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EU financial integration : is there a 'Core Europe'? ; evidence from a cluster-based approach
(2005)
Numerous recent studies, e.g. EU Commission (2004a), Baele et al. (2004), Adam et al.(2002), and the research pooled in ECB-CFS (2005), Gaspar, Hartmann, and Sleijpen(2003), have documented progress in EU financial integration from a micro-level view.This paper contributes to this research by identifying groups of financially integratedcountries from a holistic, macro-level view. It calculates cross-sectional dispersions, andinnovates by applying an inter-temporal cluster analysis to eight euro area countries for the period 1995-2002. The indicators employed represent the money, government bond and credit markets. Our results show that euro countries were divided into two stable groups of financially more closely integrated countries in the pre-EMU period. Back then, geographic proximity and country size might have played a role. This situation has changed remarkably with the euro's introduction. EMU has led to a shake-up both in the number and composition of groups. The evidence puts a question mark behin d using Germany as a benchmark in the post-EMU period. The ¯ndings suggest as well that ¯nancial integration takes place in waves. Stable periods and periods of intense transition alternate. Based on the notion of 'maximum similarity', the results suggest that there exist 'maximum similarity barriers'. It takes extraordinary events, such as EMU, to push the degree of ¯nancial integration beyond these barriers. The research encourages policymakers to move forward courageously in the post-FSAP era, and provides comfort that the substantial di®erences between the current and potentially new euro states can be overcome. The analysis could be extended to the new EU member countries, to the global level, and to additional indicators.
Aus dem weiten Spektrum ökonomisch relevanter Fragen, die die europäische Integration und das Gesellschaftsrecht verbinden, soll hier diejenige herausgegriffen werden, ob sich die nationalen Corporate-Governance-Systeme in den großen europäischen Volkswirtschaften Deutschlands, Frankreichs und Großbritanniens unter dem Einfluß der europäischen Integration bereits aneinander angeglichen haben und ob es demnächst zu einer solchen Angleichung kommen wird. Unser Thema deckt nur einen Teil des Gesellschaftsrechts ab und geht zugleich hinsichtlich der angesprochenen rechtlichen Materie über das Gesellschaftsrecht hinaus, denn die Corporate Governance fügt sich nicht einfach in herkömmliche juristische Klassifikationen ein. Unser Vorhaben unterscheidet sich aber vor allem dadurch von einer juristischen Behandlung des Themas, daß primär ökonomische Mechanismen und Zusammenhänge angesprochen werden. Ökonomen betrachten die Corporate Governance im weiteren Kontext des Finanzsystems, denn das Corporate-Governance-System ist ein Teil des Finanzsystems eines Landes. Die Fragen, wie unterschiedlich die nationalen Systeme der Corporate Governance waren, ehe zu Beginn der 80er Jahre der Prozeß der Angleichung in Europa einsetzte, wie unterschiedlich sie heute noch sind, wie sehr sie sich somit bereits angeglichen haben und wie ein möglicher Angleichungsprozeß weitergehen könnte, sind deshalb ein Teil der weiteren Frage nach der Angleichung der Finanzsysteme in Europa. In diesem Beitrag konzentrieren wir uns aber nur auf Entwicklungen der 90er Jahre.
Major differences between national financial systems might make a common monetary policy difficult. As within Europe, Germany and the United Kingdom differ most with respect to their financial systems, the present paper addresses its topic under the assumption that the United Kingdom is already a part of EMU. Employing a comprehensive concept of a financial system, the author shows that there are indeed profound differences between the national financial systems of Germany and the United Kingdom. But he argues that these differences are not likely to create great problems for a common monetary policy. In the context of the present paper, one important difference between the two financial systems refers to the structure of the respective financial sector and, as a consequence, to the strength with which a given monetary policy impulse set by the central bank is passed on to the financial sector. The other important difference refers to the typical relationship between the banks and the business sector in each country which determines to what extent the financial sectors and especially the banks pass on pressure exerted on them by a monetary policy authority to their clients in their national business sector. In Germany, the central bank has a stronger influence on the financial sector than in England, while, for systemic reasons, German banks tend to soften monetary policy pressures on their customers more than British banks do. As far as the transmission of a restrictive monetary policy of the ECB to the real economy is concerned, these two differences tend to offset each other. This is good news for the advocates of a monetary union as it eases the task of the ECB when it comes to determining the strength of its monetary policy measures.
Efficient systems for the securities transaction industry : a framework for the European Union
(2003)
This paper provides a framework for the securities transaction industry in the EU to understand the functions performed, the institutions involved and the parameters concerned that shape market and ownership structure. Of particular interest are microeconomic incentives of the industry players that can be in contradiction to social welfare. We evaluate the three functions and the strategic parameters - the boundary decision, the communication standard employed and the governance implemented - along the lines of three efficiency concepts. By structuring the main factors that influence these concepts and by describing the underlying trade-offs among them, we provide insight into a highly complex industry. Applying our framework, the paper describes and analyzes three consistent systems for the securities transaction industry. We point out that one of the systems, denoted as 'contestable monopolies', demonstrates a superior overall efficiency while it might be the most sensitive in terms of configuration accuracy and thus difficult to achieve and sustain.
Despite a lot of re-structuring and many innovations in recent years, the securities transaction industry in the European Union is still a highly inefficient and inconsistently configured system for cross-border transactions. This paper analyzes the functions performed, the institutions involved and the parameters concerned that shape market and ownership structure in the industry. Of particular interest are microeconomic incentives of the main players that can be in contradiction to social welfare. We develop a framework and analyze three consistent systems for the securities transaction industry in the EU that offer superior efficiency than the current, inefficient arrangement. Some policy advice is given to select the 'best' system for the Single European Financial Market.