Enhancing the security of perfect blind DL-signatures

  • We enhance the security of Schnorr blind signatures against the novel one-more-forgery of Schnorr [Sc01] andWagner [W02] which is possible even if the discrete logarithm is hard to compute. We show two limitations of this attack. Firstly, replacing the group G by the s-fold direct product G exp(×s) increases the work of the attack, for a given number of signer interactions, to the s-power while increasing the work of the blind signature protocol merely by a factor s. Secondly, we bound the number of additional signatures per signer interaction that can be forged effectively. That fraction of the additional forged signatures can be made arbitrarily small.

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Author:Claus Peter SchnorrGND
Document Type:Preprint
Year of Completion:2003
Year of first Publication:2003
Publishing Institution:Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Release Date:2005/07/04
Preprint, Dec. 2003 (preliminary version), später in: Information Sciences, 176.2006, S. 1305-1320
Source:Dec. 2003 (preliminary version) submitted for publication, Information Sciences, Bd. 176 (2006), S. 1305-1320 , http://www.mi.informatik.uni-frankfurt.de/research/papers.html
Institutes:Informatik und Mathematik / Mathematik
Informatik und Mathematik / Informatik
Dewey Decimal Classification:5 Naturwissenschaften und Mathematik / 51 Mathematik / 510 Mathematik
Licence (German):License LogoDeutsches Urheberrecht