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Das OLG Düsseldorf hat über Managerfehler im Vorfeld der Finanzmarktkrise bei der IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG zu entscheiden. Der Beschluss wird Anfangs- und Referenzpunkt der organhaftungsrechtlichen Krisenaufarbeitung sein, und führende Berater attestieren ihm ein Wirkungspotential, wie es zuletzt dem ARAG-Urteil des BGH zukam. Der Beitrag stimmt dem Beschlussergebnis zu, zeigt aber auf, wie Kernaussagen schnell in eine prinzipienlose Ausdehnung des Organhaftungsrechts münden können.
The purpose of this essay is to assess the automatic exchange of information as described in EU Directive 2003/48 of 3 June 2003 on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments with regard to the fundamental right of the individual to a private life, to banking secrecy and the freedoms on which the European internal market is based. The assessment reveals the conflicts of interests and values involved in the holding by banks (particularly those offering private banking services) of increasingly extensive, detailed and intimate information about their clients and in the automatic processing of that information by ever more powerful and sophisticated systems. Banking secrecy plays an essential role in protecting clients against the dangers which the disclosure of such information without their permission might produce. Banking secrecy exists not only in Luxembourg but also in many other European countries, and in Germany and France in particular it is not very different from the system applying in Luxembourg. While the French and German tax authorities do have some investigative powers not enjoyed by their Luxembourg counterparts, those powers are strictly circumscribed and cannot rely on the electronic exchange of information set out in EU Directive 2003/48/EC. While banking secrecy is totally incompatible with the electronic exchange of information, the core question is whether the latter can be reconciled with the respect for private life. In a Europe that sets itself up as the cradle of human rights, the general and en-masse exchange of private information cannot provide adequate and sufficient guarantees that the information exchanged will not be misused. The amount of interference in private life is clearly out of proportion to the public interest involved and is contrary to sub-section 2, article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and to articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Since the automatic exchange of information at least potentially risks restricting the free flow of capital among Member States and discouraging the use of transborder banking services, its compliance with the fundamental principles of the internal market also needs to be closely examined. The restrictions imposed by such exchange very probably go beyond the limits within which the free movement of capital and services is possible. The European Court of Justice has found that there is no proportionality if the measures supposedly undertaken in the general interest are actually based on a general presumption of tax evasion or tax fraud. However, it would be true to say that the ECJ does not always examine the tax restrictions placed on the free movement of capital particularly thoroughly to ensure that they are necessary or proportionate. The economic effectiveness of the automatic exchange of information is far from being proved and involves significant cost to the banks providing the information and to the tax authorities using it. To date the system does not appear to have produced any significant new tax revenue nor does it prevent the continuing outflow of capital from Europe. Yet withholding at source, which respects individual and economic freedoms, does generate tax revenue that is cost-free to the State. Exchange of information on request in justified cases using the OECD Tax Convention on Income and Capital model does also fight tax fraud while at the same time providing citizens with the guarantees required to ensure their private lives are respected. A combination of these two systems - withholding at source and exchange of information on request in justified cases - would create the proper balance between the public and private interest that the automatic exchange of information cannot provide.
Der Deutsche Corporate Governance – Kodex empfiehlt seit seiner jüngsten Änderung im Juni 2009, dass der Aufsichtsrat auf die „Unabhängigkeit“ eines von ihm herangezogenen externen Vergütungsberaters achten soll. Dieses Unabhängigkeitserfordernis wirft mehrere Fragen auf, denen im Folgenden nachgegangen werden soll. Außerdem entwickelt der Beitrag Vorschläge, wie Aufsichtsrat und Vergütungsberater verfahren sollten, um der Empfehlung des Corporate Governance-Kodex zu genügen.
After the introduction of the euro in 1999, the debate on the financial stability architecture in the EU focused on the adequacy of a decentralised setting based on national responsibilities for preventing and managing crises. The Financial Services Action Plan in 1999 and the introduction of the Lamfalussy process for financial regulation and supervision in 2001 enhanced the decentralised arrangements by increasing significantly the level of legal harmonisation and supervisory cooperation. In addition, authorities adopted EU-wide MoUs to safeguard cross-border financial stability. In this context, the financial crisis has proved to be a major challenge to the ongoing process of European financial integration. In particular, momentous events such as the freezing of interbank markets, the loss of confidence in financial institutions, runs on banks and difficulties affecting cross-border financial groups, questioned the ability of the EU financial stability architecture to contain threats to the integrated single financial market. In particular, the crisis has demonstrated the importance of coupling to micro-prudential supervision a macro dimension aimed at a broad and effective monitoring and assessment of the potential risks covering all components of the financial system. In Europe, following the de Larosière Report, the European Commission has put forward proposals for establishing a European System of Financial Supervision and a European Systemic Risk Board, the latter body to be set up under the auspices of the ECB. While the details for the implementation of these structures still need to be spelt out, they should reinforce significantly – ten years after the introduction of the euro – the financial stability architecture at the EU level.
This paper analyses the regulatory framework which applies to the determination of directors’ remuneration in Europe and examines the extent to which European firms follow best practices in corporate governance in this area, drawing on an empirical analysis of the governance systems that European firms adopt in setting remuneration and, in particular, on an empirical assessment of their diverging approaches to disclosure. These divergences persist despite recent reforms. After an examination of the link between optimal remuneration, corporate governance and regulation and an assessment of how regulatory reform has evolved in this area, the paper provides an overview of national laws and best practice corporate governance recommendations across the Member States, following the adoption of the important EC Recommendations on directors’ remuneration and on the role of non-executive directors in 2004 and 2005, respectively. This overview is largely based on the answers to questionnaires sent to legal experts from seventeen European Member States. The paper also provides an empirical analysis of governance practices and, in particular, firm disclosure of directors’ remuneration in Europe’s largest 300 listed firms by market capitalisation. The paper reveals that, notwithstanding a swathe of reforms across the Member States in recent years and related harmonisation efforts, disclosure levels still vary from country to country and are strongly dependent on the existence of regulations and best practice guidelines in the firm’s home Member State. Convergence in disclosure practices is not strong; only a few basic standards are followed by the majority of the firms examined and there is strong divergence with respect to most of the criteria considered in the study. Consistent with previous research, our study reveals clear differences not only with respect to remuneration disclosure, but also with respect to shareholder engagement and the board’s role in the remuneration process and in setting remuneration guidelines. Ownership structures still ‘matter’; these divergences tend to follow different corporate governance systems and, in particular, the dispersed ownership/block-holding ownership divide. They do not appear to have been smoothed since the EC Company Law Action Plan was launched and notwithstanding the harmonisation that has been attempted in this field. Keywords: Directors’ remuneration, corporate governance, disclosure, European regulation JEL Classifications: G30, G38, J33, K22, M52
Lessons from the crisis
(2009)
A lot happened even before the perceived beginning of this crisis in 2007, so although the events are recent, I will give an overview from a US perspective of the period from 2001 to date, in our search for the lessons to be learned. Much of it is probably familiar, but worth revisiting. I will break this necessarily simplified account into 3 stages: first, a look at the key factors that led to the increasing riskiness of US home mortgages; second, how those risks were transmitted as securities from US housing lenders to institutional investors around the globe; and third, how those risks led to huge losses and created a credit crunch that moved the impact from the financial economy to the real economy and produced a severe recession. Then we will have a factual foundation for deriving the lessons that ought to be taken away from this very expensive experience.
Der Gesetzgeber hat bei der Entstehung des SoFFin auf bekannte Gesetzesmodelle zurück gegriffen. Sondervermögen sind grundsätzlich keine juristischen Personen und auch nicht rechtsfähig. Der SoFFin ist gleichwohl rechtlich selbstständig und damit im Sinne des öffentlichen Rechts „teilrechtsfähig“. Er hat keine eigenen Organe, vielmehr wird er von der FMSA verwaltet und vertreten. Die FMSA wurde als rechtliche unselbständige Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts bei der Deutschen Bundesbank errichtet. Das daraus entstandene organisatorisch kaum einzuordnende Konstrukt lässt viele Fragen offen. Es verstößt nicht gegen Verfassungsrecht, solange die Unabhängigkeit der Bundesbank gewahrt bleibt. Wegen ihrer neu übernommenen Aufgabe aus § 8a FMStFG (Errichten von bundesrechtlichen Abwicklungsanstalten) wurde die FMSA nunmehr, im Juli 2009, in eine bundesunmittelbare, rechtsfähige Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts im Geschäftsbereich des Bundesministeriums der Finanzen umgewandelt. Sie ist ein eigener Verwaltungsträger und kann bei der Abwicklung ihrer Geschäfte die Deutsche Bundesbank in Anspruch nehmen. Die FMSA unterliegt der Rechts- und Fachaufsicht des Bundesfinanzministeriums. Das Organ der FMSA ist der Leitungsausschuss. Als Verwaltungsorgan hat er die Anstalt nach außen und vor Gericht zu vertreten. Eine genaue Zuweisung weiterer Kompetenzen und Aufgaben ist im Gesetz nicht vorgesehen. Zumindest ist er für alle Entscheidungen zuständig, die nicht dem Bundesministerium der Finanzen oder dem Lenkungsausschuss zugewiesen sind. Der Lenkungsausschuss ist ein von der FMSA unabhängiger, interministerieller Ausschuss. Er ist zum einen eine der Kontrollinstanzen für die FMSA und zum anderen kommt ihm Entscheidungsbefugnis im Aufgabenbereich der FMSA zu. Wie das Verhältnis des Lenkungsausschusses zum Bundesministerium der Finanzen zu sehen ist, ist unklar. Die parlamentarische Aufsicht über Maßnahmen, die vor allem Schulden des Fonds betreffen, wird darüber hinaus vom „Gremium zum Finanzmarktstabilisierungsfonds“ sichergestellt. Haushaltsrechtlich wirft der Fonds einige Fragen auf. Allerdings ist seine Errichtung in Form eines Sondervermögens in der Gesamtbetrachtung verfassungsrechtlich nicht bedenklich. Auch unterliegt der SoFFin einer umfassenden Prüfung durch den Bundesrechnungshof. Im Hinblick auf die Vergabe von Stabilisierungshilfen an antragstellende Unternehmen kann die FMSA in zweierlei Formen handeln: Zum einen öffentlich-rechtlich und zum anderen privatrechtlich. Die FMSA kann sich allerdings nur ausnahmsweise privatrechtlicher Handlungsformen bedienen. Auch in diesem Fall darf sie nicht willkürlich handeln, sondern ist an die Grundsätze des Verwaltungsprivatrechts gebunden.