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[I]n its present form, the bibliography contains approximately 1100 entries. Bibliographical work is never complete, and the present one is still modest in a number of respects. It is not annotated, and it still contains a lot of mistakes and inconsistencies. It has nevertheless reached a stage which justifies considering the possibility of making it available to the public. The first step towards this is its pre-publication in the form of this working paper. […]
The bibliography is less complete for earlier years. For works before 1970, the bibliographies of Firbas and Golkova 1975 and Tyl 1970 may be consulted, which have not been included here.
Presupposition
(2007)
The epistemic step
(2005)
The Strongest Meaning Hypothesis (SMH henceforth), a pragmatic principle motivated in Dalrymple et al.'s (1998) study of reciprocals, has recently been applied to problems in implicatures (Chierchia et al. to appear) and Vagueness (Cobreros et al. 2011). In this snippet, I argue that the SMH can apply to embedded sentences, which is perhaps unusual for a pragmatic principle.
This article develops a Gricean account for the computation of scalar implicatures in cases where one scalar term is in the scope of another. It shows that a cross-product of two quantitative scales yields the appropriate scale for many such cases. One exception is cases involving disjunction. For these, I propose an analysis that makes use of a novel, partially ordered quantitative scale for disjunction and capitalizes on the idea that implicatures may have different epistemic status.
Embedded implicatures and experimental constraints : a reply to Geurts & Pouscoulous and Chemla
(2010)
Experimental evidence on embedded implicatures by Chemla (2009b) and Geurts & Pouscoulous (2009a) has fewer theoretical consequences than assumed: On the one hand, the evidence successfully argues against obligatory local implicature computation, which has however already been discredited. On the other hand, the data are fully consistent with optional local implicature computation.
In this paper, I revisit the arguments against the use of fuzzy logic in linguistics (or more generally, against a truth-functional account of vagueness). In part, this is an exercise to explain to fuzzy logicians why linguists have shown little interest in their research paradigm. But, the paper contains more than this interdisciplinary service effort that I started out on: In fact, this seems an opportune time for revisiting the arguments against fuzzy logic in linguistics since three recent developments affect the argument. First, the formal apparatus of fuzzy logic has been made more general since the 1970s, specifically by Hajek [6], and this may make it possible to define operators in a way to make fuzzy logic more suitable for linguistic purposes. Secondly, recent research in philosophy has examined variations of fuzzy logic ([18, 19]). Since the goals of linguistic semantics seem sometimes closer to those of some branches of philosophy of language than they are to the goals of mathematical logic, fuzzy logic work in philosophy may mark the right time to reexamine fuzzy logic from a linguistic perspective as well. Finally, the reasoning used to exclude fuzzy logic in linguistics has been tied to the intuition that p and not p is a contradiction. However, this intuition seems dubious especially when p contains a vague predicate. For instance, one can easily think of circumstances where 'What I did was smart and not smart.' or 'Bea is both tall and not tall.' don’t sound like senseless contradictions. In fact, some recent experimental work that I describe below has shown that contradictions of classical logic aren’t always felt to be contradictory by speakers. So, it is important to see to what extent the argument against fuzzy logic depends on a specific stance on the semantics of contradictions. In sum then, there are three good reasons to take another look at fuzzy logic for linguistic purposes.
Die auf den folgenden Seiten zusammengefasste Diskussion fand am 12. Februar 1969 zwischen den Mitgliedern des Instituts für Kommunikationswissenschaft und Phonetik der Universität Bonn (Leitung Prof. Dr. G. Ungeheuer) und Mitgliedern des Instituts für Sprachwissenschaft der Universität zu Köln (Leitung Prof. Dr. H. Seiler) statt. Es wurden folgende zwei Arbeiten zunächst referiert und der Diskussion zugrundegelegt: D. Wunderlich: Pragmatik, Sprechsituation, Deixis. Universität Stuttgart. Lehrstuhl für Linguistik. Papier Nr. 9, November 1969 ; Cd. Fillmore: Deictic Categories in the Semantics of 'come' FL2 (1965), 219-227. Die Zusammenfassungen dieser Arbeiten sind in das vorliegende Referat nicht aufgenommen worden. Die Redaktion wurde in Köln vorgenommen. Dass dabei Missverständnisse und Verzeichnungen unterlaufen sind, ist wahrscheinlich; die Unterzeichner bitten dafür um Nachsicht. Sie hoffen, dass Inhalt und Ergebnisse der Diskussion dennoch im ganzen wahrheitsgemäss zur Darstellung gekommen sind und dass dieser Bericht als Grundlage für weitere Diskussionen geeignet sein möge.
Ausgangspunkt: Die Kritik am "Zwei-Welten-Modell": Die grundlegende linguistische Unterscheidung zwischen "Sprache" und "Sprechen" ist im Rahmen der neueren Debatten um Sprachmedialität wieder verstärkt thematisiert und kritisiert worden. Lässt sich dieses schulbildende, in der Linguistik geradezu eherne Begriffspaar überhaupt noch sinnvollerweise aufrechterhalten? Oder muss es mindestens umdefiniert, vielleicht sogar gänzlich verworfen werden? Hat sich insbesondere die auf Chomsky zurückgehende Unterscheidung von Sprachkompetenz und -performanz nicht von selbst ad absurdum geführt, nachdem der linguistische Kognitivismus chomskyscher Provenienz Sprache als lebendiges Phänomen, als Medium menschlicher Kommunikation, vollständig aus dem Blick verloren hat? Führt nicht schon die scheinbar harmlose linguistische Differenzierung zwischen einer Sprachregel und ihrer Anwendung zu einer irreführenden und unangemessenen Verdinglichung von Sprache? ...