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Zur Reform der Einlagensicherung: Elemente einer anreizkompatiblen Europäischen Rückversicherung
(2020)
Bankeinlagen bis 100.000 Euro sind de jure überall im Euroraum gleichermaßen vor Verlusten geschützt. De facto hängt der Wert dieser gesetzlichen Haftungszusage unter anderem von der Ausstattung des nationalen Sicherungsfonds und der relativen Größe des Bankensektors in einer Volkswirtschaft ab. Um die Homogenität des Einlagenschutzes zu gewährleisten und die Bankenunion zu vollenden, bedarf es einer einheitlichen europäischen Einlagensicherung. Die bestehende implizite Risikoteilung im Euroraum ist ordnungspolitisch nicht wünschenswert. Ferner kann eine explizite und glaubwürdige Zweitsicherung Fehlanreize zur Übernahme exzessiver Risiken verhindern, bevor es zum Schadensfall kommt. Daher plädiert dieser Beitrag für ein zweistufiges, streng subsidiär organisiertes Rückversicherungsmodell: Nationale Erstversicherungen würden einen festgeschriebenen Teil, die europäische Rückversicherung nachrangig den Rest der Deckungssumme besichern. Die Rückversicherung gewährt diese Liquiditätshilfen in Form von Kassenkrediten. Weil die Haftung auf nationaler Ebene verbleibt, werden Risiken geteilt aber nicht vergemeinschaftet. Marktgerechte Prämien müssen nicht nur das individuelle Risikogewicht einer Bank sondern auch länderspezifische Risikofaktoren berücksichtigen. Zuletzt braucht der Rückversicherer umfangreiche Aufsichtsrechte, um die Zahlungsfähigkeit der Erstversicherer mit Hinblick auf die nationalen Haftungspflichten jederzeit sicherzustellen.
We show that High Frequency Traders (HFTs) are not beneficial to the stock market during flash crashes. They actually consume liquidity when it is most needed, even when they are rewarded by the exchange to provide immediacy. The behavior of HFTs exacerbate the transient price impact, unrelated to fundamentals, typically observed during a flash crash. Slow traders provide liquidity instead of HFTs, taking advantage of the discounted price. We thus uncover a trade-o↵ between the greater liquidity and efficiency provided by HFTs in normal times, and the disruptive consequences of their trading activity during distressed times.
This paper presents causal evidence of the effects of boardroom networks on firm value. We exploit exogenous variation in network centrality arising from a ban on interlocking directorates of Italian financial and insurance companies. We leverage this shock to show that firms that become more central in the network as a result of the shock experience positive abnormal returns around the announcement date. We find that information dissemination plays a central role: results are driven by firms that have higher idiosyncratic volatility, low analyst coverage, and more uncertainty surrounding their earnings forecasts. We also find that firms benefit more from boardroom centrality when they are more central in the input-output network, as this reinforces information complementarities, or when they are less central in the cross-ownership network, as well as when they suffer from low profitability and low growth opportunities. Network centrality also results in higher compensation for board directors.
Using an original dataset on professional networks of directors sitting on the boards of large US corporations, we examine how personal relationships are used by firms to improve job match quality in the high-skill segment of the labor market. Analyzing explicit social connection data between new hires and recruiters, we are able to test predictions of well established job referral models. We find that referred executive directors have a fifteen percent longer tenure than their non-referred counterparts. Referred executive directors also tend to be similar to their referrers on multiple dimensions, giving support to network homophily hypotheses.
We study whether and how time preferences change over the life cycle, exploiting representative long-term panel data. We estimate the age patterns of discount rates from age 25 to 80. In order to identify age effects, we have to disentangle them from cohort and period factors. We address this identification problem by estimating individual fixed effects models, where we substitute period effects with determinants of time preferences that depend on calendar years. We find that discount rates decrease with age and the decline is remarkably linear over the life cycle.
In this paper we argue that the own findings of the SSM THEMATIC REVIEW ON PROFITABILITY AND BUSINESS MODEL and the academic literature on bank profitability do not provide support for the business model approach of supervisory guidance. We discuss in the paper several reasons why the regulator should stay away from intervening in management practices. We conclude that by taking the role of a coach instead of a referee, the supervisor generates a hazard for financial stability.
Discussions about the banking union have restarted. Its success so far is limited: national banking sectors are still overwhelmingly exposed to their own countries’ economies, cross border banking has not increased and capital and liquidity remain locked within national boundaries. The policy letter highlights that the current debate, centered on sovereign exposures and deposit insurance, misses critical underlying problems in the supervision and resolution frameworks. The ECB supervisors’ efforts to facilitate cross-border banking have been hampered by national ringfencing. The resolution framework is not up to its task: limited powers of the SRB, prohibitive access conditions and limited size of the Single Resolution Fund limit its effectiveness. A lack of a coherent European framework for insolvency unlevels the regulatory field and creates incentives to bypass European rules. The new Commission and European Parliament, with the new ECB leadership, provide a unique opportunity to address these shortcomings and make the banking union work.
The term structure of interest rates is crucial for the transmission of monetary policy to financial markets and the macroeconomy. Disentangling the impact of monetary policy on the components of interest rates, expected short rates and term premia, is essential to understanding this channel. To accomplish this, we provide a quantitative structural model with endogenous, time-varying term premia that are consistent with empirical findings. News about future policy, in contrast to unexpected policy shocks, has quantitatively significant effects on term premia along the entire term structure. This provides a plausible explanation for partly contradictory estimates in the empirical literature.
We design, field and exploit survey data from a representative sample of the French population to examine whether informative social interactions enter householdsístockholding decisions. Respondents report perceptions about their circle of peers with whom they interact about Önancial matters, their social circle and the population. We provide evidence for the presence of an information channel through which social interactions ináuence perceptions and expectations about stock returns, and financial behavior. We also find evidence of mindless imitation of peers in the outer social circle, but this does not permeate as many layers of financial behavior as informative social interactions do.
Abundant studies show that individuals often struggle and frequently fail to form a correct perception of how much they are worth in terms of income or net wealth, both in absolute terms and relative to others. The authors find that wealth misperception arises even in a frictionless environment. They show that this wealth misperception is related to low cognitive abilities and inattention, and that subjects who misperceive wealth have a greater tendency to borrow and spend out of gains. A standard optimal consumption choice model, enriched with a rational but inattentive agent à la Gabaix aligns the key experimental findings.