Open Access

In this article, we propose to develop a realist interpretation of political progress—that is, an analysis of what it means to achieve better conditions of life in society under political power according to realist standards. Specifically, we are interested in identifying the criteria according to which political realism defines a change in the status quo as a desirable change...

Defenders of current restrictions on EU immigrants’ access to welfare rights in host member states often invoke a principle of reciprocity among member states to justify these policies. The argument is that membership of a system of social cooperation triggers duties of reciprocity characteristic of welfare rights. Newly arriving EU immigrants who look for work do not meet the relevant criteria of membership, the argument goes, because they have not yet contributed enough to qualify as members on the grounds of reciprocity. Therefore, current restrictions on their access to welfare rights are justified. In this article, I challenge this argument by showing how restrictions on EU immigrants’ access to welfare rights are inconsistent with duties of international reciprocity. There are different variations of this challenge, but my focus here will be on one that uses a veil of ignorance device to support this claim. What matters from a perspective concerned with international reciprocity, I will argue, is what kind of welfare policy EU member states would choose were they not to know whether those receiving EU migrants were net contributors or net beneficiaries to the relevant scheme of international cooperation made possible by the four freedoms, and freedom of movement in particular. I argue that framing the requirement of reciprocity in this way provides a more comprehensive understanding of what should count as an ‘unreasonable burden’ on the welfare systems of host member states. The paper also examines alternative accounts of ‘unreasonable burdens’. It shows when and how the current institutional structure of the EU could take steps to deal with such burdens by preventing member states from gaming a comprehensive system of welfare rights protections across member states and by recognising the achievements of those member states that best serve them.

Multilevel governance of energy transitions depends on the coordination between national, supra- and international administrative actors. Coordination takes place in systems of multilevel administration, which constitute highly dynamic arenas dominated by legally non-binding instruments and reciprocal interactions and relationships. This article seeks to gain insights into the underlying coordination processes by asking which conditions account for the change over time of coordination between administrative actors in multilevel administration systems. First, research on multilevel administration is summarized. Second and starting from historic and discursive institutionalist theory, a conceptual framework is outlined to assess the conditions and modes that account for the dynamics of coordination in general, and the change of coordination instruments in particular. A trend towards persuasive coordination in a process of institutional layering driven by endogenous conditions is expected. Empirically, an in-depth comparative analysis is conducted based on exploratory interviews with 90 experts mainly from the European Commission, the International Energy Agency, and national administrators from Canada and Europe. The results unveil that administrative coordination evolves according to at least three types of layering that go beyond the initial hypothesis: first, through layering of coordination instruments; second, as an increase in formal and non-formal interactions through a growing number of channels and complexity of interactions over time; third, as layering of inter-administrative relationships through a growing importance of personal networks and the creation of new contacts. By analysing the dynamics of multilevel administrative coordination, the article contributes to an important but underdeveloped aspect of the governance of supra- and international energy transitions.

The debate on effects of globalization on welfare states is extensive. Often couched in terms of a battle between the compensation and the efficiency thesis, the scholarly literature has provided contradictory arguments and findings. This article contributes to the scholarly debate by exploring in greater detail the micro-level foundations of compensation theory. More specifically, we distinguish between individual policy preferences for compensatory social policies (unemployment insurance) and human capital-focused social investment policies (education) and expect globalization to mainly affect demand for educational investment. A multi-level analysis of ISSP survey data provides empirical support for this hypothesis. This finding provides an important revision and extension of the classical analytical perspective of compensation theory, because it shows that citizens value the social investment function of the welfare state above and beyond simple compensation via social transfers. This might be particularly relevant in today's skill-centered knowledge economies.