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This paper examines and rejects two normative justifications for low-fee private schools (LFPS), whose expansion throughout the Global South in recent years has been significant. The first justification – what I shall call the ideal thesis – contends that LFPS are the best mechanism to expand access to quality education, particularly at the primary level, and that the premise of their success is that they reject educational equality and state intervention in educational affairs, traditionally associated with public schools, embracing instead educational adequacy and unregulated markets for education. Against this thesis, the paper argues that an ideal educational arrangement must not do away with educational equality and some degree of state interference. The other justification for LFPS – the secondbest thesis – contends that although LFPS do not represent the ideal state of affairs, they nonetheless bring us a step closer to the ideal of universal primary education; they are a ‘realistic’ approximation to that goal. Against the second-best thesis, the paper argues that this justification commits the approximation fallacy: by deviating from the ideal educational arrangement LFPS may obstruct rather than facilitate its achievement.
This contribution develops a defence of a universalist conception of Global Citizenship Education (GCE) against three prominent critiques, which are, among others, put forward by postcolonial scholars. The first critique argues that GCE is essentially a project of globally minded elites and therefore expressive both of global educational injustices and of the values and lifestyles of a particular class or milieu. The second critique assumes that GCE is based on genuinely ‘Western values’ (e.g., in the form of a conception of human rights or conceptions of rationality or the self), which are neither universally accepted nor universally valid and therefore unjustly forced on members of non-Western cultures and societies. GCE, according to this critique, is assumed to be another version of the educational justification of a hegemonic and unjust global Western regime. The third critique focuses on the epistemological preconditions of GCE. It assumes that GCE relies on a particular, culturally embedded ‘Western epistemology,’ which perpetuates historically grown global educational and epistemic injustices by dominating and subjugating alternative epistemological approaches. With respect to the first critique I argue that it is to a certain extent sociologically plausible, but wrong when it is applied to the educational and political legitimacy of GCE. The second critique overestimates the consensus within the ‘Western tradition’ and underestimates the transnational dissemination of universalist ideals and values as well as its own reliance on universalist validity claims. I argue that in order to provide a plausible criticism of historically grown global educational and political injustices, it is imperative for GCE to integrate central insights provided by the postcolonial critique, without giving up on universalist ideals and values. The third critique is, according to my argumentation, based on flawed epistemological assumptions, which do not withstand critical scrutiny. Instead of identifying epistemic and scientific claims as the expressions of a particular ‘culture’ or geographical location (the ‘West’), I defend the position that philosophical and scientific research should ideally be conceived as a democratic and universalist project, whose emancipatory potential can only be realized on the basis of a universalist epistemology.
This paper explores how University as social entity has great potential to confront epistemic injustices by expanding epistemic capabilities. To do this, we primarily follow the contributions of scholars such as Miranda Fricker and José Medina. The epistemic capabilities and epistemic injustice nexus will be explored via two empirical cases: the first one is an experience developed in Lagos (Nigeria) using participatory video; the second is a service learning pedagogical strategy for final year undergraduate students conducted at Universidad de Ibagué (in Colombia). The Lagos experience shows how participatory action-research methodologies could promote epistemic capabilities and functioning, making it possible for the participants to generate interpretive materials to speak of their own realities. However, this experience is too limited to address testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. The Colombian experience is a remarkable experience that is building epistemic capabilities among students and other local participants. However, there is a hermeneutical and structural injustice that tends to give more value to disciplinary and codified knowledge at the expense of experiential and tacit knowledge.
Investigation of co-translational protein folding using cryo-EM and solid-state NMR enhanced by DNP
(2020)
Die zelluläre Proteinbiosynthese findet am Peptidyltransferase-Zentrum innerhalb der großen ribosomalen Untereinheit statt. Die neu synthetisierte Polypeptidkette passiert den ribosomalen Exit-Tunnel, der 80-100 Å lang und 10-20 Å breit ist. Proteinfaltung findet kotranslational statt, während die Peptidkette durch den ribosomalen Tunnel geschleust wird. Zu welchem Ausmaß die Proteine ihre native Struktur noch am Ribosom gebunden annehmen, steht im Fokus aktueller Studien. Verschiedene Methoden, die naszierende Proteinkette am Ribosom zu arretieren und die Faltung des Proteins untersuchen zu können, wurden entwickelt. Zur Herstellung von Ribosom naszierenden Proteinkomplexen (RNCs) in vivo werden Arrestierungspeptide (APs) verwendet. Ein oft genutztes AP ist die 17 Aminosäuren lange SecM Sequenz des E. coli Sekretionsmonitors, das C-Terminal an das zu untersuchende Protein kloniert werden kann und dadurch die Peptidkette am Ribosom behält. RNCs wurden mittels verschiedener Methoden untersucht, einschließlich Proteolyse-Experimenten, enzymatischen Aktivitätsmessungen, FRET, Cryo-EM und NMR-Spektroskopie. Alle Methoden zeigten auf, dass sich die Proteine kotranslational falten und auch am Ribosom eine funktionale Struktur annehmen können. Außerdem konnte eine Peptidkette eine α-Helix innerhalb des Ribosoms ausbilden. Ebenso wurden nicht-native kompakte Strukturen innerhalb der Vestibule detektiert.
Die Translation ist ein nicht-uniformer Prozess und der genetische Code degeneriert mit bis zu sechs Codons, die eine einzelne Aminosäure kodieren. Die Verteilung dieser synonymen Codons ist nicht zufällig und sie werden mit verschiedenen Frequenzen innerhalb eines ORFs verwendet. Codons mit einer höheren tRNA Häufigkeit werden schneller eingebaut als Codons, die seltener verwendet werden. Diese seltenen Codons sind häufig zwischen Proteindomänen oder Sekundärstrukturelementen platziert und könnten daher zur Separierung von Faltungsevents dienen. Dass der Austausch von synonymen Codons nicht ohne Folgen ist, zeigten verschiedene Studien. Buhr et al. (2016) zeigte, dass der synonyme Austausch die Translationsgeschwindigkeit, aber auch die Proteinkonformation des bovinen Augenlinsenproteins γB crystallin (GBC) beeinflusst. Während die unmodifizierte Gensequenz aus B. taurus in E. coli langsamer translatiert wurde und zu einem vollständig reduzierten GBC Protein (U) führte, wurde die harmonisierte Genvariante, die der Codon-Verwendung in E. coli angepasst war, schneller exprimiert und resultierte in einem teilweise oxidierten GBC Protein (H). Dieser Befund war der Ausgangspunkt für diese Doktorarbeit.
Die gemessenen Oxidationsunterschiede basieren auf der unterschiedlichen Translationsgeschwindigkeit der beiden Gensequenzen. Die N-terminale Domäne (NTD) des Zweidomänen-Proteins GBC enthält sechs der insgesamt sieben Cysteinreste. Nur in dieser Domäne wurde Oxidation detektiert und die drei Cysteine Cys18, Cys22 und Cys78 bilden eine Ansammlung mit einem Abstand von 5.4-6.4 Å. Um zu untersuchen, ob die Unterschiede bereits nach der Translation der NTD ausgebildet werden, wurde ein Ein-Domänen-Konstrukt hergestellt. Dieses Konstrukt beinhaltete die Aminosäuren 1-82, aber nicht den Peptidlinker, der beide Domänen verbindet. Allerdings wurden bei der Translation der ersten 70 Aminosäuren die meisten Translationspausen detektiert. Das 2D 1H-15N HSQC wies anhand der unterschiedlichen chemischen Verschiebung der Signale auf eine gefaltete Proteinstruktur hin. Daher konnte sich die NTD ohne Beteiligung der CTD eigenständig falten. Zugabe von DTT zu beiden Proteinvarianten U und H führte zu keinem messbaren Effekt. Im Gegensatz zu dem Volllängen-Protein, in dem die Variante H teilweise oxidiert war, war die NTD der Variante H vollständig reduziert.
Zusätzlich sollte geklärt werden, ob auch mögliche Disulfidbrücken im Inneren des Ribosoms ausgebildet werden können. Dann könnte in beiden Genvarianten eine anfängliche Disulfidbrücke ausgebildet werden und durch die unterschiedliche Translationsgeschwindigkeit die Disulfidbrücke in der langsamen Genvariante im E. coli Zytosol reduziert werden, während diese in der schneller translatierten Variante von der CTD geschützt wird. Um zu untersuchen, ob in der Tat Disulfidbrücken im ribosomalen Tunnel ausgebildet werden können, wurden GBC-Fragmente mittels der SecM Sequenz an das Ribosom arretiert und diese RNCs mittels theoretischer Simulation, Festkörper-NMR, Massenspektrometrie und Cryo-EM gemessen.
Theoretische Simulation mittels flexible-mecanno zeigten, dass der ribosomale Tunnel groß genug für die Ausbildung verschiedenster Disulfidbrücken ist. In einem U32SecM Konstrukt, das vier Cysteine und die SecM Sequenz beinhaltet, konnten alle theoretisch möglichen Disulfidbrücken gebildet werden.
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This paper addresses the phenomenon of climate-induced displacement. I argue that there is scope for an account of asylum as compensation owed to those displaced by the impacts of climate change which needs only to appeal to minimal normative commitments about the requirements of global justice. I demonstrate the possibility of such an approach through an examination of the work of David Miller. Miller is taken as an exemplar of a broadly ‘international libertarian’ approach to global justice, and his work is a useful vehicle for this project because he has an established view about both responsibility for climate change and about the state’s right to exclude would-be immigrants. In the course of the argument, I set out the relevant aspects of Miller’s views, reconstruct an account of responsibility for the harms faced by climate migrants which is consistent with Miller’s views, and demonstrate why such an account yields an obligation to provide asylum as a form of compensation to ‘climate migrants.’
This paper discusses two possible difficulties with Catherine Lu’s powerful analysis of the moral response to our shared history of colonial evil; both of these difficulties stem from the rightful place of shame in that moral response. The first difficulty focuses on efficacy: existing states may be better motivated by shame at the past than by a shared duty to bring about a just future. The second focuses on equity: it is, at the very least, possible that shame over past misdeeds ought to be brought into the conversation about present duties, in a manner more robust than Lu’s analysis allows.
In Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics Catherine Lu endorses the idea that those who contribute to the reproduction of structural injustice have responsibilities to address that injustice (Lu, 2017). However, in the book, Lu does not explore the grounds and justification for recognising such a responsibility. In order to address this deficit, this paper proposes that those likely to contribute to the reproduction of structural injustice, in the future, have precautionary duties, in the present, that require them to take action aimed at preventing their future contribution. It is proposed that these ‘collectivization duties’ (Collins, 2013) require them to act responsively with a view to forming a collective that can end the structural injustice in question. This account recommends a collective-action solution alongside recognising that each socially connected agent is obliged to act. However, it does not entail that amorphous groups bear responsibilities and is appropriate in its attribution of blame, thus avoiding both Nussbaum’s (2011) critique of perpetually forward-looking accounts and the ‘agency objection’ (Wringe, 2010).
This article analyzes and criticizes the temporal orientation of Catherine Lu’s theory of colonial redress in Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics. Lu argues that colonial historic injustice can, with few exceptions, justify special reparative measures only if these past injustices still contribute to structural injustice in contemporary social relations. Focusing on Indigenous peoples, I argue that the structural injustice approach can and should incorporate further backward looking elements. First, I examine how Lu’s account has backward-looking elements not present in other structural injustice accounts. Second, I suggest how the structural injustice approach could include additional backward-looking features. I presuppose here, with Lu, that all agents connected to an unjust social structure have a forwardlooking political responsibility to reform this structure, regardless of their relation (or lack thereof) to victims or perpetrators of historic injustice. However, I suggest that agents with connections to historic injustice can occupy a social position that makes them differently situated than other agents within that same structure, leading to differences in how these agents should discharge their forward-looking responsibility and differentiated liability for failure to do so. Third, I argue that Lu obscures the importance of rectifying material dispossession. Reparations, pace Lu, can be justified beyond a minimum threshold of disadvantage. Theorists of settler colonialism and Indigenous scholars show how the dispossession of Indigenous land can be seen as a structure that has not yet ended. I conclude by arguing that rectification can be a precondition for genuine reconciliation.
Structural alienation: Lu's structural approach to reconciliation from within a relational framework
(2019)
In Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics Catherine Lu argues that structural reconciliation, rather than interactional reconciliation, ought to be the primary normative goal for political reconciliation efforts. I suggest that we might have good reason to want to retain relational approaches – such as that of Linda Radzik – as the primary focus of reconciliatory efforts, but that Lu’s approach is invaluable for identifying the parties who ought to bear responsibility for those efforts in cases of structural injustice. First, I outline Lu’s analysis of reconciliation, where she argues for the normative priority of structural approaches within the global political sphere, and propose that it will be useful to identify whether or not a relational account could instead identify underlying structural injustices. Second, I examine one particular relational account of reconciliation (based on Radzik’s account of atonement) and argue that this type of account brings to light underlying structural injustices of the kind Lu is concerned with. Finally, I identify an issue for relational accounts in identifying relevant responsible parties for reconciliation before returning to Lu’s structural account to address this gap.
Traditionally, in deciding whether some strategy or action in war is proportionate and necessary and thus permissible both international law and just war theory focus exclusively on civilian deaths and the destruction of civilian infrastructure. I argue in this paper that any argument that can explain why we should care about collateral killing and damage to infrastructure can also explain why collateral displacement matters. I argue that displacement is a foreseeable near-proximate cause of lethal harm to civilians and is relevant for proportionality and necessity calculi. Accepting my argument has significant consequences for what we are permitted to do in war and for what obligations we have towards refugees that result from our actions in war.
Moral refugee markets
(2018)
States are increasingly paying other states to host refugees. For example, in 2010 the EU paid Libya €50 million to continue hosting the refugees within its borders, and five years later Australia offered Cambodia $31.16 million to accept asylum seekers living in Naru. These exchanges, which I call ‘refugees markets,’ have faced criticism by philosophers. Some philosophers claim the markets fail to ensure true protection, and are demeaning, expressing just how much refugees are unwanted. In response, some have defended refugee markets, claiming they can ensure refugees have protection and are not demeaned. I argue that many markets do demean refugees, and therefore have moral costs, but can still be all-things-considered preferable to alternative schemes if they protect refugees more than these alternative schemes.