Bargaining with a bank

  • This paper examines bargaining as a mechanism to resolve information problems. To guide the analysis, I develop a parsimonious model of a credit negotiation between a bank and firms with varying levels of impatience. In equilibrium, impatient firms accept the bank’s offer immediately, while patient firms wait and negotiate price adjustments. I test the empirical predictions using a hand-collected dataset on credit line negotiations. Firms signing the bank’s offer right away draw down their line of credit after origination and default more than late signers. Late signers negotiate price adjustments more frequently, and, consistent with the model, these adjustments predict better ex post performance.

Download full text files

Export metadata

Additional Services

Share in Twitter Search Google Scholar
Metadaten
Author:Thomas Mosk
URN:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-466774
URL:https://ssrn.com/abstract=3186111
Parent Title (English):SAFE working paper series ; No. 211
Series (Serial Number):SAFE working paper series (211)
Publisher:SAFE
Place of publication:Frankfurt am Main
Document Type:Working Paper
Language:English
Year of Completion:2018
Year of first Publication:2018
Publishing Institution:Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Release Date:2018/06/12
Tag:Bargaining; Contract terms; Credit lines; Screening
Issue:This version: January 2018
Page Number:62
HeBIS-PPN:433319879
Institutes:Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / House of Finance (HoF)
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE)
Dewey Decimal Classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
Sammlungen:Universitätspublikationen
Licence (German):License LogoDeutsches Urheberrecht