Interbank network and bank bailouts: Insurance mechanism for non-insured creditors? : [Version 20 Februar 2013]

  • This paper presents a theory that explains why it is beneficial for banks to engage in circular lending activities on the interbank market. Using a simple network structure, it shows that if there is a non-zero bailout probability, banks can significantly increase the expected repayment of uninsured creditors by entering into cyclical liabilities on the interbank market before investing in loan portfolios. Therefore, banks are better able to attract funds from uninsured creditors. Our results show that implicit government guarantees incentivize banks to have large interbank exposures, to be highly interconnected, and to invest in highly correlated, risky portfolios. This can serve as an explanation for the observed high interconnectedness between banks and their investment behavior in the run-up to the subprime mortgage crisis.

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Author:Tim Eisert, Christian Eufinger
Parent Title (German):SAFE working paper series ; No. 10
Series (Serial Number):SAFE working paper (10)
Publisher:Goethe-Univ., House of Finance, Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, SAFE
Place of publication:Frankfurt am Main
Document Type:Working Paper
Year of Completion:2013
Year of first Publication:2013
Publishing Institution:Universit├Ątsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Release Date:2013/04/18
Tag:bailout; cycle flows; cyclical liabilities; interbank network; leverage
Issue:Version 20 Februar 2013
Page Number:46
Institutes:Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / House of Finance (HoF)
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
Dewey Decimal Classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
Licence (German):License LogoDeutsches Urheberrecht