Enhancing the security of perfect blind DL-signatures
- We enhance the security of Schnorr blind signatures against the novel one-more-forgery of Schnorr [Sc01] andWagner [W02] which is possible even if the discrete logarithm is hard to compute. We show two limitations of this attack. Firstly, replacing the group G by the s-fold direct product G exp(×s) increases the work of the attack, for a given number of signer interactions, to the s-power while increasing the work of the blind signature protocol merely by a factor s. Secondly, we bound the number of additional signatures per signer interaction that can be forged effectively. That fraction of the additional forged signatures can be made arbitrarily small.
Author: | Claus Peter SchnorrGND |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-12083 |
URL: | http://www.mi.informatik.uni-frankfurt.de/research/papers.html |
Document Type: | Preprint |
Language: | English |
Year of Completion: | 2003 |
Year of first Publication: | 2003 |
Publishing Institution: | Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg |
Release Date: | 2005/07/04 |
Note: | Preprint, Dec. 2003 (preliminary version), später in: Information Sciences, 176.2006, S. 1305-1320 |
Source: | Dec. 2003 (preliminary version) submitted for publication, Information Sciences, Bd. 176 (2006), S. 1305-1320 , http://www.mi.informatik.uni-frankfurt.de/research/papers.html |
HeBIS-PPN: | 18889070X |
Institutes: | Informatik und Mathematik / Mathematik |
Informatik und Mathematik / Informatik | |
Dewey Decimal Classification: | 5 Naturwissenschaften und Mathematik / 51 Mathematik / 510 Mathematik |
Licence (German): | Deutsches Urheberrecht |