A remark on the bank cases
- Since their formulation by Keith DeRose (1992), the so-called bank cases have played a major role in the discussion about whether knowledge depends on practical factors. According to the proponents of pragmatic encroachment, the proper conclusion to be drawn from the bank cases and similar examples is that knowledge of a proposition p does not supervene on one’s evidence for or against p. In my view, this conclusion is ill-founded. The reason is that the bank cases and similar examples suffer from an ambiguity concerning the known proposition — an ambiguity that has so far been overlooked. When this ambiguity is made explicit, it becomes clear that the conclusion does not follow.
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| Author: | Wolfgang BarzORCiDGND |
|---|---|
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-696122 |
| DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00501-0 |
| ISSN: | 1874-6349 |
| Parent Title (English): | Acta analytica |
| Publisher: | Springer |
| Place of publication: | Dordrecht |
| Document Type: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Date of Publication (online): | 2021/12/08 |
| Date of first Publication: | 2021/12/08 |
| Publishing Institution: | Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg |
| Release Date: | 2023/10/23 |
| Volume: | 37 |
| Issue: | 4 |
| Page Number: | 11 |
| First Page: | 519 |
| Last Page: | 529 |
| Note: | Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL. |
| HeBIS-PPN: | 514459603 |
| Institutes: | Philosophie und Geschichtswissenschaften |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 1 Philosophie und Psychologie / 10 Philosophie / 100 Philosophie und Psychologie |
| Sammlungen: | Universitätspublikationen |
| Licence (German): |  Creative Commons - CC BY - Namensnennung 4.0 International |
