareholders or a management acting only on their behalf could exploit them because of the inevitable incompleteness of long-term contracts. One way of mitigating these problems is to put in place a corporate governance system which gives some active role to the other stakeholders or constituencies, or which makes their interests a well-defined element of the objective function of the firm. A commitment not to follow a policy of strict shareholder value maximization ex post can be efficient ex ante. Such a system would clearly differ from what is advocated by proponents of a "stakeholder approach", as it would limit the rights of the other constituencies to those which would have been agreed upon in a constitutional contract concluded between them and the founder of the firm at the time when long-term contracts are first established.
Major differences between national financial systems might make a common monetary policy difficult. As within Europe, Germany and the United Kingdom differ most with respect to their financial systems, the present paper addresses its topic under the assumption that the United Kingdom is already a part of EMU. Employing a comprehensive concept of a financial system, the author shows that there are indeed profound differences between the national financial systems of Germany and the United Kingdom. But he argues that these differences are not likely to create great problems for a common monetary policy. In the context of the present paper, one important difference between the two financial systems refers to the structure of the respective financial sector and, as a consequence, to the strength with which a given monetary policy impulse set by the central bank is passed on to the financial sector. The other important difference refers to the typical relationship between the banks and the business sector in each country which determines to what extent the financial sectors and especially the banks pass on pressure exerted on them by a monetary policy authority to their clients in their national business sector. In Germany, the central bank has a stronger influence on the financial sector than in England, while, for systemic reasons, German banks tend to soften monetary policy pressures on their customers more than British banks do. As far as the transmission of a restrictive monetary policy of the ECB to the real economy is concerned, these two differences tend to offset each other. This is good news for the advocates of a monetary union as it eases the task of the ECB when it comes to determining the strength of its monetary policy measures.
Aus dem weiten Spektrum ökonomisch relevanter Fragen, die die europäische Integration und das Gesellschaftsrecht verbinden, soll hier diejenige herausgegriffen werden, ob sich die nationalen Corporate-Governance-Systeme in den großen europäischen Volkswirtschaften Deutschlands, Frankreichs und Großbritanniens unter dem Einfluß der europäischen Integration bereits aneinander angeglichen haben und ob es demnächst zu einer solchen Angleichung kommen wird. Unser Thema deckt nur einen Teil des Gesellschaftsrechts ab und geht zugleich hinsichtlich der angesprochenen rechtlichen Materie über das Gesellschaftsrecht hinaus, denn die Corporate Governance fügt sich nicht einfach in herkömmliche juristische Klassifikationen ein. Unser Vorhaben unterscheidet sich aber vor allem dadurch von einer juristischen Behandlung des Themas, daß primär ökonomische Mechanismen und Zusammenhänge angesprochen werden. Ökonomen betrachten die Corporate Governance im weiteren Kontext des Finanzsystems, denn das Corporate-Governance-System ist ein Teil des Finanzsystems eines Landes. Die Fragen, wie unterschiedlich die nationalen Systeme der Corporate Governance waren, ehe zu Beginn der 80er Jahre der Prozeß der Angleichung in Europa einsetzte, wie unterschiedlich sie heute noch sind, wie sehr sie sich somit bereits angeglichen haben und wie ein möglicher Angleichungsprozeß weitergehen könnte, sind deshalb ein Teil der weiteren Frage nach der Angleichung der Finanzsysteme in Europa. In diesem Beitrag konzentrieren wir uns aber nur auf Entwicklungen der 90er Jahre.
In a series of recent papers, Mark Roe and Lucian Bebchuk have developed further the concept of path dependence, combined it with concepts of evolution and used it to challenge the wide-spread view that the corporate governance systems of the major advanced economies are likely to converge towards the economically best system at a rapid pace. The present paper shares this skepticism, but adds several aspects which strengthen the point made by Roe and Bebchuk. The present paper argues that it is important for the topic under discussion to distinguish clearly between two arguments which can explain path dependence. One of them is based on the role of adjustment costs, and the other one uses concepts borrowed from evolutionary biology. Making this distinction is important because the two concepts of path dependence have different implications for the issue of rapid convergence to the best system. In addition, we introduce a formal concept of complementarity and demonstrate that national corporate governance systems are usefully regarded as – possibly consistent – systems of complementary elements. Complementarity is a reason for path dependence which supports the socio-biological argument. The dynamic properties of systems composed of complementary elements are such that a rapid convergence towards a universally best corporate governance systems is not likely to happen. We then proceed by showing for the case of corporate governance systems shaped by complementarity, that there even is the possibility of a convergence towards a common system which is economically inferior. And in the specific case of European integration, "inefficient convergence" of corporate governance systems is a possible future course of events. First version December 1998, this version March 2000.
Die Empfehlung, das Shareholder-Value-Konzept zur Grundlage der Unternehmenspolitik zu machen, erscheint um so überzeugender und wird vermutlich um so eher akzeptiert, (1) je lohnender die Shareholder-Value-Orientierung für die Aktionäre ist, (2) je eindeutiger es ist, wie die Empfehlung umgesetzt werden kann und soll, und (3) je problemloser sie aus theoretischen und wohlfahrtsökonomischer Sicht ist. Der Beitrag diskutiert die in Wissenschaft und Praxis verbreiteten Positionen zu diesen drei Aspekten und erläutert, warum sie bzw. die emprischen, praktischen und theoretischen Argumente, durch die sie gestützt werden sollen, auf Mißverständnissen beruhen.
This paper provides an overview of conceptual issues and recent research findings concerning the structure and the role of financial systems and an introduction into the new research area of comparative financial systems. The authors start by pointing out the importance of financial systems in general and then sketch different ways of describing and analysing national financial systems. They advocate using what they call a “systemic approach”. This approach focuses on the fit between the various elements that constitute any financial system as a major determinant of how well a given financial system performs its functions. In its second part the paper discusses recent research concerning the relationships between financial sector development and general economic growth and development. The third part is dedicated to comparative financial systems. It first analyses the similarities and, more importantly, the differences of the financial systems of major industrialised countries and points out that these differences seem to remain in existence in spite of the current wave of liberalisation, deregulation and globalisation. This leads to the concluding discussion of what the systemic approach suggests with respect to the question of whether the financial systems of different countries are likely to converge to a common structure. Key words: Financial sector, financial system, growth and development, convergence JEL classification: G32, G34, G38
The financial crisis of 2007-08 has stressed the importance of a sound financial system. Unlike other studies weighing the pros and cons of market versus bank-based systems, this paper investigates whether the main elements of the German financial system can be regarded as complementary and consistent. This assessment refers to the idea that there is a potential for positive interaction between different elements in the system that is actually used to make it more valuable to economy and society and more robust to crises. It is shown that the old German bank-based system, where the risk of long-term lending by large private commercial banks was limited by the membership in supervisory boards and strong personal ties between all stakeholders, was a consistent system of well-adjusted complementary elements. After reunification, a hybrid system has emerged where, on the one hand, public savings banks and cooperative banks maintain their role as lenders, but on the other, large private banks have withdrawn from their former dominant role in financing and corporate governance. It is argued that this transition to stronger capital-market and, accordingly, shareholder value orientations has occurred at the expense of consistency.
The paper provides an overview and an economic analysis of the development of the corporate governance of German banks since the 1950s, highlighting peculiarities – as seen from the meanwhile prevailing standard model perspective – of the German case. These peculiarities refer to the specific German notion and legal-institutional regime of corporate governance in general as well as to the specific three-pillar structure of the German banking system.
The most striking changes in the corporate governance of German banks during the past 50 years occurred in the case of the large shareholder-owned banks. For them, capital markets have become an important element of corporate governance, and their former orientation towards the interests of a broadly defined set of stakeholders has largely been replaced by a one-sided concentration on shareholders’ interests. In contrast, the corporate governance regimes of the smaller local public savings banks and the local cooperative banks have remained virtually unchanged. They acknowledge a broader horizon of stakeholder interests and put an emphasis on monitoring.
The Great Financial Crisis, beginning in 2007, has led to a considerable reassessment in the academic and political debate on bank governance. On an international level, it has revived the older notion that, in view of their high leverage and their innate complexity, banks are “special” and bank corporate governance also – and needs to be seen in this light, not least because research indicates that banks with a strong and one-sided shareholder orientation – and thus with what appears to be the best corporate governance according to the standard model – have suffered most in the crisis. In the German case, the crisis has shown that the smaller local banks have survived the crisis much better than large private and public banks, whose funding strongly depends on wholesale markets. This may point to certain advantages of their governance and ownership regimes. But the differences in the performance during the crisis years may also, or even more so, be a consequence of the business models of large vs small banks than of their different governance regimes.
Die Macht der Ratingagenturen beruht auch auf den vielen Gesetzen und Verordnungen, die eine Orientierung an den Ratings der drei großen Agenturen vorschreiben, sagt Wirtschaftsprofessor Reinhard Schmidt. Um die Macht der Ratingagenturen zu begrenzen, empfiehlt er viele dieser Regeln ersatzlos zu streichen.
The German savings and cooperative banks of the 19th century were precursors of modern microfinance. They provided access to financial services for the majority of the German population, which was formerly excluded from bank funding. Furthermore, they did this at low costs for themselves and affordable prices for their clients. By creating networks of financially viable and stable financial institutions covering the entire country, they contributed significantly to building a sound and “inclusive” financial infrastructure in Germany. A look back at the history of German savings and cooperative banks and combining these experiences with the lessons learned from modern microfinance can guide current policy and be valuable for present and future models of microfinance business.
It appears astonishing to me that none of the papers and discussions at this conference on "Financial Flows to Developing Countries" have even touched upon an important category of international financial relationships which involves direct flows and links to the so-called developing countries. Specifically, none of the contributions have dealt with “development finance”, which is a broad term covering various kinds of activities carried out in the framework of development assistance. This is a particularly striking omission, given that until fairly recently the volume of official aid exceeded the volume of private capital flows to the developing and transition economies (IMF, 1998, p. 60). Moreover, it is conceivable that, in terms of both their developmental impact and their contribution to the alleviation of social problems, the flows financed by official aid may be more important than private capital flows. Thus, I felt that, at the very least, my fellow conference participants should be made aware of this gap in the range of topics addressed by the conference, and it was with this goal in mind that I prepared the present paper as a contribution to the concluding session of the conference. The first section of the present paper defines the concept of “development finance” and seeks to show how its content and meaning has changed over time. In the second section, I discusses a broad trend in banking regulation which has recently emerged in many developing and transition countries and which has, in my view, highly problematic implications for the potential to create financially sound and developmentally relevant “microfinance institutions”.
This Paper gives an overview of the German banking system and current challenges it is facing. It starts with an overview of the so-called ‘Three-Pillar-Banking-System’ and a detailed description of the current structure of the banking system in Germany. A brief comparison of the banking system in Germany with the ones in other European countries points out its uniqueness. The consequences of the financial crisis of 2007/2008 and further challenges for the German banking system are discussed, as well as the the ongoing debate around the question whether the strong government involvement should be sustained.
Until about 25 years ago, almost all European countries had a so-called “three pillar” banking system comprising private banks, (public) savings banks and (mutual) cooperative banks. Since that time, several European countries have implemented far-reaching changes in their banking systems, which have more than anything else affected the two “pillars” of the savings and cooperative banks. The article describes the most important changes in Germany, Austria, France, Italy and Spain and characterizes the former and the current roles of savings banks and cooperative banks in these countries. A particular focus is placed on the German case, which is almost unique in so far as the German savings banks and cooperative banks have maintained most of their traditional features. The article concludes with a plea for diversity of institutional forms of banks and argues that it is important to safeguard the strengths of those types of banks that do not conform to the model of a large shareholder-oriented commercial bank.
This paper aspires to provide an overview of the issue of diversity of banking and financial systems and its development over time from a positive and a normative perspective. In other word: how different are banks within a given country and how much do banking systems and entire financial systems differ between countries and regions, and do in-country diversity and between-country diversity change over time, as one would be inclined to expect as a consequence of globalization and increasingly global standards of regulation?
As the first part of this paper shows, the general answer to these questions is that there is still today a surprisingly high level of diversity in finance. This raises the two questions addressed in the second part of the paper: How can the persistence of diversity be explained, and how can it be assessed? In contrast to prevailing views, the author argues that persistent diversity should be regarded as valuable in a context in which there is no clear answer to the question of which structures of banking and financial systems are optimal from an economic perspective
Passt das deutsche Dreisäulensystem in eine zunehmend harmonisierte Bankenstruktur für Europa?
(2018)
Das deutsche Bankensystem ruht seit Jahrzehnten auf drei Säulen: den privaten Kreditbanken, einschließlich der großen Banken in Aktionärsbesitz, den öffentlichen Banken und den Genossenschaftsbanken. Fast nirgendwo anders in Europa hat ein solches Dreisäulensystem überlebt. Passt es also noch in ein Europa, in dem die Bankpolitik, die Regulierung und die Aufsicht inzwischen weitgehend in die Zuständigkeit der EU fallen? Für eine Bewahrung des Systems sprechen vor allem Gesichtspunkte der Stabilität. Angesichts ihrer Gruppenzugehörigkeit sind die deutschen "stakeholder-value-orientierten" Banken der Säulen 2 und 3 finanziell keineswegs weniger erfolgreich, sogar ein wenig erfolgreicher als die "shareholder-value-orientierten" Großbanken der Säule 1. Insbesondere schwanken ihre Geschäftszahlen deutlich weniger als jene der Großbanken, die in der Regel ein riskanteres Geschäftsmodell verfolgen. In vielen Privatbanken ist die Gewinnorientierung und damit auch die Bereitschaft, hohe Risiken einzugehen, aus ordnungspolitischer Sicht zu hoch, was die Systemstabilität tendenziell gefährdet. Zudem erfüllen die Genossenschaftsbanken und Sparkassen eine regionalpolitische Ausgleichsfunktion und haben eine gesamtwirtschaftlich stabilisierende Wirkung.
In this statement the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC) is advocating a conditional relief of Greek’s government debt based on Greece meeting certain targets for structural economic reforms in areas such as its labor market and pensions sector.The authors argue that the position of the European institutions that debt relief for Greece cannot be part of an agreement is based on the illusion that Greece will be able to service its sovereign debt and reduce its debt overhang after implementing a set of fiscal and structural reforms. However, the Greek economy would need to grow at an unrealistig level to achieve debt sustainability soley on the basis of reforms.The authors therefore view a substantial debt relief as inevitable and argue that three questions must be resolved urgently, in order to structure debt relief adequately: First, which groups must accept losses associated with debt relief. Second, how much debt relief should be offered. Third, under what conditions should relief be offered.
In early July 2019, Christian Sewing, the CEO of Deutsche Bank, proclaimed a fundamental shift of the bank’s strategy after finally obtaining the approval of the Supervisory Board, which the management seems to have requested for quite some time. The essential point of the reorientation is a deep cut into the bank’s investment banking activities. At the same time, those parts of the bank’s activity portfolio that had been the mainstay of Deutsche Bank’s business 20 to 25 years ago, in particular lending to large and mid-sized German and European corporate clients, shall be strengthened in spite of a simultaneous reduction of the bank’s staff by 18,000 FTEs over the next three years.
The bank’s CEO, who has only been in office since about one year, was reported to have called this shift of strategy a “return to the roots of Deutsche Bank” at the press conference at which it was announced, without, however, making it clear to which roots he was referring: those of some 40 years ago, when Deutsche Bank was essentially a Germany-focused commercial bank, or even those from the late 19th century, when the bank had been founded with the mission to become an international bank with a strong capital market-orientation. In any event, the press was impressed and keeps repeating these words, that deserve to be taken seriously and irrespective of their vagueness may be justified. If it were successfully implemented, this change of strategy would indeed be fundamental and imply undoing what Deutsche Bank’s former management teams had aspired to do in the last 20 or 25 years.
The newly announced strategy shift raises two questions. Can it be successful, and what does it mean for the bank itself and its shareholders, for its staff and for its clients? And what does it imply for the German financial system? This note focuses on the latter question. What makes it interesting is the fact that the last fundamental change of Deutsche Bank’s strategy of two decades ago, which aimed at transforming Deutsche Bank from a Germany-centered commercial bank into a leading international investment bank, had a profound – and in my view clearly negative - effect on the entire German financial system.
Das deutsche Bankensystem ruht seit Jahrzehnten auf drei Säulen: den privaten Kreditbanken, den öffentlichen Banken des Sparkassensystems und den genossenschaftlichen Banken. Das Drei-Säulen-System scheint ursächlich für die Stabilität im deutschen Bankensystem zu sein. Gerade die Krise hat gezeigt, dass es für ein Bankensystem vorteilhaft ist, wenn es darin nicht nur einen Typus von Banken gibt. Wir müssen eine Pluralität von Organisationsformen im Bankwesen erhalten und weiterentwickeln.
Access to loans and other financial services is extremely valuable for micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises in developing and transition countries as it enables their owners as well as their employees to exploit their economic potential and to increase their income. Although this insight has lead development aid institutions to undertake many attempts to create sustainable microfinance institutions, only a small fraction of these has been successful so far. This article analyses what determines the success of attempts to provide financial services in general, and credit in particular, to low income target groups in these countries. We argue that it is crucial to understand, and to mitigate or even eliminate in practice, the serious and numerous incentive problems at the level of the lending operations as well as those at the levels of the human resource management and the governance of microfinance institutions. We attempt to show moreover, that unsolved incentive problems at only one level will ultimately undermine any potential success at the other levels. In our paper, we first analyse information and incentive problems from a theoretical perspective, using and extending the well-known Stiglitz-Weiss model of credit rationing, and derive theoretical requirements for solutions of these problems. In the light of these considerations, we then discuss how problems are solved in practice. Section 3 deals with the credit relationship. Section 4 extends the argument by showing how incentive problems within the institution can be handled, and section 5 analyses corporate governance-related problems of development finance institutions as incentive problems. In section 6 it is demonstrated why, and how, the incentive problems at the different levels, as well as their solutions, are interrelated. From this we derive the proposition that, as the institutional devices for dealing with these problems constitute a complementary system, any sustainable solution requires consistent arrangements of all elements and at all levels of the system. In the last section we will show the potential of strategic networks to set up institutions which we consider to be consistent systems for successfully solving the problems at all three levels simultaneously.
Während sich die Entwicklungsfinanzierung in Theorie und Praxis generell mit dem Finanzwesen in Entwicklungs- und Transformationsländern befasst, steht im Teilgebiet der Microfinance die Frage im Vordergrund, wie in diesen Ländern der Zugang ärmerer Bevölkerungsgruppen und speziell von Klein- und Kleinstunternehmer(innen), Kleinbauern und sonstigen wirtschaftlich Selbständigen aus eher niedrigen sozialen Schichten zu Kredit und anderen Finanzdiensleistungen verbessert werden kann. Obwohl es einige Vorläufer gibt, die schon früh die allgemeine Politik der Entwicklungsländer bezüglich ihrer Finanzsektoren und ebenso die dazu passende Entwicklungshilfe-Politik der Industrieländer der 60er und 70er Jahre mit ökonomisch-theoretischen Argumenten scharf kritisiert haben,1 waren in der Vergangenheit weder Entwicklungsfinanzierung im allgemeinen noch Microfinance im besonderen ein wirklich ernst genommener Gegenstand der ökonomischen Literatur, die man zum mainstream rechnen kann. Dem entspricht es, dass sich auch die Praxis der Entwicklungsfinanzierung sehr lange weitgehend unabhängig von ökonomisch- theoretischen Überlegungen vollzogen hat. Diese Situation hat sich seit mehr als einem Jahrzehnt grundlegend verändert. Dies hat einen wesentlichen Grund darin, dass sich in der entwicklungspolitischen Praxis auf dem Gebiet der Finanzierung von Klein- und Kleinstbetrieben, eben Microfinance, Erfolge erzielen ließen, die vorher unvorstellbar waren. Mit einer deutlichen commercial orientation und einer Ausrichtung auf die genuinen Probleme des financial institution building konnte erreicht werden, dass es inzwischen einige Dutzend Finanzinstitutionen in Entwicklungs- und Transformationsländern gibt, die ökonomisch stabil und sogar profitabel sind und mit ihrem Leistungsangebot eine große Anzahl von "armen" Kunden erreichen, die bei den Kreditabteilungen der herkömmlichen Banken kaum über die Schwelle gelassen würden.2 Dies hat die Aufmerksamkeit von Forschern aus dem mainstream erweckt. Mindestens ebenso wichtig sind aber die immanenten Entwicklungen innerhalb der ökonomischen Theorie. Mit ihrer Hinwendung zum institutionalistischen Denkansatz hat die Wirtschaftstheorie auf einmal eine neue Aufmerksamkeit für die Phänomene entwickelt, die für die Praktiker der Entwicklungsfinanzierung seit langem von zentraler Bedeutung sind: Inzwischen kann man theoretisch nachweisen, dass es in der Tat Zugangsprobleme zu Kredit für "kleine Leute" gibt, dass das Angebot von Kredit für sie beschränkt ist und dass es nicht genügt, einfach nur staatlich auferlegte Restriktionen – die so genannte financial repression – zu beseitigen, um ....
The introduction of a common currency as well as the harmonization of rules and regulations in Europe has significantly reduced distance in all its guises. With reduced costs of overcoming space, this emphasizes centripetal forces and it should foster consolidation of financial activity. In a national context, as a rule, this led to the emergence of one financial center. Hence, Europeanization of financial and monetary affairs could foretell the relegation of some European financial hubs such as Frankfurt and Paris to third-rank status. Frankfurt’s financial history is interesting insofar as it has lost (in the 1870s) and regained (mainly in the 1980s) its preeminent place in the German context. Because Europe is still characterized by local pockets of information-sensitive assets as well as a demand for variety the national analogy probably does not hold. There is room in Europe for a number of financial hubs of an international dimension, including Frankfurt.
Stakeholderorientierung, Systemhaftigkeit und Stabilität der Corporate Governance in Deutschland
(2006)
Since the time of Germany’s belated industrialisation, corporate governance in Germany has been stakeholder oriented in the dual sense of attaching importance to the interests of stakeholders who are not at the same time shareholders, and of providing certain opportunities for these stakeholders to influence corporate decisions. Corporate governance is also systemic. It is a system of elements that are complementary to each other, and also consistent. In other word, it is composed of elements for which it is important that they fit together well, and in the German case these elements did fit together well until quite recently. Corporate governance as a system is itself an element of the German bank-based financial system at large and possibly even of the entire German business and economic system. Stakeholder orientation of governance is consistent with the general structure this system, and even represents one of its central elements. In retrospect, German corporate governance has also proved to be surprisingly stable. Its fundamental traits date back to the turn from the 19th to the 20th century. There are strong reasons to assume that the systemic features, that is, its complementarity and consistency, have greatly contributed to its past stability. Since about ten years now, there are growing tendencies to question the viability and stability of the German corporate governance system and even the financial system as a whole. One of the central topics in the new debate concerns the stakeholder orientation of the system, which some observers and critics consider as the main weakness of the “German model” under the increasing pressures of globalisation and European integration. As far as their development over time is concerned, systems of complementarity elements exhibit certain peculiarities: (1) They do not adjust easily to changing circumstances. (2) Changes concerning important individual elements, such as the stakeholder orientation of governance, tend to jeopardize the viability and the stability of the entire system. (3) While they appear to be stable, systems shaped by complementary may simply be rigid and tend to break under strong external pressure. “Breaking” means that a system undergoes a fundamental transformation. It seems plausible to assume that the German financial system is already in the middle of such a transformation. It is yet another consequence of its systemic character that this transformation is not likely to be a smooth and gradual process and that it will not lead to a “mixed model” but rather to the adoption of a capital market-based financial system as it prevails in the Anglo-Saxon countries. In such a system, corporate governance cannot be geared to catering to the interests of stakeholders, and an active role for them would not even make any economic sense.
Pensions- und Finanzsysteme in Europa : ein Vergleich unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Komplementarität
(2001)
Die Debatte über die optimale Ausgestaltung der Alterssicherung wird in jüngster Zeit äußerst kontrovers und hitzig geführt. Dabei scheint uns ein zentraler Aspekt nicht genügend beachte zu werden: Welcher Zusammenhang besteht zwischen den Merkmalen des Finanzsystems und des Pensionssystems eines Landes? Weil dieser Zusammenhang wichtig sein könnte, wird in diesem Beitrag untersucht, ob es Unterschiede zwischen den Finanz- und Pensionssystemen in drei großen europäischen Ländern, Deutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien, gibt, ob sich diese Unterschiede in charakteristischer Weise entsprechen und ob sich über diese Entsprechungen hinaus auch Wechselwirkungen zwischen dem Finanzsystem und dem Pensionssystem eines Landes nachweisen lassen.
Zur Beantwortung dieser Fragen wird in einem ersten Schritt kurz die Unterschiedlichkeit der Finanz- und Pensionssysteme zwischen den drei Ländern skizziert, und es werden parallelen zwischen diesen Unterschieden nachgewiesen. Daran anschließend werden die Zusammenhänge zwischen der Ausgestaltung der gesetzlichen Alterssicherung und der volkswirtschaftlichen Risikoallokation sowie der Ausgestaltung der betrieblichen Alterssicherung für die Unternehmensstrategien, -finanzierung und –verfassung betrachtet. Dabei lässt sich zeigen, dass es sowohl in Deutschland als auch in Großbritannien eine – wenn auch vollkommen unterschiedlich ausgeprägte – Komplementarität zwischen Finanz- und Pensionssystem gibt, während sich ein solcher Zusammenhang für Frankreich nicht konstatieren lässt. Abschließend werden wirtschaftspolitische Implikationen dieses Zusammenhangs angesprochen