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This paper examines the political-economy and cultural dynamics and discourses underlying the emergence of the Palestinian Hamas and the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front. Both movements emerged in the late 1980s as responses to continuing (neo) colonial conditions in their countries. I explore to what extent the various processes commonly referred to as “globalization,” both the world-wide economic transformations epitomized by post-fordism on the macro/system level and neo-liberal structural adjustment programs within countries, and—perhaps more important—its cultural dynamics contributed to the rise and power of both movements. I examine the socio-economic situation in Algeria and Palestine-Israel during the 1980s and link it to the politics developments in both countries. Next I review the events behind the founding of both movements and the main components of their ideologies and strategies. Finally I explore their arguments to determine whether the political-economic or cultural pressures unleashed by globalization were the determining factor in their emergence and ideological development. I conclude by comparing the two case studies to determine if there are common threads that can serve as the basis for a region-wide investigation of the role of globalization in the emergence and/or rise to social hegemony of Islamist movements in other MENA countries.
This paper surveys the growth and various phases of and influences on the concept of democracy in the Islamic political thought of the last two centuries. Among the thinkers covered in the survey are Rifa'a Tahtawi (1801-73), Khairuddin at-Tunis (1810-99), Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1838-97), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), Abdurrahman al-Kawakibi (1849-1903), Rashid Rida (1865-1935), Hasan al-Banna (1904-49), Ali Abd Ar-Raziq (1888-1966), Sayyid Qutb (1906-66), Sa'id Hawwa, and Malik Bennabi (1905-73). Reference is made to the influence of Sayyid Mawdudi (1903-79), on the thought of Sayyid Qutb. The paper traces also the bearing of Bennabi's thought on Rachid Ghannouchi and on the Islamic movements of our times.
The goals of Zionism today
(1998)
The Arab-Israeli wars
(2003)
Lexicon of Zionism
(2003)
Youth movements
(2008)
Di lamdonishe beratungen
(2005)
Agro-technology
(2001)
This review describes how the constraints of limited water resources and an arid and semi-arid environment were overcome by a leadership capable of defining future needs and identifying and implementing appropriate solutions. Advanced technologies proved indispensable in this process. Yet, in recent years, the continuously increasing demand for water, mainly for domestic use, has created a chronic situation in which all available water from natural sources is being used up. The only solution to ensuring a dependable supply of water for both domestic and agricultural use requires that several steps be taken concurrently to implement regulations and measures for saving water and to construct immediately large-scale plants for desalination of seawater and reclamation of urban effluents.
The Druze in Israel
(2002)
The bedouin in Israel
(1999)
The redeemers of the land
(1999)
This post is dedicated to the memory of Rabbi Chaim Flom, late rosh yeshiva of Yeshivat Ohr David in Jerusalem. I first met Rabbi Flom thirty years ago when he became my teacher at the Hebrew Youth Academy of Essex County (now known as the Joseph Kushner Hebrew Academy; unfortunately, another one of my teachers from those years also passed away much too young, Rabbi Yaakov Appel). When he first started teaching he was known as Mr. Flom, because he hadn't yet received semikhah (Actually, he had some sort of semikhah but he told me that he didn't think it was adequate to be called "Rabbi" by the students.) He was only at the school a couple of years and then decided to move to Israel to open his yeshiva. I still remember his first parlor meeting which was held at my house. Rabbi Flom was a very special man. Just to give some idea of this, ten years after leaving the United States he was still in touch with many of the students and even attended our weddings. He would always call me when he came to the U.S. and was genuinely interested to hear about my family and what I was working on. He will be greatly missed.
In discussing final status issues, Palestinians and Israelis approach the question of the refugees and the right of return from radically different perspectives. The Palestinian narrative maintains that the Zionists forcibly expelled the Arab refugees in 1948. The Palestinians insist on the right of the refugees to return to their homes or, for those who choose not to do so, to accept compensation. And they demand that Israel unilaterally acknowledge its complete moral responsibility for the injustice of the refugees’ expulsion. In contrast, the Israeli narrative rejects the refugees’ right of return. Israel argues that it was the Arabs who caused the Palestinian refugee problem, by rejecting the creation of the State of Israel and declaring war upon it—a war which, like most wars, created refugee problems, including a Jewish one. Israel sees the return of Palestinian refugees as an existential threat, insofar as it would undermine the Jewish character and the viability of the state. The two sides’ traditional solutions make no attempt to reconcile these opposing narratives. Yet such an attempt is vital if the issue is to be engaged. Hence the Joint Working Group on Israeli–Palestinian Relations developed two compromise solutions. They narrow the gap between the positions, but do not fully reconcile them. The compromise solution espoused by the Palestinian members of the Joint Working Group would insist that Israel acknowledge both its responsibility for creating the refugee problem and the individual moral right of Palestinian refugees to return. But it recognizes that, in view of the changed situation of the refugees over 50 years, and taking into account Israel’s constraints, the return of only a limited number would be feasible. Israel would pay both individual and collective compensation. The Palestinians’ case for an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders would be strengthened as a result of their willingness to absorb the refugees in the Palestinian state. Under the compromise solution proposed by the Israeli members of the Joint Working Group, Israel would acknowledge that it shares, with the other parties to the 1948 war, practical, but not moral, responsibility for the suffering of the refugees, and that rectification of their plight is a central goal of the peace process. Israel would accept repatriation of tens of thousands of refugees under its family reunification program. Israel would pay collective compensation to the Palestinian state, paralleled by Arab State compensation for Jewish refugees from 1948. In seeking to further reconcile these two compromise solutions, we note that they reflect a large measure of agreement between Palestinians and Israelis: that Israel had a historic role in the events that created the refugee issue; that a massive exercise of the right of return is unrealizable, and “return”/family reunification will be limited; that a larger number of Palestinians will “return” to the Palestinian state; that some resettlement will take place in host states, primarily Jordan; that Israel will pay some form of compensation; and that closing the file on the refugee issue means the dismantling of the entire international apparatus that has sustained the refugees—camps, UNRWA, etc. But there remain significant gaps between the two sides’ compromise proposals as well. These concern the nature of Israeli acknowledgement of Palestinian suffering and the responsibility for it; the nature and number of “return”/family reunification; the nature and size of compensation, and its linkage to compensation for Jewish refugees from 1948; and the size of “return” to the Palestinian state. In order to negotiate an agreed solution that bridges these remaining gaps, Israelis and Palestinians will have to develop the mutual trust required to further accommodate each other’s narratives. They will also, inevitably, have to factor the refugee/right of return issue into the broader fabric of tradeoffs and compromises that will characterize a comprehensive solution to the conflict. This will involve additional parties—primarily the refugee host countries—as well as related substantive issues, such as borders.