Working Paper
Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Working Paper (1496) (remove)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (1496) (remove)
Keywords
- Deutschland (90)
- monetary policy (33)
- Corporate Governance (31)
- Schätzung (30)
- corporate governance (19)
- household finance (17)
- Bank (16)
- Banking Union (16)
- Börsenkurs (15)
- ECB (15)
Institute
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften (1496) (remove)
In den letzten Jahren wurden verschiedene Modelle entwickelt, um das Ausfallrisiko von Banken unter Berücksichtigung von Portfolioeffekten zu quantifizieren. Bisher hat sich kein Ansatz als allgemein akzeptierter Standard durchsetzen können. Da die Modelle grundlegende konzeptionelle Unterschiede aufweisen und unterschiedliche empirische Inputdaten verwenden, hat die Auswahl eines Kreditrisikomodells unter Umständen einen erheblichen Einfluß auf die Kreditportfoliosteuerung der Bank. In diesem Beitrag soll deshalb geklärt werden, ob die Modelle systematisch abweichende Value-at-Risk-Werte berechnen und worin die Ursachen für auftretende Abweichungen liegen. Zunächst wird gezeigt, daß die bestehenden Kreditrisikomodelle in zwei grundlegende Klassen eingeteilt werden können: Assetwert-basierte Modelle und auf Ausfallraten basierende Modelle. Am Beispiel eines Musterportfolios von Krediten an deutsche Baufirmen werden zwei Vertreter der Modellklassen (CreditMetrics und CreditRisk+) verglichen und der Effekt der unterschiedlichen empirischen Inputparameter auf die Risikoergebnisse abgeschätzt. Die Analyse zeigt erhebliche Unterschiede zwischen den Modellen. Eine Analyse der Abweichungsursachen ergibt allerdings, daß der Grund für die großen Value-at-Risk-Unterschiede in erster Linie in den unterschiedlichen empirischen Inputdaten liegt, welche zu unterschiedlichen impliziten Korrelationsannahmen führen. Es wird gezeigt, wie die Modellparameter gewählt werden müssen, um identische Korrelationen zu erzeugen. Bei konsistenten Korrelationsannahmen stimmen die Ergebnisse beider Modelle weitgehend überein. Keywords: Credit Risk Models, credit risk correlation
European households face tremendous obstacles when intending to open a savings account outside their home country. The shortage of deposits has become a major reason for banks’ declining loan supply and ultimately is responsible for a substantial part of the investment weakness and GDP decline in affected European countries.
Policy makers have made important efforts to promote European deposit market integration and to stimulate cross border flows of savings within the European Union. But these efforts will only yield the intended benefits if a number of additional non-tariff trade barriers are removed. Currently, these barriers prevent households in surplus countries to transfer their savings to banks in deficit countries where their deposits are most urgently needed.
New provisioning rules introduced by IFRS 9 are expected to reduce the procyclicality of provisioning. Heterogeneity among banks in the procyclicality of provisioning may not only reflect the formal accounting rules, but also variation in discretionary provisioning policies. This paper presents empirical evidence on the heterogeneity of provisioning procyclicality among significant banks that are directly supervised by the ECB. In particular, this paper finds that provisioning is relatively procyclical at banks that have i) high loans-to-assets ratios, ii) high shares of non-interest income in total operating income, iii) low capitalization rates, and iv) low total assets. Supervisory guidance provided to banks on how to implement IFRS 9 has mostly been of a qualitative nature, and may prove inadequate to prevent an undesirably wide future variation in provisioning among EU banks.
This paper was provided at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament and commissioned and drafted under the responsibility of the Economic Governance Support Unit (EGOV) of the European Parliament. It was originally published on the European Parliament’s webpage.
The European low-carbon transition began in the last few decades and is accelerating to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. This paper examines how climate-related transition indicators of a large European corporate firm relate to its CDS-implied credit risk across various time horizons. Findings show that firms with higher GHG emissions have higher CDS spreads at all tenors, including the 30-year horizon, particularly after the 2015 Paris Agreement, and in prominent industries such as Electricity, Gas, and Mining. Results suggest that the European CDS market is currently pricing, to some extent, albeit small, the exposure to transition risk for a firm across different time horizons. However, it fails to account for a company’s efforts to manage transition risks and its exposure to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. CDS market participants seem to find challenging to risk-differentiate ETS-participating firms from other firms.
Projected demographic changes in industrialized and developing countries vary in extent and timing but will reduce the share of the population in working age everywhere. Conventional wisdom suggests that this will increase capital intensity with falling rates of return to capital and increasing wages. This decreases welfare for middle aged asset rich households. This paper takes the perspective of the three demographically oldest European nations — France, Germany and Italy — to address three important adjustment channels to dampen these detrimental effects of aging in these countries: investing abroad, endogenous human capital formation and increasing the retirement age. Our quantitative finding is that endogenous human capital formation in combination with an increase in the retirement age has strong implications for economic aggregates and welfare, in particular in the open economy. These adjustments reduce the maximum welfare losses of demographic change for households alive in 2010 by about 2.2 percentage points in terms of a consumption equivalent variation.
Motivated by the recent discussion of the declining importance of deposits as banks´ major source of funding we investigate which factors determine funding costs at local banks. Using a panel data set of more than 800 German local savings and cooperative banks for the period from 1998 to 2004 we show that funding costs are not only driven by the relative share of comparatively cheap deposits of bank´s liabilities but among other factors especially by the size of the bank. In our empirical analysis we find strong and robust evidence that, ceteris paribus, smaller banks exhibit lower funding costs than larger banks suggesting that small banks are able to attract deposits more cheaply than their larger counterparts. We argue that this is the case because smaller banks interact more personally with customers, operate in customers´ geographic proximity and have longer and stronger relationships than larger banks and, hence, are able to charge higher prices for their services. Our finding of a strong influence of bank size on funding costs is also in an in- ternational context of great interest as mergers among small local banks - the key driver of bank growth - are a recent phenomenon not only in European banking that is expected to continue in the future. At the same time, net interest income remains by far the most important source of revenue for most local banks, accounting for approximately 70% of total operating revenues in the case of German local banks. The influence of size on funding costs is of strong economic relevance: our results suggest that an increase in size by 50%, for example, from EUR 500 million in total assets to EUR 750 million (exemplary for M&A transactions among local banks) increases funding costs, ceteris paribus, by approximately 18 basis points which relates to approx. 7% of banks´ average net interest margin.
This paper is one of the first to analyse political influence on state-owned savings banks in a developed country with an established financial market: Germany. Combining a large dataset with financial and operating figures of all 457 German savings banks from 1994 to 2006 and information on over 1,250 local elections during this period we investigate the change in business behavior around elections. We find strong indications for political inflence: the probability that savings banks close branches, lay-off employees or engage in merger activities is significantly reduced around elections. At the same time they tend to increase their extraordinary spendings, which include support for social and cultural events in the area, on average by over 15%. Finally, we find that savings banks extend significantly more loans to their corporate and private customers in the run-up to an election. In further analyses, we show that the magnitude of political influence depends on bank specific, economical and political circumstances in the city or county: political influence seems to be facilitated by weak political majorities and profitable banks. Banks in economically weak areas seem to be less prone to political influence.
We study whether prices of traded options contain information about future extreme market events. Our option-implied conditional expectation of market loss due to tail events, or tail loss measure, predicts future market returns, magnitude, and probability of the market crashes, beyond and above other option-implied variables. Stock-specific tail loss measure predicts individual expected returns and magnitude of realized stock-specific crashes in the cross-section of stocks. An investor that cares about the left tail of her wealth distribution benefits from using the tail loss measure as an information variable to construct managed portfolios of a risk-free asset and market index.
One of the dangers of harmonisation and unification processes taking place within the framework of the EU is that they may result in the codification of the lowest common denominator. This is precisely what is threatening to happen in respect of assignment. Referring the transfer of receivables by way of assignment to the law of the assignor’s residence, as article 13 of the Proposal does, would be opting for the most conservative solution and would for many Member States be a step backward rather than forward. A conflict rule referring assignment to the law of the assignor's residence is too rigid to do justice to the dynamic nature of assignments in cross-border transactions and it is unjustly one-sided. It offers no real advantages when compared to other conflict rules; it even has serious disadvantages which make the conflict rule unsuitable for efficient assignment-based cross-border transactions. It is not unconceivable that this conflict rule would even be contrary to the fundamental freedoms of the ECTreaty. The Community legislators in particular should be careful not to needlessly adopt rules which create insurmountable obstacles for cross-border business where choice-of-law by the parties would perfectly do. Community legislation has a special responsibility to create a smooth legal environment for single market transactions.
Im Rahmen des Value Based Managements sollen alle Manahmen der Unternehmensfhrung auf die Steigerung des intrinsischen Marktwertes des Eigenkapitals ausgerichtet werden. Hauptanwendungsbereiche des Value Based Managements sind die Planung, Performancemessung, Managemententlohnung sowie die Bereichssteuerung. Eine konsequente shareholder-orientierte Steuerung beinhaltet eine adquate Ermittlung von Wertbeitrgen in den einzelnen Anwendungsbereichen. Hierzu dienen insbesondere absolute Wertbeitragskennzahlen in Form von Residualgewinnen. Residualgewinne sind dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass der Gewinn um eine auf das Gesamtkapital bezogene Capital bzw. Interest Charge reduziert wird. Der magebliche Gewinn sowie das Gesamtkapital ergeben sich, indem die handelsrechtlichen Gren durch mehr oder minder weitreichende Modifikationen angepasst werden. Die Berechnung der Interest Charge erfolgt entweder auf Basis eines risikoangepassten Zinssatzes oder auf Basis eines risikofreien Zinssatzes. In der Praxis finden sich zahlreiche unterschiedliche Residualgewinnkonzepte, die sich insbesondere durch die jeweils charakteristischen Modifikationen und durch den verwendeten Zinssatz zur Berechnung der Kapitalkosten unterscheiden.1) Herkmmliche Konzepte zeichnen sich dadurch aus, dass die Interest Charge auf Basis eines risikoangepassten Zinssatzes berechnet wird. Das in Velthuis (2003c) theoretisch entworfene und von der KPMG in der Praxis umgesetzte Konzept Earnings less Riskfree Interest Charge, ERIC , ist hingegen dadurch charakterisiert, dass zur Berechnung der Interest Charge ein risikofreier Zinssatz verwendet wird. Ferner werden Modifikationen nur insofern vorgenommen, als dass eine vollstndige Bercksichtigung aller Erfolgskomponenten gewhrleistet wird. Glaubt man den Vertretern herkmmlicher Konzepte, basieren diese Konzepte auf einer hinreichenden theoretischen Fundierung. Diesem Anspruch gengen solche Konzepte tatschlich jedoch nicht, sie zeichnen sich gerade durch eine mangelnde theoretische Fundierung aus.2) In Velthuis (2003c) wird verdeutlicht, dass die in der Praxis verbreitete Vorgehensweise gerade zum Ausweis von Wertbeitrgen fhrt, die inkonsistent mit der Zielsetzung der Shareholder sind. In allen Anwendungsbereichen des VBM zeigt sich nmlich aus theoretischer Sicht die Problematik der VerIm Rahmen des Value Based Managements sollen alle Maßnahmen der Unternehmensführung auf die Steigerung des intrinsischen Marktwertes des Eigenkapitals ausgerichtet werden. Hauptanwendungsbereiche des Value Based Managements sind die Planung, Performancemessung, Managemententlohnung sowie die Bereichssteuerung. Eine konsequente shareholder-orientierte Steuerung beinhaltet eine adäquate Ermittlung von Wertbeiträgen in den einzelnen Anwendungsbereichen. Hierzu dienen insbesondere absolute Wertbeitragskennzahlen in Form von Residualgewinnen. Residualgewinne sind dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass der Gewinn um eine auf das Gesamtkapital bezogene Capital bzw. Interest Charge reduziert wird. Der maßgebliche Gewinn sowie das Gesamtkapital ergeben sich, indem die handelsrechtlichen Größen durch mehr oder minder weitreichende Modifikationen angepasst werden. Die Berechnung der Interest Charge erfolgt entweder auf Basis eines risikoangepassten Zinssatzes oder auf Basis eines risikofreien Zinssatzes. In der Praxis finden sich zahlreiche unterschiedliche Residualgewinnkonzepte, die sich insbesondere durch die jeweils charakteristischen Modifikationen und durch den verwendeten Zinssatz zur Berechnung der Kapitalkosten unterscheiden.1) Herkömmliche Konzepte zeichnen sich dadurch aus, dass die Interest Charge auf Basis eines risikoangepassten Zinssatzes berechnet wird. Das in Velthuis (2003c) theoretisch entworfene und von der KPMG in der Praxis umgesetzte Konzept Earnings less Riskfree Interest Charge, ERIC Ò , ist hingegen dadurch charakterisiert, dass zur Berechnung der Interest Charge ein risikofreier Zinssatz verwendet wird. Ferner werden Modifikationen nur insofern vorgenommen, als dass eine vollständige Berücksichtigung aller Erfolgskomponenten gewährleistet wird. Glaubt man den Vertretern herkömmlicher Konzepte, basieren diese Konzepte auf einer hinreichenden theoretischen Fundierung. Diesem Anspruch genügen solche Konzepte tatsächlich jedoch nicht, sie zeichnen sich gerade durch eine mangelnde theoretische Fundierung aus.2) In Velthuis (2003c) wird verdeutlicht, dass die in der Praxis verbreitete Vorgehensweise gerade zum Ausweis von Wertbeiträgen führt, die inkonsistent mit der Zielsetzung der Shareholder sind. In allen Anwendungsbereichen des VBM zeigt sich nämlich aus theoretischer Sicht die Problematik der Verwendung eines risikoangepassten Zinssatzes zur Berechnung von Kapitalkosten: Schon die Verwendung eines risikoangepassten Kapitalkostensatzes im Rahmen der Planung kann problematisch sein. Die Verwendung risikoangepasster Kapitalkosten als Benchmark bei der Performancemessung ist sogar ganz abzulehnen, und bei der Managemententlohnung ist die Verrechnung von risikoangepassten Kapitalkosten zwingend mit Fehlanreizen verbunden. Aber auch praxisübliche Modifikationen erweisen sich als problematisch, da Erfolgskomponenten nicht bzw. nicht vollständig berücksichtigt werden. Im Gegensatz zu herkömmlichen Konzepten weist das VBM-Konzept ERIC eine tatsächliche theoretische Fundierung auf. In Velthuis (2003c) werden grundlegende theoretische und praktische Anforderungen für die einzelnen Anwendungsbereiche herausgearbeitet und es wird gezeigt, dass ein integriertes VBM-Konzept auf Basis des Residualgewinns ERIC diese Anforderungen stets erfüllt. Ziel dieses Aufsatzes ist es, die Grundkonzeption von ERIC theoretisch weiter zu entwickeln. Während in Velthuis (2003c) stets von einer sehr einfachen Idealwelt ausgegangen wird, soll hier zum einen verdeutlicht werden, wie ein erfolgreiches Value Based Management auf Basis von ERIC in komplexeren und realitätsnäheren Situationen erfolgen kann. Zum anderen gilt es, zusätzliche praktische Problembereiche zu erkennen und Lösungsmöglichkeiten aufzuzeigen. Der Aufsatz ist wie folgt aufgebaut: Zunächst wird gezeigt, wie der Residualgewinn ERIC zu berechnen ist, und es wird ein Überblick über die Anwendungsbereiche gegeben. Anschließend wird die grundlegende Entscheidungssituation für die späteren Darstellungen erörtert und es werden fundamentale Prinzipien des Value Based Managements und ihre Bedeutung für die einzelnen Anwendungsbereichen erläutert. Sodann wird für die einzelnen Bereichen des Value Based Managements, der Planung, Performancemessung, Managemententlohnung und der Bereichssteuerung gezeigt, wie ERIC anzuwenden ist, damit eine tatsächliche Shareholder-Orientierung gewährleistet wird. Die Darstellungen erfolgen dabei jeweils zunächst vor dem Hintergrund einer Idealwelt. In einem zweiten Schritt wird die Entscheidungssituation jeweils modifiziert, um der Realität ein Stück näher zu kommen.
Using two datasets containing demographically representative samples of the Dutch population, I study how lifetime experiences of aggregate labor market conditions affect personality. Three sets of findings are reported. First, experienced aggregate unemployment is negatively correlated with the levels of all Big Five personality traits, except for conscientiousness (no significant correlation). Second, in panel data models with individual fixed effects I find that changes in experienced aggregate unemployment cause changes in emotional stability and agreeableness for men, and conscientiousness for women. The correlation is positive, and effects are economically large. Thirdly, I report suggestive evidence that the main driver is experienced aggregate unemployment, instead of other macroeconomic variables as experienced GDP, stock market returns or inflation. Taken together, these findings suggest that changes in Big Five personality traits are systematically related to experienced aggregate labor market conditions.
Do household inflation expectations affect consumption-savings decisions? We link survey data on quantitative inflation expectations to administrative data on income and wealth. We document that households with higher inflation expectations save less. Estimating panel data models with year and household fixed effects, we find that a one percentage point increase in a household's inflation expectation over time is associated with a 250-400 euro reduction in the household's change in net worth per year on average. We also document that households with higher inflation expectations are more likely to acquire a car and acquire higher-value cars. In addition, we provide a quantitative model of household-level inflation expectations.
A number of recent studies have concluded that consumer spending patterns over the month are closely linked to the timing of income receipt. This correlation is interpreted as evidence of hyperbolic discounting. I re-examine patterns of spending in the diary sample of the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey, incorporating information on the timing of the main consumption commitment for most households - their monthly rent or mortgage payment. I find that non-durable and food spending increase with 30-48% on the day housing payments are made, with smaller increases in the days after. Moreover, households with weekly, biweekly and monthly income streams but the same timing of rent/mortgage payments have very similar consumption patterns. Exploiting variation in income, I find that households with extra liquidity decrease non-durable spending around housing payments, especially those households with a large budget share of housing.
Self-control failure is among the major pathologies (Baumeister et al. (1994)) affecting individual investment decisions which has hardly been measurable in empirical research. We use cigarette addiction identified from checking account transactions to proxy for low self-control and compare over 5,000 smokers to 14,000 nonsmokers. Smokers self-directing their investment trade more frequently, exhibit more biases and achieve lower portfolio returns. We also find that smokers, some of which might be aware of their limited levels of self-control, exhibit a higher propensity than nonsmokers to delegate decision making to professional advisors and fund managers. We document that such precommitments work successfully.
Discussions regarding the planned European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), the missing third pillar of the European Banking Union, have been ongoing since the Commission published its initial legisla-tive proposal in 2015. A breakthrough in negotiations has yet to be achieved. The gridlock on EDIS is most commonly attributed to moral hazard concerns over insufficient risk reduction harboured on the side of northern member states, particularly Germany, due to the weak state of some other member states’ banking sectors. While moral hazard based on uneven risk reduction is helpful for explaining divergent member-state preferences on the scope of necessary risk reduction, this does not explain preferences on the institutional design of EDIS. In this paper, we argue that contrary to persistent differences on necessary risk reduction, preferences regarding the institutional design of EDIS have become more closely aligned. We analyse how preferences on EDIS developed in the key member states of Germany, France, and Italy. In all sampled countries, we find path-dependent benefits con-nected to the current design of national Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) that shifted preferences of the banking sector or significant subsectors in favour of retaining national DGSs. Overall, given that a compromise on risk-reduction can be accomplished, we argue that current preferences in these key member states provide an opportunity to implement EDIS in the form of a reinsurance system that maintains national DGSs in combination with a supranational fund.
Für Zwecke des privaten Konsums werden ständig Gegenwarts- und Zukunftsgüter bewertet und gehandelt. Ein zuverlässiges und umfassendes Maß für die allgemeine Kaufkraft des Geldes und deren Veränderung sollte diesem Grundsachverhalt Rechnung tragen. Im Unterschied zu konventionellen statistischen Verbraucherpreisindizes ist ein ökonomischer Lebenskostenindex intertemporal angelegt, da er die effektiven Konsumgüterpreise (Effektivpreise) über den Planungshorizont der privaten Haushalte bündelt. Ein Preisstabilitätsstandard, der diesen Zusammenhang ausblendet, ist tendenziell verzerrt und leistet einer asymmetrischen Geldpolitik Vorschub.
Effektivpreise sind Gegenwartspreise für künftigen Konsum, sie berücksichtigen Güterpreise und Zinsen bzw. Vermögenspreisänderungen, sind konsumtheoretisch und wohlfahrtsökonomisch fundiert und bilden die zentralen Bausteine für die Modellklasse der ökonomischen Lebenskostenindizes. Nutzentheoretisch gesehen sind Effektivpreise bewerteter Grenznutzen der letzten konsumierten Gütereinheit, und die daraus abgeleiteten Effektiven Inflationsraten sind intertemporale Grenzraten der Substitution.
Die Autoren entwickeln einen intertemporalen Lebenskostenindex auf der Grundlage des Konzepts der Effektivpreise und stellen empirische Zeitreihen und kohortenspezifische Szenarioanalysen für Deutschland vor.
Mit einem um die Behandlungskapazität des Gesundheitssystems erweiterten epidemiologischen SIRD-Modell werden Mechanismen und Dynamik einer Virusepidemie wie Corona anhand von stilisierten politischen Reaktionsmustern (Ignore, Shutdown, Ignore-Shutdown-Relax) simuliert. Ferner werden aus dem Modell Lehren für die statistische Analyse von Corona gezogen, wie die Aussagekraft publizierter Verdopplungszeiten und Reproduktionszahlen. Die Dunkelziffer unbestätigter Fälle und die im Epidemieverlauf variable Genauigkeit von medizinischen Infektionstests werden diskutiert. Zur Messung der medizinischen Kosten von Corona sowie für regionale und internationale Vergleiche wird ein Schadensindex der verlorenen Lebenszeit vorgeschlagen. Zuletzt geht die Arbeit kurz auf die ökonomischen Kosten von Corona in Deutschland ein.
Much has been written on the success of the Indian software industry, enumerating systemic factors like first-class higher education and research institutions, both public and private; low labour costs, stimulating (state) policies etc. However, although most studies analyzing the 'Indian' software industry cover essentially the South (and West) Indian clusters, this issue has not been tackled explicitly. This paper supplements the economic geography explanations mentioned above with the additional factor social capital, which is not only important within the region, but also in transnational (ethnic) networks linking Indian software clusters with the Silicon Valley. In other words, spatial proximity is complemented with cultural proximity, thereby, extending the system of innovation. The main hypothesis is that some Indian regions are more apt to economic development and innovation due to their higher affinity to education and learning, as well as, their more general openness, which has been a main finding of my interviews. In addition, the transnational networks of Silicon Valley Indians seem to be dominated by South Indians, thus, corroborating the regional clustering of the Indian software industry. JEL Classifications: O30, R12, Z13, L86
This paper contributes a multivariate forecasting comparison between structural models and Machine-Learning-based tools. Specifically, a fully connected feed forward non-linear autoregressive neural network (ANN) is contrasted to a well established dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, a Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR) using optimized priors as well as Greenbook and SPF forecasts. Model estimation and forecasting is based on an expanding window scheme using quarterly U.S. real-time data (1964Q2:2020Q3) for 8 macroeconomic time series (GDP, inflation, federal funds rate, spread, consumption, investment, wage, hours worked), allowing for up to 8 quarter ahead forecasts. The results show that the BVAR improves forecasts compared to the DSGE model, however there is evidence for an overall improvement of predictions when relying on ANN, or including them in a weighted average. Especially, ANN-based inflation forecasts improve other predictions by up to 50%. These results indicate that nonlinear data-driven ANNs are a useful method when it comes to macroeconomic forecasting.
Central bank intervention in the form of quantitative easing (QE) during times of low interest rates is a controversial topic. The author introduces a novel approach to study the effectiveness of such unconventional measures. Using U.S. data on six key financial and macroeconomic variables between 1990 and 2015, the economy is estimated by artificial neural networks. Historical counterfactual analyses show that real effects are less pronounced than yield effects.
Disentangling the effects of the individual asset purchase programs, impulse response functions provide evidence for QE being less effective the more the crisis is overcome. The peak effects of all QE interventions during the Financial Crisis only amounts to 1.3 pp for GDP growth and 0.6 pp for inflation respectively. Hence, the time as well as the volume of the interventions should be deliberated.
This paper sets out to analyze the influence of different types of venture capitalists on the performance of their portfolio firms around and after IPO. We investigate the hypothesis that different governance structures, objectives, and track records of different types of VCs have a significant impact on their respective IPOs. We explore this hypothesis using a data set embracing all IPOs that have occurred on Germany's Neuer Markt. Our main finding is that significant differences among the different VCs exist. Firms backed by independent VCs perform significantly better two years after IPO as compared to all other IPOs, and their share prices fluctuate less than those of their counterparts in this period of time. On the contrary, firms backed by public VCs show relative underperformance. The fact that this could occur implies that market participants did not correctly assess the role played by different types of VCs.
Mehr als 18 Milliarden Euro hat die Commerzbank im Zuge der Finanzkrise in Form von staatlichen Garantien, Kapitalspritzen oder Einlagen erhalten. Auch die Hypo Real Estate, die WestLB, die SachsenLB und die IKB profitierten von Stützungsmaßnahmen. Die EU genehmigte diese und andere staatlichen Hilfsmaßnahmen. Grundsätzlich sind staatliche Stützungsmaßnahmen jedoch als wirtschaftlicher Vorteil zu werten und damit zunächst eine verbotene Beihilfe. In seinem Working Paper betrachtet Tuschl die rechtlichen Grundlagen des EU-Beihilferechts und zeigt die teilweise differierende Praxis der EU-Kommission auf.
This paper analyses the long-term effects of improved small-scale lending, often provided by microfinance institutions set up with the support of development aid. The analysis shows that some common assumptions about microfinance are not true at all: First, it shows that the impact on income will accrue not to the microenterprises themselves, but rather to the consumers of their products. Second, microfinance will have a significant positive effect on the wage levels of employees in the informal sector. Third, microfinance will cause high growth rates in the informal production sector, whereas the trade sector will either contract or at best grow very little.
The theoretical derivation of credit market segmentation as the result of a free market process
(2003)
Information asymmetries make it difficult for banks to assess accurately whether specific entrepreneurs are able and/or willing to repay their loans. This leads to implicit interest rate ceilings, i.e. banks "refuse" to increase their interest rates beyond this ceiling as this would lower their net returns. Although the maximum interest rate increases as the size of enterprises decreases, such ceilings nonetheless constrain the banks’ ability to set interest rates at a level that would enable them to cover costs. If transaction costs are high, the total costs associated with granting small and medium-sized loans will exceed the maximum average return which the banks can earn by issuing such loans. For this reason, banks do not lend to small and medium-sized enterprises, and, as a consequence, these businesses have no access to formal sector loans. Because micro and small enterprises have a very high RoI, it is worthwhile for them to rely on expensive informal loans to finance their operations, at least until they reach a certain size. Once they have reached this size, however, it does not make economic sense for them to continue taking out informal credits, and thus they face a growth constraint imposed by the credit market. Medium-sized enterprises earn a lower RoI than small ones, which is why borrowing in the informal credit market is not a worthwhile option for them. Moreover, they do not have access to credit from formal financial institutions, and are thus excluded from obtaining any kind of financing in either of the two credit markets. As the result of free, unregulated market forces we get a stable equilibrium in which the credit market is segmented into an informal (small loan) segment, a formal (large loan) segment and, in between, a "non-market" (medium loan) segment.
The extension of long-term loans, e.g. to finance housing, is adversely affected by inflation. For one thing, the higher nominal interest rates charged by the banks in response to inflation mean that borrowers have to make (nominally) higher interest payments, which unnecessarily reduces their borrowing capacity. For another, long-term loans with variable interest rates increase the probability that borrowers will become unable to meet their payment obligations. The present paper examines these two assertions in detail. At the same time, it presents a concept for substantially reducing the weaknesses of conventional lending methodologies. We start by investigating the consequences of a stable inflation rate on the borrowing capacity of credit clients, then go on to analyze the impact of fluctuating inflation rates on the risk of default.
This paper investigates the potential implications of say on pay on management remuneration in Germany. We try to shed light on some key aspects by presenting quantitative data that allows us to gauge the pertinent effects of the German natural experiment that originates with the 2009 amendments to the Stock Corporation Act of 1965. In order to do this, we deploy a hand-collected data set for Germany's major firms (i.e. DAX 30), for the years 2006-2012. Rather than focusing exclusively on CEO remuneration we collected data for all members of the management board for the whole period under investigation. We observe that the compensation packages of management board members of Germany's DAX30-firms are quite closely linked to key performance measures. In addition, we find that salaries increase with the size of the company and that ownership concentration has no significant effect on compensation. Also, our findings suggest that the two-tier system seems to matter a lot when it comes to compensation. However, it would be misleading to state that we see no significant impact of the introduction of the German say on pay-regime. Our findings suggest that supervisory boards anticipate shareholder-behavior.
We study the design features of disclosure regulations that seek to trigger the green transition of the global economy and ask whether such regulatory interventions are likely to bring about sufficient market discipline to achieve socially optimal climate targets.
We categorize the transparency obligations stipulated in green finance regulation as either compelling the standardized disclosure of raw data, or providing quality labels that signal desirable green characteristics of investment products based on a uniform methodology. Both categories of transparency requirements can be imposed at activity, issuer, and portfolio level.
Finance theory and empirical evidence suggest that investors may prefer “green” over “dirty” assets for both financial and non-financial reasons and may thus demand higher returns from environmentally-harmful investment opportunities. However, the market discipline that this negative cost of capital effect exerts on “dirty” issuers is potentially attenuated by countervailing investor interests and does not automatically lead to socially optimal outcomes.
Mandatory disclosure obligations and their (public) enforcement can play an important role in green finance strategies. They prevent an underproduction of the standardized high-quality information that investors need in order to allocate capital according to their preferences. However, the rationale behind regulatory intervention is not equally strong for all categories and all levels of “green” disclosure obligations. Corporate governance problems and other agency conflicts in intermediated investment chains do not represent a categorical impediment for green finance strategies.
However, the many forces that may prevent markets from achieving socially optimal equilibria render disclosure-centered green finance legislation a second best to more direct forms of regulatory intervention like global carbon taxation and emissions trading schemes. Inherently transnational market-based green finance concepts can play a supporting role in sustainable transition, which is particularly important as long as first-best solutions remain politically unavailable.
We investigate whether the bank crisis management framework of the European banking union can effectively bar the detrimental influence of national interests in cross-border bank failures. We find that both the internal governance structure and decision making procedure of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and the interplay between the SRB and national resolution authorities in the implementation of supranationally devised resolution schemes provide inroads that allow opposing national interests to obstruct supranational resolution. We also show that the Single Resolution Fund (SRG), even after the ratification of the reform of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the introduction of the SRF backstop facility, is inapt to overcome these frictions. We propose a full supranationalization of resolution decision making. This would allow European authorities in charge of bank crisis management to operate autonomously and achieve socially optimal outcomes beyond national borders.
This paper contrasts the recent European initiatives on regulating corporate groups with alternative approaches to the phenomenon. In doing so it pays particular regard to the German codified law on corporate groups as the polar opposite to the piecemeal approach favored by E.U. legislation.
It finds that the European Commission’s proposal to submit (significant) related party transactions to enhanced transparency, outside fairness review, and ex ante shareholder approval is both flawed in its design and based on contestable assumptions on informed voting of institutional investors. In particular, the contemplated exemption for transactions with wholly owned subsidiaries allows controlling shareholders to circumvent the rule extensively. Moreover, vesting voting rights with (institutional) investors will not lead to the informed assessment that is hoped for, because these investors will rationally abstain from active monitoring and rely on proxy advisory firms instead whose competency to analyze non-routine significant related party transactions is questionable.
The paper further delineates that the proposed recognition of an overriding interest of the group requires strong counterbalances to adequately protect minority shareholders and creditors. Hence, if the Commission choses to go down this route it might end up with a comprehensive regulation that is akin to the unpopular Ninth Company Law Directive in spirit, though not in content. The latter prediction is corroborated by the pertinent parts of the proposal for a European Model Company Act.
Germany Inc. was an idiosyncratic form of industrial organization that put financial institutions at the center. This paper argues that the consumption of private benefits in related party transactions by these key agents can be understood as a compensation for their coordinating and monitoring function in Germany Inc. As a consequence, legal tools apt to curb tunneling remained weak in Germany from the perspective of outside shareholders. While banks were in a position to use their firm-level knowledge and influence to limit rent-seeking by other related parties, their own behavior was not subject to meaningful controls. With the dismantling of Germany Inc. banks seized their monitoring function and left an unprecedented void with regard to related party transactions. Hence, a “traditionalist” stance which opposes law reform for related party transactions in Germany negatively affects capital market development, growth opportunities and ultimately social welfare.
This paper looks into the specific influence that the European banking union will have on (future) bank client relationships. It shows that the intended regulatory influence on market conditions in principle serves as a powerful governance tool to achieve financial stability objectives.
From this vantage, it analyzes macro-prudential instruments with a particular view to mortgage lending markets – the latter have been critical in the emergence of many modern financial crises. In gauging the impact of the new European supervisory framework, it finds that the ECB will lack influence on key macro-prudential tools to push through more rigid supervisory policies vis-à-vis forbearing national authorities.
Furthermore, this paper points out that the current design of the European bail-in tool supplies resolution authorities with undue discretion. This feature which also afflicts the SRM imperils the key policy objective to re-instill market discipline on banks’ debt financing operations. The latter is also called into question because the nested regulatory technique that aims at preventing bail-outs unintendedly opens additional maneuvering space for political decision makers.
This paper is the national report for Germany prepared for the to the 20th General Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law 2018 and gives an overview of the regulation of crowdfunding in Germany and the typical design of crowdfunding campaigns under this legal framework. After a brief survey of market data, it delineates the classification of crowdfunding transactions in German contract law and their treatment under the applicable conflict of laws regime. It then turns to the relevant rules in prudential banking regulation and capital market law. It highlights disclosure requirements that flow from both contractual obligations of the initiators of campaigns vis-à-vis contributors and securities regulation (prospectus regime). After sketching the most important duties of the parties involved in crowdfunding, the report also looks at the key features of the respective transactions’ tax treatment.
This paper analyzes the bail-in tool under the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and predicts that it will not reach its policy objective. To make this argument, this paper first describes the policy rationale that calls for mandatory private sector involvement (PSI). From this analysis, the key features for an effective bail-in tool can be derived.
These insights serve as the background to make the case that the European resolution framework is likely ineffective in establishing adequate market discipline through risk-reflecting prices for bank capital. The main reason for this lies in the avoidable embeddedness of the BRRD’s bail-in tool in the much broader resolution process, which entails ample discretion of the authorities also in forcing private sector involvement. Moreover, the idea that nearly all positions on the liability side of a bank’s balance sheet should be subjected to bail-in is misguided. Instead, a concentration of PSI in instruments that fall under the minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) is preferable.
Finally, this paper synthesized the prior analysis by putting forward an alternative regulatory approach that seeks to disentangle private sector involvement as a precondition for effective bank-resolution as much as possible form the resolution process as such.
The bail-in tool as implemented in the European bank resolution framework suffers from severe shortcomings. To some extent, the regulatory framework can remedy the impediments to the desirable incentive effect of private sector involvement (PSI) that emanate from a lack of predictability of outcomes, if it compels banks to issue a sufficiently sized minimum of high-quality, easy to bail-in (subordinated) liabilities. Yet, even the limited improvements any prescription of bail-in capital can offer for PSI’s operational effectiveness seem compromised in important respects.
The main problem, echoing the general concerns voiced against the European bail-in regime, is that the specifications for minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) are also highly detailed and discretionary and thus alleviate the predicament of investors in bail-in debt, at best, only insufficiently. Quite importantly, given the character of typical MREL instruments as non-runnable long-term debt, even if investors are able to gauge the relevant risk of PSI in a bank’s failure correctly at the time of purchase, subsequent adjustment of MREL-prescriptions by competent or resolution authorities potentially change the risk profile of the pertinent instruments. Therefore, original pricing decisions may prove inadequate and so may market discipline that follows from them.
The pending European legislation aims at an implementation of the already complex specifications of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) for Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) by very detailed and case specific amendments to both the regulatory capital and the resolution regime with an exorbitant emphasis on proportionality and technical fine-tuning. What gets lost in this approach, however, is the key policy objective of enhanced market discipline through predictable PSI: it is hardly conceivable that the pricing of MREL-instruments reflects an accurate risk-assessment of investors because of the many discretionary choices a multitude of agencies are supposed to make and revisit in the administration of the new regime. To prove this conclusion, this chapter looks in more detail at the regulatory objectives of the BRRD’s prescriptions for MREL and their implementation in the prospectively amended European supervisory and resolution framework.
Crowdfunding is a buzzword that signifies a sub-set in the new forms of finance facilitated by advances in information technology usually categorized as fintech. Concerns for financial stability, investor and consumer protection, or the prevention of money laundering or funding of terrorism hinge incrementally on including the new techniques to initiate financing relationships adequately in the regulatory framework.
This paper analyzes the German regulation of crowdinvesting and finds that it does not fully live up to the regulatory challenges posed by this novel form of digitized matching of supply and demand on capital markets. It should better reflect the key importance of crowdinvesting platforms, which may become critical providers of market infrastructure in the not too distant future. Moreover, platforms can play an important role in investor protection that cannot be performed by traditional disclosure regimes geared towards more seasoned issuers. Against this background, the creation of an exemption from the traditional prospectus regime seems to be a plausible policy choice. However, it needs to be complemented by an adequate regulatory stimulation of platforms’ role as gatekeepers.
This paper looks into the specific influence that the European banking union will have on (future) bank client relationships. It shows that the intended regulatory influence on market conditions in principle serves as a powerful governance tool to achieve financial stability objectives.
From this vantage, it analyzes macro-prudential instruments with a particular view to mortgage lending markets – the latter have been critical in the emergence of many modern financial crises. In gauging the impact of the new European supervisory framework, it finds that the ECB will lack influence on key macro-prudential tools to push through more rigid supervisory policies vis-à-vis forbearing national authorities.
Furthermore, this paper points out that the current design of the European bail-in tool supplies resolution authorities with undue discretion. This feature which also afflicts the SRM imperils the key policy objective to re-instill market discipline on banks’ debt financing operations. The latter is also called into question because the nested regulatory technique that aims at preventing bail-outs unintendedly opens additional maneuvering space for political decision makers.
How special are they? - Targeting systemic risk by regulating shadow banking : (October 5, 2014)
(2014)
This essay argues that at least some of the financial stability concerns associated with shadow banking can be addressed by an approach to financial regulation that imports its functional foundations more vigorously into the interpretation and implementation of existing rules. It shows that the general policy goals of prudential banking regulation remain constant over time despite dramatic transformations in the financial and technological landscape. Moreover, these overarching policy goals also legitimize intervention in the shadow banking sector. On these grounds, this essay encourages a more normative construction of available rules that potentially limits both the scope for regulatory arbitrage and the need for ever more rapid updates and a constant increase in the complexity of the regulatory framework. By tying the regulatory treatment of financial innovation closely to existing prudential rules and their underlying policy rationales, the proposed approach potentially ends the socially wasteful race between hare and tortoise that signifies the relation between regulators and a highly dynamic industry. In doing so it does not generally hamper market participants’ efficient discoveries where disintermediation proves socially beneficial. Instead, it only weeds-out rent-seeking circumventions of existing rules and standards.
Um den Teufelskreis sich wechselseitig verstärkender Banken- und Staatsschuldenkrisen zu durchbrechen, haben sich die europäischen Institutionen grundsätzlich dazu bekannt, eine Bankenunion zu schaffen. Der Dreh- und Angelpunkt der verfolgten Strategie liegt dabei darin, durch die Schaffung zentraler, d.h. supranationaler Auffangmechanismen die Ausfallrisiken von Banken und Staaten nachhaltig zu entkoppeln. Dabei ist zu beachten, dass gerade auch die einzelnen Elemente des institutionellen Reformpakets in ihrer Binnenstruktur so beschaffen sein müssen, dass vorhersehbare Ineffizienzen nicht dazu führen, dass Vorteile der Supranationalisierung aufgehoben oder gar in ihr Gegenteil verkehrt werden. Der vorliegende Beitrag diskutiert den Verordnungsentwurf der EU Kommission für einen Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) vor dem Hintergrund dieser Forderung.
The Judgement of the EGC in the Case T-122/15 – Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg - Förderbank v European Central Bank is the first statement of the European judiciary on the sub-stantive law of the Banking Union. Beyond its specific holding, the decision is of great importance, because it hints at the methodological approach the EGC will take in interpreting prudential banking regulation in the appeals against supervisory measures that fall in its jurisdiction under TFEU, arts. 256(1) subpara 1 and 263(4). Specifically, the case pertained to the scope of direct ECB oversight of significant banks in the euro area and the reassignment of this competence to national competent authorities (NCAs) in individual circumstances (Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) Regulation, art. 6(4) subpara 2; SSM Framework Regulation, arts. 70, 71).
Negative Zinsen auf Einlagen – juristische Hindernisse und ihre wettbewerbspolitischen Auswirkungen
(2015)
Im anhaltenden Niedrigzinsumfeld tun Banken sich schwer damit, die ihnen zur Verfügung gestellte Liquidität einer renditeträchtigen Nachfrage zuzuführen. Darüberhinaus müssen sie auf Liquiditätsüberschüsse, die im Rahmen der Einlagenfazilität des Eurosystems über Nacht bei den nationalen Zentralbanken der Eurozone deponiert werden, Strafzinsen entrichtet. Vor diesem Hintergrund könnten Banken durch negative Einlagenzinsen das Anliegen verfolgen, die Nachfrage nach Aufbewahrung von (Sicht)Einlagen zu verringern. Einer solchen Strategie stehen aber aus juristischer Sicht Hindernisse entgegen, soweit der beschriebene Paradigmenwechsel auch im Rahmen existierender Kundenbeziehungen einseitig vorgenommen werden soll. Die rechtlichen Hürden sind weder Ausdruck einer realitätsfernen Haarspalterei, noch eines verbraucherschützenden Furors. Vielmehr ermöglichen sie privaten und gewerblichen Bankkunden, im Zeitpunkt der angestrebten Zinsanpassung bewusst über die Verwendung ihrer liquiden Mittel zu entscheiden.
This paper analyzes the evolving architecture for the prudential supervision of banks in the euro area. It is primarily concerned with the likely effectiveness of the SSM as a regime that intends to bolster financial stability in the steady state.
By using insights from the political economy of bureaucracy it finds that the SSM is overly focused on sharp tools to discipline captured national supervisors and thus under-incentives their top-level personnel to voluntarily contribute to rigid supervision. The success of the SSM in this regard will hinge on establishing a common supervisory culture that provides positive incentives for national supervisors. In this regard, the internal decision making structure of the ECB in supervisory matters provides some integrative elements. Yet, the complex procedures also impede swift decision making and do not solve the problem adequately. Ultimately, a careful design and animation of the ECB-defined supervisory framework and the development of inter-agency career opportunities will be critical.
The ECB will become a de facto standard setter that competes with the EBA. A likely standoff in the EBA’s Board of Supervisors will lead to a growing gap in regulatory integration between SSM-participants and other EU Member States.
Joining the SSM as a non-euro area Member State is unattractive because the cur-rent legal framework grants no voting rights in the ECB’s ultimate decision making body. It also does not supply a credible commitment opportunity for Member States who seek to bond to high quality supervision.
This paper analyzes the evolving architecture for the prudential supervision of banks in the euro area. It is primarily concerned with the likely effectiveness of the SSM as a regime that intends to bolster financial stability in the steady state. By using insights from the political economy of bureaucracy it finds that the SSM is overly focused on sharp tools to discipline captured national supervisors and thus underincentives their top-level personnel to voluntarily contribute to rigid supervision. The success of the SSM in this regard will hinge on establishing a common supervisory culture that provides positive incentives for national supervisors. In this regard, the internal decision making structure of the ECB in supervisory matters provides some integrative elements. Yet, the complex procedures also impede swift decision making and do not solve the problem adequately. Ultimately, a careful design and animation of the ECB-defined supervisory framework and the development of inter-agency career opportunities will be critical.
The ECB will become a de facto standard setter that competes with the EBA. A likely standoff in the EBA’s Board of Supervisors will lead to a growing gap in regulatory integration between SSM-participants and other EU Member States.
Joining the SSM as a non-euro area Member State is unattractive because the current legal framework grants no voting rights in the ECB’s ultimate decision making body. It also does not supply a credible commitment opportunity for Member States who seek to bond to high quality supervision.
How special are they? - Targeting systemic risk by regulating shadow banking : (October 5, 2014)
(2014)
This essay argues that at least some of the financial stability concerns associated with shadow banking can be addressed by an approach to financial regulation that imports its functional foundations more vigorously into the interpretation and implementation of existing rules. It shows that the general policy goals of prudential banking regulation remain constant over time despite dramatic transformations in the financial and technological landscape. Moreover, these overarching policy goals also legitimize intervention in the shadow banking sector. On these grounds, this essay encourages a more normative construction of available rules that potentially limits both the scope for regulatory arbitrage and the need for ever more rapid updates and a constant increase in the complexity of the regulatory framework. By tying the regulatory treatment of financial innovation closely to existing prudential rules and their underlying policy rationales, the proposed approach potentially ends the socially wasteful race between hare and tortoise that signifies the relation between regulators and a highly dynamic industry. In doing so it does not generally hamper market participants’ efficient discoveries where disintermediation proves socially beneficial. Instead, it only weeds-out rent-seeking circumventions of existing rules and standards.
This paper analyses the bail-in tool under the BRRD and predicts that it will not reach its policy objective. To make this argument, this paper first describes the policy rationale that calls for mandatory PSI. From this analysis the key features for an effective bail-in tool can be derived. These insights serve as the background to make the case that the European resolution framework is likely ineffective in establishing adequate market discipline through risk-reflecting prices for bank capital. The main reason for this lies in the avoidable embeddedness of the BRRD’s bail-in tool in the much broader resolution process which entails ample discretion of the authorities also in forcing private sector involvement. Finally, this paper synthesized the prior analysis by putting forward an alternative regulatory approach that seeks to disentangle private sector involvement as a precondition for effective bank-resolution as much as possible form the resolution process as such.
The bail-in tool as implemented in the European bank resolution framework suffers from severe shortcomings. To some extent, the regulatory framework can remedy the impediments to the desirable incentive effect of private sector involvement (PSI) that emanate from a lack of predictability of outcomes, if it compels banks to issue a sufficiently sized minimum of high-quality, easy to bail-in (subordinated) liabilities. Yet, even the limited improvements any prescription of bail-in capital can offer for PSI’s operational effectiveness seem compromised in important respects.
The main problem, echoing the general concerns voiced against the European bail-in regime, is that the specifications for minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) are also highly detailed and discretionary and thus alleviate the predicament of investors in bail-in debt, at best, only insufficiently. Quite importantly, given the character of typical MREL instruments as non-runnable long-term debt, even if investors are able to gauge the relevant risk of PSI in a bank’s failure correctly at the time of purchase, subsequent adjustment of MREL-prescriptions by competent or resolution authorities potentially change the risk profile of the pertinent instruments. Therefore, original pricing decisions may prove inadequate and so may market discipline that follows from them.
The pending European legislation aims at an implementation of the already complex specifications of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) for Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) by very detailed and case specific amendments to both the regulatory capital and the resolution regime with an exorbitant emphasis on proportionality and technical fine-tuning. What gets lost in this approach, however, is the key policy objective of enhanced market discipline through predictable PSI: it is hardly conceivable that the pricing of MREL-instruments reflects an accurate risk-assessment of investors because of the many discretionary choices a multitude of agencies are supposed to make and revisit in the administration of the new regime. To prove this conclusion, this chapter looks in more detail at the regulatory objectives of the BRRD’s prescriptions for MREL and their implementation in the prospectively amended European supervisory and resolution framework.
Spillovers of PE investments
(2022)
In this paper, we investigate a primary potential impact of leveraged buyout (LBOs) transactions: the effects of LBOs on the peers of the LBO target in the same industry. Using a data sample based on US LBO transactions between 1985 and 2016, we investigate the impact of the peer firms in the aftermath of the transaction, relative to non-peer firms. To account for potential endogeneity concerns, we employ a network-based instrumental variable approach. Based on this analysis, we find support for the proposition that LBOs do indeed matter for peer firms’ performance and corporate strategy relative to non-peer firms. Our study supports a learning factor hypothesis: peers gain by learning from the LBO target to improve their operational performance. Conversely, we find no evidence to support the conjecture that peers lose due to the increased competitiveness of the LBO target firm.
This paper investigates whether a fiscal stimulus implies a different impact for flexible and rigid labour markets. The analysis is done for 11 advanced OECD economies. Using quarterly data from 1999 to 2013, I estimate a panel threshold structural VAR model in which regime switches are determined by OECD’s employment protection legislation index. My empirical results indicate significant differences between rigid and flexible labour markets regarding the impact of the fiscal stimulus on output and unemployment. While the impulse response of real GDP to a government spending shock is positive and more effective in flexible labour markets, it has less impact in the rigid ones. Moreover, it is found that a fiscal stimulus leads to higher overall unemployment in highly regulated countries.
We examine both the degree and the structural stability of inflation persis tence at different quantiles of the conditional inflation distribution. Previous research focused exclusively on persistence at the conditional mean of the inflation rate. Economic theory, however, provides various reasons -for example downward wage rigidities or menu costs- to expect higher inflation persistence at the upper than at the lower tail of the conditional inflation distribution.
Based on post-war US data we indeed find slower mean reversion in response to positive than to negative shocks. We find robust evidence for a structural break in persistence at all quantiles of the inflation process in the early 1980s. Inflation persistence has decreased and become more homogeneous across quantiles. Persistence at the conditional mean became more informative about the degree of persistence across the entire conditional inflation distribution. While prior to the 1980s inflation was not mean reverting in response to large positive shocks, our evidence strongly suggests that since the end of the Volcker disinflation the unit root can be rejected at every quantile including the upper tail of the conditional inflation distribution.
We examine both the degree and the structural stability of inflation persistence at different quantiles of the conditional inflation distribution. Previous research focused exclusively on persistence at the conditional mean of the inflation rate. As economic theory provides reasons for inflation persistence to differ across conditional quantiles, this is a potentially severe constraint. Conventional studies of inflation persistence cannot identify changes in persistence at selected quantiles that leave persistence at the median of the distribution unchanged. Based on post-war US data we indeed find robust evidence for a structural break in persistence at all quantiles of the inflation process in the early 1980s. While prior to the 1980s inflation was not mean reverting, quantile autoregression based unit root tests suggest that since the end of the Volcker disinflation the unit root can be rejected at every quantile of the conditional inflation distribution.
Die Coronakrise und die Eindämmungspolitik der Nationalstaaten hat gravierende wirtschaftliche Folgen. Nicht alle EU-Mitgliedsstaaten sind in gleicher Weise gewappnet und manche werden derzeit heftiger von der Coronakrise getroffen als andere. Eine Möglichkeit, europäische Solidarität zu organisieren, ist die Ausgabe von Gemeinschaftsanleihen, so genannter Corona-Bonds. Dieser Beitrag diskutiert das Für und Wider der Corona-Bonds und ihrer Alternativen: Weder Gemeinschaftsanleihen noch eine Ausweitung des EZB-Engagements sollten das Mittel der Wahl sein. Wir plädieren vielmehr für direkte, auf europäischer Ebene koordinierte Transferzahlungen an bedürftige Mitgliedsstaaten.
This paper contributes to the debate on the adequate regulatory treatment of non-bank financial intermediation (NBFI). It proposes an avenue for regulators to keep regulatory arbitrage under control and preserve sufficient space for efficient financial innovation at the same time. We argue for a normative approach to supervision that can overcome the proverbial race between hare and hedgehog in financial regulation and demonstrate how such an approach can be implemented in practice. We first show that regulators should primarily analyse the allocation of tail risk inherent in NBFI. Our paper proposes to apply regulatory burdens equivalent to prudential banking regulation if the respective transactional structures become only viable through indirect or direct access to (ad hoc) public backstops. Second, we use insights from the scholarship on regulatory networks as communities of interpretation to demonstrate how regulators can retrieve the information on transactional innovations and their risk-allocating characteristics that they need to make the pivotal determination. We suggest in particular how supervisors should structure their relationships with semi-public gatekeepers such as lawyers, auditors and consultants to keep abreast of the risk-allocating features of evolving transactional structures. Finally, this paper uses the example of credit funds as non-bank entities economically engaged in credit intermediation to illustrate the merits of the proposed normative framework and to highlight that multipolar regulatory dialogues are needed to shed light on the specific risk-allocating characteristics of recent contractual innovations.
The use of contractual engineering to create channels of credit intermediation outside of the realm of banking regulation has been a recurring activity in Western financial systems over the last 50 years. After the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008, this phenomenon, at that time commonly referred to as ‘shadow banking’, evoked a large-scale regulatory backlash, including several specific regulatory constraints being placed on non-bank financial institutions (NBFI). This paper proposes a different avenue for regulators to keep regulatory arbitrage under control and preserve sufficient space for efficient financial innovation. Rather than engaging in the proverbial race between hare and hedgehog that is emerging with increasingly specific regulation of particular contractual arrangements, this paper argues for a normative approach to supervision. We outline this approach in detail by showing that regulators should primarily analyse the allocation of tail risk inherent in the respective contractual arrangements. Our paper proposes to assign regulatory burdens equivalent to prudential banking regulation, in case these arrangements become only viable through indirect or direct access to an (ad hoc) public backstop. In order to make the pivotal assessment, regulators will need information about recent contractual innovations and their risk-allocating characteristics. According to the scholarship on regulatory networks serving as communities of interpretation, we suggest in particular how regulators should structure their relationships with semi-public gatekeepers such as lawyers, auditors and consultants to keep abreast of the real-world implications of evolving transactional structures. This paper then uses the rise of credit funds as a non-bank entities economically engaged in credit intermediation to apply this normative framework, pointing to recent contractual innovations that call for more regulatory scrutiny in a multipolar regulatory dialogue.
Understanding the shift from micro to macro-prudential thinking: a discursive network analysis
(2016)
While some economists argued for macro-prudential regulation pre-crisis, the macro-prudential approach and its emphasis on endogenously created systemic risk have only gained prominence post-crisis. Employing discourse and network analysis on samples of the most cited scholarly works on banking regulation as well as on systemic risk (60 sources each) from 1985 to 2014, we analyze the shift from micro to macro-prudential thinking in the shift to the post crisis period. Our analysis demonstrates that the predominance of formalism, particularly, partial equilibrium analysis along with the exclusion of historical and practitioners’ styles of reasoning from banking regulatory studies impeded economists from engaging seriously with the endogenous sources of systemic risk prior to the crisis. Post-crisis, these topics became important in this discourse, but the epistemological failures of banking regulatory studies pre-crisis were not sufficiently recognized. Recent attempts to conceptualize and price systemic risk as a negative externality point to the persistence of formalism and equilibrium thinking, with its attending dangers of incremental innovation due to epistemological barriers constrains theoretical progress, by excluding observed phenomena, which cannot yet be accommodated in mathematical models.
Regulatory failures, which came to the fore after the financial crisis of 2007-2009, lead to the question of why some activities by financial institutions were not regulated prior to the crisis of 2007, even though regulators knew about certain dangers to financial stability? The repo-market, although centrally involved in the last crisis, still awaits stringent regulation. At the same time, the regulatory cycle seems to come to an end, boding ill for future crises which will be amplified by this market. In this situation, NGOs are needed to make regulators act upon their knowledge and to tighten their regulations.
The US Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) led to a drastic reduction in the corporate tax and improved the treatment of C corporations compared to S corporations. We study the differential effect of the TCJA on these types of corporations using key economic variables of US banks, such as the number of employees, average salaries and benefits, profit/loss before taxes, and net income. Our analysis suggests that the TCJA increased the net-of-tax profits of C corporation banks compared to S corporations and, to a lesser extent, their pre-tax profits. At the same time, the reform triggered no significantly differential effect on the employment and average wages.
Many equity markets combine continuous trading and call auctions. Oftentimes designated market makers (DMMs) supply additional liquidity. Whereas prior research has focused on their role in continuous trading, we provide a detailed analysis of their activity in call auctions. Using data from Germany’s Xetra system, we find that DMMs are most active when they can provide the greatest benefits to the market, i.e., in relatively illiquid stocks and at times of elevated volatility. Their trades stabilize prices and they trade profitably.
Die externe Performance-Messung beurteilt auf Basis öffentlich verfügbarer Daten die Leistung des Fondsmanagements. Es wird zunächst geprüft, inwieweit die für die Beurteilung von Aktienfonds entwickelten Maße auf Rentenfonds anwendbar sind. Anschließend wird die Performance einer Stichprobe deutscher Rentenfonds untersucht. Es zeigt sich, daß die risikoadjustierte Rendite in den meisten Fällen nicht über der eines geeigneten Marktindex liegt. Einige Fonds weisen ein signifikantes Aktien-Exposure auf. Ein systematischer Zusammenhang zwischen der Nettorendite und der Gebührenhöhe kann nicht nachgewiesen werden.
Die mit unterschiedlichen Organisationsformen des Wertpapierhandels einhergehende Liquidität und ihre Messung ist eine der zentralen Fragen im Zusammenhang mit der Gestaltung von Wertpapiermärkten. Zunächst wird die Eignung verschiedener in der Literatur vorgeschlagener Liquiditätsmaße diskutiert. Anhand einer Serie von Marktexperimenten wird dann die Liquidität der grundsätzlichen Ausgestaltungsformen des Wertpapierhandels - Gesamtkursermittlung, kontinuierliche Auktion und Market-Maker-System - miteinander verglichen.
Sowohl das Handelsvolumen als auch das von ROLL (1984) vorgeschlagene Maß sind offenbar für den Vergleich der Liquidität unterschiedlich organisierter Wertpapiermärkte nicht geeignet. Eine aufgrund theoretischer Überlegungen prognostizierte Überschätzung der Transaktionskosten bei der Gesamtkursermittlung kann empirisch bestätigt werden.
Die explizite Geld-Brief-Spanne ist dagegen grundsätzlich ein geeignetes Liquiditätsmaß. Mit den Daten der experimentellen Märkte läßt sich auch für die Gesamtkursermittlung eine solche Spanne ermitteln. Sie erweist sich als niedriger als die Spanne in der kontinuierlichen Auktion und dem Market-Maker-Markt. Jedoch ist auch die Geld-Brief-Spanne mit Vorsicht zu interpretieren. Es wird gezeigt, daß unter bestimmten Umständen systematische Verzerrungen existieren können. In den hier untersuchten experimentellen Märkten ließen sich diese identifizieren. Bei Untersuchungen anhand von Felddaten ist dies jedoch nicht ohne weiteres möglich, so daß hier die Gefahr von Verzerrungen durchaus real ist.
Der Neue Markt soll wachstumsorientierten Unternehmen den Zugang zur Börse eröffnen. Die für dieses Marktsegment neu geschaffene Institution des Betreuers soll Vorbildcharakter für andere Marktsegmente haben. In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden Vor- und Nachteile des Betreuer-Konzeptes erarbeitet. Die daraus abgeleiteten Fragen werden empirisch untersucht. Dabei zeigt sich, daß der Neue Markt eine hohe Handelsintensität und niedrige Geld-BriefSpannen aufweist. Auch eine schriftliche Befragung der notierten Unternehmen ergab eine positive Einschätzung des neuen Marktsegments.
Überlegungen zur Profitabilität der Betreuer-Funktion deuten darauf hin, daß diese nicht an sich profitabel ist. Es findet offenbar eine Quersubventionierung aus Erträgen des Emissionsgeschäftes statt. Diese Abhängigkeit sollte berücksichtigt werden, wenn die Übertragung des Betreuerkonzepts auf andere Marktsegmente diskutiert wird.
During the 1970s, industrial countries, including the US and continental Europa, experienced a combination of slow productivity growth and high unemplyoment. Subsequent research has shown that the standard model of unemployment actually gives counterfactual predictions. Motivated by the observation that the 1970s were also characterized by high and rising inflation, Tesfaselassie and Wolters examine the effect of growth on unemployment in the presence of nominal price rigidity.
The authors demonstrate that the effect of growth on unemployment may be positive or negative. Faster growth leads to lower unemployment if the rate of inflation is high enough. There is a threshold level of inflation below which faster growth leads to higher unemployment and above which faster growth leads to lower unemployment. The threshold level in turn depends on labor market characteristics, such as hiring efficiency, the job destruction rate, workers' relative bargaining power and the opportunity cost of work.
Joseph E. Stiglitz (1943 - )
(2000)
Am 24.11.1999 gibt Joseph E. Stiglitz seinen vorzeitigen Rücktritt als Chief Economist und Senior Vice President der Weltbank zum Jahresende bekannt. Er will sich wieder ausschließlich der Forschung und Lehre widmen und kehrt auf seinen Lehrstuhl am Economics Department der Stanford University zurück. Stiglitzs Rückzug aus der aktiven Entwicklungspolitik erfolgt nicht ganz freiwillig. Er selbst kommentiert seinen Entschluß: „It has become obvious to me that it would be difficult to continue to speak out as forcefully and publicly as I have on a variety of issues and still remain as chief economist. Rather than muzzle myself, or be muzzled, I decided to leave.“ (New York Times, 1.12.1999). Seit geraumer Zeit galt seine öffentliche Kritik am Washington Consensus, dem ökonomischen Glaubensbekenntnis, auf das sich die politische Linie des US Treasury genauso stützt wie die Stabilisierungs- und Reformpolitik des IWF, als Dorn im Auge der Vertreter dieser Institutionen. Für sie war Stiglitz - so die Metapher der Financial Times vom 26.11.99 - „a veritable gadfly“, eine wahre Viehbremse, deren lästiges Summen aufgrund von Position und Intellekt nicht einfach ignoriert werden konnte. ...
We examine how U.S. monetary policy affects the international activities of U.S. Banks. We access a rarely studied US bank‐level dataset to assess at a quarterly frequency how changes in the U.S. Federal funds rate (before the crisis) and quantitative easing (after the onset of the crisis) affects changes in cross‐border claims by U.S. banks across countries, maturities and sectors, and also affects changes in claims by their foreign affiliates. We find robust evidence consistent with the existence of a potent global bank lending channel. In response to changes in U.S. monetary conditions, U.S. banks strongly adjust their cross‐border claims in both the pre and post‐crisis period. However, we also find that U.S. bank affiliate claims respond mainly to host country monetary conditions.
In this paper we investigate the comparative properties of empirically-estimated monetary models of the U.S. economy. We make use of a new data base of models designed for such investigations. We focus on three representative models: the Christiano, Eichenbaum, Evans (2005) model, the Smets and Wouters (2007) model, and the Taylor (1993a) model. Although the three models differ in terms of structure, estimation method, sample period, and data vintage, we find surprisingly similar economic impacts of unanticipated changes in the federal funds rate. However, the optimal monetary policy responses to other sources of economic fluctuations are widely different in the different models. We show that simple optimal policy rules that respond to the growth rate of output and smooth the interest rate are not robust. In contrast, policy rules with no interest rate smoothing and no response to the growth rate, as distinct from the level, of output are more robust. Robustness can be improved further by optimizing rules with respect to the average loss across the three models.
Recently there has been an explosion of research on whether the equilibrium real interest rate has declined, an issue with significant implications for monetary policy. A common finding is that the rate has declined. In this paper we provide evidence that contradicts this finding. We show that the perceived decline may well be due to shifts in regulatory policy and monetary policy that have been omitted from the research. In developing the monetary policy implications, it is promising that much of the research approaches the policy problem through the framework of monetary policy rules, as uncertainty in the equilibrium real rate is not a reason to abandon rules in favor of discretion. But the results are still inconclusive and too uncertain to incorporate into policy rules in the ways that have been suggested.
The Federal Reserve has been publishing federal funds rate prescriptions from Taylor rules in its Monetary Policy Report since 2017. The signals from the rules aligned with Fed action on many occasions, but in some cases the Fed opted for a different route. This paper reviews the implications of the rules during the coronavirus pandemic and the subsequent inflation surge and derives projections for the future.
In 2020, the Fed took the negative prescribed rates, which were far below the effective lower bound on the nominal interest rate, as support for extensive and long-lasting quantitative easing. Yet, the calculations overstate the extent of the constraint, because they neglect the supply side effects of the pandemic.
The paper proposes a simple model-based adjustment to the resource gap used by the rules for 2020. In 2021, the rules clearly signaled the need for tightening because of the rise of inflation, yet the Fed waited until spring 2022 to raise the federal funds rate. With the decline of inflation over the course of 2023, the rules’ prescriptions have also come down. They fall below the actual federal funds rate target range in 2024. Several caveats concerning the projections of the interest rate prescriptions are discussed.
I have assessed changes in the monetary policy stance in the euro area since its inception by applying a Bayesian time-varying parameter framework in conjunction with the Hamiltonian Monte Carlo algorithm. I find that the estimated policy response has varied considerably over time. Most of the results suggest that the response weakened after the onset of the financial crisis and while quantitative measures were still in place, although there are also indications that the weakening of the response to the expected inflation gap may have been less pronounced. I also find that the policy response has become more forceful over the course of the recent sharp rise in inflation. Furthermore, it is essential to model the stochastic volatility relating to deviations from the policy rule as it materially influences the results.
Testing frequency and severity risk under various information regimes and implications in insurance
(2023)
We build on Peter et al. (2017) who examined the benefit of testing frequency risk under various information regimes. We first consider testing only severity risk, and whether the principle of indemnity, i.e. the usual contract term that excludes claims payments above the resulting insured loss, affects the insurance contracts offered and purchased. Under information regimes which are less restrictive (in terms of obtaining and using customer information), it is possible for the insurer to offer different contracts for tested and untested individuals. In the absence of the principle of indemnity, individuals will test their severity risk and a separating equilibrium ensues. With the principle of indemnity, given an actuarially fair pooled contract, individuals will not test for severity under less restrictive information regimes; a pooling equilibrium thus ensues. Under more restrictive information regimes, the insurer offers separating contracts. Individuals will test for severity and purchase appropriate contracts. We also consider testing for both frequency and severity risk. The results here are more varied. The highest gain in efficiency from testing results from one of the more restrictive information regimes. Generally under all information regimes, there is a greater gain in efficiency without the principle of indemnity than with the principle of indemnity.
Der bevorstehende Beitritt Sloweniens in die OECD1 (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), die jüngste Bewertung des BTI-Status-Index 2008 (Bertelsmann-Transformation-Index) auf dem 2. Platz, der Ratsvorsitz der EU (Europäische Union) im 1. Halbjahr 2008, die Mitgliedschaft zum Schengen-Raum und die Einführung des Euro, sind nur die jüngsten Meilensteine der erfolgreichen und nachhaltigen Transformation in ein demokratisches System und die Festlegung auf eine marktwirtschaftliche Ordnung. Die Geschichte Sloweniens stand lange Zeit im Schatten der Geschichte Österreichs und Jugoslawiens. Als eine Nation in einem eigenen Staat sieht sich Slowenien seit dem Zerfall Jugoslawiens in einer gänzlich neuen Rolle. Das Erbe der früheren Abhängigkeiten ist einem neuen Selbstbewusstsein gewichen. Die graduelle Transformation Sloweniens während der 1990er Jahre in einen völkerrechtlich unabhängigen Staat, eine politische Demokratie und eine freie Marktwirtschaft erscheint im europäischen Kontext „…only [as] a chapter in the larger tale of the democratic wave that rather unexpectedly swept across Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe during the last years of the twentieth century.“ In Reflexion der historischen Ereignisse beurteilt Kornai die Transformation am Ende des letzten Jahrhunderts in Europa „…in spite of serious problems and anomalies …[as] a success story.“ Im Rahmen des Transformationsprozesses konnte sich Slowenien als „politischer und ökonomischer Zwerg“ als unabhängiger Staat in das demokratische Europa und die Europäische Union integrieren und fest verankern. Um Gründe und Faktoren dieses Prozesses zu identifizieren, ist eine Betrachtung der Entwicklungen in den 1980er Jahren, die zur Auflösung des blockfreien sozialistischen Jugoslawiens und zur Selbstständigkeit Sloweniens geführt haben, notwendig. Jede der konstituierenden Teilrepubliken und Regionen Jugoslawiens blickt zurück auf eine eigene historische, religiöse und sprachliche Tradition mit individuellen Erfahrungen und spezifischen Spannungen innerhalb und außerhalb der gemeinsamen Föderation. Sloweniens Weg in die politische, ökonomische und demokratische Unabhängigkeit war ein individueller nationaler Differenzierungs- und Umgestaltungsprozess und Ergebnis vielfältiger mehrdimensionaler Konflikte. Unerwartet und plötzlich war der Bruch und die Herauslösung aus dem Staatenbund Jugoslawiens am 25. Juni 1991 nicht. Die Gründung und der Niedergang eines Staates sind schwierig zu erklärende und komplexe Phänomene. Die Triebkräfte der auflösenden gesellschaftlichen Prozesse im Jugoslawien der 1980er Jahre ausschließlich auf die Nationalitätenfrage zu reduzieren, bewertet Weißenbacher als eine zu enge Fokussierung der Darstellung und Begründung auf die ethnischen Spannungen innerhalb des Vielvölkerstaates. Er argumentiert: „Die Wurzeln der Desintegration des sozialistischen Jugoslawiens in alten ethnischen Feindseligkeiten zu suchen, hieße die ökonomischen, sozialen und politischen Prozesse zu ignorieren….“ Die zunehmenden regionalen Inkompatibilitäten Jugoslawiens in den 1980er Jahren verdeutlichen in Betrachtung des spezifischen Entwicklungspfads der Teilrepublik Slowenien, dass die politisch-gesellschaftlichen, kulturellen und die sozioökonomischen Strukturen letztendlich nicht dauerhaft mit den Strukturen anderer jugoslawischer Teilrepubliken vereinbar waren. Die politische und wirtschaftliche Instabilität Jugoslawiens und der frühzeitige Wandel innerhalb der slowenischen Gesellschaft und der Kommunistischen Partei in den 1980er Jahren führten durch politischen Reformdruck und makroökonomische Ungleichgewichte zum Kollaps des jugoslawischen Staatenbundes. Mencinger betont, dass die tiefe Krise Jugoslawiens letzten Endes ohne einen radikalen Systembruch und Sturkurwandel von politischer und ökonomischer Machtverteilung nicht zu überwinden gewesen wäre. Der vorliegende Beitrag greift die Rahmenbedingungen, Entwicklungen, Konflikte und Ziele auf und zeichnet die wesentlichen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Geschehnisse nach, denen sich die slowenische Bevölkerung und Politik in den Jahren vor der Loslösung gegenübersahen und die zur Gründung des unabhängigen Staates geführt haben.
We examine the effects of credit default swaps (CDS), a major type of over-the-counter derivative, on the corporate liquidity management of the reference firms. CDS help firms to access the credit market since the lenders can hedge their credit risk more easily using these contracts. However, CDS-protected creditors can be tougher in debt renegotiations and less willing to support distressed borrowers, causing some firms to become more cautious. Consequently, we find that firms hold significantly more cash after the inception of CDS trading on their debt. The increase in cash holdings by CDS firms is more pronounced for financially constrained firms and firms facing higher refinancing risk. Moreover, bank relationships and outstanding credit facilities intensify the CDS effect on cash holding. Finally, firms with greater financial expertise hold more cash when their debt is referenced by CDS. These findings suggest that CDS, which are primarily a risk management tool for lenders, induce firms to adopt more conservative liquidity policies.
The recent sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone was characterized by a monetary policy, which has been constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates, and several countries, which faced high risk spreads on their sovereign bonds. How is the government spending multiplier affected by such an economic environment?While prominent results in the academic literature point to high government spending multipliers at the ZLB, higher public indebtedness is often associated with small government spending multipliers. I develop a DSGE model with leverage constrained banks that captures both features of this economic environment, the ZLB and fiscal stress. In this model, I analyze the effects of government spending shocks. I find that not only are multipliers large at the ZLB, the presence of fiscal stress can even increase their size. For longer durations of the ZLB,multipliers in this model can be considerably larger than one.
JEL Classification: E32, E 44, E62
This paper aims to provide a descriptive analysis of the changing patterns of labour market participation, non-participation and unemployment in Great Britain, Sweden and Germany. Since the mid 1970s, most European countries have experienced two parallel developments: on the one hand they have witnessed a huge growth in the proportion of women participating on the labour market. On the other however, they have experienced the return of mass unemployment and a growing insecurity of employment for those in work. In this paper, a typology of work histories is constructed using decade periods. Retrospective and panel data from Germany, Britain and Sweden are then used to compare the effects of different employment and welfare regimes on the proportions of respondents with different types of work histories and how these are combined with unemployment.
Überarbeitete Version des Arbeitspapiers "The dynamics of labour market participation, unemployment and non-participation in Great Britain, Sweden and Germany" / Wolfgang Strengmann-Kuhn. [Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre]
Die BaFin hat im August 2021 eine Richtlinie für nachhaltige Investmentvermögen vorgelegt. Diese soll regeln, unter welchen Voraussetzungen ein Fonds als „nachhaltig“, „grün“ o.ä. bezeichnet und vermarktet werden darf. Zwar sind aufsichtsrechtliche Maßnahmen, die darauf abzielen, die Qualität von Informationen zu Nachhaltigkeitscharakteristika von Finanzprodukten zu erhöhen, grundsätzlich zu begrüßen. Der Erlass der konsultierten Richtlinie ist jedoch nicht zu befürworten. Im Lichte der einschlägigen unionsrechtlichen Regelwerke und Initiativen ist unklar, welchen informationellen Mehrwert diese rein nationale Maßnahme schaffen soll. Ferner bleibt auf Grundlage des Entwurfs unklar, anhand welcher Maßstäbe die „Nachhaltigkeit“ eines Investmentvermögens beurteilt werden soll, sodass das primäre Regelungsziel einer verbesserten Anlegerinformation nicht erreicht würde.
We present an empirical study focusing on the estimation of a fundamental multi-factor model for a universe of European stocks. Following the approach of the BARRA model, we have adopted a cross-sectional methodology. The proportion of explained variance ranges from 7.3% to 66.3% in the weekly regressions with a mean of 32.9%. For the individual factors we give the percentage of the weeks when they yielded statistically significant influence on stock returns. The best explanatory power – apart from the dominant country factors – was found among the statistical constructs „success“ and „variability in markets“.
In the euro area, monetary policy is conducted by a single central bank for 20 member countries. However, countries are heterogeneous in their economic development, including their inflation rates. This paper combines a New Keynesian model and a neural network to assess whether the European Central Bank (ECB) conducted monetary policy between 2002 and 2022 according to the weighted average of the inflation rates within the European Monetary Union (EMU) or reacted more strongly to the inflation rate developments of certain EMU countries.
The New Keynesian model first generates data which is used to train and evaluate several machine learning algorithms. They authors find that a neural network performs best out-of-sample. They use this algorithm to generally classify historical EMU data, and to determine the exact weight on the inflation rate of EMU members in each quarter of the past two decades. Their findings suggest disproportional emphasis of the ECB on the inflation rates of EMU members that exhibited high inflation rate volatility for the vast majority of the time frame considered (80%), with a median inflation weight of 67% on these countries. They show that these results stem from a tendency of the ECB to react more strongly to countries whose inflation rates exhibit greater deviations from their long-term trend.
Die Entwicklung des aggregierten Privatvermögens und seine Verteilung in Deutschland seit 1970
(2002)
Die hier vorgestellte Untersuchung des Vermögens privater Haushalte als ein möglicher Indikator für den Wohlstand einer Gesellschaft hat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland einen starken Anstieg der Vermögen seit 1970 aufgezeigt. Dies gilt sowohl für die makroökonomischen Resultate der Finanzierungsrechnung der Deutschen Bundesbank als auch für die mikroökonomischen Ergebnisse der Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichproben des Statistischen Bundesamts. Allerdings werden auch wesentliche Unterschiede im Aussagegehalt der einzelnen Datensätze deutlich. Während die Finanzierungsrechnung eine Steigerung des Nettovermögens um 808 Prozent in 27 Jahren aufweist (von 1,3 Billionen DM im Jahr 1970 auf 12,1 Billionen DM im Jahr 1997) lautet der entsprechende Prozentwert auf der Berechnungsbasis der Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichproben nur 280 Prozent in 25 Jahren bei einer wesentlich niedrigeren Gesamthöhe in späteren Untersuchungen (von 2,2 Billionen DM im Jahr 1973 auf nur 8,3 Billionen DM im Jahr 1998). Die Untersuchung der Daten der EVS hat aufgezeigt, welch große Bedeutung das Immobilienvermögen für die Vermögenssituation der privaten Haushalte hat. Allerdings ist es nicht so, dass alle Haushalte über Eigentum an Grund- und Hausbesitz verfügen. In Westdeutschland hat es zwar eine starke Steigerungen der Eigentümerquote seit 1961 gegeben. Seit 1993 ist jedoch eine Stagnation bei etwa 50 Prozent zu konstatieren. Die Analyse der Vermögensverteilung nur bezogen auf die westdeutschen Haushalte hat im Zeitraum von 1973 bis 1993 eine abnehmende Konzentration sowohl bei der Betrachtung der Anteile einzelner Haushaltsquintile am Nettogesamtvermögen als auch bei der Analyse des Gini-Koeffizienten ergeben. Allerdings hat sich dieser Trend in den Jahren bis 1998 nicht weiter fortgeführt. Für das Jahr 1998 ist in Westdeutschland feststellbar, dass die unteren 40 Prozent der Haushalte über praktisch kein Vermögen verfügen, während das oberste Quintil über 60 Prozent des Gesamtvermögens aufweisen kann. Für Ostdeutschland sind starke Anpassungstendenzen hin zu den Werten der westdeutschen Bundesländer festzustellen. Dies betrifft einerseits die absolute Höhe der Vermögenswerte, auch wenn diese bisher nur 38 Prozent des entsprechenden Wertes westdeutscher Haushalte bei einer Betrachtung der Durchschnittswerte je Haushalte im Jahr 1998 erreichen. Andererseits ist auch die Eigentümerquote an Haus- und Grundbesitz nach der Wiedervereinigung stark angestiegen. Durch dieses Immobilieneigentum auf breiterer Basis wird die Ungleichheit der Vermögensverteilung in Ostdeutschland im Zeitablauf etwas verringert, so dass der Gini-Koeffizient in den Jahren von 1993 zu 1998 leicht gesunken ist. Jedoch kann auch für die neuen Bundesländer festgestellt werden, dass die unteren 40 Prozent der Haushalte über praktisch kein Vermögen verfügen, während das oberste Quintil ostdeutscher Haushalte sogar über 70 Prozent des Gesamtvermögens aufweisen kann. Feststellbar ist weiterhin eine hohe Übereinstimmung der Vermögensverteilung in Ost- und Westdeutschland. Sowohl die Vermögensverteilung auf der Basis der Quintilswerte als auch die Resultate der Gini-Koeffizienten weisen ähnliche Ergebnisse auf, wobei eine starke Angleichungstendenz zwischen beiden Landesteilen gegeben ist. Diese Ähnlichkeit der Ergebnisse kann nur als erstaunlich bezeichnet werden, wenn man bedenkt, dass beide Landesteile für über 40 Jahre unterschiedlichen wirtschaftspolitischen Leitbildern gefolgt sind – die Bundesrepublik Deutschland der sozialen Marktwirtschaft und die Deutsche Demokratische Republik der sozialistischen Planwirtschaft.
This investigation of the wealth of private households as a possible indicator for the prosperity of a society indicated a strong increase in wealth for the Federal Republic of Germany since 1970. This applies both to the macro-economic results of the financial accounting of the Deutsche Bundesbank and to the micro-economic results of the Income and Consumption Surveys of the Federal Statistical Office. However, substantial differences become clear in the content expressed by these two different sets of data. While the financial accounting of the Deutsche Bundesbank shows an increase of net assets of around 808 per cent over 27 years (from 1.3 trillion DM in the year 1970 to 12.1 trillion DM in 1997), calculations on the basis of the Income and Consumption Surveys yield a corresponding value of only 280 per cent in a 25-year period, with a substantially lower overall magnitude in later investigations (from 2.2 trillion DM in 1973 to only 8.3 trillion DM in 1998). Investigation of the EVS data pointed out the great importance of property for the wealth situation of private households. However, not every household has property in the form of housing and real estate. In West Germany, ownership rates have increased substantially since 1962. However, since 1993 these rates have stagnated at about 50 per cent. The analysis of the distribution of wealth for West German households yielded a decline in the concentration of wealth in the period from 1973 to 1993, both in terms of the shares of total wealth held by individual quintiles of households, and as expressed by the Gini coefficients. However, this trend did not continue in the years between 1993 and 1998. For the year 1998 it can be determined that the lowest 40 per cent of households in West Germany had practically no wealth, while the highest quintile claimed over 60 per cent of total assets. For East Germany, strong tendencies are established toward adapting to the values in the West German Länder. This concerns first the absolute level of net assets, even though in 1998 these amounted to just 38 per cent of the analogous value in West German households, in terms of the average value per household. Similarly, the ownership rates of housing and real estate also rose dramatically after reunification. The inequality of the distribution of wealth in East Germany was reduced somewhat by this broader basis of real-estate ownership over the course of time, such that the Gini coefficient decreased slightly in the period from 1993 to 1998. However, it is also true for the new Länder in the Federal Republic that the lowest 40 per cent of households have practically no wealth, while the highest quintile of East German households claim over 70 per cent of total assets, even higher than its share in West Germany. Furthermore, the distribution of wealth is remarkably congruous in East and West Germany. Both the distribution of wealth as expressed by the quintile values and the results of the Gini coefficients yield similar results, whereby the trend in both regions is toward convergence. The similarity of these results must be regarded as nothing less than amazing, considering that the two regions followed different economic models for over forty years: the social free-market economy (Soziale Marktwirtschaft) in the Federal Republic of Germany, and the socialist planned economy (Sozialistische Planwirtschaft) in the German Democratic Republic.
Robustness, validity, and significance of the ECB's asset quality review and stress test exercise
(2014)
As we are moving toward a eurozone banking union, the European Central Bank (ECB) is going to take over the regulatory oversight of 128 banks in November 2014. To that end, the ECB conducted a comprehensive assessment of these banks, which included an asset quality review (AQR) and a stress test. The fundamental question is how accurately will the financial condition of these banks have been assessed by the ECB when it commences its regulatory oversight? And, can the comprehensive assessment lead to a full repair of banks’ balance sheets so that the ECB takes over financially sound banks and is the necessary regulation in place to facilitate this? Overall, the evidence presented in this paper based on the design of the comprehensive assessment as well as own stress test exercises suggest that the ECB’s assessment might not comprehensively deal with the problems in the financial sector and risks may remain that will pose substantial threats to financial stability in the eurozone.
In der Literatur zur Abschlußprüfung ist ein negativer Effekt eines ökonomischen Vorteils aus der wiederholten Mandatsannahme, der aufgrund von Transaktionskosten entsteht, auf die Unabhängigkeit des Abschlußprüfers diskutiert worden. Anders als die bisher vorgestellten Ansätze wird im Rahmen des vorliegenden Modells rationales Verhalten der Kapitalmarktakteure unterstellt, die ihre Ansprüche in Abhängigkeit der Reputation des Prüfers und damit der Glaubwürdigkeit des Testats stellen. Als Ergebnis kann festgehalten werden, daß transaktionskostenbedingte Quasirenten die Urteilsfreiheit nicht gefährden, sondern daß vielmehr Informationsrenten für das Berichtsverhalten des Prüfers ausschlaggebend sind. Auch ergeben sich neue Ansatzpunkte zur Diskussion der externen Pflichtrotation und von Maßnahmen zur Steigerung der Kapitalmarkteffizienz.
This paper argues that the key mechanisms protecting retail investors’ financial stake in their portfolio investments are indirect. They do not rely on actions by the investors or by any private actor directly charged with looking after investors’ interests. Rather, they are provided by the ecosystem that investors (are legally forced to) inhabit, as a byproduct of the mostly self-interested, mutually and legally constrained behavior of third parties without a mandate to help the investors (e.g., speculators, activists). This elucidates key rules, resolves the mandatory vs. enabling tension in corporate/securities law, and exposes passive investing’s fragile reliance on others’ trading.
The objective of this paper is to test the hypothesis that in particular financially constrained firms lease a higher share of their assets to mitigate problems of asymmetric information. The assumptions are tested under a GMM framework which simultaneously controls for endogeneity problems and firms’ fixed effects. We find that the share of total annual lease expenses attributable to either finance or operating leases is considerably higher for financially strained as well as for small and fast-growing firms – those likely to face higher agency-cost premiums on marginal financing. Furthermore, our results confirm the substitution of leasing and debt financing for lessee firms. However, we find no evidence that firms use leasing as an instrument to reduce their tax burdens. Keywords: Leasing; financial constraints; capital structure; asymmetric information.
This paper empirically investigates how organizational hierarchy affects the allocation of credit within a bank. Using an exogenous variation in organizational design, induced by a reorganization plan implemented in roughly 2,000 bank branches in India during 1999-2006, and employing a difference-in-differences research strategy, we find that increased hierarchization of a branch decreases its ability to produce "soft" information on loans, leads to increased standardization of loans and rationing of "soft information" loans. Furthermore, this loss of information brings about a reduction in performance on loans: delinquency rates and returns on similar loans are worse in more hierarchical branches. We also document how hierarchical structures perform better in environments that are characterized by a high degree of corruption, thus highlighting the benefits of hierarchical decision making in restraining rent seeking activities. Finally, we document a channel - managerial interference - through which hierarchy affects loan outcomes.
Under Solvency II, corporate governance requirements are a complementary, but nonetheless essential, element to build a sound regulatory framework for insurance undertakings, also to address risks not specifically mitigated by the sole solvency capital requirements. After recalling the provisions of the second pillar concerning the system of governance, the paper is devoted to highlight the emerging regulatory trends in the corporate governance of insurance firms. Among others, it signals the exceptional extension of the duties and responsibilities assigned to the Board of directors, far beyond the traditional role of both monitoring the chief executive officer, and assessing the overall direction and strategy of the business. However, a better risk governance is not necessarily built on narrow rule-based approaches to corporate governance.
Under Solvency II, corporate governance requirements are a complementary, but nonetheless essential, element to build a sound regulatory framework for insurance undertakings, also to address risks not specifically mitigated by the sole solvency capital requirements. After recalling the provisions of the Second Pillar concerning the system of governance, the paper highlights the emerging regulatory trends in the corporate governance of insurance firms. Among others things, it signals the exceptional extension of the duties and responsibilities assigned to the board of directors, far beyond the traditional role of both monitoring the chief executive officer, and assessing the overall direction and strategy of the business. However, a better risk governance is not necessarily built on narrow rule-based approaches to corporate governance.
Industry concentration and markups in the US have been rising over the last 3-4 decades. However, the causes remain largely unknown. This paper uses machine learning on regulatory documents to construct a novel dataset on compliance costs to examine the effect of regulations on market power. The dataset is comprehensive and consists of all significant regulations at the 6-digit NAICS level from 1970-2018. We find that regulatory costs have increased by $1 trillion during this period. We document that an increase in regulatory costs results in lower (higher) sales, employment, markups, and profitability for small (large) firms. Regulation driven increase in concentration is associated with lower elasticity of entry with respect to Tobin's Q, lower productivity and investment after the late 1990s. We estimate that increased regulations can explain 31-37% of the rise in market power. Finally, we uncover the political economy of rulemaking. While large firms are opposed to regulations in general, they push for the passage of regulations that have an adverse impact on small firms.
We examine the inter-linkages between financial factors and real economic activity. We review the main theoretical approaches that allow financial frictions to be embedded into general equilibrium models. We outline, from a policy perspective, the most recent empirical papers focusing on the propagation of exogenous shocks to the economy, with a particular emphasis on works dealing with time variation of parameters and other types of nonlinearities. We then present an application to the analysis of the changing transmission of financial shocks in the euro area. Results show that the effects of a financial shock are time-varying and contingent on the state of the economy. They are of negligible importance in normal times but they greatly matter in conditions of stress.
Although the elderly are more vulnerable to COVID-19, the empirical evidence suggests that they do not behave more cautiously in the pandemic than younger individuals. This theoretical model argues that some individuals might not comply with the COVID-19 measures to reassure themselves that they are not vulnerable, and that the incentives for such self-signaling can be stronger for the elderly. The results suggest that communication strategies emphasizing the dangers of COVID-19 could backfire and reduce compliance among the elderly.
This note reviews the legal issues and concerns that are likely to play an important role in the ongoing deliberations of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany concerning the legality of ECB government bond purchases such as those conducted in the context of its earlier Securities Market Programme or potential future Outright Monetary Transactions.
This note reviews the legal issues and concerns that are likely to play an important role in the ongoing deliberations of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany concerning the legality of ECB government bond purchases such as those conducted in the context of its earlier Securities Market Programme or potential future Outright Monetary Transactions.
This paper summarizes key elements of the German Federal Constitutional Court’s decision on the European Central Bank’s Public Sector Asset Purchase Programme. It briefly explains how it is possible for the German Court to disagree with the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Finally, it makes suggestions concerning a practical way forward for the Governing Council of the ECB in light of these developments.
In the communication of the European Central Bank (ECB), the statement that „we act within our mandate“ is often referred to. Also among practitioners of the Eurosystem the term „mandate“ has become popular. In his Working Paper, Helmut Siekmann analyzes the legal foundation of the tasks and objectives of the Eurosysstem and price stability as a legal term. He finds that the primary law of the EU only very sparsely employs the term „mandate“. It is never used in the context of monetary policy and its institutions. Moreover, he comes to the conclusion that inflation targeting as a task, competence, or objective of the Eurosystem is legally highly questionable according to the common standards of interpretation.
Gegen den Landeshaushalt 2022 des Freistaats Thüringen bestehen nach Einschätzung von Helmut Siekmann erhebliche verfassungsrechtliche Bedenken. In einem Gutachten kommt Siekmann zu dem Schluss, dass sich die festgestellten globalen Minderausgaben im Vergleich zum gesamten Haushaltsvolumen nicht rechtfertigen lassen. Der verfassungsrechtlich gebotene Haushaltsausgleich sei nur dadurch erzielt worden, dass die eigentlich gebotenen Einzelkürzungen nicht vom Parlament entschieden, sondern der Exekutive überlassen worden seien. Durch Globale Minderausgaben soll der Ausgleich von Einnahmen und Ausgaben erreicht werden, ohne dafür erforderliche und politisch oft schwer durchsetzbare Kürzungen bei Einzeltiteln vornehmen zu müssen.
In Thüringen fehlen der Minderheitskoalition aus Linke, SPD und Grünen im Parlament vier Stimmen für eine eigene Mehrheit. Sie muss damit bei allen Entscheidungen eine Unterstützung der oppositionellen CDU aushandeln. Siekmann weist in seinem Gutachten darauf hin, dass die Veranschlagung von globalen Minderausgaben gleich welcher Art in keinem Fall die Exekutive ermächtigt, bestehende Verpflichtungen nicht zu erfüllen.
In the course of the crisis, the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) has acted several times to support the EU Member States and banking systems in financial distress by purchasing debt instruments: Covered Bonds Programmes (CBP), Securities Market Programmes (SMP), Long Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO), and Targeted Long Term Refinancing Operations (TLTRO), followed by the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) and then the Extended Asset Purchase Programmes (EAPP) – colloquially labelled as Quantitative Easing (QE).
Initially, the support measures of the ESCB might have to be judged as monetary policy but the selectivity of OMT and – even more – SMP in conjunction with the transfer of risks to the ESCB speak against it.
Helmut Siekmann erläutert in seinem Beitrag die Einstandspflicht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland für die Deutsche Bundesbank und die Europäische Zentralbank. Dabei kommt er zu dem Schluss, dass weder eine „Haftung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland für Verluste der EZB noch eine Verpflichtung zur Auffüllung von aufgezehrtem Eigenkapital“ besteht.
Dieser Beitrag ist zuerst erschienen in: Festschrift für Theodor Baums zum siebzigsten Geburtstag, S. 1145-1179, Helmut Siekmann, Andreas Cahn, Tim Florstedt, Katja Langenbucher, Julia Redenius-Hövermann, Tobias Tröger, Ulrich Segna, Hrsg., Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2017