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Institute
We study the returns the venture capital and private equity investment from 221 venture capital and private equity funds that are part of 72 venture capital and private equity firms, 5040 entrepreneurial firms (3826 venture capital and 1214 private equity), and spanning 32 years (1971 - 2003) and 39 countries from North and South America, Europe and Asia. We make use of four main categories of variables to proxy for value-added activities and risks that explain venture capital and private equity returns: market and legal environment, VC characteristics, entrepreneurial firm characteristics, and the characteristics and structure of the investment. We show Heckman sample selection issues in regards to both unrealized and partially realized investments are important to consider for analysing the determinants of realized returns. We further compare the actual unrealized returns, as reported to investment managers, to the predicted unrealized returns based on the estimates of realized returns from the sample selection models. We show there exists significant systematic biases in the reporting of unrealized investments to institutional investors depending on the level of the earnings aggressiveness and disclosure indices in a country, as well as proxies for the degree of information asymmetry between investment managers and venture capital and private equity fund managers. Klassifikation: G24, G28, G31, G32, G35
We analyze governance with a dataset on investments of venture capitalists in 3848 portfolio firms in 39 countries from North and South America, Europe and Asia spanning 1971-2003. We find that cross-country differences in Legality have a significant impact on the governance structure of investments in the VC industry: better laws facilitate faster deal screening and deal origination, a higher probability of syndication and a lower probability of potentially harmful co-investment, and facilitate board representation of the investor. We also show better laws reduce the probability that the investor requires periodic cash flows prior to exit, which is in conjunction with an increased probability of investment in high-tech companies. Klassifikation: G24, G31, G32.
We investigate the decisions of listed firms to go private once again. We start by revealing that while a significant number of firms which go public is VC-backed, an overproportional share of these VC-backed firms go private later on (they stay on the exchange for an average of 8.5 years). We interpret this very robust pattern such that IPOs of VC-backed firms are to a large extent a temporary rather than a permanent feature of the corporate governance of these firms. We investigate various potential hypotheses why VCs actually seem to be able to bring marginal firms to the exchange by relating the going-private decisions to various characteristics of the IPO market as well as to VC characteristics. We find strong support for the certification ability of VCs: more experienced and reputable VCs are more able to bring marginal firms to public exchanges via an IPOs. These marginal firms backed-by more reputable and experienced VCs are more likely to go private later on. Hence, our analysis suggests that IPOs backed by experienced VCs are most likely to be a temporary rather than the final stage in the life of the portfolio firm. We find no support that reputable VCs underprice their IPO-exits more implying that they have no need to leave more money on the table to take the marginal firms public.
This paper investigates the financial contracting behavior of German venture capitalists against the results of recent theoretical work on the design of venture capital contracts, especially with regard to the use of convertible securities. First, we identify a special feature of the German market, namely that public-private partnership agencies require significantly lower returns than private and young venture capitalists. The latter are most likely to follow their North-American counterpart by refinancing themselves with closed-end funds. Second, with regard to financing practices it is shown that the use of convertibles, relative to other instruments, is influenced by the anticipated severity of agency problems. Klassifikation: C24; G24; G32
This paper aims to analyze the effects of financial constraints and the financial crisis on the financing and investment policies of newly founded firms. Thereby, the analysis adds important new insights on a crucial segment of the economy. We make use of a large and comprehensive data set of French firms founded in the years 2004-2006, i.e. well before the financial crisis. Our panel data analysis shows that the global financial crisis imposed a shock (mostly demand-driven) on the financing as well as on the investments of these firms. Moreover, we find that financially constrained firms use less external debt financing and invest smaller amounts. They also rely on less trade credit. With regard to bank financing, newly founded firms which are more financially constrained accumulate less bank debt and repay initial bank debt slower than their non-financially constraint counterparts. Finally, we find that financially constrained firms are affected to a smaller degree by the financial crisis than their less financially constrained counterparts.
We analyze the desinvestment decision of venture capitalists in the course of an IPO of their portfolio firms. The capital market learns of the project quality only in the period following the IPO. Venture capitalists with high-quality firms face a trade-off between immediately selling their stake in the venture at a price below the true value and having to wait until the true value is revealed. We show that the dilemma may be resolved via a reputation-acquiring mechanism in a repeated game set-up. Thereby, we can explain, e.g., the advent of "hot-issue market behavior" involving early disinvestments and a high degree of price uncertainty. Furthermore, we provide a new rationale for underpricing. Young venture capitalists may use underpricing as a device for credibly committing themselves to acquiring reputation.
This paper investigates the potential implications of say on pay on management remuneration in Germany. We try to shed light on some key aspects by presenting quantitative data that allows us to gauge the pertinent effects of the German natural experiment that originates with the 2009 amendments to the Stock Corporation Act of 1965. In order to do this, we deploy a hand-collected data set for Germany's major firms (i.e. DAX 30), for the years 2006-2012. Rather than focusing exclusively on CEO remuneration we collected data for all members of the management board for the whole period under investigation. We observe that the compensation packages of management board members of Germany's DAX30-firms are quite closely linked to key performance measures. In addition, we find that salaries increase with the size of the company and that ownership concentration has no significant effect on compensation. Also, our findings suggest that the two-tier system seems to matter a lot when it comes to compensation. However, it would be misleading to state that we see no significant impact of the introduction of the German say on pay-regime. Our findings suggest that supervisory boards anticipate shareholder-behavior.
We highlight the implications of combining underwriting services and lending for the choice of underwriters and for competition in the underwriting business. We show that cross-selling can increase underwriters’ incentives, and we explain three phenomena: first, that cross-selling is important for universal banks to enter the investment banking business; second, that cross-selling is particularly attractive for highly leveraged borrowers; third, that less-than-market rates are no prerequisite for cross-selling to benefit a bank’s clients. In our model, cross-selling reduces rents in the underwriting business.
Comparative proteomics reveals a diagnostic signature for pulmonary head‐and‐neck cancer metastasis
(2018)
Patients with head‐and‐neck cancer can develop both lung metastasis and primary lung cancer during the course of their disease. Despite the clinical importance of discrimination, reliable diagnostic biomarkers are still lacking. Here, we have characterised a cohort of squamous cell lung (SQCLC) and head‐and‐neck (HNSCC) carcinomas by quantitative proteomics. In a training cohort, we quantified 4,957 proteins in 44 SQCLC and 30 HNSCC tumours. A total of 518 proteins were found to be differentially expressed between SQCLC and HNSCC, and some of these were identified as genetic dependencies in either of the two tumour types. Using supervised machine learning, we inferred a proteomic signature for the classification of squamous cell carcinomas as either SQCLC or HNSCC, with diagnostic accuracies of 90.5% and 86.8% in cross‐ and independent validations, respectively. Furthermore, application of this signature to a cohort of pulmonary squamous cell carcinomas of unknown origin leads to a significant prognostic separation. This study not only provides a diagnostic proteomic signature for classification of secondary lung tumours in HNSCC patients, but also represents a proteomic resource for HNSCC and SQCLC.
Private equity fund managers are typically required to invest their own money alongside the fund. We examine how this coinvestment affects the acquisition strategy of leveraged buyout funds. In a simple model, where the investment and capital structure decisions are made simultaneously, we show that a higher coinvestment induces managers to chose less risky firms and use more leverage. We test these predictions in a unique sample of private equity investments in Norway, where the fund manager's taxable wealth is publicly available. Consistent with the model, portfolio company risk decreases and leverage ratios increase with the coinvestment fraction of the manager's wealth. Moreover, funds requiring a relatively high coinvestment tend to spread its capital over a larger number of portfolio firms, consistent with a more conservative investment policy.