Strategic transparency and electoral pressure
- This paper investigates how an office-motivated incumbent can use transparency enhancement on public spending to signal his budgetary management ability and win re-election. We show that when the incumbent faces a popular challenger, transparency policy can be an effective signaling device. A more popular challenger can reduce the probability to enhance transparency, while voters can be better off due to a more informative signaling. It is also shown that a higher level of public interest in fiscal issues can increase the probability of enhancing transparency, while voters can be worse off by a less informative signaling.
Author: | Laura Moretti, Toru Suzuki |
---|---|
URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-286340 |
Parent Title (German): | Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 2012,19 |
Series (Serial Number): | CFS working paper series (2012, 19) |
Publisher: | Center for Financial Studies |
Place of publication: | Frankfurt, M. |
Document Type: | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Year of Completion: | 2012 |
Year of first Publication: | 2012 |
Publishing Institution: | Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg |
Release Date: | 2013/02/04 |
Tag: | Electoral Pressure; Fiscal Transparency; Perfect Sequential Equilibrium; Signaling Game |
Issue: | Version 4 December 2012 |
Page Number: | 25 |
HeBIS-PPN: | 328037966 |
Institutes: | Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Center for Financial Studies (CFS) |
Dewey Decimal Classification: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 32 Politikwissenschaft / 320 Politikwissenschaft |
3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft | |
Sammlungen: | Universitätspublikationen |
Licence (German): | Deutsches Urheberrecht |