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Public administration is the largest part of the democratic state and a key consideration in understanding its legitimacy. Despite this, democratic theory is notoriously quiet about public administration. One exception is deliberative systems theories, which have recognized the importance of public administration and attempted to incorporate it within their orbit. This article examines how deliberative systems approaches have represented (a) the actors and institutions of public administration, (b) its mode of coordination, (c) its key legitimacy functions, (d) its legitimacy relationships, and (e) the possibilities for deliberative intervention. It argues that constructing public administration through the pre-existing conceptual categories of deliberative democracy, largely developed to explain the legitimacy of law-making, has led to some significant omissions and misunderstandings. The article redresses these issues by providing an expanded conceptualization of public administration, connected to the core concerns of deliberative and other democratic theories with democratic legitimacy and democratic reform.
Many democracies use geographic constituencies to elect some or all of their legislators. Furthermore, many people regard this as desirable in a noncomparative sense, thinking that local constituencies are not necessarily superior to other schemes but are nevertheless attractive when considered on their own merits. Yet, this position of noncomparative constituency localism is now under philosophical pressure as local constituencies have recently attracted severe criticism. This article examines how damaging this recent criticism is, and argues that within limits, noncomparative constituency localism remains philosophically tenable despite the criticisms. The article shows that noncomparative constituency localism is compelling in the first place because geographic constituencies foster partisan voter mobilisation, and practices of constituency service help to sustain deliberation among constituents and within the legislature and promote the realisation of equal opportunity for political influence. The article further argues that it is unwarranted to criticise geographic constituencies for being biased against geographically dispersed voter groups, for causing vote-seat disproportionality, and for being vulnerable to gerrymandering. The article also discusses the criticisms that local constituencies may pose risks of inefficiency and injustice in resource allocation decisions, may lead legislators to neglect the common good, and may limit citizens’ control over the political agenda. Whilst conceding that these objections may be valid, the article argues that they do not outweigh the diverse and normatively weighty considerations speaking in favour of noncomparative constituency localism. Finally, the article’s analysis is defended against several variants of the charge that it exaggerates the benefits of geographic constituencies.
One of the central assumptions of global governance is that "problems without borders" require collaboration among multiple stakeholders to be managed effectively. This commitment to multistakeholderism, however, is not a functional imperative but the product of potentially contested agency recognition in the past. As such, we contend that a reconstruction of agency dynamics must be at the core of understanding global governance since global governors. We draw on a relational framework to lay out the basics of how to reconstruct the agency of global governors as it emerges through relations. Through these relations, entities-in-the-making advance agency claims or are ascribed agency by relevant others. Equally important from a relational perspective are recognition acts, which those claims trigger. We theorize in this paper that different types of agency claims paired with different recognition dynamics determine the outcome as to who is accepted to "sit at the table" for a particular issue. This theorization is required to (a) better understand current manifestations of global governance in their historical emergence and (b) discuss conditions of agency from a normative perspective to determine who should be the global governors of our time.
Becoming global governors: self-agentification, recognition, and delegation in world politics
(2022)
The emergence of new global governors and the ensuing complexity marks one of the most noticeable characteristics of contemporary global politics. However, this core axiom of global governance has not been unpacked in terms of why and how new actors emerge. This is surprising, since the emergence of new global governors raises fundamental questions about the very architecture of global governance. To unpack the dynamics of agency emergence, the article proposes a conceptual framework eclectically derived from relationalism. The framework defines foundational terms and allows us to posit assumptions on self-agentification, recognition, and delegation. We illustrate the framework and its mechanisms by reconstructing the emergence and evolution of corporate agency within the United Nations (UN) from initial debates in the 1960s to the UN Global Compact and conclude that this is mostly a story of contested recognition rather than self-agentification, with the international community and, in particular, states of the global north, inviting business to become more active.
Cyberspace is not the ‘electronic frontier’ that cyberlibertarian utopianists dream about, no distinct and uncivilized space beyond the reach of the state. Instead, cyberspace and the digital have become integral parts of a hybridizing digital/physical lifeworld. States are adapting to this transformation by creating analogies to borders and territory in cyberspace and by adopting deterritorialized and extraterritorial modes of control. To describe state adaptation strategies, this paper first discusses the conceptualization of borders and territory and their relation to order from an International Relations perspective. It then develops the concept of territorial practices as a technique of governance which consists of the reification of spaces, the communication of boundaries, and displays of power.
Digital sovereignty has become a prominent concept in European digital policy, and Germany stands out as its leading advocate in Europe. How digital sovereignty is being understood in German politics is therefore highly relevant for broader policy debates on the European level. This motivates the main objective of the article to map out the different meanings that are attributed to digital sovereignty in German political discourse. Specifically, the article adopts a narrative framework to reconstruct the narratives through which these meanings are constructed. The analysis identifies seven different but overlapping narratives of digital sovereignty in the German discourse that serve to promote partly contradictory political agendas. We argue that this diversity is not a bug, but a feature. Specifically, it supports rich internarrative linkages which benefit the broader resonance of each individual narrative. It also enables a broad set of political actors to enlist digital sovereignty for their specific priorities.
Against the backdrop of intensifying United States–China strategic competition, the European Union (EU) has recently changed course and moved closer to mirroring US rhetoric and action on China. Why has this happened, and how can it be best explained? In this article, it is argued that current role dynamics between the EU and the two rival great powers can help us understand the growing, albeit not full, EU–United States alignment on China. Role theory assumes that co-operation between actors intensifies when their roles become more compatible. Accordingly, it is shown that the EU has recently adjusted its role to be more closely aligned with the United States' position. That is to say, the EU has reshaped its own role conception, whilst the bloc has likewise become more open to meeting US role expectations after EU–United States role-playing turned positive once again under President Joe Biden.
In times of digital pervasion of everyday life, the EU has strengthened a normative idea of European fundamental rights, especially by referring to a strong notion of privacy protection. A normative corridor is evolving with the “right to privacy” at its heart, a right that will be instrumental in shaping the European legal architecture’s future structure. In this Article we argue that the constitutional protection of privacy rights is not only of individual relevance but also of major democratic significance: it protects the integrity of the communication structures that underpin democratic self-determination. The debate on privacy protection, however, often lacks a democratic understanding of privacy and misses its public value. Following an interactionist understanding of privacy and a discourse-theoretical model of democracy, our argument puts forward a conceptual link between privacy and the idea of communicative freedom. From this perspective, the substantiation of a European fundamental right to privacy can be seen as a possible contribution to promoting European democracy in general.
Von den bisher zwölf Bundespräsidenten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland waren alle, zumindest auf dem Papier, christlichen Glaubens. Neun Bundespräsidenten waren, einer ist evangelischer Konfession. Dazu kommt, dass die meisten dieser zehn evangelischen Bundespräsidenten ihrer evangelischen Kirche sehr verbunden waren. Der in chronologischer Reihenfolge elfte Bundespräsident, Joachim Gauck, war Theologe und Pfarrer. Das ist sicherlich weithin bekannt. Aber auch Roman Herzog, Johannes Rau, Richard von Weizäcker und Gustav Heinemann waren ihren evangelischen Kirchen durch viele, meist sehr bedeutende Ehrenämter verbunden. Auch der amtierende (evangelische) Bundespräsident Frank-Walter Steinmeier ist ein 'hochverbundener Protestant', um es einmal mit dem einschlägigen Begriff der Religionssoziologie zu sagen. Gleichzeitig gilt selbstverständlich die religiöse Neutralität des Staates und somit auch die von dessen höchstem Repräsentanten. Und dennoch könnte bei einer solch beachtlichen Reihung die Frage aufkommen, ob es eine Art staatstragenden Protestantismus in Deutschland gibt. Ohne diese sehr umfangreiche Frage beantworten zu wollen, möchte ich im Folgenden auf einen Aspekt eines solchen, möglichen Zusammenhangs blicken. Anhand der ersten Rede unseres amtierenden Bundespräsidenten, die ich als 'Mut-Rede' bezeichne, möchte ich die Frage stellen, ob sich die hier angeschlagene politische Rhetorik an die protestantische Konfession Steinmeiers zurückbinden lässt. Diese Frage steht dabei im größeren Rahmen einer sich kulturwissenschaftlich verstehenden Theologie.
