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We develop an interregional version of the standard textbook input-output model, that is extended with respect to the inclusion of the consumption expenditures and income generation process into the endogenous part of the input-output table. We also introduce a new method for deriving a two-region version of an interregional input-output table from original input-output tables for an overall economy and one of its regions. In an empirical assessment of the economic effects of the Frankfurt Airport, the interregional model is successfully employed. It is shown, that the model is capable of reducing the degree of overestimation of economic effects that results from inappropriate use of national input-output tables in the assessment of regional impact effects.
Models with multiple equilibria are a popular way to explain currency attacks. Morris and Shin (1998) have shown that, in the context of those models, unique equilibria may prevail once noisy private information is introduced. In this paper, we generalize the results of Morris and Shin to a broader class of probability distributions and show - using the technique of iterated elimination of dominated strategies - that uniqueness will hold, even if we allow for sunspots and individual uncertainty about strategic behavior of other agents. We provide a clear exposition of the logic of this model and we analyse the impact of transparency on the probability of a speculative attack. For the case of uniform distribution of noisy signals, we show that increased transparency of government policy reduces the likelihood of attacks. JEL Classification F 31, D 82
During the last decade, there has been a significant bias towards bond financing on emerging markets, with private investors relying on a bail-out of bonds by the international community. The bias has been a main cause for recent excessive fragility of international capital markets. The paper shows how collective action clauses in bonds contracts help to involve the private sector in risk sharing. It argues that such clauses, as a market based instrument, will raise spreads for emerging market debt and so help to correct a market failure towards excessive bond finance. Recent pressure by the IMF to involve the private sector is facing a conflict between the principle to honour existing contracts and the principle of equal treatment of bondholders.
Joseph E. Stiglitz (1943 - )
(2000)
Am 24.11.1999 gibt Joseph E. Stiglitz seinen vorzeitigen Rücktritt als Chief Economist und Senior Vice President der Weltbank zum Jahresende bekannt. Er will sich wieder ausschließlich der Forschung und Lehre widmen und kehrt auf seinen Lehrstuhl am Economics Department der Stanford University zurück. Stiglitzs Rückzug aus der aktiven Entwicklungspolitik erfolgt nicht ganz freiwillig. Er selbst kommentiert seinen Entschluß: „It has become obvious to me that it would be difficult to continue to speak out as forcefully and publicly as I have on a variety of issues and still remain as chief economist. Rather than muzzle myself, or be muzzled, I decided to leave.“ (New York Times, 1.12.1999). Seit geraumer Zeit galt seine öffentliche Kritik am Washington Consensus, dem ökonomischen Glaubensbekenntnis, auf das sich die politische Linie des US Treasury genauso stützt wie die Stabilisierungs- und Reformpolitik des IWF, als Dorn im Auge der Vertreter dieser Institutionen. Für sie war Stiglitz - so die Metapher der Financial Times vom 26.11.99 - „a veritable gadfly“, eine wahre Viehbremse, deren lästiges Summen aufgrund von Position und Intellekt nicht einfach ignoriert werden konnte. ...
Entwicklungsfinanzierung
(2000)
The extension of long-term loans, e.g. to finance housing, is adversely affected by inflation. For one thing, the higher nominal interest rates charged by the banks in response to inflation mean that borrowers have to make (nominally) higher interest payments, which unnecessarily reduces their borrowing capacity. For another, long-term loans with variable interest rates increase the probability that borrowers will become unable to meet their payment obligations. The present paper examines these two assertions in detail. At the same time, it presents a concept for substantially reducing the weaknesses of conventional lending methodologies. We start by investigating the consequences of a stable inflation rate on the borrowing capacity of credit clients, then go on to analyze the impact of fluctuating inflation rates on the risk of default.
Although the world of banking and finance is becoming more integrated every day, in most aspects the world of financial regulation continues to be narrowly defined by national boundaries. The main players here are still national governments and governmental agencies. And until recently, they tended to follow a policy of shielding their activities from scrutiny by their peers and members of the academic community rather than inviting critical assessments and an exchange of ideas. The turbulence in international financial markets in the 1980s, and its impact on U.S. banks, gave rise to the notion that academics working in the field of banking and financial regulation might be in a position to make a contribution to the improvement of regulation in the United States, and thus ultimately to the stability of the entire financial sector. This provided the impetus for the creation of the “U.S. Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee”. In the meantime, similar shadow committees have been founded in Europe and Japan. The specific problems associated with financial regulation in Europe, as well as the specific features which distinguish the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee from its counterparts in the U.S. and Japan, derive from the fact that while Europe has already made substantial progress towards economic and political integration, it is still primarily a collection of distinct nation-states with differing institutional set-ups and political and economic traditions. Therefore, any attempt to work towards a European approach to financial regulation must include an effort to promote the development of a European culture of co-operation in this area, and this is precisely what the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC) seeks to do. In this paper, Harald Benink, chairman of the ESFRC, and Reinhard H. Schmidt, one of the two German members, discuss the origin, the objectives and the functioning of the committee and the thrust of its recommendations.