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The terminator of social welfare? : The economic consequences of algorithmic discrimination

  • Using experimental data from a comprehensive field study, we explore the causal effects of algorithmic discrimination on economic efficiency and social welfare. We harness economic, game-theoretic, and state-of-the-art machine learning concepts allowing us to overcome the central challenge of missing counterfactuals, which generally impedes assessing economic downstream consequences of algorithmic discrimination. This way, we are able to precisely quantify downstream efficiency and welfare ramifications, which provides us a unique opportunity to assess whether the introduction of an AI system is actually desirable. Our results highlight that AI systems’ capabilities in enhancing welfare critically depends on the degree of inherent algorithmic biases. While an unbiased system in our setting outperforms humans and creates substantial welfare gains, the positive impact steadily decreases and ultimately reverses the more biased an AI system becomes. We show that this relation is particularly concerning in selective-labels environments, i.e., settings where outcomes are only observed if decision-makers take a particular action so that the data is selectively labeled, because commonly used technical performance metrics like the precision measure are prone to be deceptive. Finally, our results depict that continued learning, by creating feedback loops, can remedy algorithmic discrimination and associated negative effects over time.

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Metadaten
Verfasserangaben:Kevin BauerORCiDGND, Nicolas PfeufferORCiDGND, Benjamin M. Abdel-KarimORCiDGND, Oliver HinzORCiDGND, Michael KosfeldORCiDGND
URN:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-552357
DOI:https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3675313
Titel des übergeordneten Werkes (Englisch):SAFE working paper series ; No. 287
Schriftenreihe (Bandnummer):SAFE working paper (287)
Verlag:SAFE
Verlagsort:Frankfurt am Main
Dokumentart:Arbeitspapier
Sprache:Englisch
Jahr der Fertigstellung:2020
Jahr der Erstveröffentlichung:2020
Veröffentlichende Institution:Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Datum der Freischaltung:15.09.2020
Freies Schlagwort / Tag:Algorithmic Discrimination; Artificial Intelligence; Batch Learning; Economics; Game Theory
Seitenzahl:64
HeBIS-PPN:470270543
Institute:Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / House of Finance (HoF)
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE)
DDC-Klassifikation:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
Sammlungen:Universitätspublikationen
Lizenz (Deutsch):License LogoDeutsches Urheberrecht