Institutes
Refine
Document Type
- Article (22) (remove)
Has Fulltext
- yes (22)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (22)
Keywords
- Emotion (3)
- Burkina Faso (2)
- Cognitive archeology (2)
- Cognitive evolution (2)
- Disposition (2)
- Evil (2)
- Hate (2)
- Hostile emotions (2)
- NGO (2)
- Niche construction (2)
Institute
- Philosophie und Geschichtswissenschaften (22) (remove)
Explaining humans as rational creatures—capable of deductive reasoning—remains challenging for evolutionary naturalism. Schechter (Philosophical Perspectives, 24(1)437–464, 2011, 2013) proposes to link the evolution of this kind of reasoning with the ability to plan. His proposal, however, does neither include any elaborated theory on how logical abilities came into being within the hominin lineage nor is it sufficiently supported by empirical evidence. I present such a theory in broad outline and substantiate it with archeological findings. It is argued that the cognitive makeup of any animal is constituted by being embedded in a certain way of life. Changing ways of life thus foster appearances of new cognitive abilities. Finally, a new way of life of coordinated group behavior emerged within the hominins: anticipatory group planning involved in activities like making sophisticated spears for hunting. This gave rise to human logical cognition. It turned hominins into domain-general reasoner and adherents of intersubjective norms for reasoning. However, as I argue, it did not—and most likely could not—give rise to reason by deductive logic. More likely, deductive reasoning entered our world only a few thousand years ago: exclusively as a cultural artifact.
A remark on the bank cases
(2021)
Since their formulation by Keith DeRose (1992), the so-called bank cases have played a major role in the discussion about whether knowledge depends on practical factors. According to the proponents of pragmatic encroachment, the proper conclusion to be drawn from the bank cases and similar examples is that knowledge of a proposition p does not supervene on one’s evidence for or against p. In my view, this conclusion is ill-founded. The reason is that the bank cases and similar examples suffer from an ambiguity concerning the known proposition — an ambiguity that has so far been overlooked. When this ambiguity is made explicit, it becomes clear that the conclusion does not follow.
Stanley Cavell is one of very few philosophers who systematically reflect on the impact and influence of autobiographical detail, experience, and preferences on their philosophical work. The aim of this essay is to show how Cavell’s use of autobiographical exploration is rooted in his early aesthetic theory, in particular his view of the similarities between philosophy and aesthetic criticism. Cavell argues that criticism starts by exploiting and incorporating a subjective vantage point, eventually bringing the reader to test the significance of a work on herself. In his ‘Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy’, Cavell states exactly this form of appeal to the ‘We’ of author and reader as the basic move of his own version of ‘ordinary language philosophy’. It is because of the connections Cavell sees between criticism and philosophy that his aesthetic diagnosis harks back on his overall critical style of thinking.
Rational agency is of central interest to philosophy, with evolutionary accounts of the cognitive underpinnings of rational agency being much debated. Yet one building block—our ability to argue—is less studied, except Mercier and Sperber’s argumentative theory (Mercier and Sperber in Behav Brain Sci 34(02):57–74, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x10000968 [Titel anhand dieser DOI in Citavi-Projekt übernehmen] , 2011, in The enigma of reason. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2017). I discuss their account and argue that it faces a lacuna: It cannot explain the origin of argumentation as a series of small steps that reveal how hominins with baseline abilities of the trait in question could turn into full-blown owners of it. This paper then provides a first sketch of the desired evolutionary trajectory. I argue that reasoning coevolves with the ability to coordinate behavior. After that, I establish a model based on niche construction theory. This model yields a story with following claims. First, argumentation came into being during the Oldowan period as a tool for justifying information ‘out of sight’. Second, argumentation enabled hominins to solve collective action problems with collaborators out of sight, which stabilized argumentative practices eventually. Archeological findings are discussed to substantiate both claims. I conclude with outlining changes resultant from my model for the concept of rational agency.
It’s intuitively plausible to suppose that there are many things that we can be rationally certain of, at least in many contexts. The present paper argues that, given this principle of Abundancy, there is a Preface Paradox for (rational) credence. Section 1 gives a statement of the paradox, discusses its relation to its familiar counterpart for (rational) belief, and points out the congeniality between Abundancy and broadly contextualist trends in epistemology. This leads to the question whether considerations of context-sensitivity might lend themselves to solving the Preface for credence. Sections 2 and 3 scrutinize two approaches in this spirit—one mimicking Hawthorne’s (2002) Semantic Contextualist approach to an epistemic version of the Preface, the other one analogous to Clarke’s (2015) Sensitivist approach to the doxastic version—arguing that neither approach succeeds as it stands.
Das Zusammenleben von Juden und Christen war in vielen deutschen Territorien, insbesondere in ländlichen Gebieten, viel enger, als man dies heute zumeist annimmt. Dafür finden sich auch in der Landgrafschaft Hessen-Kassel zahlreiche Belege. Hier soll das kirchliche Verwaltungsschrifttum zum Sprechen gebracht werden, das in Zusammenhang mit den Kasseler Superintendenten Paul Stein und Theophil Neuberger sowie dem Eschweger Superintendenten Johannes Hütterodt steht. Als Ausgangspunkt dienen insbesondere ihre Diensttagebücher.
This article discusses the potential of a historical approach to sustainability transformations. Using environmental issues and governance structures as case studies, it first describes how historical “sustainability transformations” can be conceptualized. It then suggests that 19th-century constitutional reforms can be read as attempts at reaching fiscal sustainability, whereas some social reforms can be interpreted as attempts to render the capitalist economy sustainable. In conclusion, the article highlights that the primary value of historical approaches to sustainability transformations will not lie in models, but in encouraging more creative questions.
Kola nut (Cola cf. nitida) and Safou fruit (Dacryodes edulis) remains have been discovered in eleventh- to fourteenth-century archaeological contexts at Togu Missiri near Ségou in Mali. These remains are evidence of early trade in perishable foodstuffs from the West African forest zone into the Middle Niger region. On the basis of these finds, this paper argues that long-distance trade links were well established by the end of the first millennium AD. It thereby supports the hypothesis that dates the inception of trade between the West African forest zone and the savanna regions to the first millennium AD. The circumstances of the find are discussed, as are the implications for our understanding of the wider exchange network based on the Niger River system in the late first and early second millennium CE.
A vast range of our everyday experiences seem to involve an immediate consciousness of value. We hear the rudeness of someone making offensive comments. In seeing someone risking her life to save another, we recognize her bravery. When we witness a person shouting at an innocent child, we feel the unfairness of this action. If, in learning of a close friend’s success, envy arises in us, we experience our own emotional response as wrong. How are these values apprehended? The three most common answers provided by contemporary philosophy explain the consciousness of value in terms of judgment, emotion, or perception. An alternative view endorsed mainly by authors inspired by the phenomenological tradition argues that values are apprehended by an intentional feeling. In this model, it is by virtue of a feeling that objects are presented as being in different degrees and nuances fair or unfair, boring or funny, good or bad. This paper offers an account of this model of feeling and its basic features, and defends it over alternative models. To this end, the paper discusses different versions of the model circulating in current research which until now have developed in parallel rather than in mutual exchange. The paper also applies the proposed account to the moral domain and examines how a feeling of values is presupposed by several moral experiences.
Development economists have suggested that the hopes of the poor are a relevant factor in overcoming poverty. I argue that Kant’s approach to hope provides an important complement to the economists’ perspective. A Kantian account of hope emphasizes the need for the rationality of hope and thereby guards against problematic aspects of the economists’ discourse on hope. Section 1 introduces recent work on hope in development economics. Section 2 clarifies Kant’s question “What may I hope?” and presents the outlines of his answer. Crucially, hope is rational if it is rational to trust in the structures of reality on which the realization of one’s hope depends. Section 3 argues that central tenets of Kant’s account of what makes hope rational can be applied to the context of poverty. It becomes apparent that the poor often have good reason to be hopeless since they may not trust fundamental structures that are necessary for realizing their hope. Thus, the insight that the poor need more hope must go hand in hand with a commitment to establishing trustworthy political structures, such that their hope can be rational. Section 4 highlights the relevance of the secular highest good for a better understanding of the justification and scope of our duties to the poor in a Kantian framework.
Drawing on insights found in both philosophy and psychology, this paper offers an analysis of hate and distinguishes between its main types. I argue that hate is a sentiment, i.e., a form to regard the other as evil which on certain occasions can be acutely felt. On the basis of this definition, I develop a typology which, unlike the main typologies in philosophy and psychology, does not explain hate in terms of patterns of other affective states. By examining the developmental history and intentional structure of hate, I obtain two variables: the replaceability/irreplaceability of the target and the determinacy/indeterminacy of the focus of concern. The combination of these variables generates the four-types model of hate, according to which hate comes in the following kinds: normative, ideological, retributive, and malicious.
Drawing on insights found in both philosophy and psychology, this paper offers an analysis of hate and distinguishes between its main types. I argue that hate is a sentiment, i.e., a form to regard the other as evil which on certain occasions can be acutely felt. On the basis of this definition, I develop a typology which, unlike the main typologies in philosophy and psychology, does not explain hate in terms of patterns of other affective states. By examining the developmental history and intentional structure of hate, I obtain two variables: the replaceability/irreplaceability of the target and the determinacy/indeterminacy of the focus of concern. The combination of these variables generates the four-types model of hate, according to which hate comes in the following kinds: normative, ideological, retributive, and malicious.
Ziel des Lehr-Lern-Projektes war die Schaffung einer kollegialen Arbeitsgemeinschaft zwischen Lehramtsstudierenden der hochschulischen Ausbildungsphase und bereits im Beruf etablierten Lehrkräften im Fachbereich Geschichte. Traditionell hierarchische Strukturen wurden aufgebrochen, um die jeweiligen Kompetenzen der Teilnehmenden für beide Seiten gewinnbringend zu vereinen. Anders als in den hochschulischen Praktika treten Lehramtsstudierende den Lehrkräften mit Expertise gegenüber: Der Austausch ist daher weniger einseitig als vielmehr von doppelseitigem Nutzen. Dieses Konzept bietet im Sinne einer community of practice nicht nur den Lehramtsstudierenden die Chance, ihr theoretisch erworbenes Wissen praxisorientiert anzuwenden und zu reflektieren, sondern ermöglicht auch den Lehrkräften, an den aktuellen geschichtsdidaktischen Forschungen und Entwicklungen an den Hochschulen teilzuhaben und mithilfe der Studierenden in der eigenen Schulpraxis zu reflektieren und gegebenenfalls anzuwenden. Anliegen des Lehr-Lern-Projektes ist ein Plädoyer, das Potenzial der Hochschulen über die eigenen Studierenden im Fortbildungsbereich der Lehrkräfte gewinnbringend zu nutzen, die schulische Reichweite von fachdidaktischer For-schung auszuschöpfen und den Lehramtsstudierenden zugleich eine weitere Möglichkeit einer schulpraktischen Erfahrung zu bieten. Nicht zuletzt: Die Verzahnung von Ausbildungs- und Weiterbildungsphase ist eine weitere gewinnbringende Möglichkeit, Akteur*innen der Lehrer*innenbildung in einen gewinnbringenden und praxisnahen Dialog zu bringen.
Obwohl „materielle Kultur“ ein eher schwach konturiertes Theoriekonzept darstellt und die Relevanz des Materiellen bis heute kontrovers bewertet wird, ist in den letzten fünf Jahrzehnten das Interesse an der Erforschung materieller Kultur deutlich angestiegen. Als „ein Projekt in der Geschichte der Kulturwissenschaften“, das Züge eines travelling concepts trägt, ist materielle Kultur ein Impulsgeber für konzeptuelle und methodologische Innovationen. Zudem vermag sie neue empirische Felder zu erschließen und hat das Potenzial, grundlegende epistemische Probleme wie jenes der Alterität zu überwinden. Der Beitrag skizziert richtungsweisende Entwicklungen der vergangenen Dekaden auf diesem Gebiet und zeigt deren innovative Potenziale an drei konkreten Beispielen: der symmetrischen Anthropologie Bruno Latours, der materialorientierten Herangehensweise Tim Ingolds und dem konsumtheoretischen Ansatz Daniel Millers
Mistrust and social hierarchies as blind spots of ICT4D projects : lessons from Togo and Rwanda
(2019)
Information and communication technologies for development (ICT4D) are seen to have great potential for boosting democratization processes all over the world by giving people access to information and thereby empowering them to demand more accountability and transparency of authorities. Based on ethnographic research in Togo and Rwanda on an SMS-based citizen monitoring and evaluation system, this article argues that focusing on access to information is too narrow a view. We show that it is crucial to take into account the respective socio-political backgrounds, such as levels of mistrust or existing social hierarchies. In this context, mobile phone usage has rather varied and ambiguous meanings here. These dynamics can pose a challenge to the successful implementation of ICT4D projects aimed at political empowerment. By addressing these often overlooked issues, we offer explanations for the gap between ICT4D assumptions and people’s lifeworlds in Togo and Rwanda.
NGO brokers between local needs and global norms: trajectories of development actors in Burkina Faso
(2021)
Local NGO brokers in Africa and beyond negotiate and mediate between (inter)national donors and potential beneficiaries within their communities. They translate local needs into development projects to make them suitable for international donors. This article looks at two main conditions that influence their work: First, windows of opportunity, which open and close according to structures and institutions beyond their sphere of influence; and second, their personality and skills. Based on two case studies from Burkina Faso, this article offers insights into biographies and life stories of such brokers where engagement leads to a distinguished lifestyle that contains aspects of cosmopolitanism and distinctiveness.
NGO brokers between local needs and global norms: trajectories of development actors in Burkina Faso
(2021)
Local NGO brokers in Africa and beyond negotiate and mediate between (inter)national donors and potential beneficiaries within their communities. They translate local needs into development projects to make them suitable for international donors. This article looks at two main conditions that influence their work: First, windows of opportunity, which open and close according to structures and institutions beyond their sphere of influence; and second, their personality and skills. Based on two case studies from Burkina Faso, this article offers insights into biographies and life stories of such brokers where engagement leads to a distinguished lifestyle that contains aspects of cosmopolitanism and distinctiveness.
Ever since Hegel highlighted the difference between morality and ethical life or ‘Sittlichkeit’, philosophical discourse concerning morality and law in the traditions that developed subsequently, up to and including the Frankfurt School, has oscillated between those poles. This paper opens with a short exposition of autonomy as one of the few large-scale innovations in the history of philosophy and proceeds to discuss Hegel's concept of ethical life and the objections that can be raised against it from a Kantian point of view. Political theory, however, has to move beyond pure normativism and consider actual social relations of power, as Marx disclosed. Tracing this winding trajectory from Kant to Marx provides some perspective that may be illuminating concerning present-day challenges.
Adorno führt in seinem Werk der Negativen Dialektik, anhand einer Kant-Kritik, aus, dass Freiheit nur negativ bestimmt werden kann. Dazu bedient dieser sich der Methode der bestimmten Negation. Dieser Ansatz wird auf Nauckes Konzept des negativen Strafrechts übertragen und gezeigt, dass auch Naucke dieses nur negativ bestimmt. Dabei stellt das negative Strafrecht eine Position dar, welche dem affirmativen Strafrecht kritisch gegenübersteht und dieses kontinuierlich hinterfragen und begrenzen soll.