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Right-wing populist parties often resort to a xenophobic rhetoric which both exploits and fuels existing illiberal anti-immigrant sentiments. Since populist anti-immigrant sentiments are at odds with fundamental liberal values and challenge the implementation of any liberal ethics of migration, this essay argues that states should adopt civic education policies to counter such sentiments and persuade citizens to develop liberal attitudes towards immigrants. Empirical evidence suggests that sentiments may be malleable, and there are already examples of local governments devising or supporting initiatives aimed at dispelling prejudices and promoting positive interactions. It might be objected that a government’s involvement in shaping sentiments and opinions conflicts with liberal democratic states’ commitment to individual autonomy and electoral fairness. However, I argue that civic education policies are not necessarily incompatible with such values and I provide five criteria to identify policies that liberal democratic governments may legitimately adopt to counteract anti-immigrant sentiments.
This article argues that populism, cosmopolitanism, and calls for global justice should be understood not as theoretical positions but as appeals to different segments of democratic electorates with the aim of assembling winning political coalitions. This view is called democratic realism: it considers political competition in democracies from a perspective that is realist in the sense that it focuses not first on the content of competing political claims but on the relationships among different components of the coalitions they work to mobilise in the pursuit of power. It is argued that Laclau’s populist theory offers a sort of realist critique of other populists, but that his view neglects the crucial dynamics of political coalition-building. When the relation of populism to global justice is rethought from this democratic realist angle, one can better understand the sorts of challenges each faces, and also where and how they come into conflict.
A tradição de pensamento conhecida como Teoria Crítica, que conta com os nomes de Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse e Habermas, entre muitos outros, é composta por diferentes modelos críticos. Encontramos, numa mesma geração ou ainda num mesmo autor, diferentes formulações da crítica social apoiadas em diagnósticos do tempo renovados. O presente artigo procura pensar as condições de renovação dos diagnósticos a partir da qual os obstáculos à emancipação ou potenciais emancipatórios, quando presentes numa dada sociedade, sejam considerados e analisados de modo crítico. Essa renovação implica desvincular a fundamentação normativa da crítica do "paradigma produtivista" e conceber as lutas emancipatórias na pluralidade de seus sentidos.
Habermas defensa en aquest escrit l’existència d’un nexe intern entre l’Estat de dret i lademocràcia. Aquest nexe sorgeix del concepte modern de dret i del fet que el dret positiuja no pot legitimar-se a partir d’un dret d’ordre superior. Així doncs, el dret es legitima apartir de l’autonomia que tot ciutadà té garantida, de tal manera que l’autonomia pública ila privada es pressuposen mútuament. Aquest nexe es fa visible en la dialèctica entre la concepcióliberal del dret i el paradigma jurídic de l’Estat social, dialèctica que fa necessària unaautocomprensió procedimental de l’Estat democràtic de dret. Finalment aquest nou paradigmajurídic procedimental és exemplificat a partir de les polítiques feministes d’emancipació.
La revitalització de les grans religions: un repte per a l’autocomprensió secular de la modernitat?
(2014)
La vitalitat de la religió ha conduït a un qüestionament de la tesi que vincula la modernització i la secularització. Cal, doncs, repensar el mateix significat de la “modernitat” per tal d’adaptar-la a l’escala mundial. A l’hora de dur a terme un diàleg intercultural ja no es pot confiar en un suposat universalisme de la raó. La raó secular no pot pretendre establir els criteris de la racionalitat sense prendre en consideració també altres tradicions, com les que beuen de la religió. Es planteja, doncs, la pregunta si el pensament postmetafísic por aprendre alguna cosa de les tradicions religioses i si per fer-ho cal que s’hi relacioni de manera agnòstica.
The European Union is at the crossroads between intelligent expansion of future horizons and frightened shrinking to a perspective of local areas. Fear of descent of the citizens on one side and a politics of crisis, that goes along with harsh injustice have made upset the national societies against each other, missing courage on the side of politicians, to bring European issues to the fore, endanger the European project. There is only one way to overcome this situation by establishing a democratic union, which conserves not only the social and civilian achievements of the national state, as well as the assets of a greater democratic political unity, that offers an unity of European citizens and European state demos.
Representation is a process of making, accepting, or rejecting representative claims (Disch, 2015; Saward, 2014). This groundbreaking insight challenged the standard assumption that representative democracy can be reduced to elections and activities of elected representatives (Pitkin, 1967). It broadened the scope of representative democracy to encompass representation activities beyond those authorized by elections, transformed our thinking and provided a new perspective, putting claims and their reception into the center. This paradigm shift erased the distinction between elected and non-elected representatives and disclosed the potential of non-elected actors’ claims to represent (Andeweg, 2003; Kuyper, 2016; Rosanvallon & Goldhammer, 2008; Saward, 2006, 2009; Van Biezen & Saward, 2008). In spite of this lively debate, we identify an important gap in the literature: while this paradigmatic shift inspired many authors, conceptual frameworks that can be applied for systematic empirical analysis of real-life cases are missing. In this article, we fill this gap and propose frameworks for assessing and validating a variety of real-life claims. Our study provides empirical substance to the ongoing theoretical debates, helping to translate the mainly theoretical ‘claim approach’ into empirical research tools. It helps to transform the conventional wisdom about what representation can (not) be and shines a new light on the potential future of (claims on) representation.
The system of representative democracy is under considerable strain. Its institutions are struggling to maintain legitimacy, and its elected representatives are failing to keep their monopoly on (formal) political representation. An emerging multitude of (new) claim makers contests the authority of elected representatives as well as the functioning of the existing system of representative democracy by alleging misrepresentation. In this article, we identify a significant shortcoming in Saward’s claims-making approach; specifically, we argue that it offers little direction in addressing misrepresentation. We distinguish between claims of representation and claims of misrepresentation, and show how the latter can fulfill one, two or all three of the following functions: (1) they appeal to an enemy/antagonist (strategy), (2) identify causes of misrepresentation related to policies, politics, and polity (persuasion), and (3) claim to create a new linkage to "the people", sometimes present themselves as new representatives (reframing). To test this proposed framework, we compare claims of misrepresentation in Brazil made by civil society groups (before and during the presidential impeachment between 2014 and 2016) and in Germany (focusing on the parliamentarians of the Alternative for Germany during the first six months of mandate). Our results suggest that claims of misrepresentation are not intrinsically democratic or undemocratic, but are instead ambiguous, have different manifestations and disparate impacts on the representative system. Our article contributes to the conceptual development of the claims approach and to further understanding several critical and current challenges to representative democracy.
The established notion of political representation is challenged on multiple accounts—theoretically, conceptually, and empirically. The contributions to this thematic issue explore the constructivist turn as the means for rethinking political representation today around the world. The articles included here seek to reconsider representation by theoretically and empirically reassessing how representation is conceptualized, claimed and performed—in Western and non-Western contexts. In recognition that democratic representation in Western countries is in a process of fundamental transformation and that non-Western countries no longer aim at replicating established Western models, we look for representation around the world—specifically in: Belgium, Brazil, France, Germany, China, and India. This enables us to advance the study of representative democracy from a global perspective. We show the limits and gaps in the constructivist literature and the benefits of theory-driven empirical research. Finally, we provide conceptual tools and frameworks for the (comparative) study of claims of representation.
Scholars are coming to terms with the fact that something is rotten in the new democracies of Central Europe. The corrosion has multiple symptoms: declining trust in democratic institutions, emboldened uncivil society, the rise of oligarchs and populists as political leaders, assaults on an independent judiciary, the colonization of public administration by political proxies, increased political control over media, civic apathy, nationalistic contestation and Russian meddling. These processes signal that the liberal-democratic project in the so-called Visegrad Four (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) has been either stalled, diverted or reversed. This article investigates the “illiberal turn” in the Visegrad Four (V4) countries. It develops an analytical distinction between illiberal “turns” and “swerves”, with the former representing more permanent political changes, and offers evidence that Hungary is the only country in the V4 at the brink of a decisive illiberal turn.